Yarris v. County of Delaware

Opinions of the United

2006 Decisions States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

10-2-2006

Yarris v. Delaware

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Precedential

Docket No. 05-1319

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PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 05-1319

NICHOLAS YARRIS

v.

COUNTY OF DELAWARE; BARRY GROSS, ESQUIRE;

WILLIAM H. RYAN, JR.; DENNIS MCANDREWS,

ESQUIRE; OFFICE OF DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF

DELAWARE COUNTY; CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION

DIVISION, RANDOLPH MARTIN, Criminal Investigation

Division, Office of the District Attorney Delaware County;

DAVID PFEIFER, Criminal Investigation Division, Office of

the District Attorney Delaware County; CLIFTON MINSHALL,

Criminal Investigation Division, Office of the District Attorney

Delaware County; CRAIG SITI, Investigator, Criminal

Investigation Division, Office of the District Attorney Delaware

County,

Appellants

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. No. 04-cv-03804)

District Judge: Honorable Juan R. Sánchez

Argued April 24, 2006

Before: FUENTES, STAPLETON, and ALARCÓN,* Circuit

Judges.

(Filed: October 2, 2006)

John W. Beavers, Esq. (Argued)

John Wendell Beavers & Associates

1518 Walnut Street, Suite 800

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19102

Counsel for Appellee

William F. Holsten, II, Esq.

Robert P. DiDomenicis, Esq.

Paola T. Kaczynski

Holsten & Associates

One South Olive Street

Media, Pennsylvania 19063

William J. Convoy, Esq.

C. Scott Toomey, Esq. (Argued)

Campbell Campbell Edwards & Convoy

690 Lee Road, Suite 300

Wayne, Pennsylvania 19087

Counsel for Appellants

_______________________

OPINION OF THE COURT

_______________________

FUENTES, Circuit Judge.

Nicholas Yarris claims he spent twenty-two years on death

row for a kidnaping, rape, and murder he did not commit because

*

The Honorable Arthur L. Alarcón, Senior Judge, United

States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, sitting by

designation.

2

Delaware County, its prosecutors, and its detectives obscured and

destroyed evidence pointing to the actual killer, manufactured

evidence against him, and thwarted his demands for DNA testing.

After Yarris’s conviction was overturned and the charges against

him were dropped, he filed this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

alleging violations of his rights under the United States

Constitution and Pennsylvania law. The prosecutors and detectives

moved to dismiss Yarris’s claims on the basis of absolute and

qualified immunity. The District Court denied the motion to

dismiss in part, and this appeal followed. We are asked to

determine whether the District Court properly concluded that the

prosecutors and detectives are not entitled to immunity from any of

Yarris’s claims. For the reasons that follow, we will affirm in part,

reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.

I. Background

A. Factual Background1

In 1981, Yarris was arrested and charged with attempted

murder after assaulting a police officer during a traffic stop. Yarris

was subsequently placed in solitary confinement in a Delaware

County prison. Yarris was addicted to methamphetamine at the

time of his arrest, and he began suffering from “cold turkey”

withdrawal.

While in prison, Yarris learned from a newspaper of the

unsolved kidnaping, rape, and murder of Linda Mae Craig, which

took place four days before Yarris’s arrest. In an effort to bargain

for release from prison, Yarris told Delaware County detectives

Randolph Martin (“Martin”) and David Pfeifer (“Pfeifer”) that he

had information about the Craig murder. He told the detectives

that a fellow drug addict had admitted to raping and murdering

Craig, but that the addict had since died from a drug overdose. In

1

Because this is an appeal of the District Court’s denial of

absolute and qualified immunity at the motion-to-dismiss stage of

the proceedings, we accept Yarris’s allegations as true and draw all

reasonable inferences in his favor. See Torisky v. Schweiker, 446

F.3d 438, 442 (3d Cir. 2006).

3

fact, Yarris was wrong and it was the addict’s brother who had died

from an overdose. After determining that Yarris’s information was

incorrect, Martin and Pfeifer returned Yarris to solitary

confinement and told him that unless he came up with a better story

they would think he had raped and murdered Craig.

After a failed suicide attempt and a brief hospital stay,

Yarris was again returned to solitary confinement. Yarris claims

that he was placed in a freezing cell with broken windows, without

any clothes, sheets, or blankets. Seeking a transfer to a different

cell, Yarris offered to share more information about the Craig

murder with a prison guard. According to the prison guard, Yarris

said that he raped Craig, but that another man murdered her. The

day after Yarris’s conversation with the guard, Yarris was charged

with kidnaping, robbing, raping, and murdering Craig.

Before proceeding to trial for the Craig murder, Yarris was

tried and acquitted for the crime for which he was initially arrested

and jailed—the attempted murder of a police officer. After the

verdict, the prosecutor assigned to the case, assistant district

attorney Barry Gross (“Gross”), allegedly slammed his case file

against the courtroom wall, screamed at Yarris, “Motherfucker,

you’ll never leave the county alive!” and spat in Yarris’s face.

