Opinion

Amerisourcebergen Corporation v. Dialysist West, Inc.

  • 465 F.3d 946
  • 61 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) 72
  • 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 25026
  • 2006 WL 2846342
Court
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Filed
Oct 6, 2006
Status
Published
On the bench
Farris, Tashima, Callahan
Nature of suit
Civil
Cited by
912 cases
Authority
More cited than 86.2%

finding that the district 6 court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to amend, even where eight months 7 of discovery remained, because allowing the amendment would have “unfairly imposed 8 potentially high, additional litigation costs on [defendant] that could have easily been 9 avoided” had plaintiff pursued its proposed new theory in the original complaint; 10 further noting that it would be prejudicial to defendant to allow “[plaintiff] to ‘advance 11 different legal theories and require proof of different facts’ at this stage in the 12 litigation.”

How later courts described this case

  • finding that the district 6 court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to amend, even where eight months 7 of discovery remained, because allowing the amendment would have “unfairly imposed 8 potentially high, additional litigation costs on [defendant] that could have easily been 9 avoided” had plaintiff pursued its proposed new theory in the original complaint; 10 further noting that it would be prejudicial to defendant to allow “[plaintiff] to ‘advance 11 different legal theories and require proof of different facts’ at this stage in the 12 litigation.”
  • finding prejudice where allowing amendment that propounded a new theory “would have unfairly imposed potentially high, additional litigation costs on [defendant] that could have easily been avoided had [plaintiff] pursued its ‘tainted product’ theory in its original complaint or reply”
  • finding that an amended complaint would “require[ ] the parties to scramble” and “would have unfairly imposed potentially high, additional litigation costs on [defendant]” that could easily have been avoided had the amendments existed in the original briefing
  • stating that “an eight month delay between the time of obtaining a relevant fact and seeking a leave to amend is unreasonable,” and that a plaintiff may not “drastically change[] its litigation theory” “twelve months into the litigation”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

AMERISOURCEBERGEN CORPORATION, 

a New Jersey corporation, dba

Bergen Brunswig Corporation, aka

BBC; AMERISOURCEBERGEN DRUG

CORPORATION; MEDICAL INITIATIVES,

INC., aka Oncology Supply; ASD

SPECIALTY HEALTHCARE, INC.,

Plaintiffs-Appellants, No. 04-15595

v. D.C. No.

DIALYSIST WEST, INC., an Arizona  CV-02-01472-JWS

corporation, AMENDED

Defendant-Appellee, OPINION

v.

AMERX INC., a Florida corporation;

CSG DISTRIBUTORS, a Tennessee

company; PREMIER MEDICAL

DISTRIBUTORS, INC.,

Third-party-Defendants.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Arizona

John W. Sedwick, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

November 18, 2005—San Francisco, California

Filed March 22, 2006

Amended April 24, 2006

Second Amendment October 6, 2006

Before: Jerome Farris, A. Wallace Tashima, and

Consuelo M. Callahan, Circuit Judges.

17311

17312 AMERISOURCEBERGEN v. DIALYSIST WEST

Opinion by Judge Farris;

Dissent by Judge Tashima

17316 AMERISOURCEBERGEN v. DIALYSIST WEST

COUNSEL

Morton R. Branzburg and Andrew O. Schiff, Klehr, Harrison,

Harvey, Branzburg, & Ellers LLP, Philadelphia, Pennsylva-

nia, for the plaintiffs-appellants.

Dan L. Bagatell and Joel W. Nomkin, Perkins Coie Brown &

Bain P.A., Phoenix, Arizona, for the defendant-appellee.

OPINION

FARRIS, Circuit Judge:

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On August 2, 2002, AmerisourceBergen Corporation1

brought suit against Dialysist West, Inc. alleging that Dialy-

sist West breached a sales agreement concerning the sale of

the drug Epogen S40. Following its determination that 50%

to 100% of the Epogen it purchased from Dialysist West was

counterfeit, AmerisourceBergen withheld payments due Dia-

lysist West on non-Epogen drug sales. On March 18, 2003,

Dialysist West filed a counterclaim demanding that Ameri-

sourceBergen pay the approximately $2.2 million it owed for

the non-Epogen products Dialysist West had shipped to

AmerisourceBergen. On the same day, Dialysist West also

filed an Epogen-related, third-party complaint against phar-

maceutical distributors AmeRx Inc., CSG Distributors, and

Optia Medical. On April 21, 2003, CSG Distributors filed a

third-party complaint against Premier Medical Distributors

Inc., and on July 14, 2003, AmeRx filed a third-party com-

plaint against three more Epogen distributors.

1

AmerisourceBergen Corp. succeeded Bergen Brunswig Corporation as

the plaintiff-appellant in this case.

AMERISOURCEBERGEN v. DIALYSIST WEST 17317

On May 30, 2003, AmerisourceBergen filed a reply to Dia-

lysist West’s counterclaim conceding that it had not paid for

the non-Epogen products (including Procrit) and that these

products were genuine. On July 22, 2003, Dialysist West filed

a motion for judgment on the pleadings and for entry of final

judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b)

on the $2.2 million counterclaim. On August 25, 2003,

AmerisourceBergen filed a cross-motion for leave to amend

its complaint and its reply to Dialysist West’s counterclaim,

changing its tack by alleging that Dialysist West had also sold

it counterfeit Procrit. On January 6, 2004, the district court

granted Dialysist West’s motion for judgment on the plead-

ings, denied AmerisourceBergen’s motion for leave to amend,

and certified the judgment as final under Rule 54(b). On

March 3, 2004, the district court denied AmerisourceBergen’s

motion to stay execution of judgment and AmerisourceBergen

filed this appeal on March 24, 2004.

II. JURISDICTION & STANDARD OF REVIEW

We have subject matter jurisdiction over the final decision

of the district court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review

the district court’s interpretation of Arizona contract law de

novo. El-Hakem v. BJY Inc., 415 F.3d 1068, 1072 (9th Cir.

2005). The denial of AmerisourceBergen’s motion for leave

to amend is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See Bowles v.

Reade, 198 F.3d 752, 757 (9th Cir. 1999). The district court’s

Rule 54(b) certification of the judgment is reviewed de novo

to determine if it will lead to “piecemeal appeals” and for

“clear unreasonableness” on the issue of equities. See Grego-

rian v. Izvestia, 871 F.2d 1515, 1519 (9th Cir. 1989). The dis-

trict court’s refusal to stay enforcement of the judgment under

Rule 62(h) is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See MacKillop

v. Lowe’s Mkt., Inc., 58 F.3d 1441, 1446 (9th Cir. 1995).

17318 AMERISOURCEBERGEN v. DIALYSIST WEST

III. DISCUSSION

A. Setoff of Epogen Claims

AmerisourceBergen claims that the district court erred in

finding that it could not set-off the approximately $2.2 million

it owes Dialysist West for non-Epogen, pharmaceutical pur-

chases against the estimated $8 million judgment it seeks

from Dialysist West for selling AmerisourceBergen counter-

feit Epogen. AmerisourceBergen bears the burden of estab-

lishing that it is entitled to either a legal or equitable setoff of

its claims. See Newbery Corp. v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 95

F.3d 1392, 1399 (9th Cir. 1996).

[1] AmerisourceBergen and Dialysist West agree that sec-

tion 47-2717 of the Arizona Commercial Code applies. The

Arizona statute, a codification of section 2-717 of the Uni-

form Commercial Code, provides:

The buyer on notifying the seller of his intention to

do so may deduct all or any part of the damages

resulting from any breach of the contract from any

part of the price still due under the same contract.

Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 47-2717 (2006). A plain reading of the stat-

ute indicates that a party may not set-off a contractual claim

against a debt on a separate contract. See ITV Direct, Inc. v.

Healthy Solutions, LLC, 379 F. Supp. 2d 130, 133 (D. Mass.

2005) (“Section 2-717 is not a general setoff provision per-

mitting a buyer of goods to adjust its continuing contract obli-

gations according to the equities perceived by the buyer.”).

[2] AmerisourceBergen concedes that the contracts for sale

of Epogen and the other drugs were separate contracts. But

because the Vendor Agreement signed by Dialysist West per-

mits AmerisourceBergen to return any goods to Dialysist

West for “full credit,” AmerisourceBergen believes it was jus-

tified in applying the credit it held for the counterfeit Epogen

AMERISOURCEBERGEN v. DIALYSIST WEST 17319

purchases against its outstanding debts. AmerisourceBergen’s

reading of the Vendor Agreement is strained.2 The Vendor

Agreement does not indicate that AmerisourceBergen can off-

set one deficient transaction against another transaction.

Rather, as the district court pointed out, “[t]he plain language

of the provision links the allowable credit to the specific

returned goods.” AmerisourceBergen Corp. v. Dialysist West,

Inc., No. CIV-02-1472 PHX JWS, slip op. at 13 (D. Ariz. Jan.

6, 2004).

[3] The contract clause is not ambiguous, as Amerisource-

Bergen argues. The intention of the parties is clear: to create

a return policy by which AmerisourceBergen can fully

recover for returned goods that do not meet its standards. See

Smith v. Melson, Inc., 659 P.2d 1264, 1266 (Ariz. 1983) (stat-

ing that a contract should be read in light of the intentions of

the parties as reflected in the language and circumstances of

the contract); see also Echo, Inc. v. Whitson Corp., 52 F.3d

702, 705 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding under Illinois law that in

applying UCC section 2-717, purchase orders cannot be set-

off against damages buyer sustains as result of breach of

related distributorship agreement).

[4] Furthermore, AmerisourceBergen has provided no evi-

dence that it was the pattern or practice of the parties or indus-

try custom to offset deficiencies in one sales contract by

giving discounts or “credit” on other sales contracts. See

Mohave Valley Irrigation & Drainage Dist. v. Norton, 244

F.3d 1164, 1166 (9th Cir. 2001) (“According to the UCC, to

determine whether a contract’s terms are ambiguous, courts

may only consider evidence of course of dealing, trade usage,

or course of performance.”). The district court did not err in

holding that AmerisourceBergen had no legal right to set-off

its Epogen claims against its other contractual claims.

2

The relevant contract clause reads: “BBC may, at its sole option, return

all or any part of any product received from Vendor and receive full credit

for all returned items.”

17320 AMERISOURCEBERGEN v. DIALYSIST WEST

[5] AmerisourceBergen argues that even if it is not entitled

to offset its debt under section 47-2717 of the Arizona Com-

mercial Code, Dialysist West’s insolvency affords it an equi-

table right of setoff under Arizona common law. But

AmerisourceBergen’s claim to equitable setoff is preempted

by 47-2717. Arizona’s Commercial Code provides that “prin-

ciples of law and equity” apply “unless [displaced] by the par-

ticular provisions of this title.” Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 47-1103

(2006); see also John Deere Co. v. First Interstate Bank, 709

P.2d 890, 894 (Ariz. 1985). Although no Arizona court has

ruled on whether section 47-2717 preempts a common law

claim for setoff, several federal courts have indicated that the

corresponding UCC section preempts equitable setoffs. See

ITV Direct, 379 F. Supp. at 133; Carlisle Corp. v. Uresco

Const. Materials, Inc., 823 F. Supp. 271, 275 (E.D. Pa. 1993).

As the court convincingly reasoned in Carlisle, because the

UCC “specifically provides for set-offs in particular circum-

stances . . . we must conclude that the Code drafters, and the

state legislatures that have adopted the Code, meant to dis-

place common law set-off.” Carlisle, 823 F. Supp. at 275. It

is apparent that the Arizona legislature intended section 47-

2717 to supercede the common law of setoff. The district

court did not err in denying AmerisourceBergen’s common

law claim for equitable setoff.

B. Denial of Leave to Amend

[6] AmerisourceBergen appeals the district court’s decision

to deny it leave to amend its reply pursuant to Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 15(a).3 Rule 15(a) is very liberal and leave

to amend “shall be freely given when justice so requires.” See

3

We need not decide whether the district court also erred in denying

AmerisourceBergen leave to amend its complaint. See 10 Moore’s Federal

Practice, § 54.28[3][b], at 54-109 (3d ed. 2005) (“On appeal of a judg-

ment properly entered under Rule 54(b), the court of appeals may review

any matter implicated by the judgment, but should not reach beyond the

bounds of the judgment . . . .”).

AMERISOURCEBERGEN v. DIALYSIST WEST 17321

Bowles v. Reade, 198 F.3d 752, 757 (9th Cir. 1999). But a dis-

trict court need not grant leave to amend where the amend-

ment: (1) prejudices the opposing party; (2) is sought in bad

faith; (3) produces an undue delay in litigation; or (4) is futile.

Id. at 758; Jackson v. Bank of Hawaii, 902 F.2d 1385, 1387

(9th Cir. 1990).

AmerisourceBergen filed its leave to amend on August 25,

2003, nearly fifteen months after it first learned that counter-

feit Procrit was in the marketplace and three months after

entering a reply where it conceded that the products for which

it had not paid Dialysist West, including Procrit, were genu-

ine. In the dissent, Judge Tashima emphasizes the district

court’s filing of a pretrial scheduling order on July 7, 2003,

which extended the period for filing a motion to amend from

June 2, 2003 to December 2, 2003; and the non-expert discov-

ery cutoff date from August 1, 2003 to February 2, 2004.4

Because AmerisourceBergen’s motion for leave to amend was

filed before the cutoff date set by the court, Judge Tashima

concludes that the motion was “presumptively timely” and the

district court therefore abused its discretion in denying the

motion. (Dissent at 17332; citing Halbert v. City of Sherman,

33 F.3d 526, 529 (5th Cir. 1994)).5

4

In a joint motion to extend the dates set in the pretrial schedule, coun-

sel for the parties argued that more time was necessary because of disputes

regarding what materials should be produced and the complications that

arose in the case from the entry of third parties. Joint Motion To Extend

Dates in Pretrial Schedule, Bergen Brunswig Corp. v. Dialysist West, Inc.,

No. CIV 02 1472 PHX JWS, at *3 (D. Ariz. June 19, 2003).

5

Judge Tashima’s interpretation of Halbert is flawed. Halbert does not

stand for the proposition that a district court must always accept a motion

for leave to amend simply because the court has established a period, pur-

suant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(b), in which the parties may

file a leave to amend. Rather, Halbert reiterates that granting or denying

a motion for leave to amend remains within the discretion of the district

court. Halbert, 33 F.3d at 530. In Halbert the Fifth Circuit did not reverse

the district court because the motion for leave to amend was “presump-

tively timely,” but rather because the district court provided no “justifying

reasons” for denying the motion for leave to amend. Id.; see also DCD

Programs, Ltd. v. Leighton, 833 F.2d 183, 185 (9th Cir. 1987) (reversing

district court’s leave to amend ruling where the “district court denied the

motion without explanation or findings.”).

