Lawrence Twp Bd Ed v. New Jersey

Opinions of the United

2005 Decisions States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

8-2-2005

Lawrence Twp Bd Ed v. New Jersey

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Precedential

Docket No. 04-3637

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PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 04-3637

LAWRENCE TOWNSHIP BOARD OF EDUCATION,

Appellant

v.

STATE OF NEW JERSEY

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

D.C. Civil No. 03-cv-04073

District Judge: The Honorable Stanley R. Chesler

Argued: June 29, 2005

Before: ROTH, RENDELL, and BARRY, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed August 2, 2005)

James F. Schwerin, Esq. (Argued)

Parker, McCay & Criscuolo

1009 Lenox Drive

Building 4 East, Suite 102A

Lawrenceville, NJ 08648

Counsel for Appellant

Michael C. Walters, Esq. (Argued)

Office of the Attorney General of

New Jersey

Division of Law

P.O. Box 112

25 Market Street

Trenton, NJ 08625

Counsel for Appellee

OPINION OF THE COURT

BARRY, Circuit Judge

E.E.,1 a child whose family resides in Lawrence

Township, New Jersey, suffers from diabetes and autism. The

parties agree that E.E. is “disabled” as that term is defined in the

Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C.

§§ 1400-82. E.E.’s parents registered her with the New Jersey

Division of Developmental Disabilities (“DDD”), a division of

the State Department of Human Services. The DDD is charged

with providing specialized services “directed toward the

alleviation of a developmental disability or toward the social,

personal, physical or economic habilitation or rehabilitation of a

person with a developmental disability.” N.J. Stat. Ann. §

30:6D-25.

At the time the complaint was filed, E.E. was a day

student at the Eden Institute, a school which specializes in

addressing the needs of autistic children. Among other

problems, E.E.’s condition causes her to engage in self-injurious

behavior. Although this behavior could be controlled while E.E.

1

To preserve the child’s privacy, she and her family are

referred to in all court documents only by their initials.

2

was at the Institute, it could not be controlled at home, and E.E.

was, therefore, a danger to herself when outside the closely

monitored environment of the school. In order to address this

situation, E.E.’s parents and the Lawrence Township School

District Board of Education (“Lawrence Township”) agreed that

E.E. should be placed in a residential facility where she can

receive proper care at all times, and specifically agreed that she

should be placed at Allies, Inc., a facility in Hamilton, New

Jersey. We were advised at oral argument that she is now there.

E.E.’s parents requested that DDD fund this placement,

but, for reasons not relevant here, DDD refused. Instead, E.E.

was placed on a DDD waiting list of persons eligible for

residential placement, and, as of September 26, 2002, E.E. was

number 231 on that list. Lawrence Township, which is financing

E.E.’s placement, a placement for which it paid $235,367 for the

2003-2004 school year, filed this action, alleging that, under the

IDEA, the State of New Jersey was obligated to assume the cost

of the placement.2 The District Court concluded that Lawrence

Township does not have a private right of action under the

IDEA, and granted New Jersey’s motion to dismiss. This appeal

followed.

I.

The IDEA authorizes federal funding for state and local

agencies to provide for the educational needs of disabled

children. Every state educational agency (“SEA”) or local

educational agency (“LEA”) which receives funding under the

IDEA must provide disabled children with a “free appropriate

public education.” (“FAPE”). See 20 U.S.C. §1412(a)(1) (2003).

Federal funding under the IDEA is “contingent on state

compliance with its array of substantive and procedural

requirements.” Beth V. v. Carroll, 87 F.3d 80, 82 (3d Cir. 1996)

(citing 20 U.S.C. § 1412). In New Jersey, the LEAs, including

Lawrence Township, are vested with the responsibility for

2

The E.s never filed a complaint against Lawrence

Township, and are not parties to the instant litigation.

3

providing and administering a FAPE, in accordance with the

requirements of the IDEA. See N.J Admin. Code § 6A:14-

1.1(d).