Yarris subsequently went to trial for the Craig murder, with

Gross prosecuting the case. At trial, the prosecution introduced

into evidence a photograph of the bloody interior of the victim’s

car, which showed a pair of men’s leather gloves inside the vehicle.

The prosecution had never informed Yarris that the gloves existed

and, according to Yarris, had determined that the gloves were too

small to fit Yarris. Nonetheless, the prosecution led the jury to

infer that Yarris’s fingerprints were not found in the vehicle

because he wore the gloves. In addition to two witnesses who

testified that they observed Yarris stalking the victim, the

prosecution presented the testimony of Charles Catalino, a

jailhouse informant who stated that Yarris confessed his guilt while

the two were detained in adjacent cells at the Delaware County

prison. Yarris claims the informant testified against him in

exchange for a reduced sentence and visits with his wife. On July

1, 1982, the jury found Yarris guilty on all counts and returned a

verdict recommending imposition of the death penalty. Yarris was

4

formally sentenced to death on January 24, 1983. The

Pennsylvania Supreme Court eventually affirmed Yarris’s

conviction and sentence in October of 1988.

In March of 1988, Yarris requested testing of the physical

evidence recovered from the crime scene using newly developed

DNA testing techniques. He was initially informed by the District

Attorney’s office that all of the relevant evidence had been

destroyed, except for two stained slides. The slides were tested,

but in August of 1988 the laboratory rejected them as being of

insufficient quantity for DNA testing.

After reviewing the transcripts of his criminal trial, Yarris

discovered the existence of two additional slides. Yarris contacted

the District Attorney’s office and assistant district attorney Dennis

McAndrews sent two detectives to retrieve the evidence and

transport it to the coroner and then to the laboratory. According to

Yarris, detectives Pfeifer and John Davidson2 never delivered the

slides to the coroner; instead, they kept the slides in a paper bag

under a detective’s desk where the slides eventually rotted and

were rendered useless for DNA testing. In 1989, additional

evidence in the form of the victim’s clothing was discovered.

Yarris successfully petitioned for DNA testing of this evidence in

November of 1989, but the results were inconclusive.

Beginning in 1989, Yarris began to request that evidence be

tested again, this time using a newer and more accurate type of

DNA testing known as PCR-enhanced DNA testing. The District

Attorney eventually agreed to additional testing of the evidence in

September 1992, but only if the testing was conducted by the

Alabama Department of Forensic Science, which Yarris alleges

was not competent in PCR-enhanced DNA testing. The test results

were inconclusive.

Yarris eventually sought habeas relief from the United

States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. In

2

Davidson died some time after engaging in the conduct

alleged in the Amended Complaint and, therefore, is not a

defendant in this action.

5

April of 2003, PCR-enhanced DNA testing was performed on the

gloves found in the victim’s car, and the results indicated that

Yarris was not the “habitual user” of the gloves. PCR-enhanced

DNA testing was then performed on semen stains found on the

victim’s clothing, and the results indicated that the sample did not

come from Yarris, but did come from two unknown males, one of

whom was the “habitual user” of the gloves. PCR-enhanced DNA

testing was then done on scrapings found under the victim’s

fingernails, which revealed that the scrapings were from the

“habitual user” of the gloves.

In light of the new evidence, on August 19, 2003, the district

court ordered that Yarris be granted a new trial within two weeks,

or that Yarris be set free. On August 26, 2003, the District

Attorney’s office and Yarris’s counsel filed a joint petition in the

Delaware County Court of Common Pleas requesting that the

conviction be vacated. The court vacated Yarris’s conviction and

sentence on September 3, 2003. After receiving a ninety-day

extension to consider whether to re-prosecute Yarris, the District

Attorney dropped all charges against Yarris on December 9, 2003.

Yarris was released from prison on January 16, 2004.

B. Procedural Background

Yarris commenced this action in the United States District

Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania on August 11, 2004.

In his complaint, Yarris named as defendants the County of

Delaware; the Office of the District Attorney of Delaware County;

the Criminal Investigation Division of the Office of the District

Attorney of Delaware County; Assistant District Attorneys Barry

Gross, Dennis McAndrews, and William H. Ryan, Jr.; and

Criminal Investigation Division Detectives Randolph Martin,

Clifton Minshall, David Pfeifer, and Craig Siti. Yarris later filed

an Amended Complaint, which contains two causes of action

arising out of Yarris’s arrest and conviction for murder in 1982: the

first for federal constitutional claims, and the second for claims

under Pennsylvania law.

The ADAs and CID Detectives moved, pursuant to Rule

12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, to dismiss the

Amended Complaint on the basis of, among other things, absolute

6

and qualified immunity. The District Court granted the motion as

to Yarris’s Fifth Amendment claim against all defendants, and

Yarris’s claims against Minshall, who is no longer living. Yarris

v. Delaware County, No. 04-cv-3804, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

4131, at *12-13 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 28, 2005). However, the District

Court denied the motion as to the remainder of Yarris’s claims

against Assistant District Attorneys Gross, McAndrews, and Ryan

(collectively, the “ADAs”), and Criminal Investigation Division

Detectives Martin, Pfeifer, and Siti (collectively, the “CID

Detectives”). Id. The ADAs and CID Detectives appealed the

District Court’s denial of absolute and qualified immunity.