17322 AMERISOURCEBERGEN v. DIALYSIST WEST

By the dissent’s reasoning, a district court initially has the

discretion to determine whether a motion for leave to amend

is prejudicial, made in bad faith, would cause undue delay, or

is futile under Rule 15(a); but once the district court sets a

schedule for pretrial motions pursuant to Rule 16(b), the court

must accept all “timely” motions filed before the court-

appointed deadline.6 Even if such a scheme made sense—if a

pretrial order changed parties’ expectations regarding the

prospect of litigating new facts and legal theories—there is no

authority stating that Rule 16(b) preempts Rule 15(a) in cases

like this one.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16 has no effect on the

operation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) principles

in this case. In Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975

F.2d 604 (9th Cir. 1992), we held that Rule 15(a) did not

apply, not because Rule 15 is trumped by Rule 16 once the

district court filed a pretrial scheduling order, but rather

because the party in Johnson had failed to file his motion to

join additional parties within the period of time set in the dis-

trict court’s scheduling order. Id. at 607-08. Put simply, the

party could not appeal to the liberal amendment procedures

afforded by Rule 15; his tardy motion had to satisfy the more

stringent “good cause” showing required under Rule 16. In

this case, AmerisourceBergen filed its motion for leave to

amend within the deadline set by the district court. Accord-

ingly, as the district court correctly recognized, Amerisource-

Bergen’s motion is subject to the limited constraints placed on

motions for leave to amend under Rule 15(a).7

6

Judge Tashima argues that it would be pointless to create a schedule

for filing pretrial motions pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

16(b), “if the schedule can be disregarded by the court and counsel.” Dis-

sent at 17332 n.1.

7

AmerisourceBergen Corp., et al. v. Dialysist West, Inc., No. CIV-02-

1472-PHXJWS, slip op. at 6 (D. Ariz. Jan. 6, 2004) (“The effect of filing

a motion to amend prior to court ordered deadlines is that Rule 15(a) pro-

vides the standard of review, not the “good cause” standard articulated in

Rule 16.”)

AMERISOURCEBERGEN v. DIALYSIST WEST 17323

Unlike the district courts in Halbert and DCD Programs,8

the district court in this case provided sufficient “justifying

reasons” for denying AmerisourceBergen’s leave to amend. In

a detailed order on January 6, 2004, the district court held that

AmerisourceBergen’s motion to amend its reply and allege

that non-Epogen drugs (Procrit) that it had purchased from

Dialysist West were counterfeit was both untimely and preju-

dicial to Dialysist West.9

[7] In assessing timeliness, we do not merely ask whether

a motion was filed within the period of time allotted by the

district court in a Rule 16 scheduling order. Rather, in evalu-

ating undue delay, we also inquire “whether the moving party

knew or should have known the facts and theories raised by

the amendment in the original pleading.” Jackson, 902 F.2d

at 1388; see also Sierra Club v. Union Oil Co. of California,

813 F.2d 1480, 1492-93 (9th Cir. 1987), vacated on other

grounds by Union Oil Co. of California v. Sierra Club, 485

U.S. 931 (1988). We have held that an eight month delay

between the time of obtaining a relevant fact and seeking a

leave to amend is unreasonable. See Texaco, Inc. v. Ponsoldt,

939 F.2d 794, 799 (9th Cir. 1991) (citing Jackson, 902 F.2d

at 1388).

[8] In this case, fifteen months passed between the time

AmerisourceBergen first discovered the possibility that the

Procrit was tainted and its assertion of this theory in the

motion for leave to amend. Even more detrimental to Ameri-

sourceBergen’s motion for leave to amend, however, is the

8

Halbert, 33 F.3d at 530; DCD Programs, 833 F.2d at 185.

9

AmerisourceBergen, No. CIV-02-1472-PHXJWS, slip op. at 4-7. The

district court’s key holdings on the motion for leave to amend were: 1)

AmerisourceBergen did not allege any “newly discovered facts” in the

motion nor did the company explain why it waited over a year after filing

its complaint before bringing these facts to the attention of the court; and

2) the amendments were prejudicial because they contradicted the compa-

ny’s “own previous admissions mid-stream,” without any proffered rea-

son.

17324 AMERISOURCEBERGEN v. DIALYSIST WEST

fact that AmerisourceBergen had admitted only three months

before that the products for which it had not paid Dialysist

West, including Procrit, were genuine. At the time Ameri-

sourceBergen filed its reply in May 2003, it had all the infor-

mation necessary to raise the affirmative defense it now

pursues: AmerisourceBergen knew about the counterfeit

Procrit on the pharmaceuticals market, acknowledged that it

had purchased Procrit from Dialysist West during that period,

and had previously filed suit because it believed that it had

purchased counterfeit drugs from Dialysist West. Although

AmerisourceBergen vigorously protests the denial of its

motion for leave to amend, it has never provided a satisfac-

tory explanation of why, twelve months into the litigation, it

so drastically changed its litigation theory.

[9] Even though eight months of discovery remained,

requiring the parties to scramble and attempt to ascertain

whether the Procrit purchased by AmerisourceBergen was

tainted, would have unfairly imposed potentially high, addi-

tional litigation costs on Dialysist West that could have easily

been avoided had AmerisourceBergen pursued its “tainted

product” theory in its original complaint or reply.10 Allowing

AmerisourceBergen to “advance different legal theories and

require proof of different facts” at this stage in the litigation

would have prejudiced Dialysist West and unfairly delayed

Dialysist West’s collection of a judgment worth approxi-

mately $2.2 million. Jackson, 902 F.2d at 1387; see also Cho-

dos v. West Publ’g Co., 292 F.3d 992, 1003 (9th Cir. 2002)

(upholding district court’s denial of leave to amend fraud

claim where plaintiff had facts prior to first amendment and

amendment was both prejudicial and dilatory); Morongo

10

See 6 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Fed-

eral Practice and Procedure § 1487 (2d ed. 1990) (stating that “if [an] . . .

amendment substantially changes the theory on which the case has been

proceeding and is proposed late enough so that the opponent would be

required to engage in significant new preparation, the court may deem it

prejudicial.”).

AMERISOURCEBERGEN v. DIALYSIST WEST 17325

Band of Mission Indians v. Rose, 893 F.2d 1074, 1079 (9th

Cir. 1990) (upholding denial of leave to amend on the basis

of dilatoriness and prejudice where Morongo Indians intro-

duced new legal theory well into the litigation). Amerisource-

Bergen’s motion to amend its reply closely followed Dialysist

West’s challenge to AmerisourceBergen’s claim for equitable

setoff and motion for final judgment under Rule 54(b) as well

as the addition of seven new parties to the Epogen litigation.

We will not speculate whether AmerisourceBergen’s sudden

change in tactics was gamesmanship or the result of an over-

sight by counsel, but we do conclude that the district court did

not abuse its discretion in denying AmerisourceBergen’s

motion for leave to amend.

C. Certification of Final Judgment

[10] AmerisourceBergen also appeals the district court’s

certification of final judgment on Dialysist West’s counter-

claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b). Rule 54(b)

provides that final entry of judgment should be made on indi-

vidual claims in multiple claim suits “upon an express deter-

mination that there is no just reason for delay.” Fed. R. Civ.

