Linda Mays v. H.G. Rhodes

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 00-1822

___________

Linda Mays, Personal representative *

of the estate of Steven Anthony Mays, *

deceased, *

*

Appellee, *

*

v. *

* Appeal from the United States

H. G. Rhodes, Major, individually and * District Court for the

as employee of the Arkansas * Eastern District of Arkansas.

Department of Corrections; Larry A. *

Teal, Field Lt., individually and as *

employee of the Arkansas Department *

of Corrections; J. Andrews, Sergeant, *

individually and as employee of the *

Arkansas Department of Corrections, *

*

Appellants. *

___________

Submitted: January 10, 2001

Filed: June 29, 2001

___________

Before RICHARD S. ARNOLD and BOWMAN, Circuit Judges, and KYLE,1 District

Judge.

___________

1

The Honorable Richard H. Kyle, United States District Judge for the District

of Minnesota, sitting by designation.

BOWMAN, Circuit Judge.

In early November 1996, Steven Mays became an inmate at the East Arkansas

Regional Unit. On November 6, he began his first day of work on a hoe squad under

the supervision of Sergeant Jeremy Andrews. Steven completed the morning session,

took a lunch break, and returned to work for the afternoon session. At mid-afternoon,

with the temperature reaching only seventy-two degrees, Steven collapsed. Andrews

called for assistance. Lieutenant Larry Teal responded and after investigating Steven's

condition called Major Harry Rhodes, who transported Steven to the prison infirmary.

After initial treatment and diagnosis, infirmary personnel transferred Steven to a

hospital. He never regained consciousness and died later the next day, his death

apparently resulting from heat exhaustion.

Linda Mays, the decedent's mother, initiated a § 1983 suit as the personal

representative of Steven's estate. She alleged that Rhodes, Teal, and Andrews2 violated

Steven's Eighth Amendment rights by requiring him to continue working after he

exhibited signs of heat exhaustion and by delaying medical treatment after he collapsed.

The officers argued that qualified immunity shielded them from suit and moved for

summary judgment. The District Court denied the officers' claim of qualified immunity,

and they appeal. We reverse.

I.

We first consider Linda Mays's argument that we lack jurisdiction to hear this

interlocutory appeal. Although the denial of summary judgment generally does not

create the finality required for appellate jurisdiction, the Supreme Court has repeatedly

instructed that "a district court's denial of a claim of qualified immunity, to the extent

2

The original complaint also named Warden Marvin Evans as a defendant, but

the District Court granted his motion to dismiss. That order has not been appealed.

-2-

that it turns on an issue of law, is an appealable 'final decision' within the meaning of

28 U.S.C. § 1291 notwithstanding the absence of a final judgment." Mitchell v.

Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530 (1985); accord Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 306

(1996); Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 311 (1995). In adjudicating the officers' claim

of qualified immunity in this case, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to

Mays, and our decision turns on whether, so viewed, the officers as a matter of law are

entitled to qualified immunity. We have jurisdiction to hear this appeal. See McCaslin

v. Wilkins, 183 F.3d 775, 778 (8th Cir. 1999); Collins v. Bellinghausen, 153 F.3d 591,

595 (8th Cir. 1998).

II.

Qualified immunity generally shields public officials performing discretionary

functions from civil liability if "their conduct does not violate clearly established

statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known."

Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). We perform a three-part inquiry in

order to determine whether a plaintiff's lawsuit can proceed against a defendant public

official despite his assertion of qualified immunity at the summary-judgment stage.

Hunter v. Namanny, 219 F.3d 825, 829 (8th Cir. 2000); Habiger v. City of Fargo, 80

F.3d 289, 295 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1011 (1996). First, the plaintiff must

assert a violation of a constitutional or statutory right. Hunter, 219 F.3d at 829.

Second, the right allegedly violated must be clearly established. Id. Third, the record,

viewed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, must show genuine issues of material

fact as to whether a reasonable official would have known that his course of conduct

violated that right. Id. Only after a court determines that each requirement has been

satisfied may an official be denied qualified immunity when he seeks summary

judgment on that ground.

-3-

A.