II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review

The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343, as this case involves claims of

constitutional violations brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

The District Court had supplemental jurisdiction over Yarris’s state

law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). We have appellate

jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal of the District Court’s

order denying absolute and qualified immunity from Yarris’s

constitutional claims to the extent that the order turns on issues of

law. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530 (1985).

We exercise plenary review of the legal issues of absolute

and qualified immunity. See Kulwicki v. Dawson, 969 F.2d 1454,

1461 (3d Cir. 1992). We apply the same standard that district

courts apply at the motion-to-dismiss stage, and our review is

limited to the contents of the complaint and any attached exhibits.

See id. at 1462. We are thus concerned with neither the accuracy

of the facts alleged nor the merits of Yarris’s underlying claims.

We must construe the facts in the manner most favorable to Yarris,

in order to determine whether the state officials are entitled to

absolute or qualified immunity from any claims based on their

alleged conduct.

III. Discussion

The ADAs and CID Detectives argue that the District Court

should have granted their motion to dismiss because they are

immune from each of Yarris’s claims against them. Specifically,

7

the ADAs contend that they are entitled to either absolute or

qualified immunity, and the CID Detectives contend that they are

entitled to qualified immunity. We address these arguments in

turn.

A. The Assistant District Attorneys

1. Absolute Immunity From Yarris’s

Constitutional Claims

Although § 1983 purports to subject “[e]very person” acting

under color of state law to liability for depriving any other person

in the United States of “rights, privileges, or immunities secured by

the Constitution and laws,” the Supreme Court has recognized that

§ 1983 was not meant “to abolish wholesale all common-law

immunities.” Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967). To that

end, the Court has identified two kinds of immunities under

§ 1983: qualified immunity and absolute immunity. Most public

officials are entitled only to qualified immunity.3 Harlow v.

Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 807 (1982). However, for public officials

who perform “special functions,” Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478,

508 (1978), the Court has determined that absolute immunity is

appropriate because it is “better to leave unredressed the wrongs

done by dishonest officers than to subject those who try to do their

duty to the constant dread of retaliation.” Imbler v. Pachtman, 424

U.S. 409, 418 (1976) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

“[T]he official seeking absolute immunity bears the burden of

showing that such immunity is justified for the function in

question.” Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 486 (1991).

In Imbler, the Supreme Court held that state prosecutors are

absolutely immune from liability under § 1983 for actions

performed in a quasi-judicial role. See 424 U.S. at 431. This

immunity extends to acts that are “intimately associated with the

judicial phase of the criminal process,” such as “initiating a

prosecution and . . . presenting the State’s case.” Id. at 430-31.

The Supreme Court has noted numerous public policy

3

We discuss qualified immunity in detail in Part III.B of this

opinion, infra.

8

considerations underlying its extension of absolute immunity to

prosecutors:

[S]uits against prosecutors for initiating and

conducting prosecutions “could be expected with

some frequency, for a defendant often will transform

his resentment at being prosecuted into the ascription

of improper and malicious actions to the State’s

advocate”; lawsuits would divert prosecutors’

attention and energy away from their important duty

of enforcing the criminal law; prosecutors would

have more difficulty than other officials in meeting

the standards for qualified immunity; and potential

liability “would prevent the vigorous and fearless

performance of the prosecutor’s duty that is essential

to the proper functioning of the criminal justice

system.” . . . [T]here are other checks on

prosecutorial misconduct, including the criminal law

and professional discipline.

Burns, 500 U.S. at 485-86 (citing Imbler, 424 U.S. at 425, 427-28,

429).

Since extending absolute immunity to state prosecutors in

Imbler, the Supreme Court has clarified that absolute immunity

does not extend to “[a] prosecutor’s administrative duties and those

investigatory functions that do not relate to an advocate’s

preparation for the initiation of a prosecution or for judicial

proceedings.” Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 273 (1993);

see also Burns, 500 U.S. at 494-96. At the same time, the Court

has reaffirmed that “acts undertaken by a prosecutor in preparing

for the initiation of judicial proceedings or for trial, and which

occur in the course of his role as an advocate for the State, are

entitled to the protections of absolute immunity.” Buckley, 509

U.S. at 273.

Ultimately, whether a prosecutor is entitled to absolute

immunity depends on whether she establishes that she was

functioning as the state’s “advocate” while engaging in the alleged

conduct that gives rise to the constitutional violation. See id. at

274. As the Supreme Court explained in Kalina v. Fletcher, “in

9

determining immunity, we examine the nature of the function

performed, not the identity of the actor who performed it.” 522

U.S. 118, 127 (1997) (internal quotation marks, citation, and

footnote omitted).