P. 54(b). Review of a district court’s certification of a final

judgment involves a two-step process. See Curtiss-Wright

Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 446 U.S. 1, 12 (1980). In the first

step, we review the district court’s entry of judgment de novo

and evaluate “such factors as the interrelationship of the

claims so as to prevent piecemeal appeals.” See Gregorian v.

Izvestia, 871 F.2d 1515, 1519 (9th Cir. 1989). The second

step of review requires an assessment of the equities. We

apply the “substantial deference” standard, reversing the dis-

trict court only if we find the district court’s conclusions

clearly unreasonable. Id.

[11] The district court found that there was no risk of dupli-

cative effort by the courts because any subsequent judgments

in this case would not vacate its judgment on Dialysist West’s

counterclaim. See Curtiss-Wright, 446 U.S. at 8 (holding that

17326 AMERISOURCEBERGEN v. DIALYSIST WEST

proper factors for 54(b) review include “whether the claims

for review were separable from the others . . . and whether the

nature of the claims already determined was such that no

appellate court would have to decide the same issues more

than once”). We agree. Because Dialysist West’s counter-

claim to recover for non-Epogen sales was not legally or fac-

tually related to AmerisourceBergen’s Epogen claim, no court

need revisit this judgment. See Morrison-Knudsen Co., Inc. v.

Archer, 655 F.2d 962, 965 (9th Cir. 1981).

[12] AmerisourceBergen contends that, as a matter of

equity, the district court’s certification of its judgment on Dia-

lysist West’s counterclaim should not be upheld because Dia-

lysist West is insolvent. We recognize that insolvency is a

factor that should weigh against the final entry of judgment on

Dialysist West’s counterclaim. See Reiter v. Cooper, 507 U.S.

258, 270 (1993) (acknowledging that “even a ‘threat of insol-

vency’ of the party seeking separate judgment is a factor

weighing against it”). But as the Supreme Court held in

Reiter: “[W]e cannot say that insolvency is an absolute bar [to

certification].” Id.; see also Shintom Am. Inc. v. Car Tels.

Inc., 45 F.3d 1107, 1110 (7th Cir. 1995) (affirming district

court’s entry of final judgment under 54(b) despite the “pre-

carious financial condition and potential insolvency of the

plaintiff”).

In weighing the equities of Rule 54(b) certification, the dis-

trict court concluded that certification was warranted because

this result: (1) aligned with the set-off principles of the UCC;

(2) helped avoid unreasonable delay; and because (3) Ameri-

sourceBergen owed Dialysist West approximately $2.2 mil-

lion. See AmerisourceBergen Corp., No. CIV-02-1472 PHX

JWS, slip op. at 14-15. These factors are a sufficient basis for

certifying final judgment in favor of Dialysist West. See

Schieffelin & Co. v. Valley Liquors, Inc., 823 F.2d 1064,

1065-1067 (7th Cir. 1987) (permitting certification where

defendant filed counterclaims and plaintiff asserted defenses

that were “at least plausible”); C.R. Bard, Inc. v. Med. Elecs.

AMERISOURCEBERGEN v. DIALYSIST WEST 17327

Corp., 529 F. Supp. 1382, 1388 (D. Mass. 1982) (stating that

court “saw no reason why plaintiff should be denied” use of

substantial funds “while awaiting disposition of . . . counter-

claims”). Moreover, the district court’s decision to favor Dia-

lysist West’s creditors as a matter of equity is not erroneous

where AmerisourceBergen has not shown that the debt it

seeks to set-off is related to Dialysist West’s counterclaim.

See Newbery Corp., 95 F.3d at 1399 (“[S]etoffs run contrary

to fundamental bankruptcy policies such as the equal treat-

ment of creditors and the preservation of a reorganizing debt-

or’s assets.”).

[13] “The task of weighing and balancing the contending”

equities of a case is “peculiarly one for the trial judge.”

Curtiss-Wright, 446 U.S. at 12. It is not the appellate court’s

role to “reweigh the equities.” Id. at 10. The district court’s

conclusions for certifying the judgment were not “clearly

unreasonable.” We decline to vacate the certification of judg-

ment.

D. Denial of Stay of Enforcement

[14] Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 62(h) provides that

when a court has entered final judgment, it may upon its dis-

cretion, “stay enforcement of that judgment until the entering

of a subsequent judgment or judgments.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

62(h). AmerisourceBergen argues that the district court erred

in rejecting its 62(h) motion by conflating Rule 54(b) and

Rule 62(h). While it is true that the district court has discre-

tion to grant a stay when it has already certified final judgment,11

11

See Curtiss-Wright, 446 U.S. at 13 (“Under this Rule [62(h)], we

assume it would be within the power of the district court to protect all par-

ties by having the losing party deposit the amount of the judgment with

the court . . . . In this way, valid considerations of economic duress and

solvency . . . can be provided without preventing Rule 54(b) consider-

ation.”); see also Reiter, 507 U.S. at 270-271 (similarly endorsing the con-

cept of a Rule 62(h) stay when a court certifies final judgment in favor of

17328 AMERISOURCEBERGEN v. DIALYSIST WEST

we disagree with AmerisourceBergen’s contention that “spe-

cial circumstances” warrant a stay in this case.

[15] AmerisourceBergen cannot show that failure to pro-

vide the stay will cause it to suffer greater harm than Dialysist

West will face should it be denied this judgment pending res-

olution of AmerisourceBergen’s outstanding claims. See Soo

Line R.R. Co. v. Escanaba & Lake Superior R.R. Co., 840

F.2d 546, 552 (7th Cir. 1988) (“Courts regularly require the

payment of undisputed debts while the parties litigate their

genuine disputes.”). Moreover, allowing AmerisourceBergen

to obtain a stay of the judgment would effectively sanction its

self-help tactics. If it does ultimately succeed on its Epogen

claim, AmerisourceBergen will have avoided paying funds it

owes Dialysist West and would unjustifiably leap-frog other

creditors. See Pereira v. Cogan, 275 B.R. 472, 475 (S.D.N.Y.

2002) (“In fashioning a stay of enforcement, a court looks to

general equitable principles.”). The district court did not

abuse its discretion in denying AmerisourceBergen’s Rule

62(h) motion.12

an insolvent party). Judge Tashima extensively cites Curtiss-Wright and

Reiter for the proposition that the district court abused its discretion by

denying AmerisourceBergen’s Rule 62(h) motion. Dissent at 17339-40.

But while Curtiss-Wright and Reiter both approved (in dicta) the option

of a Rule 62(h) stay when a court certifies judgment for an insolvent party,

neither case suggested that a district court would abuse its discretion if it

declined to issue a stay under these circumstances.

12

Judge Tashima would stay enforcement of the judgment and “pro-

tect[ ] AmerisourceBergen’s claims against Dialysist West’s insolvency.”

Dissent at 17343. Section 553 of the Bankruptcy Code governs the equita-

ble right of setoff in bankruptcy law. 11 U.S.C. § 553 (2006). Section 553,

however, does not create a right of setoff: “Rather, the section merely rec-

ognizes and preserves setoff rights that exist under other applicable law.

. . . Thus, the threshold determination in every case involving section 553

is the source of the alleged setoff right.” 5 Myron M. Sheinfeld et al., Col-

lier on Bankruptcy ¶ 553.01[2] (Lawrence P. King, ed., 15th ed. rev.

