Jodie Smook v. Minnehaha County

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 05-1363

___________

Jodie Smook, individually and on *

behalf of all other persons similarly *

situated, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* District of South Dakota.

Minnehaha County, South Dakota; Jim *

Banbury, in his individual capacity; *

Todd Cheever, as Director of *

Minnehaha County Juvenile Detention *

Center, *

*

Appellants. *

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Submitted: December 14, 2005

Filed: August 9, 2006

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Before MELLOY, COLLOTON, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

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COLLOTON, Circuit Judge.

Jodie Smook filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, “individually and

behalf of all other persons similarly situated,” alleging, among other things, that the

policy of the Minnehaha, South Dakota, County Juvenile Detention Center (“JDC”)

to “strip search[] minors without probable cause” was unconstitutional. The

complaint sought damages and injunctive relief. After granting Smook’s motion for

class certification, the district court denied the defendants’ motions for summary

judgment on the search claims, and granted the plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary

judgment on those claims. Defendants Jim Banbury and Todd Cheever, directors of

the JDC, appeal the district court’s denial of qualified immunity, and Minnehaha

County also appeals the court’s denial of its motion for summary judgment. We

reverse and remand.

I.

Smook’s complaint alleged that on August 8, 1999, when she was 16 years old,

she and three minor friends were arrested by the Sioux Falls City Police Department

after 11:00 p.m. for violating local curfew laws. All four juveniles were transported

to the JDC. Smook alleged that as part of the admission process at the detention

center, she and each of her friends were taken into a bathroom and “strip searched”

by JDC personnel. (Complaint, R. Doc. No. 1, at 3-4). In her complaint, Smook

asserted that the institution’s search policy or practice was a violation of her right

against unreasonable search and seizure under the Fourth and Fourteenth

Amendments.

The district court certified two classes of plaintiffs who:

when they [were] under the age of eighteen years, were charged with

minor offenses from November 1, 1997 to a date to be set by the Court

or were charged with non-felony offenses from April 16, 1999 to a date

to be set by the Court, and were, pursuant to JDC policy, strip searched

at the Minnehaha County Juvenile Detention Center.

(R. Doc. Nos. 42, 78). One class was defined as individuals in this category seeking

injunctive relief; the other encompassed individuals seeking compensatory and

punitive damages. The court further defined “minor offenses” to include petty theft,

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liquor violations, being a runaway, and curfew violations, and defined “non-felony

offenses” to include a litany of other specific non-violent offenses, such as truancy,

tobacco, contempt of court, disturbance of school, and damage to public and private

property.1

According to the written admission policy in effect at the time of Smook’s

arrest in 1999, when juveniles arrived at the JDC for admission, staff members were

to take them to an intake area, to ask them to remove their personal items, and then to

conduct an interview while an admission form was filled out. A photograph was to

be taken, and the juvenile was to be given a wristband identification bracelet. The

policy then called for the juvenile to take a shower, during which time a detention

officer was to conduct a visual inspection of the person’s body and a manual search

of the person’s clothes, including pockets and linings. The policy dictated that

searches should “only be conducted by members of the same sex” and that “[t]he

juvenile is not touched throughout this procedure.” (Appellees’ App. at 60).

It is undisputed, however, that when Smook was admitted to the JDC, she was

not required to take a shower or to disrobe completely. Rather, she was required to

remove her outer clothing so that it could be searched, but she remained clothed in her

undergarments in a private room with a female staff member. One female JDC

official testified that she did not recall ever asking a juvenile to remove her

undergarments, because “you can pretty much see what’s there when they’re in

undergarments.” (Appellants’ App. at 4). Banbury testified to his belief that some

1

Smook’s complaint also alleged that she was asked questions about her

religious beliefs and practices and “ordered to answer those questions.” (Complaint,

R. Doc. No. 1, at 4). She alleged that these questions invaded her privacy and

impinged upon her rights to free exercise of religion and freedom of association under

the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The district court certified two other classes

of plaintiffs in connection with these claims, but the claims were later dismissed, and

they are not at issue on this appeal.

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staff were performing searches as described in the written policy, while others were

not. (Appellees’ App. at 152).