Turning to the instant case, Yarris’s Amended Complaint

alleges that the ADAs engaged in conduct that violated Yarris’s

rights under the Fourth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments

to the United States Constitution.4 In support of these claims, the

Amended Complaint alleges that the ADAs deliberately destroyed

exculpatory evidence, withheld exculpatory evidence, fabricated a

false confession, and obtained a false statement from a jailhouse

informant.5 We analyze whether the ADAs are entitled to absolute

immunity from claims based on this alleged conduct below.

a. Deliberately Destroying Exculpatory

Evidence

The Amended Complaint alleges that the ADAs violated

Yarris’s Fourteenth Amendment rights when they “deliberately

destroyed . . . highly exculpatory information.”6 (Am. Compl.

4

The Amended Complaint also alleges that the ADAs’

conduct violated Yarris’s Fifth Amendment rights. As noted

above, however, the District Court dismissed that claim, and that

ruling is not now on appeal.

5

In denying absolute immunity to the ADAs, the District

Court stated that Yarris alleged that the ADAs “used torture and

physical coercion to extract incriminating statements.” As the

ADAs point out, however, although the Amended Complaint

alleges that the CID Detectives engaged in “torture” (Am. Compl.

¶ 91), there are no allegations that the ADAs did so. Accordingly,

this was not a proper basis on which to deny absolute immunity to

the ADAs.

6

The ADAs argue that “[t]he Complaint does not allege that

the ADA Appellants expunged or destroyed investigative notes

regarding the black gloves.” (Appellants’ Reply Br. at 13.) We

believe, however, that Yarris’s assertion that the ADAs deliberately

destroyed highly exculpatory information (Am. Compl. ¶ 92), is

10

¶ 92.) Although we have not directly addressed whether

prosecutors are absolutely immune from claims based on the

destruction of exculpatory evidence, we have denied absolute

immunity where a plaintiff alleged that a prosecutor knowingly

failed to preserve exculpatory evidence. See Henderson v. Fisher,

631 F.2d 1115, 1120 (3d Cir. 1980) (per curiam). We have also

observed that “courts have been unwilling to extend absolute

immunity to a prosecutor’s alleged perjury or destruction of

evidence when not closely connected to an ongoing criminal

prosecution.” Davis v. Grusemeyer, 996 F.2d 617, 630 n.28 (3d

Cir. 1993); but see Heidelberg v. Hammer, 577 F.2d 429, 432 (7th

Cir. 1978) (prosecutor absolutely immune from suit claiming that

he destroyed and falsified evidence).

We believe that destroying exculpatory evidence is not

related to a prosecutor’s prosecutorial function. Unlike decisions

on whether to withhold evidence from the defense, decisions to

destroy evidence are not related to a prosecutor’s prosecutorial

function. As our late colleague Judge Becker aptly observed in

Wilkinson v. Ellis, 484 F. Supp. 1072, 1083 (E.D. Pa. 1980):

[O]nce the decision is made not to furnish evidence to the

defense, no additional protectible prosecutorial discretion

is involved in deciding to dispose of it, and . . ., while

deciding not to furnish the prosecution’s evidence to the

defense may be an act of advocacy, throwing the evidence

away is not such an act.

Accordingly, the ADAs are not entitled to absolute immunity from

suit for constitutional violations caused by their alleged deliberate

destruction of exculpatory evidence.

b. Withholding Exculpatory Evidence

The Amended Complaint next alleges that the ADAs

violated Yarris’s constitutional rights when they: “withheld highly

exculpatory information”; “fail[ed] to disclose investigatory

materials and exculpatory evidence”; “fail[ed] to release physical

sufficiently detailed at the motion-to-dismiss stage.

11

evidence for DNA testing in a prompt manner”; and failed “to

release exculpatory physical, investigatory, and DNA evidence.”

(Am. Compl. ¶¶ 92, 93, 96).

It is well settled that prosecutors are entitled to absolute

immunity from claims based on their failure to disclose exculpatory

evidence, so long as they did so while functioning in their

prosecutorial capacity. As the Supreme Court explained in Imbler,

the “deliberate withholding of exculpatory information” is included

within the “legitimate exercise of prosecutorial discretion.” 424

U.S. at 431-32 n.34; see also Smith v. Holtz, 210 F.3d 186, 199

n.18 (3d Cir. 2000). Furthermore, courts have held that prosecutors

are entitled to immunity even when they withhold evidence after

trial while the criminal conviction is on appeal. See, e.g.,

Parkinson v. Cozzolino, 238 F.3d 145, 152 (2d Cir. 2001)

(explaining that “absolute immunity covers prosecutors’ actions

after the date of conviction while a direct appeal is pending”).

Here, even accepting the allegations concerning the ADAs as true

and drawing all reasonable inferences in Yarris’s favor, we find

that the ADAs are absolutely immune from claims based on

allegations that they “intentionally concealed” exculpatory

evidence prior to trial. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 4, 5.) See Imbler, 424 U.S.

at 431-32 n.34.