2005). AmerisourceBergen has no right to legal or equitable setoff under

Arizona law for the judgment against it on the counterclaim; it therefore

does not have a right to setoff under bankruptcy law. See In re Hal, Inc.,

196 B.R. 159, 161 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1996).

AMERISOURCEBERGEN v. DIALYSIST WEST 17329

E. Attorney’s Fees & Costs of Appeal

[16] Dialysist West seeks attorney’s fees and the costs of

appeal under Arizona Revised Statute section 12-341.01(A).

The statute permits an award of attorney’s fees to the “suc-

cessful party” in “any contested action arising out of a con-

tract.” Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-341.01(A) (2006). An award of

attorney’s fees under Arizona law is permissive, rather than

mandatory. See Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Mem’l. Hosp., 710

P.2d 1025, 1049 (Ariz. 1985). The Arizona Supreme Court

has held that there are six grounds that must be considered in

awarding attorney’s fees to a successful litigant including:

(1) whether the unsuccessful party’s claim or

defense was meritorious; (2) whether the litigation

could have been avoided or settled and the success-

ful party’s efforts were completely superfluous in

achieving the result; (3) whether assessing fees

against the unsuccessful party would cause an

extreme hardship; (4) whether the successful party

prevailed with respect to all of the relief sought; (5)

whether the legal question presented was novel and

whether such claim or defense have previously been

adjudicated in this jurisdiction; and (6) whether the

award would discourage other parties with tenable

claims or defenses from litigating or defending legit-

imate contract issues for fear of incurring liability for

substantial amounts of attorney’s fees.

Id. at 1049. Neither party directly addresses the Wagenseller

factors in its briefing, but there is sufficient evidence in the

record to conclude that these factors weigh against granting

Dialysist West attorney’s fees and costs. First, no evidence

has been presented indicating that this case could have been

successfully avoided or settled. Second, the issues in this

appeal raise novel questions of contract law. Finally, we do

not wish to discourage parties like AmerisourceBergen from

17330 AMERISOURCEBERGEN v. DIALYSIST WEST

litigating opaque issues of contract law for fear of being sad-

dled with opposing counsel’s fees and costs.

AFFIRMED.

TASHIMA, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

While I agree with most of the majority’s disposition of the

issues raised by this appeal, I part company on two issues. I

believe that the district court abused its discretion in denying

AmerisourceBergen’s motion for leave to amend because the

motion was made well before the deadline set by the court for

the making of such motions and because Dialysist West has

shown absolutely no prejudice. I further believe that the dis-

trict court abused its discretion in refusing to stay the judg-

ment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 62(h)

because it failed to perform an analysis separate from its Rule

54(b) analysis and failed to give adequate consideration to

Dialysist West’s insolvency. For these reasons, I respectfully

dissent from Parts III.B. and III.D. of the majority opinion,

and from the judgment of affirmance.

1. Leave to Amend.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 provides that “leave to

amend shall be freely given when justice so requires.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 15(a). Absent prejudice, or a “strong showing” of the

other factors, such as undue delay, bad faith, or dilatory

motive, “there exists a presumption under Rule 15(a) in favor

of granting leave to amend.” Eminence Capital, LLC v.

Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003) (per

curiam); see also Allwaste, Inc. v. Hecht, 65 F.3d 1523, 1530

(9th Cir. 1995) (stating that, although the denial of leave to

amend after a responsive pleading has been filed is reviewed

for an abuse of discretion, “we strictly review such denial in

light of the strong policy permitting amendment”). Amend-

AMERISOURCEBERGEN v. DIALYSIST WEST 17331

ments are to be permitted liberally because, as the Supreme

Court observed many years ago, “[i]f the underlying facts or

circumstances relied upon by a plaintiff may be a proper sub-

ject of relief, he ought to be afforded an opportunity to test his

claim on the merits.” Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182

(1962).

On January 16, 2003, the district court held the scheduling

conference, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16,

and set the trial date and the deadlines for discovery and dis-

positive motions. On June 19, 2003, the parties filed a joint

motion to extend the dates in the pretrial schedule. The dis-

trict court granted the motion on July 7, 2003, and accord-

ingly filed an order adjusting the pretrial schedule, based on

the joint motion of the parties and on a showing of good

cause. This order provided that the last date to file motions to

amend was extended from June 2, 2003, to December 2, 2003.

The order also extended the non-expert discovery cutoff date

from August 1, 2003, to February 2, 2004, and for expert dis-

covery from October 17, 2003, to April 19, 2004. The court

deleted the reference to the pretrial conference, stating that it

would address the final pretrial arrangements at a later date.

AmerisourceBergen’s motion for leave to amend was filed on

August 25, 2003 — more than three months before the cutoff

date for such motions and almost eight months before discov-

ery was to be completed.

“A pretrial order controls the subsequent course of the

action unless modified ‘upon a showing of good cause.’ ” El-

Hakem v. BJY Inc., 415 F.3d 1068, 1077 (9th Cir. 2005)

(quoting Zivkovic v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 302 F.3d 1080, 1087

(9th Cir. 2002)), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1470 (2006); see also

Arsement v. Spinnaker Exploration Co., 400 F.3d 238, 245

(5th Cir. 2005) (“It goes without saying that a pre-trial order

controls the scope and course of trial . . . .” ); Johnson v.

Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 608 (9th Cir.

1992) (“The scheduling order ‘control[s] the subsequent

17332 AMERISOURCEBERGEN v. DIALYSIST WEST

course of the action’ unless modified by the court.”) (quoting

Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(e)) (alteration in original).

We have often affirmed the denial of leave to amend when

the motion was made after the cutoff date for such motions,

or when discovery had closed or was about to close. For

example, in Zivkovic, the motion to amend was filed three

months after the deadline established by the court and only

five days before discovery was to be completed. We con-

cluded that, under those circumstances, the district court did

not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to amend. Ziv-

kovic, 302 F.3d at 1087; see also, e.g., Lockheed Martin Corp.

v. Network Solutions, Inc., 194 F.3d 980, 983, 986 (9th Cir.

1999) (where the motion to amend was made more than four

months after the cutoff date for motions to amend, stating that

“[a] need to reopen discovery and therefore delay the pro-

ceedings supports a district court’s finding of prejudice from

a delayed motion to amend the complaint”); Solomon v. N.

Am. Life & Cas. Ins. Co., 151 F.3d 1132, 1139 (9th Cir. 1998)

(affirming the denial of leave to amend where the motion was

made “on the eve of the discovery deadline”).

Our jurisprudence thus establishes that where a motion to

amend the pleadings is made within the time established by

the pretrial scheduling order for the making of such motions,

the motion is presumptively timely. Otherwise, it would be a

pointless exercise to establish cutoff dates in a Rule 16 sched-

uling order.1 Here, the motion to amend was made more than

three months before the motion cutoff date; thus, “on its face,

the motion was timely.” Halbert v. City of Sherman, Tex., 33

F.3d 526, 529 (5th Cir. 1994). Moreover, eight months

remained before the completion of discovery.

1

What would be the point, for example, of the rule’s requirement that

“[a] schedule shall not be modified except upon a showing of good cause

and by leave of the district court,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b), if the schedule

can be disregarded by the court and counsel.

AMERISOURCEBERGEN v. DIALYSIST WEST 17333

The majority has cited no case in which a motion to amend

was made within the deadline set by the district court and yet

denied as untimely. Indeed, such a case would be difficult to

find because common sense and Rule 16 dictate that a motion

filed “well within the . . . scheduling order deadline for the

amendment of pleadings” is timely “on its face.” Id.