In September 1999, the JDC admissions policy was revised. One revision

provides that when juveniles are arrested on minor charges or detained as children in

need of supervision, the detention officials shall attempt for two hours to contact a

parent, and if the parent agrees to pick up the minor, then the minor may not be

searched or admitted to the secure area of the facility. In addition, the JDC modified

the shower area by installing a screen that shields from view all but the head, neck,

and lower leg area of a showering youth’s body. In response to a state law passed in

2000, which provides that “[n]o person under the age of eighteen detained solely for

a curfew violation may be strip-searched,” S.D. Codified Laws § 26-11-1.1, the JDC

also modified its policy to disallow strip searches of such juveniles, unless the

detention officer first fills out a “probable cause” form indicating why the search is

warranted.

After discovery, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing

that strip searches of juveniles who were admitted to the facility was a reasonable

administrative procedure, and further asserting that even if the searches were not

constitutional, the defendant directors of the JDC were entitled to qualified immunity.

The plaintiffs also filed a motion for summary judgment on their Fourth Amendment

claim, arguing that the undisputed facts established that the policy of strip-searching

all juveniles without individualized suspicion was a violation of clearly established

constitutional law.

The district court denied the defendants’ motions for summary judgment. The

court concluded that the JDC’s written search policy in effect in August 1999 was

unconstitutional and that the subsequent changes to the policy did not cure the

constitutional defects. (Mem. Op. and Order, R. Doc. No. 116, at 11). The court also

concluded that the search of Smook in August 1999 violated her constitutional rights.

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(Id. at 14). The court further held that Banbury and Cheever were not entitled to

qualified immunity because it was “clearly established for several years” prior to the

time of the alleged violations that the Fourth Amendment prohibited “the kinds of

searches of which Plaintiff and the class complain.” (Id. at 15).

The district court then granted partial summary judgment for the plaintiffs on

the Fourth Amendment claim. The court identified three remaining issues relating to

these claims: “(1) what type of injunctive relief is appropriate in this case; (2) what

amount of monetary damages are appropriate and how should the class members’

damages be determined; (3) what should the ending date be for membership in the

first two classes certified by the Court.” (Id. at 18).

After the district court entered its order, the defendants filed a motion to

reconsider based on a decision of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, N.G.

v. Connecticut, 382 F.3d 225 (2d Cir. 2004), which was filed shortly before the district

court granted partial summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. The court in N.G.

held that the disrobing and visual inspection of two juveniles upon their admission to

a detention facility was not a violation of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 237. The

defendants here argued that the N.G. decision supported the constitutionality of the

JDC policy, and at least demonstrated that the institution’s search policy did not

violate clearly established rights in 1999. (Defs.’ Mot. for Recons., R. Doc. No. 130,

at 11-12). On reconsideration, however, the district court reiterated its holding that

the searches violated the constitutional rights of the minors, and that the law was

clearly established prior to the searches at issue. (Mem. Op. and Order, R. Doc. No.

140, at 12; Add. at 12).

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II.

A.

We begin with the damages claim of the named plaintiff and class

representative, Jodie Smook. The district court concluded that the search of Smook

upon initial admission to the JDC, which required her to remove her outer clothing but

not her undergarments, was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. The

individual appellants, Banbury and Cheever, contend that the search was reasonable

and, alternatively, that even if the search was unreasonable, the law was not clearly

established on that point as of August 1999.

The Fourth Amendment proscribes “unreasonable” searches, and “[t]he test of

reasonableness . . . requires a balancing of the need for the particular search against

the invasion of personal rights that the search entails.” Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520,

559 (1979). “A search unsupported by probable cause may be reasonable when

special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and

probable-cause requirement impracticable.” Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 829

(2002) (internal quotations omitted). To determine whether a “special needs”

situation justifies a search without individualized suspicion, a court must undertake

“a fact-specific balancing of the intrusion . . . against the promotion of legitimate

governmental interests.” Id. at 830.

The most apposite precedent is the Second Circuit’s recent opinion in N.G. v.