At issue here are some of the procedural safeguards set

forth in the IDEA. As an initial matter, we note that certain

provisions of the IDEA were altered by legislation in December,

2004, effective July 1, 2005. See Pub. L. 108-446, Title I, § 101,

118 Stat. 2647. Nonetheless, amendments to the IDEA have

prospective application only, and neither party argues that the

new amendments should apply to this case. Therefore, the

provisions in effect at the time the complaint was filed in 2003

will be applied here. See Tucker v. Calloway County Bd. of Ed.,

136 F.3d 495, 501 (6th Cir. 1998) (citing Fowler v. Unified

School District No. 259, 128 F.3d 1431, 1436 (10th Cir. 1997));

Heather S. v. Wisconsin, 125 F.3d 1045, 1062 (7th Cir. 1997).

Among those provisions is section 1412 of the IDEA,

which states, in relevant part, that “[t]he state educational agency

is responsible for ensuring that...the requirements of this

subchapter are met.” 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(11)(A)(i) (2003).

Section 1415(b) provides, in relevant part, that “the procedures

required by this section shall include...an opportunity to present

complaints with respect to any matter relating to the

identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the child,

or the provision of a free appropriate public education to such

child.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6) (2003). Section 1415(i)(2)

provides that any “ party aggrieved” may bring a civil action in

federal district court or state court.

Relying upon these provisions, Lawrence Township

argues that the funding for E.E.’s placement at Allies is “a

matter relating to. . .the provision of” E.E.’s FAPE, and,

therefore, falls within the framework of section 1415(b)(6).

Moreover, because the states are ultimately responsible for

fulfilling the requirements of the IDEA, the Township argues

that it has the right to bring an action under the IDEA to force

4

New Jersey to fund E.E.’s placement.3 New Jersey argues that

Lawrence Township lacks standing because, as an LEA, it has

no private right of action under the IDEA.

II.

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and may

hear actions only where authorized to do so by Congress. U.S.

Const. Art. III, § 1. The Supreme Court of the United States has

made it quite clear that

“private rights of action to enforce federal law

must be created by Congress. The judicial task is

to interpret the statute Congress has passed to

determine whether it displays an intent to create

not just a private right but also a private remedy.

Statutory intent on this latter point is

determinative. Without it, a cause of action does

not exist and courts may not create one, no matter

how desirable that might be as a policy matter, or

how compatible with the statute.”

Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286-87 (2001) (internal

citations omitted).

Section 1415(a) of the IDEA, entitled “establishment of

procedures,” provides that procedures shall be established and

maintained “in accordance with this section to ensure that

children with disabilities and their parents are guaranteed

procedural safeguards with respect to the provision of [a

FAPE].” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(a) (2003) (emphasis added).

Similarly, section 1412(a)(6), which is entitled “procedural

safeguards,” provides that “[c]hildren with disabilities and their

parents are afforded the procedural safeguards required by

section [1415].” 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(6)(A) (2003).

3

Congress has abrogated sovereign immunity for claims

under the IDEA. See 20 U.S.C. § 1403 (2003).

5

This language strongly suggests that Congress intended to

provide a private right of action only to disabled children and

their parents. Indeed, section 1415(b), which sets forth the types

of procedures required, limits most relief under those procedures

to the parents of a disabled child.

Nonetheless, section 1415(b)(6), the provision upon

which Lawrence Township relies, contains no such limitation.

Thus, the Township argues that the broader language of section

1415(b)(6) – “an opportunity to present complaints with respect

to any matter...” – clearly demonstrates that Congress intended to

permit persons or entities other than parents and children to

bring an action under the IDEA.4 We disagree. While section

1415(b)(6) is crafted more broadly than other subsections, this

fact alone does not indicate an intent to permit a private right of

action by an LEA against a state. Instead, when examined in the

context of the IDEA as a whole, the language of section

1415(b)(6) is at best ambiguous.