Contrary to the majority’s assertion, taking into account the

fact that the motion was presumptively timely does not force

the district court to “accept all ‘timely’ motions filed before

the court-appointed deadline.”2 Maj. Op. at 17322. In fact, the

remaining factors, including prejudice and bad faith, remain

to be assessed. Given the undeniable conclusion that the

motion was presumptively timely, it remains for Dialysist

West to establish prejudice sufficient to overcome the pre-

sumption under Rule 15(a) in favor of granting leave to

amend. Eminence Capital, 316 F.3d at 1052.

In DCD Programs, Ltd. v. Leighton, 833 F.2d 183 (9th Cir.

1987), we reversed the district court’s denial of the plaintiffs’

motion to file a fourth amended complaint. Id. at 190. We

rejected the defendant’s argument that it would be prejudiced

by the delay in naming it to the suit, stating that, “[g]iven that

this case is still at the discovery stage with no trial date pend-

ing, nor has a pretrial conference been scheduled, there is no

evidence that [the defendant] would be prejudiced by the tim-

ing of the proposed amendment.” Id. at 187-88.

The Eighth Circuit similarly has relied on the fact that trial

was nearly three months away in concluding that the district

court abused its discretion in denying leave to amend an

answer. Dennis v. Dillard Dep’t Stores, Inc., 207 F.3d 523,

526 (8th Cir. 2000); see also Halbert, 33 F.3d at 530 (con-

cluding that the district court erred in denying “the facially

valid motion to amend,” where the motion to amend was

2

The majority’s use of quotation marks around “timely” is disingenu-

ous; there is absolutely no question that the motion to amend was timely.

17334 AMERISOURCEBERGEN v. DIALYSIST WEST

made four months before the scheduling order deadline). The

court reasoned that, although discovery had closed, the district

court had discretion to reopen it for the limited purpose of

exploring the additional defense raised by the amendment,

noting that “an ‘adverse party’s burden of undertaking discov-

ery, standing alone, does not suffice to warrant denial of a

motion to amend a pleading.’ ” Dennis, 207 F.3d at 526 (quot-

ing United States ex rel. Maritime Admin. v. Cont’l Ill. Nat’l

Bank & Trust Co., 889 F.2d 1248, 1255 (2d Cir. 1989)). The

court further reasoned that the three months remaining until

trial was ample time to conduct any further discovery that

may have been required. Id.

Similar to DCD, the trial date in the instant case had not

even been set at the time AmerisourceBergen filed its motion

to amend. The district court already had found that there was

good cause to modify the pretrial schedule, giving the parties

six additional months to file motions to amend, to complete

discovery, and to file dispositive motions. AmerisourceBer-

gen’s motion was filed less than two months after the court

had modified the schedule, and well before the deadline estab-

lished by the modified schedule. Thus, this case falls squarely

within the reasoning of DCD, Dennis, and Halbert.

The majority asserts that this case is distinguishable from

DCD and Halbert because the district court provided suffi-

cient reasons to justify the denial of the leave to amend. Maj.

op. at 17323. The district court relied primarily on a finding

of prejudice to Dialysist West in denying the motion to

amend, but the court did not explain how Dialysist West

would be prejudiced. We have noted that “[b]ald assertions of

prejudice cannot overcome the strong policy reflected in Rule

15(a) to ‘facilitate a proper disposition on the merits.’ ” Hurn

v. Ret. Fund Trust of the Plumbing, Heating & Piping Indus.,

648 F.2d 1252, 1254 (9th Cir. 1981) (quoting Conley v. Gib-

son, 355 U.S. 41, 48 (1957)); see also Eminence Capital, 316

F.3d at 1052 (“A simple denial of leave to amend without any

explanation by the district court is subject to reversal. Such a

AMERISOURCEBERGEN v. DIALYSIST WEST 17335

judgment is ‘not an exercise of discretion; it is merely abuse

of that discretion and inconsistent with the spirit of the Fed-

eral Rules.’ ” (quoting Foman, 371 U.S. at 182)).

The majority asserts that the proposed amendment would

have imposed “potentially high, additional litigation costs on

Dialysist West.”3 Maj. op. at 17324. AmerisourceBergen dis-

putes the district court’s statement that the parties agreed that

the proposed amendment would require further discovery.4

Even if further discovery were required, however, nearly eight

months remained before the discovery cutoff date — a dead-

line based on the parties’ own stipulation. Given that the par-

ties had agreed on this schedule, it is difficult to understand

how Dialysist West could have been prejudiced, even if fur-

ther discovery were required.

The reason the majority gives for the potential additional

litigation costs is that AmerisourceBergen “drastically

changed its litigation theory.” Maj. op. at 17324. Yet Ameri-

sourceBergen alleged in its proposed amendment that it pur-

chased both Epogen and Procrit from Dialysist West, the two

are identical drugs, they are manufactured by the same com-

pany, although Procrit is marketed by a different company,

and both drugs were the subject of announcements regarding

counterfeit products. The assertion that the addition of the

Procrit claim constitutes a drastic change in AmerisourceBer-

gen’s litigation theory is thus not supported by the record.

Dialysist West bore the burden of showing that it would be

prejudiced by the proposed amendment. See Eminence Capi-

3

There is no denying that litigation costs today are high. But if the “high

cost” of additional litigation were a sufficient showing of prejudice, then

virtually all but the most innocuous amendments could be denied as “prej-

udicial.” This surely cannot be the standard for denying leave to amend.

4

In its memorandum in support of its motion to amend, Amerisource-

Bergen disputed Dialysist West’s assertions regarding the need for further

discovery that would arise from the proposed amendment.

17336 AMERISOURCEBERGEN v. DIALYSIST WEST

tal, 316 F.3d at 1052. Dialysist West did not contend, and the

district court did not find, that any additional discovery that

might have been required could not have been completed

within the time remaining before the discovery cutoff date.

The need to undertake additional discovery cannot be classi-

fied as prejudice so long as ample time remains, as it did in

this case, to complete that discovery before the discovery cut-

off date. See, e.g., Arthur v. Maersk, Inc., 434 F.3d 196, 206

(3d Cir. 2006) (finding no prejudice where the plaintiff’s pro-

posed amendment was filed eleven months after the original

complaint, reasoning that the defendant “had not argued that

the delay impaired its ability to defend against the suit or that

it ‘was unfairly disadvantaged or deprived of the opportunity

to present facts or evidence which it would have offered had

the . . . amendment [ ] been timely’ ”) (quoting Bechtel v.

Robinson, 886 F.2d 644, 652 (3d Cir. 1989)) (alterations in

original); Dennis, 207 F.3d at 526 (stating that the mere fact

that an adverse party must undertake discovery does not suf-

fice to warrant denying a motion to amend); DCD, 833 F.2d

at 188 (reasoning that, because the case was at the discovery

stage, there was no evidence of prejudice). After all, discov-

ery is an ordinary incident and burden of litigation sanctioned

by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. I thus disagree with

the majority’s characterization of the need to conduct discov-

ery as prejudicial. The majority simply misunderstands the

meaning of “prejudice” in this context — or willfully misap-

plies it.

As in DCD and Dennis, I would therefore hold that Dialy-

sist West has failed to demonstrate any prejudice from the

proposed amendment, let alone prejudice sufficient to over-

come the presumption in favor of granting leave to amend.

See, e.g., Adam v. Hawaii, 235 F.3d 1160, 1164 (9th Cir.