Connecticut, where the court applied the foregoing principles to a strip search of

juveniles upon initial admission to a detention facility. Judge Newman’s opinion for

the panel acknowledged that the circuits uniformly have held that adults held for

minor offenses may not be strip searched without reasonable suspicion that they

possess contraband. 382 F.3d at 232; see Jones v. Edwards, 770 F.2d 739, 741-42

(8th Cir. 1985). The Second Circuit concluded, however, that “[s]trip searches of

children pose the reasonableness inquiry in a context where both the interests

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supporting and opposing such searches appear to be greater than with searches of

adults confined for minor offenses.” N.G., 382 F.3d at 232. The State has a greater

interest in conducting such a search, because “[w]here the state is exercising some

legitimate custodial authority over children, its responsibility to act in the place of

parents (in loco parentis) obliges it to take special care to protect those in its charge,

and that protection must be concerned with dangers from others and self-inflicted

harm.” Id. The juvenile’s interest in privacy is greater than an adult’s, the court

thought, because “the adverse psychological effect of a strip search is likely to be

more severe upon a child than an adult, especially a child who has been the victim of

sexual abuse.” Id.

After finding no prior appellate decision concerning the reasonableness of strip

searches of juveniles in lawful state custody, the Second Circuit tallied the State’s

legitimate interests in performing such searches: (1) the State has “an enhanced

responsibility to take reasonable action to protect [children] from hazards resulting

from the presence of contraband where children are confined”; (2) a strip search

serves “the protective function of locating and removing concealed items that could

be used for self-mutilation or even suicide”; and (3) a strip search may “disclose

evidence of abuse that occurred in the home, and awareness of such abuse can assist

juvenile authorities in structuring an appropriate plan of care.” Id. at 236. Then

assessing the risks to the well-being of the juveniles and institutional safety from not

conducting the searches as compared to the risks to the psychological health of the

children from performing the searches, the court held that “strip searches upon initial

admission do not violate Fourth Amendment standards.” Id. at 237. A dissenting

judge concluded that the strip searches were unconstitutional because the State had

failed to demonstrate a “close and substantial relationship” of the invasive strip

searches to a legitimate governmental need. Id. at 242 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).

Smook’s constitutional claim is not as strong as that of the juveniles in N.G.,

because she was not subjected to a full strip search. She was taken to a private

restroom by a female staff person, who explained that she would search Smook’s

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clothes for drugs, drug paraphernalia, and weapons. The staff person directed Smook

to remove her shorts, t-shirt, and sandals, and then turned the clothes inside-out,

pulled the pockets inside-out, and looked through the sandals to ensure that they did

not have a false bottom. (Appellants’ App. at 30). Smook remained attired in her

undergarments, which she testified placed her at the same level of undress as if she

were “at the beach in a swimsuit.” (Id. at 33). The staff person touched Smook to

look under her arms, between her toes, and through her hair and scalp. (Id. at 30).

After searching the clothing, the staff member returned the clothes to Smook and

allowed her to get dressed. (Id.).

We conclude that this search was reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth

Amendment. The legitimate interests of the State, surveyed by the Second Circuit in

N.G., were present in this case and weigh in favor of reasonableness. The search,

while intrusive to a degree, presented a lesser invasion of privacy than a full strip

search. It has been observed that strip searches requiring a person to disrobe

completely have a “uniquely invasive and upsetting nature,” N.G., 382 F.3d at 239

(Sotomayor, J., dissenting), and the decision of JDC officials to perform a less

intrusive search distinguishes this incident from the close constitutional issue

presented in N.G. We do not gainsay that requiring a minor disrobe to her

undergarments, even in a private room with only one staff member of the same sex,

may still be a stressful and disturbing experience. But even the dissenting opinion in

N.G. did not question that a juvenile detention facility could justify “a potentially-

invasive search of some kind – such as a frisk search or a thorough search of all of a

detainee’s clothing and possessions,” id. at 244, and there are obvious practical

difficulties in conducting a thorough search of a detainee’s clothing while the detainee

is wearing them. In light of the State’s legitimate responsibility to act in loco parentis

with respect to juveniles in lawful state custody, we conclude that after weighing the

special needs for the search against the invasion of personal rights involved, the

balance tips in favor of reasonableness. We thus conclude that Banbury and Cheever

did not violate Smook’s constitutional rights.

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Our decision in Doe v. Little Rock School District, 380 F.3d 349 (8th Cir.

2004), does not dictate a different conclusion. In that case, our court held that a

practice of subjecting secondary public school students to random, suspicionless

searches of their persons and belongings by school officials was unconstitutional. As

part of the analysis, we observed that “the fruits of the searches at issue here are

apparently regularly turned over to law enforcement officials and are used in criminal

proceedings against students whose contraband is discovered.” Id. at 355. We

concluded that “[r]ather than acting in loco parentis, with the goal of promoting the

students’ welfare, the government officials conducting the searches are in large part

playing a law enforcement role with the goal of ferreting out crime and collecting

evidence to be used in prosecuting students.” Id.