Less clear is whether the ADAs are absolutely immune from

claims based on allegations that they withheld exculpatory

evidence, in the form of DNA samples, after Yarris was convicted

and sentenced to death. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 93, 96.) We agree with

other courts that “[a]bsolute immunity applies to the adversarial

acts of prosecutors during post-conviction proceedings . . . where

the prosecutor is personally involved . . . and continues his role as

an advocate,” but that “where the role as advocate has not yet

begun . . . or where it has concluded, absolute immunity does not

apply.” Spurlock v. Thompson, 330 F.3d 791, 799 (6th Cir. 2003).

Compare Houston v. Partee, 978 F.2d 362, 366 (7th Cir. 1992) (no

absolute immunity where prosecutors were “not personally

prosecuting the appeal” in post-conviction proceedings) with

Carter v. Burch, 34 F.3d 257, 263 (4th Cir. 1994) (absolute

immunity where prosecutor “was handling the postconviction

motions and the initial direct appeal . . . [and thus] still functioning

as an advocate for the State”). After a conviction is obtained, the

12

challenged action must be shown by the prosecutor to be part of the

prosecutor’s continuing personal involvement as the state’s

advocate in adversarial post-conviction proceedings to be

encompassed within that prosecutor’s absolute immunity from suit.

Based on the facts on the record as it now stands, the

prosecutors have not satisfied their burden of showing that they are

entitled to the immunity they seek. Yarris’s direct appeal to the

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania was argued in April and decided

in October of 1988. See Commonwealth v. Yarris, 549 A.2d 513

(Pa. 1988). Yarris’s numerous requests for DNA testing of

physical evidence began in March 1988—presumably in an attempt

to uncover new evidence that might entitle him to extraordinary

relief in case the legal avenues he was pursuing did not succeed.

The prosecutors have not shown that their response to Yarris’s

DNA test requests was part of their advocacy for the state in post-

conviction proceedings in which they were personally involved.

Without such a showing, a prosecutor acting merely as a

custodian of evidence after conviction serves the same non-

adversarial function as police officers, medical examiners, and

other clerical state employees and—just as with certain police

investigative work—“it is neither appropriate nor justifiable that,

for the same act, [absolute] immunity should protect the one and

not the other[s].” Buckley, 509 U.S. at 273. The handling of

requests to conduct scientific tests on evidence made after

conviction—not related to grounds claimed in an ongoing

adversarial proceeding—can be best described as part of the

“prosecutor's administrative duties . . . that do not relate to an

advocate's preparation for the initiation of a prosecution or for

judicial proceedings” and “are not entitled to absolute immunity.”

Id. Because the ADAs have not yet shown how the handling of

DNA evidence related to ongoing adversarial proceedings in which

they were personally involved, we conclude that the prosecutors

may have been “function[ing] as . . . administrator[s] rather than as

. . . officer[s] of the court” and, thus, may be “entitled only to

qualified immunity.” Id.

c. Concocting a False and Fabricated

Confession

13

The Amended Complaint next alleges that the ADAs

violated Yarris’s constitutional rights when they “concoct[ed] a

false and fabricated confession.” (Am. Compl. ¶ 93.) There is no

elaboration in the Amended Complaint regarding the circumstances

under which the ADAs fabricated a confession by Yarris. In fact,

the only reference to a confession is found in paragraph 40 of the

Amended Complaint, which discusses a conversation Yarris had on

February 1, 1982, with a prison guard who subsequently “gave a

statement and later testified that Yarris said that he had raped

Craig, but that another man named Mark had actually murdered

her, a statement known to be absolutely false in light of DNA

evidence conclusively showing that Yarris was not the rapist.”

(Am. Compl. ¶ 40.)

Accepting Yarris’s allegations as true and drawing all

reasonable inferences in his favor, we must conclude that absolute

immunity from this claim is not appropriate at the motion-to-

dismiss stage. As already noted, the key question is whether the

ADAs were functioning as the state’s advocates when they

engaged in the conduct that gave rise to the evidence-fabrication

allegations. See Buckley, 509 U.S. at 274. In Buckley, the

Supreme Court denied absolute immunity to prosecutors who had

allegedly fabricated evidence that was used to obtain a criminal

conviction after it determined that “the prosecutors’ conduct

occurred well before they could properly claim to be acting as

advocates.” Id. at 275; see also Kulwicki, 969 F.2d at 1467 (stating

that prosecutor who fabricated confession would be absolutely

immune if he did so while prosecuting the case). In contrast, the

allegations here do not indicate whether the fabrication of Yarris’s

confession occurred during the preliminary investigation of an

unsolved crime, as in Buckley, or after the ADAs had decided to

indict Yarris and had begun working as the state’s advocates in the

prosecution of Yarris. Accordingly, at this stage of the

proceedings, the ADAs cannot establish that they are entitled to

absolute immunity for allegedly fabricating Yarris’s confession.

d. Obtaining a False Statement from a

Jailhouse Informant

The Amended Complaint also alleges that the ADAs

violated Yarris’s constitutional rights when they “obtain[ed] a false

14

statement from a jailhouse informant.” (Am. Compl. ¶ 93.)