2001) (concluding that the district court erred by denying the

motion to amend where the defendants failed to identify any

prejudice they would suffer from the amendment and “at this

point in the proceedings, there has been no discovery, nor has

a trial date been set”), overruled on other grounds by Green

AMERISOURCEBERGEN v. DIALYSIST WEST 17337

v. City of Tucson, 255 F.3d 1086 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc);

S.S. Silberblatt, Inc. v. E. Harlem Pilot Bock Bldg. 1 Hous.

Dev. Fund Co., 608 F.2d 28, 42-43 (2d Cir. 1979) (reversing

the denial of the appellant’s motion for leave to amend, reject-

ing the appellee’s argument that it would suffer undue preju-

dice because of the extensive discovery that would be

required, stating that this was insufficient to overcome the

policy in favor of permitting amendment, “particularly when

trial has not yet commenced and is not likely to do so for

some time”).

The district court also stated that AmerisourceBergen’s

proposed amendment sought to contradict established facts of

the case. The majority similarly relies on this reasoning. See

Maj. Op. at 17323-24. But this is the very nature and purpose

of an amendment. “ ‘[A]n amended pleading supersedes the

original.’ ” Armstrong v. Davis, 275 F.3d 849, 878 n.40 (9th

Cir. 2001) (quoting Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner

& Co., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1989)) (alteration in the

original). Thus, although “a statement in a complaint may

serve as a judicial admission,” the admission is no longer

binding if the party subsequently amends the pleading. Sicor

Ltd. v. Cetus Corp., 51 F.3d 848, 859 (9th Cir. 1995); see

also, e.g., 188 LLC v. Trinity Indus., 300 F.3d 730, 736 (7th

Cir. 2002) (“When a party has amended a pleading, allega-

tions and statements in earlier pleadings are not considered

judicial admissions.”); 3 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore’s

Federal Practice § 15.17[3] (3d ed. 2005) (stating that, “in the

more usual scenario, a court may permit a party amending a

pleading to withdraw an admission contained in the original

pleading”). I therefore disagree with the majority that “the

district court . . . provided sufficient ‘justifying reasons’ for

denying AmerisourceBergen’s leave to amend.” Maj. op. at

17323.

Finally, the majority asserts that permitting the amendment

“would have unfairly delayed Dialysist West’s collection of

a judgment worth over $2.2 million.” Maj. op. at 17324-25.

17338 AMERISOURCEBERGEN v. DIALYSIST WEST

There is nothing in the record, however, to support the asser-

tion that final judgment would have been unnecessarily

delayed. The pretrial conference date had previously been

vacated and no trial date had been set, and there was ample

time left before the discovery cutoff date to conduct any nec-

essary discovery. Thus, nothing in this record supports the

majority’s assertion of unnecessary delay.

The district court abused its discretion in denying Ameri-

sourceBergen’s timely motion to amend in the absence of any

showing of prejudice by Dialysist West.

2. Stay of the Judgment.

I also believe that the district court abused its discretion in

denying AmerisourceBergen’s motion to stay the judgment

pursuant to Rule 62(h). After directing entry of final judgment

pursuant to Rule 54(b) against AmerisourceBergen on Dialy-

sist West’s second claim for relief in its counterclaim, the dis-

trict court denied AmerisourceBergen’s motion to stay the

judgment pursuant to Rule 62(h). To support its order, the dis-

trict court stated only that AmerisourceBergen’s motion was

based on Dialysist West’s insolvency, and that it had consid-

ered the issue in its prior order and found the argument unper-

suasive. But the insolvency analysis under Rule 62(h) is

different from the insolvency analysis under Rule 54(b), and

the district court did not make that analysis.

This case involved several claims and counterclaims. The

district court directed entry of judgment on the pleadings with

respect to Dialysist West’s second claim for relief in its coun-

terclaim, related to non-Epogen products. Still at issue are

AmerisourceBergen’s claims regarding Epogen and Dialysist

West’s first claim for relief. Although the district court ruled

against AmerisourceBergen on the set-off issue, Amerisource-

Bergen’s claim regarding the counterfeit Epogen remains.

AmerisourceBergen argued below that enforcement of the

judgment should be stayed because of Dialysist West’s insol-

AMERISOURCEBERGEN v. DIALYSIST WEST 17339

vency. The district court docket indicates that Dialysist West

had, in fact, filed for bankruptcy as of May 2004.

In Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. General Electric Co., 446 U.S.

1 (1980), the Supreme Court examined the district court’s

entry of final judgment under Rule 54(b), in favor of Curtiss-

Wright, on some of the claims in a multi-claim suit. The dis-

trict court’s entry of judgment was based, in part, on the fact

that the litigation on the remaining claims would continue for

months, if not years, and on the determination that both liti-

gants were financially sound. The Supreme Court agreed that,

although General Electric’s pending counterclaims created the

possibility of a set-off against the amount it owed Curtiss-

Wright, Curtiss-Wright was financially sound and would be

able to satisfy any judgment on the counterclaims. Id. at 11-

12. The Court further stated that, “if Curtiss-Wright were

under a threat of insolvency, that factor alone would weigh

against qualifying” because the threat alone would cast doubt

on Curtiss-Wright’s ability to satisfy any counterclaims, if

General Electric were to prevail. Id. at 12. The Court noted

that Rule 62(h) would allow the district court to protect the

parties by having the losing party deposit the amount of the

judgment with the court, such that “valid considerations of

economic duress and solvency, which do not affect the juridi-

cal considerations involved in a Rule 54(b) determination, can

be provided for without preventing Rule 54(b) certification.”

Id. at 13 n.3.

The Supreme Court again cited the threat of insolvency in

Reiter v. Cooper, 507 U.S. 258 (1993), in which the issue was

whether, “when a shipper defends against a motor common

carrier’s suit to collect tariff rates with the claim that the tariff

rates were unreasonable, the court should proceed immedi-

ately to judgment on the carrier’s complaint without waiting

for the Interstate Commerce Commission . . . to rule on the

reasonableness issue.” Id. at 260. The Court concluded that

the “ordinary rules governing counterclaims” applied and

stated that, “[i]n the ordinary case, where a carrier is solvent

17340 AMERISOURCEBERGEN v. DIALYSIST WEST

and has promptly initiated suit, the equities favor separate

judgment on the principal claim.” Id. at 270. The equities to

be balanced in a Rule 54(b) consideration “change, however,

when the suing carrier is in bankruptcy.” Id. Although insol-

vency is not an “absolute bar” to Rule 54(b) certification, the

Court reasoned that a district court could protect against the

threat of insolvency by entering separate judgment but staying

enforcement of the judgment under Rule 62(h). Id. at 270-71.

Curtiss-Wright and Reiter thus indicate that, although entry of

a final judgment under Rule 54(b) may be proper, the district

court should rely on Rule 62(h) to protect the parties when

there are “valid considerations of economic duress and sol-

vency.” Curtiss-Wright, 446 U.S. at 13 n.3; see Pereira v.

Cogan, 275 B.R. 472, 475 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (“ ‘[t]he Supreme

Court has suggested that where Rule 54(b) certification is

appropriate, courts can protect all parties against the

uncertainties posed by the possibility of a large setoff and by

the possibility of the insolvency of a judgment debtor’ ” by

staying enforcement pursuant to Rule 62(h) and having the

losing party deposit the amount of the judgment with the

court) (quoting Bowne of New York City, Inc. v. AmBase

Corp., 161 F.R.D. 270, 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)).