Smook points out that the JDC policy at issue here provides that the law

enforcement officer admitting a juvenile to the facility should stay at the JDC until the

completion of the search, that any contraband found on a juvenile is to be taken by the

police officer, and that “it is the officer’s decision regarding further charges.”

(Appellees’ App. at 59). Smook argues that because the searches may produce

evidence that an officer could refer to a prosecutor in support of potential criminal

charges, the analysis in Doe compels a finding that the searches are unreasonable. The

Doe decision, however, should not be read to establish that a suspicionless search

based on “special needs” is per se unconstitutional whenever the fruits of the searches

may potentially be used in criminal proceedings. In that case, we inferred from the

available evidence that the officials conducting searches acted “with the goal of

ferreting out crime and collecting evidence,” rather than “with the goal of promoting

the students’ welfare.” 380 F.3d at 355.

We do not draw the same inference from the evidence here. Officers already

are permitted to search juvenile arrestees for evidence as an incident of the arrest, even

for a minor offense, see Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354-55 (2001);

id. at 364 (O’Connor, J., dissenting), and the goals of law enforcement to gather

evidence are thus largely satisfied prior to admission at the JDC. We are not

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persuaded that the JDC’s profession of concern for the welfare of juveniles admitted

to the facility is merely a pretextual explanation for searches that are in large part

designed to gather evidence for criminal prosecutions. As outlined above and in the

decision in N.G., a residential facility like the JDC has sound reasons to act in loco

parentis, and the incidental possibility that evidence might be discovered and referred

to a criminal prosecutor (no example of which is disclosed in this record) is

insufficient to render the search of Smook unreasonable.

Because Minnehaha County’s appeal regarding liability for the search of Smook

is inextricably intertwined with the appeal of the individual defendants, see Avalos v.

City of Glenwood, 382 F.3d 792, 801 & n.1 (8th Cir. 2004); Kincade v. City of Blue

Springs, 64 F.3d 389, 394-95 (8th Cir. 1995), we have jurisdiction to consider the

county’s appeal on that point. For the reasons discussed, we likewise conclude that,

assuming there was a direct causal link between the search of Smook and the

municipal policy, see City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989), the county

did not violate Smook’s constitutional rights.

Alternatively, assuming for the sake of argument that the district court was

correct that there is no constitutional distinction between searches of juveniles in

undergarments and searches of juveniles stripped of all clothing, and assuming the

district court’s conclusion that all such searches without probable cause are

unreasonable, we hold that Banbury and Cheever are entitled to qualified immunity

from claims for damages arising from the search of Smook in 1999. As of that year,

there was no appellate decision from the Supreme Court, this court, or any other

federal circuit ruling on the reasonableness of strip searches of juveniles in lawful

state custody. See N.G., 382 F.3d at 233.2 Our court, like many others, had concluded

2

One federal appellate decision in 1992 held that “law enforcement officers may

conduct a strip search of a juvenile in custody, even for a minor offense, based upon

reasonable suspicion to believe that the juvenile is concealing weapons or

contraband.” Justice v. City of Peachtree, 961 F.2d 188, 193 (11th Cir. 1992)

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that a strip search of adult offenders without individualized suspicion was

unreasonable, but those cases did not consider the different interests involved when

the State has responsibility to act in loco parentis.

To defeat a claim of qualified immunity, the contours of an alleged

constitutional right must be “sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would

understand that what he is doing violates that right.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S.

635, 640 (1987). Qualified immunity analysis “must be undertaken in light of the

specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition.” Saucier v. Katz, 533

U.S. 194, 201 (2001). Here, no governing appellate decision had decided how to

strike the “reasonableness” balance in the situation of juvenile detainees, and as late

as 2004, the Second Circuit concluded not only that the asserted right of juvenile

detainees to be free from strip searches was not clearly established, but that the right

did not even exist. The conclusion in N.G., at a minimum, was within the range of

objectively reasonable determinations that an official might have reached about the

lawfulness of strip searches at the JDC in 1999. Even if we have misapprehended

how the Supreme Court would resolve the “reasonableness” balance on Smook’s

claim, we reach the alternative conclusion that Banbury and Cheever are entitled to

qualified immunity for allegedly acting in a manner consistent with, or less intrusive

than, a practice that the Second Circuit later held to be reasonable and constitutional.