According to the Amended Complaint, after Yarris was charged

with murder, rape, kidnaping, and robbery, he was returned to his

prison cell, which was located next to a cell occupied by Charles

Catalino, who had been convicted of burglarizing ADA Ryan’s

home and was awaiting sentencing. (Am. Compl. ¶ 42.) Yarris

alleges that the following ensued:

43. Charles Catalino subsequently falsely

reported, and, perjuring himself, testified at trial, that

Yarris expressed concern that his blood would be

discovered at the scene of the murder and that he had

committed the rape and murder, a statement now

known to be absolutely false in light of DNA

evidence conclusively showing that Yarris was not

the rapist or murderer.

44. Yarris believes and therefore avers that

Catalino received a reduced sentence on the burglary

charge to run concurrent with an existing sentence,

was allowed conjugal visits with his spouse, and was

released later in 1982.

(Am. Compl. ¶¶ 43-44.) Yarris thus claims that the ADAs used a

“‘stick and carrot’ treatment to elicit [Catalino’s] false testimony.”

(Am. Compl. ¶ 54.)

Based on these allegations, the ADAs are entitled to

absolute immunity from Yarris’s claim that they obtained a false

statement from a jailhouse informant. As a general matter, we note

that a prosecutor is absolutely immune from liability for using

“false testimony in connection with [a] prosecution.” Kulwicki,

969 F.2d at 1465; see also Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430. With respect

to the solicitation of false statements alleged here, the ADAs are

entitled to absolute immunity to the extent that their conduct

occurred while they were acting as advocates rather than

investigators. As the Amended Complaint makes clear, Yarris had

already been charged with the Craig crimes before Catalino made

any statements about what Yarris told him while they were held in

adjacent prison cells. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 41-43.) Thus, although the

Amended Complaint does not describe in detail when or how the

15

ADAs “obtain[ed] a false statement from a jailhouse informant”

(Am. Compl. ¶ 93), the allegations relating to Catalino’s false

statements indicate that the ADAs’ involvement with Catalino’s

statements occurred after Yarris’s prosecution for those crimes had

begun. See Rose v. Bartle, 871 F.2d 331, 344-45 (3d Cir. 1989)

(granting absolute immunity where complaint alleged that

prosecutors solicited perjured testimony for use in grand jury

proceedings); Brawer v. Horowitz, 535 F.2d 830, 832-34 (3d Cir.

1976) (granting absolute immunity where complaint alleged that

federal prosecutor and witness conspired to use perjured testimony

to secure plaintiffs’ convictions). Accordingly, the ADAs are

entitled to absolute immunity from this claim.

2. Qualified Immunity From Yarris’s

Constitutional Claims

Prosecutors who are not entitled to absolute immunity from

a plaintiff’s claims may nonetheless be entitled to qualified

immunity from those same claims. See Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430-31.

Here, as noted above, the ADAs moved to dismiss Yarris’s claims

on the basis of both absolute and qualified immunity. The District

Court, however, did not consider the ADAs’ qualified immunity

arguments. Instead, after ruling that the ADAs were not entitled to

absolute immunity from any of Yarris’s claims, the District Court

turned directly to the CID Detectives’ qualified immunity

arguments without addressing those of the ADAs. For this

reason—and with the benefit of our conclusions as to the ADAs’

partial entitlement to absolute immunity, supra—we will remand

this issue for the District Court to consider in the first instance.

3. Absolute Immunity From Yarris’s

Pennsylvania Law Claims

The Amended Complaint also alleges that the ADAs’

actions violated certain of Yarris’s rights under Pennsylvania law,

which he describes as his “rights to be free from unlawful arrest,

malicious prosecution and unlawful incarceration, defamation,

assault, battery, negligent and intentional infliction of emotional

distress, intimidation, abuse of public trust and public office,

breach of fiduciary and governmental trust, invasion of privacy,

unlawful restraint, abuse of process, misuse of process, and

16

malicious prosecution, and to due process of law under the

Pennsylvania Constitution and laws of the Commonwealth of

Pennsylvania.” (Am. Compl. ¶ 99.) The ADAs sought dismissal

of these claims on the basis of state law immunity.

In denying absolute immunity generally, the District Court

did not rule on the ADAs’ request for immunity from Yarris’s

Pennsylvania law claims. Rather, the District Court’s analysis

focused solely on the ADAs’ immunity with respect to the alleged

violations of Yarris’s rights under the United States Constitution.

Because the District Court did not rule on whether the ADAs are

immune from Yarris’s Pennsylvania law claims, we will remand

this issue for consideration by the District Court in the first

instance.

B. The Criminal Investigation Division Detectives

The Amended Complaint alleges that the CID Detectives

also engaged in conduct that violated Yarris’s rights under the

Fourth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments.7 The CID

Detectives moved to dismiss each of Yarris’s claims against them

on the basis of qualified immunity.