For similar reasons, Lawrence Township has no implied

right of action under the IDEA. As the Supreme Court has

instructed, “‘unless [the] congressional intent can be inferred

from the language of the statute, the statutory structure, or some

other source, the essential predicate for implication of a private

remedy simply does not exist.’” Thompson v. Thompson, 484

U.S. 174, 179 (1988) (quoting Northwest Airlines, Inc. v.

Transport Workers, 451 U.S. 77, 94 (1981)). As the District

Court noted, “this case is not about the child’s educational needs,

but rather the Township’s fiscal ones.” App. 25. A budgetary

dispute between local and state agencies is simply not among the

private actions contemplated by the IDEA, and is traditionally

the type of dispute left to state and local authorities.

In this regard, it is significant to note that the cases relied

4

Although Lawrence Township initially argued that it has

both an express and an implied right of action under the IDEA, at

oral argument counsel for the Township conceded that it has no

express right of action.

6

upon by Lawrence Township, cases in which courts have held

that a private right of action existed, were nearly all initiated by

the parents of a disabled child. See, e.g., Beth V., 87 F.3d 80;

John T. v. Iowa Dep’t of Ed., 258 F.3d 860, 862 (8th Cir. 2001);

Gadsby v. Grasmick, 109 F.3d 940, 948 (4th Cir. 1997); Todd D.

v. Andrews, 933 F.2d 1576, 1579 (11th Cir. 1991); David D. v.

Dartmouth Sch. Comm., 775 F.2d 411, 414 (1st Cir. 1985). We

do not disagree with the proposition that the parents of a

disabled child have a private right of action. Those cases,

however, do not even discuss, much less decide, whether an

LEA has a similar right of action against the state, the issue

before us. Although St. Tammany Parrish School Board v.

Louisiana, 142 F.3d 776 (5th Cir. 1998), did involve an action

brought by an LEA against Louisiana, it was in the context of

litigation filed by the parents against both the LEA and the state.

Thus, the LEA in St. Tammany merely sought the imposition of

interim liability, as between itself and the state, pending the

ultimate outcome of the underlying litigation. The court in St.

Tammany never addressed the issue of whether an LEA has a

private right of action under the IDEA.

Those courts that have addressed the issue have held

against the LEA. See, e.g., Andrews v. Ledbetter, 880 F.2d 1287,

1290 (11th Cir. 1989) (“nothing indicates that Congress intended

to grant an LEA statutory standing to bring suit to compel a state

agency to fulfill its statutory duties”); Board of Ed. of Oak Park

v. Kelly E., 207 F.3d 931, 935 (7th Cir. 2000) (“nothing in this

subsection authorizes awards of financial relief in favor of local

educational officials”). The Court of Appeals for the Second

Circuit was recently presented with a factual setting virtually

identical to that in this case where a county agency was

attempting to bring an action against the State of New York. In

rejecting this attempt, the Court reasoned as follows:

Since Congress expressly provided a private right

of action in favor of certain groups, specifically,

any party aggrieved by particular findings or a

decision rendered under subsection 1415, see 20

U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A), but did not expressly

provide a private right of action in favor of a

7

county, educational agency or any other entity

seeking to challenge the lack of an interagency

agreement required by § 1412(a)(12), we find it

extremely unlikely that Congress intended to do so.

County of Westchester v. New York, 286 F.3d 150, 152 (2d Cir.

2002). We find this reasoning both persuasive and consistent

with our own precedent. Lawrence Township has neither an

express nor implied right of action under the IDEA.5

III.

The judgment of the District Court will be affirmed.

5

While there is some dispute as to whether an LEA may

cross-claim against a state agency where both are sued by the

parents, that issue is not presented here, and we do not address it.

Compare Andrews, 880 F.2d at 1291 (holding that an LEA may not

bring an action against the state, but noting that, in a suit brought

by parents, “it may be that the LEA may defend by asserting that

the state education agency is primarily and ultimately responsible

for the [IDEA]’s implementation”); with Oak Park, 207 F.3d at 937

(“[a] local educational agency that has received its share of the

federal appropriation must provide for services out of that share; it

cannot collect more from the state by way of contribution).

8