The district court here denied AmerisourceBergen’s motion

to stay enforcement of the judgment without any discussion,

stating only that it had considered AmerisourceBergen’s argu-

ment regarding Dialysist West’s insolvency when it granted

Dialysist West’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, and

citing its prior order. But the discussion cited by the district

court regarding Dialysist West’s “alleged threat of insolven-

cy” was made in the context of AmerisourceBergen’s argu-

ment that it was entitled to equitable set-off because of

Dialysist West’s insolvency, which is a completely different

question from that raised by the motion under Rule 62(h).

AmerisourceBergen sought a stay of the enforcement of the

judgment because of Dialysist West’s undisputed insolvency

and the claims that remained to be resolved. The Supreme

AMERISOURCEBERGEN v. DIALYSIST WEST 17341

Court’s references to Rule 62(h) in Curtiss-Wright and Reiter

indicate that the instant case presents exactly the type of situa-

tion in which a stay of the enforcement of the judgment is

appropriate. For example, in a case similar to the instant case

that involved multiple claims and counterclaims, the First Cir-

cuit reasoned that, unlike Curtiss-Wright, the plaintiff “would

likely be left with no way to collect” if it established its

claims, because the defendant was insolvent. ITV Direct, Inc.

v. Healthy Solutions, LLC, 445 F.3d 66, 73 (1st Cir. 2006).

Nonetheless, the court affirmed the district court’s entry of

judgment under Rule 54(b) because the plaintiff had dis-

missed its claims, but noted that the plaintiff “was not com-

pelled to dismiss its claims against [the defendant] simply

because the district court ruled against it on the 54(b) certifi-

cation,” citing Rule 62(h). Id.; see also, e.g., Schieffelin & Co.

v. Valley Liquors, Inc., 823 F.2d 1064, 1066 (7th Cir. 1987)

(affirming the entry of final judgment under Rule 54(b)

despite a remaining counterclaim, but noting that “enforce-

ment might have been stayed under appropriate conditions

under Rule 62(h),” although the party did not make such a

claim); Navajo Tribe of Indians v. United States, 364 F.2d

320, 347 (Ct. Cl. 1966) (holding that, although the plaintiff

was entitled to entry of a separate final judgment, payment of

the judgment should be stayed pursuant to Rule 62(h) because

the validity of the defendant’s counterclaim had not yet been

determined); EMI Music Mktg. v. Avatar Records, Inc., 317

F. Supp. 2d 412, 424-25 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (directing the entry

of final judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b) but staying enforce-

ment of the judgment because of the claims and counterclaims

that remained to be resolved and the possibility that the judg-

ment might be reduced if the defendant prevailed on its coun-

terclaims).

The majority reasons that staying the judgment would “ef-

fectively sanction” AmerisourceBergen’s “self-help tactics”

because, if it succeeds on its Epogen claim, it “will have

avoided paying funds it owes Dialysist West and would

unjustifiably leap-frog other creditors.” Maj. op. at 17328.

17342 AMERISOURCEBERGEN v. DIALYSIST WEST

AmerisourceBergen cannot continue to litigate its Epogen

claim, however, because Dialysist West has filed for bank-

ruptcy and, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1), the case has

been stayed by the district court. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (stat-

ing that a bankruptcy petition operates as a stay of, inter alia,

the continuation of a judicial proceeding against the debtor

that was commenced prior to the bankruptcy filing); McCar-

thy, Johnson & Miller v. North Bay Plumbing, Inc. (In re Pet-

tit), 217 F.3d 1072, 1077 (9th Cir. 2000) (explaining that the

automatic stay under § 362 enjoins the continuation of any

judicial proceedings against the debtor and the enforcement of

prior judgments). Furthermore, even if AmerisourceBergen

were permitted by the bankruptcy court to proceed with its

action and then succeed on its Epogen claim, it still would be

prohibited from enforcing its judgment by the automatic stay.

See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (further stating that the bankruptcy

petition stays a proceeding to recover a claim against the

debtor that arose before the commencement of the bankruptcy

case); Delpit v. Comm’r, 18 F.3d 768, 772 (9th Cir. 1994)

(stating that “a creditor’s attempt to enforce a pre-bankruptcy

judgment outside of Bankruptcy Court would violate four pro-

visions of Section 362 simultaneously”). AmerisourceBergen

would simply become an unsecured creditor, in line with Dia-

lysist West’s other unsecured creditors. Cf. Shoen v. Shoen (In

re Shoen), 176 F.3d 1150, 1153 n.1 (9th Cir. 1999) (Mc-

Keown, J., dissenting) (stating that there was no dispute that

the appellees, “as judgment creditors, but not lien creditors,

hold unsecured claims”). Thus, contrary to the majority’s

assertion, maj. op. at 17328, AmerisourceBergen is prevented

by the Bankruptcy Code from “leap-frogging” Dialysist

West’s other creditors.

As discussed supra, Curtiss-Wright and Reiter indicate

that, when multiple claims and counterclaims are involved,

and the district court grants certification under Rule 54(b),

“valid considerations of economic duress and solvency” can

be addressed by the use of Rule 62(h) to “protect all parties.”

Curtiss-Wright, 446 U.S. at 13 n.3. When Dialysist West filed

AMERISOURCEBERGEN v. DIALYSIST WEST 17343

for bankruptcy, the judgment awarded on its second counter-

claim became the property of the bankruptcy estate. See 11

U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (describing property of the estate as “all

legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the

commencement of the [bankruptcy] case”); Myron M. Shein-

feld et al., 3 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 541.08[5] (Lawrence P.

King, ed., 15th ed. rev. 2005) (“Where a cause of action

belonging to the debtor has been merged into judgment prior

to bankruptcy, the estate succeeds to all rights under such

judgment.”). Staying enforcement of the judgment would not

have allowed AmerisourceBergen to avoid payment of the

judgment and step in line ahead of other creditors; the Bank-

ruptcy Code provides numerous protections of the property of

the estate, such as the automatic stay and the avoidance of

fraudulent or preferential transfers. Rather, a stay would have

served the purpose contemplated by the Supreme Court in

Curtiss-Wright of protecting AmerisourceBergen’s claims

against Dialysist West’s insolvency.5

Because the district court failed to conduct any analysis of

AmerisourceBergen’s Rule 62(h) motion and did not consider

the effect of Dialysist West’s insolvency on its ability to sat-

isfy any claims of AmerisourceBergen, I believe that the court

abused its discretion in denying the Rule 62(h) motion.

5

The majority apparently believes that the only right of Amerisource-

Bergen protectable by a stay is its equitable right of setoff. Maj. op. at

17328 n.12. This narrow focus, however, ignores that if the district court

had allowed AmerisourceBergen to amend its reply, as I believe it should

have, Dialysist West would not have been entitled to judgment on the

pleadings on its second counterclaim because AmerisourceBergen would

have been able to dispute the genuineness of the non-Epogen products on

which that claim was based. Thus, the majority’s assumption that Ameri-

sourceBergen’s only right to payment from Dialysist West was based on

setoff is incorrect. AmerisourceBergen’s own claims against Dialysist

West remained and still remain undetermined, and its ability to collect on

those claims, should it ultimately prevail, is jeopardized by Dialysist

West’s bankruptcy.

17344 AMERISOURCEBERGEN v. DIALYSIST WEST

For the foregoing reasons, I would reverse the judgment of

the district court. I respectfully dissent.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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