7

Specifically, the Amended Complaint states that the CID

Detectives violated Yarris’s constitutional rights when they: “used

impermissible interrogation techniques including, but not limited

to, torture, trickery and deceit, and the suggestion of facts not

known to Yarris or other witnesses, to obtain false statements and

improper identifications”; “deliberately destroyed and/or withheld

highly exculpatory information from [Yarris]”; “concoct[ed] a false

and fabricated confession”; “obtain[ed] a false statement from a

jailhouse informant”; “fail[ed] to disclose investigatory materials

and exculpatory evidence”; and “fail[ed] to release physical

evidence for DNA testing in a prompt manner.” (Am. Compl.

¶¶ 91, 92, 93.)

In addition, the Amended Complaint alleges that the CID

Detectives’ conduct violated Yarris’s Fifth Amendment rights. As

noted above, however, the District Court dismissed that claim, and

that ruling is not now on appeal.

17

Qualified immunity shields state officials from suit when

their conduct “does not violate clearly established statutory or

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have

known.” Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818. Courts must undertake a two-

step inquiry to determine whether a state official is entitled to

qualified immunity. First, the court must determine whether the

facts alleged show that the defendant’s conduct violated a

constitutional or statutory right. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194,

201 (2001). If so, the court must then determine whether the

constitutional or statutory right allegedly violated by the defendant

was “clearly established” at the time the violation occurred. See id.

If the court concludes that the defendant’s conduct violated a

clearly established constitutional or statutory right, it must deny the

defendant the protection afforded by qualified immunity. See id.;

see also Williams v. Bitner, 455 F.3d 186, 190-91 (3d Cir. 2006).

In denying the motion to dismiss the claims against the CID

Detectives, the District Court stated the following:

Yarris claims the Criminal Investigator Defendants,

Martin, Pfeifer and Siti intentionally destroyed

evidence by retaining exculpatory DNA evidence in

a paper bag under a desk, used impermissible

interrogation techniques and coercion to obtain false

statements, inflicted serious physical injuries and

prosecuted Yarris without probable cause after they

determined the killer’s gloves would not fit him. If

Yarris’s claims are true, the Defendants knew their

conduct violated Yarris’s constitutional rights and

they are not entitled to qualified immunity.

Yarris, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4131, at *13. On appeal, the CID

Detectives argue that the constitutional rights they allegedly

violated were not “clearly established” at the time of their conduct.

(Appellants’ Reply Br. at 13.)

The Amended Complaint alleges that the CID Detectives

violated Yarris’s Fourteenth Amendment rights when they refused

to turn over exculpatory evidence. In Brady v. Maryland, the

Supreme Court held that “the suppression by the prosecution of

evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process

18

where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment,

irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.” 373

U.S. 83, 87 (1963). However, “the Brady duty to disclose

exculpatory evidence to the defendant applies only to a

prosecutor.” Gibson v. Superintendent of N.J. Dep’t of Law &

Public Safety-Div. of State Police, 411 F.3d 427, 442 (3d Cir.

2005). Nonetheless, “police officers and other state actors may be

liable under § 1983 for failing to disclose exculpatory information

to the prosecutor.” Id. at 443; see also McMillian v. Johnson, 88

F.3d 1554, 1567 (11th Cir. 1996) (“Investigators satisfy their

obligations under Brady when they turn exculpatory and

impeachment evidence over to the prosecutors.”); Walker v. City

of New York, 974 F.2d 293, 299 (2d Cir. 1992) (“[T]he police

satisfy their obligations under Brady when they turn exculpatory

evidence over to the prosecutors.”).

The CID Detectives argue that they are entitled to qualified

immunity from Yarris’s claim that they failed to turn the gloves

recovered from the crime scene over to the ADAs prior to trial.

We agree. According to the Amended Complaint, before

presenting to the jury a photograph depicting a pair of men’s gloves

inside the victim’s vehicle, “[t]he prosecution had already

determined . . . after assessing the size of Yarris’ hands, that the

gloves would not have fit his hands.” (Am. Compl. ¶ 56.) Thus,

Yarris’s own allegations indicate that the CID Detectives had

complied with their disclosure duties by giving the gloves to the

ADAs prior to trial. Accordingly, the Amended Complaint does

not allege a constitutional violation with respect to the pre-trial

disclosure of the gloves and, therefore, the CID Detectives are

entitled to qualified immunity from this claim.

The CID Detectives also argue that they are entitled to

qualified immunity from Yarris’s claim that they mishandled and

failed to preserve evidence that could be used for DNA testing.

The Supreme Court’s decision in Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S.

51 (1988), establishes the standard for determining whether law

enforcement officials have infringed on a defendant’s due process

rights by failing to preserve “evidentiary material of which no more

can be said than that it could have been subjected to tests, the

results of which might have exonerated the defendant.” Id. at 57.