In addition to granting partial summary judgment in favor of Smook, the district

court’s order also granted partial summary judgment for unnamed class members who,

(emphasis added). The Eleventh Circuit said that “the strip search of a juvenile based

on less than probable cause ‘instinctively gives us the most pause,’” id. (quoting Bell

v. Wolfish, 411 U.S. at 558), but the court neither reached a holding nor uttered further

dictum on the constitutionality of strip searching juveniles at a police station, without

probable cause, after an arrest for a minor offense. Uncertain dictum from a different

circuit on a search arising in a different context surely did not establish clearly as of

1999 that strip searches at the Juvenile Detention Center in Minnehaha County were

unreasonable.

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as the class was defined by the court, were strip searched at the JDC from June 1,

1999, through September 14, 1999. Banbury and Cheever contend that they are also

entitled to qualified immunity from suits for damages by the unnamed class members.

To review that contention, it appears that we would be required by the Supreme

Court’s current direction to resolve first whether the searches of the unnamed class

members violated the Fourth Amendment, and then, if so, whether the defendants are

nonetheless entitled to qualified immunity. See Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194,

197-98 & n.3 (2004) (per curiam); Saucier, 533 U.S. at 200; see also Bunting v.

Mellen, 541 U.S. 1019, 1024-25 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of

certiorari).

The requirement to resolve the reasonableness of these searches of unnamed

class members places us in a quandary. The specific facts underlying the claims are

not yet developed, and the reasonableness of a particular search is often highly

contextual. We do not know from this record which, if any, of the unnamed class

members were searched after removing all of their clothing, what might have led staff

members at the JDC to conduct such searches (e.g., whether they simply followed a

policy by rote, or whether they exercised discretion based on such factors as whether

particular undergarments were unusually capable of concealing contraband), whether

any such searches may have involved reasonable suspicion, probable cause, or

consent, and so forth. Plaintiffs contend that “[t]he question of whether individual

class members were required to be completely nude or nearly nude will be determined

among the factual matters during the damages phase of the case,” (Appellees’ Br. at

14 n.8), yet the entitlement to qualified immunity is an immunity from suit, not merely

a defense to liability, Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985), and the individual

defendants are thus entitled to a decision before the litigation proceeds to that phase.

The posture of the appeal is complicated further by our decision that the named

class representative, Smook, has no claim for damages against the defendants. That

conclusion typically would disqualify her as a class representative, see, e.g., E. Tex.

Motor Freight Sys. Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395, 403-04 (1977); Burris v. First

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Fin. Corp., 928 F.2d 797, 806 (8th Cir. 1991), but given that a class already has been

certified, “the class of unnamed persons described in the certification acquire a legal

status separate from the interest asserted by [Smook].” Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393,

398 (1975). This separate legal status means that the dismissal of Smook’s claim does

not inexorably require dismissal of the class action, id. at 399-401; Rodriguez, 431

U.S. at 406 n.12; but cf. Great Rivers Coop. of Southeastern Iowa v. Farmland Indus.,

Inc., 120 F.3d 893, 899 (8th Cir. 1997), but it also does not mandate that we decide

constitutional issues in the abstract or in a context that may be hypothetical. See

Kremens v. Bartley, 431 U.S. 119, 134 (1977) (“While there are ‘live’ disputes

between unnamed members of the class certified by the District Court, on the one

hand, and [defendants], on the other, these disputes are so unfocused as to make

informed resolution of them almost impossible.”).

Under these unusual circumstances, we decline to pass on the merits of the

constitutional claims of the unnamed class members that must be resolved as a first

step in determining whether Banbury and Cheever are entitled to qualified immunity

from suit. Because we decline to resolve this aspect of the appeal by the individual

defendants, we dismiss for lack of jurisdiction that portion of the county’s appeal

regarding liability for damages to the unnamed class members. On remand, the

district court may consider, after pausing to “stop, look, and listen,” id. at 135,

whether the class should be redefined or decertified, cf. Gen. Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457

U.S. 147, 160 (1982), and whether there is an adequate class representative to replace

Smook, if appropriate. Cf. Howe v. Varity Corp., 896 F.2d 1107, 1111 (8th Cir.

1990). If the court concludes that a class should continue to be certified and there is

an adequate class representative to continue the action, then the defendants, of course,

may renew motions for summary judgment if they wish. We expect that the district

court would consider any such motions in light of our conclusions regarding the

individual defendants’ entitlement to qualified immunity from suit on Smook’s claim.

