Maness v. District Court of Logan County-Northern Division

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

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No. 06-1909

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Richard Stanley Maness, *

*

Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Western District of Arkansas.

District Court Of Logan County- *

Northern Division; Paula McCaully, * [PUBLISHED]

District Court Clerk; Judge David R. *

Cravens, District Court Judge; *

Amanda Roberts, District Court Clerk; *

Judge Paul X. Williams, District Court *

Judge; Logan County Circuit Clerk; *

Judge Paul Danielson, Logan County *

Circuit Judge; David McCormick, *

Logan County Circuit Judge; Terry *

Sullivan, Logan County Circuit Judge; *

Everly Kellar, Logan County Circuit *

and Chancery Clerk; Kevin Barham, *

Paris City Prosecutor, *

*

Appellees. *

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Submitted: March 7, 2007

Filed: August 13, 2007

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Before RILEY, HANSEN, and MELLOY, Circuit Judges.

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PER CURIAM.

Richard Maness appeals the district court’s 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)

preservice dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action. As relevant, the magistrate judge

recommended dismissal based upon immunity, and the district court adopted the

magistrate judge’s report. Upon de novo review, see Moore v. Sims, 200 F.3d 1170,

1171 (8th Cir. 2000) (per curiam), we affirm.

Maness alleged that Logan County District Court Judge Paul X. Williams

improperly refused his request to continue his state-court trial, refused to hear

evidence of Maness’s factual innocence, and convicted him; and that City Prosecutor

Kevin Barham failed to present any evidence against him. Maness also alleged that

Logan County Circuit Court Clerk Everly Kellar refused to file his appeal for lack of

a filing fee, and refused his repeated requests to present his application to proceed in

forma pauperis (IFP) to a circuit court judge. According to correspondence between

Kellar and Maness, an order from a circuit judge granting IFP status was required to

perfect the appeal. As a result of Kellar’s alleged refusal to present the IFP

application, Maness’s appeal was dismissed. Maness sought damages and an order

vacating his conviction and fine.

Initially, we note that Maness conceded in his objections to the magistrate

judge’s report that Judge Williams, Prosecutor Barham, and Court Clerk Kellar are the

only proper defendants in this case; and we note as well that Maness’s request to

vacate his conviction is cognizable only in a habeas corpus action, see Preiser v.

Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 489-90 (1973). We agree with the district court that Judge

Williams and Prosecutor Barham enjoyed absolute immunity. See Mireles v. Waco,

502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991) (per curiam) (judges are immune from suit unless actions were

nonjudicial in nature or taken in complete absence of all jurisdiction); Brodnicki v.

City of Omaha, 75 F.3d 1261, 1266 (8th Cir. 1996) (prosecutor is entitled to absolute

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immunity when acting as advocate for state in criminal prosecution; immunity covers

initiation and pursuit of criminal prosecution).

A different analysis is used to assess any immunity from suit Clerk Kellar may

have. As to absolute quasi-judicial immunity, there is no suggestion in the record that

Kellar’s alleged refusal to present Maness’s IFP application to a circuit judge was

discretionary rather than ministerial. See Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc., 508

U.S. 429, 436-37 (1993) (when judicial immunity is extended to officials other than

judges, it is because they exercise discretionary judgment as part of their function;

functional approach does not require that absolute immunity be extended to court

personnel simply because they are “part of judicial function”; holding that court

reporters do not enjoy immunity because they have no discretion in carrying out

statutory duties); Snyder v. Nolen, 380 F.3d 279, 286-289, 291 (7th Cir. 2004) (per

curiam) (clerk of court who allegedly refused to file inmate’s pleadings was not acting

in “functionally comparable” way to judge and breached duty to perform ministerial

act of accepting technically sufficient papers; clerk did not enjoy absolute quasi-

judicial immunity); cf. McCullough v. Horton, 69 F.3d 918, 919 (8th Cir. 1995) (per

curiam) (court clerk’s failure to provide transcript as ordered by court was not clearly

discretionary act entitling clerk to immunity). Thus, Kellar was not shielded by

absolute quasi-judicial immunity.

However, we conclude that Kellar is shielded by qualified immunity. "Qualified

immunity protects state actors from civil liability when their conduct does not violate

clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person

would have known." Kahle v. Leonard, 477 F.3d 544, 549 (8th Cir. 2007) (internal

marks omitted). We must ask and answer two questions when a defense of qualified

immunity is raised by a state actor: (1) whether or not the state actor deprived the

complainant of a constitutional or statutory right, and (2) if there was a deprivation of

such a right, whether or not the right was clearly established such that a reasonable

person would have realized that his or her actions were unlawful. Id. at 550. If the

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answer to the first question is no then the § 1983 claim fails, and if the answer to the

second question is no, the state actor is protected by qualified immunity. Id.

In this instance, Maness's claim of access to the courts fails because he cannot

show actual injury or prejudice based on Clerk Keller's ministerial decision to not

present his petition to a judge. See Johnston v. Hamilton, 452 F.3d 967, 973 (8th Cir.

2006) ("To sustain his claim based on denial of access to . . . the court, [he] must

prove that he suffered an actual injury or prejudice as a result of the alleged denial of

access."). We reach this conclusion for two reasons. First, the Arkansas state courts

have made it clear that the responsibility for perfecting an appeal rests on the appellant

in total, Sullivan v. Arkansas, 784 S.W. 2d 155, 156 (Ark. 1990) (per curiam), and

that placing blame on the clerk does not excuse an appellant's failure to do so, Raynor

v. Arkansas, No. CR 06-655, 2006 WL 1781500 at *1 (Ark. June 29, 2006)

(unpublished) (holding that petitioner's claim that he failed to timely file a notice of

appeal because the circuit clerk did not respond to his questions concerning requests

to proceed in forma pauperis was not a showing of good cause for delay in perfecting

the appeal); Phelps v. Arkansas, No. CR 92-1160, 1992 WL 392727 at *1 (Ark. Dec.

21, 1992) (unpublished) (stating that it was not the duty of the clerk to perfect an

appeal and that "[p]etitioner's contention that his failure to tender the record was

caused by the circuit clerk . . . does not excuse him of his responsibility to have either

tendered the record to this court within ninety days or sought by proper motion an

extension of time to lodge the record").

Secondly, we agree with Judge Easterbrook's reasoning in Snyder v. Nolen, and

find that Maness has not stated a claim for violation of his right to access to the courts.

380 F.3d at 292-93 (writing that no claim for access to the courts was stated based

upon the fact that the appellant could have appealed the clerk's refusal of his petition

within the state system but failed to take advantage of the remedies available to him).

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Based on Arkansas law that places the responsibility for perfecting an appeal

on the appellant and Maness's apparent failure to pursue any sort of relief in the state

courts before filing the federal claim, we find no violation of Maness's constitutional

right of access to the courts.

Accordingly, we affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment to all

three defendants.

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