Because the qualified-immunity question in this case arises at the summary-

judgment stage, we "must take as true those facts asserted by [the] plaintiff that are

properly supported in the record." Tlamka v. Serrell, 244 F.3d 628, 632 (8th Cir.

2001); see also Behrens, 516 U.S. at 309 ("On summary judgment . . . the plaintiff can

no longer rest on the pleadings and the court looks to the evidence before it (in the light

most favorable to the plaintiff) when conducting the Harlow [qualified immunity]

inquiry.") (citation omitted).

The record shows that prior to Steven's collapse, James Mays, Steven's brother

who was also incarcerated at the same prison, spoke to Steven during their lunch break.

In deposition testimony, James stated that Steven told him that during the morning work

session he had been hit in the head with a hoe and had been falling down, but after

going to the infirmary he was told that nothing was wrong with him. James Mays's

testimony does not provide any indication that Steven complained about any other

physical troubles. The record also includes the deposition testimony of Dr. J. R. Barber

who examined Steven's medical files and concluded that he likely had to have been

"worked to death" in order to have died from heat stroke in seventy-two degree

weather. Barber further stated that possible signs of heat stroke include fainting, thirst,

fatigue, nausea, vomiting, and headaches, but admitted that he had no way of knowing

if any such signs were displayed by Steven.

The record reveals that although Steven was overweight at two hundred eighty

pounds and six feet tall, he had been medically cleared, without restriction, for work

detail. Andrews, the officer who supervised Steven's hoe squad, provided hourly

breaks, during which time inmates could drink water, use the bathroom, smoke, and

rest. Andrews testified at his deposition that Steven had not complained of, or

displayed, any unusual physical condition prior to his collapse, and he was keeping up

with the rest of the squad. After Steven collapsed, Andrews ordered him to get up.

-4-

When Steven failed to respond, Andrews promptly called Lieutenant Teal for help.3

He then ordered another inmate to take water to Steven, but Steven was unable to drink

the water.

Teal stated in his deposition testimony that when he arrived he spoke to Steven

but received no response. He then put water on Steven in order to cool him off. Still

unable to revive Steven, Teal called Major Rhodes for assistance, who arrived

approximately five minutes later with a truck. Rhodes testified at his deposition that

he placed Steven in handcuffs and transported him to the infirmary. On the way to the

infirmary, he radioed the tower to alert infirmary personnel that he was bringing them

an inmate in need of medical care. When Rhodes arrived, he helped waiting medical

personnel move Steven to a gurney. He then removed the handcuffs from Steven,

secured him to the gurney, and left him in the care of medical personnel. Rhodes

testified that less than five minutes elapsed between the time he arrived at the scene of

Steven's collapse and the time he delivered Steven into medical care at the infirmary.

Linda Mays argues that evidence in the record contradicts the officers' account

of the events and supports her allegations that they violated Steven's constitutional

rights. Mays heavily relies on an unsigned, handwritten account of the events

surrounding Steven's collapse, which Mays contends is from an inmate who witnessed

the events. Mays also relies on unsworn accounts found in grievance forms filed by

inmates on other work squads the day Steven collapsed.

While we review the record in the light most favorable to Mays as the non-

moving party, we do not stretch this favorable presumption so far as to consider as

evidence statements found only in inadmissible hearsay. See Fed R. Civ. P. 56(e);

3

Andrews stated that because he was armed, prison safety policies did not permit

him to dismount from his horse. When Teal arrived, he gave Andrews his weapon.

Andrews then stood watch as Teal investigated Steven's condition.

-5-

Cronquist v. City of Minneapolis, 237 F.3d 920, 927 (8th Cir. 2001) (holding that

affidavits based on hearsay cannot defeat a summary-judgment motion). The unsworn

accounts in question are inadmissible hearsay; moreover, Mays has failed to obtain

deposition testimony or affidavits from the inmates who gave these unsworn accounts,

and thus she has failed to provide any evidence from these sources that even potentially

would be admissible at trial. See Duluth News-Tribune v. Mesabi Publ'g Co., 84 F.3d

1093, 1098 (8th Cir. 1996) ("In evaluating the evidence at the summary judgment stage,

we consider only those responses that are supported by admissible evidence."); JRT,