The Youngblood Court held that “unless a criminal defendant can

19

show bad faith on the part of the police, failure to preserve

potentially useful evidence does not constitute a denial of due

process of law.” 488 U.S. at 58. “The presence or absence of bad

faith by the police for purposes of the Due Process Clause must

necessarily turn on the police’s knowledge of the exculpatory value

of the evidence at the time it was lost or destroyed.” Id. at 57 n.*.

At the outset, we note that Youngblood addresses law

enforcement officials’ constitutional duty to preserve evidence

prior to conviction, whereas Yarris’s claim is based on the CID

Detectives’ post-conviction conduct. We nonetheless believe that

the Supreme Court’s application of the Due Process Clause in

Youngblood guides our analysis here. However, the Youngblood

decision did not indicate that it was limited to its temporal context,

as it sought to govern applicability of the Due Process Clause in

“what might loosely be called the area of constitutionally

guaranteed access to evidence” and resolve the violation it

described broadly as “the failure of the State to preserve

evidentiary material.” 488 U.S. at 55, 57. We agree with the

reasoning of Judge King of the Fourth Circuit in his concurring

opinion in Harvey v. Horan, in which he discussed prisoners’ post-

conviction due process rights:

In essence, the concept of due process requires that

the government treat its citizens in an evenhanded

and neutral manner; thus the targeting of specific

individuals with the purpose of frustrating the

exercise of their lawful rights contradicts the basic

premise of the constitutional guarantee.

Thus, given that prisoners possess a right of

effective access to the court system, a governmental

decision to deny access to evidence with the

intent—and with the effect—of preventing a prisoner

from exercising his right of effective access to the

court system would violate due process. To permit

a state official to target a particular prisoner and to

deliberately frustrate that prisoner’s ability to take

advantage of post-conviction legal options

contravenes the essence of fair and impartial

procedural justice.

20

278 F.3d 370, 387 (4th Cir. 2002) (internal citations omitted)

(King, J., concurring in part).

The CID Detectives contend that their alleged mishandling

of DNA samples does not amount to a constitutional violation

because they could not have acted in bad faith insofar as DNA

testing was still in its infancy at the time of the alleged violation.

We disagree. To establish bad faith, Yarris must allege only that

the CID Detectives knew “of the exculpatory value of the evidence

at the time it was . . . destroyed.” Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 57 n.*.

According to the Amended Complaint, CID Detective Pfeifer and

another detective “refused to relinquish custody of the evidence,

kept the evidence in a paper bag, in a non-controlled environment,

under a detective’s desk, where it was allowed to rot and to be

destroyed as useful evidence.” (Am. Compl. ¶ 70.) These

allegations indicate that the CID Detectives consciously acted to

frustrate Yarris’s request for DNA testing; therefore, the Amended

Complaint’s allegations concerning the CID Detectives’ conduct

satisfy Youngblood’s bad faith requirement. See id. at 58

(explaining that due process is violated when “the police

themselves by their conduct indicate that the evidence could form

a basis for exonerating the defendant”).

Furthermore, we find that the due process right at issue here

was “clearly established” at the time of the alleged violation. The

Supreme Court decided Youngblood on November 29, 1988.

Although the Amended Complaint does not indicate precisely

when the evidence was hidden under a desk and allowed to rot, the

sequence of the allegations suggests that the conduct occurred

between some time in 1988 and November of 1989. (See Am.

Compl. ¶¶ 68-72.) Thus, accepting Yarris’s allegations as true and

drawing all reasonable inferences in his favor, we conclude that

even though DNA testing may have been less common at the time

of the alleged mishandling of evidence, the CID Detectives were

given fair warning that their conduct was unconstitutional.8

8

We note that even if the CID Detectives’ alleged conduct

occurred prior to Youngblood, the constitutional right at issue

nonetheless may have been clearly established. See Hope v.

Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002) (explaining that in some cases “a

21

Accordingly, the CID Detectives are not entitled to qualified

immunity from this claim at this stage of the proceedings.

Yarris also alleges that the CID Detectives violated his

constitutional rights by using trickery or deceit to obtain false

evidence against him. As noted, the introduction in evidence of

the allegedly false testimony was the work of prosecutors—not the

CID Detectives—and is covered by absolute prosecutorial

immunity. Michaels v. New Jersey, 222 F.3d 118, 121-22 (3d Cir.

2000). We perceive no support—and Yarris has identified no

support—for the proposition that the use of impermissible

interrogation techniques in securing statements prior to their use in

court constituted an independent violation of Yarris’s

constitutional rights. See Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760

(2003); Michaels v. New Jersey, 222 F.3d 118 (3d Cir. 2000);

Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 20 F.3d 789 (7th Cir. 1994). In the

absence of such a violation, the CID Detectives are entitled to

qualified immunity with respect to these claims.

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the order of the District Court

will be affirmed in part, reversed in part, and this case will be

remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

general constitutional rule already identified in the decisional law

may apply with obvious clarity to the specific conduct in question,

even though the very action in question has [not] previously been

held unlawful”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

22