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B.

The defendants also appeal the district court’s finding of liability on the

plaintiffs’ claims for injunctive relief with respect to future searches of juveniles

detained for “minor offenses.” This appeal includes a challenge to the district court’s

conclusion that the JDC may not, consistent with the Constitution, conduct future

searches comparable to the search of Smook. As to that aspect of the appeal from the

district court’s determinations concerning injunctive relief, we agree with the parties

that the issues of law are “inextricably intertwined” with the determination of whether

Banbury and Cheever are entitled to qualified immunity on Smook’s claim for

damages, such that appellate jurisdiction is proper. See Gardner v. Howard, 109 F.3d

427, 431 (8th Cir. 1997); Kincade, 64 F.3d at 394-95. Before we may reach the

merits, however, we must first satisfy ourselves that the action for injunctive relief

presented a “case or controversy” over which the district court properly exercised

Article III jurisdiction. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94

(1998). Having carefully reviewed Smook’s complaint with that question in mind, we

conclude that she and the class certified by the district court lack standing to seek

injunctive relief.

The allegations of the complaint relate entirely to past conduct by the

defendants that occurred when Smook and others were arrested for minor offenses in

August 1999. The district court’s order certifying a class defined the relevant class

as encompassing “all persons seeking injunctive relief who, when they [were] under

the age of eighteen years old, were charged with minor offenses and were, pursuant

to JDC policy strip searched . . . at the Minnehaha County Juvenile Detention Center

from June 1, 1999 through September 14, 1999.” There is no allegation about the

likelihood of future contact with the JDC or future unreasonable searches.

It is well settled that “[p]ast exposure to illegal conduct does not in itself show

a present case or controversy regarding injunctive relief . . . if unaccompanied by any

continuing, present adverse effects.” O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 495 (1974).

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There is no allegation in the complaint that Smook or the certified class members are

suffering any “continuing, present adverse effects” from searches conducted between

June 1 and September 14, 1999. There is no assertion that the plaintiffs expect to

commit additional minor offenses in Minnehaha County, or that they are likely to be

detained at the JDC. And there is no allegation that if the plaintiffs were detained at

the JDC for a minor offense in the future, then they would be unable to take advantage

of the two-hour grace period for parental pick-up, which now permits a juvenile to

avoid any kind of search when detained for a minor offense. Even if the face of the

complaint did include a general assertion of future injury, we think that attempting to

anticipate whether any of the plaintiffs would actually be detained and strip searched

would take us “into the area of speculation and conjecture.” Id. at 497; see also City

of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105 (1983) (“That Lyons may have been

illegally choked by the police on October 6, 1976, while presumably affording Lyons

standing to claim damages against the individual officers and perhaps against the City,

does nothing to establish a real and immediate threat that he would again be stopped

for a traffic violation, or for any other offense, by an officer or officers who would

illegally choke him into unconsciousness without any provocation or resistence on his

part.”); Hedgepeth v. Washington Metro. Transit Auth., 386 F.3d 1148, 1152 (D.C.

Cir. 2004) (Roberts, J.).

Absent a sufficient allegation that Smook and other class members are likely

to be strip searched at the JDC in the future, they are “no more entitled to an

injunction than any other citizen.” Lyons, 461 U.S. at 111. And “a federal court may

not entertain a claim by any or all citizens who no more than assert that certain

practices of [juvenile detention officials] are unconstitutional.” Id. The Supreme

Court has explained that this limitation on the authority of the federal courts does not

mean that “undifferentiated claims should not be taken seriously by local authorities,”

for “the interest of an alert and interested citizen is an essential element of an effective

and fair government.” Id. Indeed, in this very case, the claims by Jodie Smook that

she was unreasonably searched at the JDC triggered a modification of the institution’s

policy on searching minors, and prompted a statewide discussion that culminated in

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legislation prohibiting strip searches, without probable cause, of juveniles detained for

curfew violations. But a federal court “is not the proper forum to press such claims

unless the requirements for entry and the prerequisites for injunctive relief are

satisfied.” Id. at 112. We therefore conclude that the plaintiffs’ claims for injunctive

relief should be dismissed for lack of an Article III case-or-controversy.

* * *

For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the district court is reversed, and the

case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

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