Inc. v. TCBY Sys., Inc., 52 F.3d 734, 737 (8th Cir. 1995) ("[A] successful summary

judgment defense requires more than argument or re-allegation; [the party] must

demonstrate that at trial it may be able to put on admissible evidence proving its

allegations."); Walker v. Wayne County, Iowa, 850 F.2d 433, 434 (8th Cir. 1988)

(holding that courts considering a summary judgment motion "may consider only the

portion of the submitted materials that is admissible or usable at trial"), cert. denied,

488 U.S. 1008 (1989). Based on the admissible evidence in the summary-judgment

record, the officers' accounts of the events surrounding Steven's collapse stand

uncontradicted. We therefore need only address the legal question of whether those

facts support a denial of qualified immunity to the officers.

B.

In order to decide whether the officers' actions were objectively reasonable and

thus whether they are entitled to qualified immunity, we must examine the underlying

rights Mays accuses them of violating. She contends that the record supports two

distinct violations of Steven's Eighth Amendment rights. First, she argues that the

officials caused Steven's death by working him to the point where he collapsed of heat

stroke. Claims that a prisoner's assigned work exceeded his physical capacity are

covered under the Eighth Amendment, and require a showing that an official was

deliberately indifferent to a known serious medical need. See Choate v. Lockhart, 7

F.3d 1370, 1373-74 (8th Cir. 1993). In this context, deliberate indifference requires

-6-

a showing that Andrews4 knowingly compelled Steven to perform physical labor that

was beyond his strength, dangerous to his health, or unduly painful. Id. at 1374;

Williams v. Norris, 148 F.3d 983, 987 (8th Cir. 1998). The record, however, contains

no admissible evidence that would show that Andrews knew he was compelling Steven

to work in disregard of a known serious medical need. Steven had been medically

cleared with no restrictions and the record is devoid of admissible evidence that would

show Steven displayed any signs of physical difficulty prior to his collapse that would

have alerted Andrews to a medical need. Andrews categorically denies that Steven

manifested any such signs. We conclude there are no genuine issues of material fact

concerning whether a reasonable official, standing in Andrews's shoes, would have

known that his supervision of Steven constituted deliberate indifference to a known

medical need.

Linda Mays also alleges that the officers violated Steven's Eighth Amendment

rights by improperly treating him following his collapse. The Eighth Amendment

"obligat[es] prison officials to provide medical care to inmates in their custody."

Tlamka, 244 F.3d at 632-33. In order to demonstrate a violation of Steven's right to

medical care, Mays must show that the officers were deliberately indifferent to Steven's

serious medical needs. Id. at 633; Gregoire v. Class, 236 F.3d 413, 417 (8th Cir.

2000). Deliberate indifference requires proof that Steven suffered objectively serious

medical needs and that the officials actually knew of these needs but deliberately

disregarded them. Tlamka, 244 F.3d at 633. There is no question that, at the time of

his collapse, Steven required medical attention. The evidence establishes, however,

that Andrews responded in a quick, reasonable manner while still maintaining the

necessary security of the hoe squad. He promptly called for the assistance of Teal who,

4

The record shows that Teal and Rhodes only became involved after Steven

collapsed, and therefore took no actions that exposed them to liability on this theory.

Nor are they subject to § 1983 liability on a respondeat superior theory. Tlamka, 244

F.3d at 635.

-7-

after arriving a few minutes later and attempting to revive Steven, radioed Rhodes.

Rhodes arrived soon afterwards and promptly transported Steven in a truck to the

prison infirmary. There is no evidence that would support a finding of deliberate

indifference toward Steven's medical condition on the part of Andrews, Teal, or

Rhodes.

In sum, considering all the admissible evidence in the summary-judgment record,

Mays has failed to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether a reasonable

officer would have known he was violating Steven's Eighth Amendment rights either

before or after his collapse. We conclude that as a matter of law the officers' actions

were objectively reasonable in light of what they knew at the time, and that they are

entitled to qualified immunity. Accordingly, the decision of the District Court denying

the officers qualified immunity is reversed and the case is remanded for dismissal.

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.

-8-