Alston v. Parker

Opinions of the United

2004 Decisions States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

4-5-2004

Alston v. Parker

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Precedential

Docket No. 03-2683

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PRECEDENTIAL Joseph B. Young [ARGUED]

New Jersey Protection & Advocacy, Inc.

UNITED STATES 210 South Broad Street, 3rd Floor

COURT OF APPEALS Trenton, NJ 08608

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT Counsel for Appellant

Joanne Leone

No. 03-2683 Maria Desautelle [ARGUED]

Office of the Attorney General of NJ

Division of Law

GARY MARSHALL ALSTON 25 Market Street

v. Trenton, NJ 08625

WILLIAM PARKER; JACK SINGER Counsel for Appellees

(N.J. (Newark) D.C. No. 95-cv-06158)

OPINION OF THE COURT

GARY MARSHALL ALSTON

v.

CARROLL SIMMON; LYNDA

RENDELL, Circuit Judge.

NAVRATIL

(N.J. (Newark) D.C. No. 95-cv-06159) At the end of Gary Marshall

Alston’s 17-year sentence in a New Jersey

Gary Marshall Alston, prison, he was involuntarily committed to

Appellant Greystone Park Psychiatric Hospital.

Wh ile there, Alston sued various

Greystone employees in a pro se § 1983

Appeal from the United States complaint, raising several challenges with

District Court respect to his prison sentence and his

for the District of New Jersey psychiatric commitment. Before the

(D.C. Civil Nos. 95-cv-06158 merits of Alston’s claims could be tested,

and 95-cv-06159) the District Court granted a motion to

District Judge: Honorable dismiss for failure to state a claim under

William H. Walls Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The Court

concluded that Alston’s pleading did not

meet the factual specificity requirement for

Argued January 15, 2004 civil rights complaints and dismissed his

complaint. Because we hold that the

Before: SLOVITER, RENDELL and District Court subjected Als ton’s

ALDISERT, Circuit Judges. complaint to a heightened pleading

standard no longer applicable in such civil

(Filed: April 5, 2004) rights cases, we will reverse.

I. Greystone and requested the appointment

of counsel to help advance his case.

Challenging his transfer to

Greystone, Alston filed two pro se The District Court referred the

complaints under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on matter to a Magistrate Judge, who granted

December 4, 1995. In those complaints, Alston’s application for counsel on March

which were later consolidated, Alston 19, 1996. The threshold requirement for

sought over $63 million in damages from the appointment of counsel to indigent

four Greystone employees, who he plaintiffs is the arguable legal and factual

contended had violated his rights. The merit of a complaint. See Tabron v.

employees included William Parker, Jack Grace, 6 F.3d 147 (3d Cir. 1993). The

Singer, and Lynda Navratil (collectively, Magistrate Judge recognized two claims in

“Defendants”). 1 The complaints, the Alston’s complaint: 1) a claim that his 17-

pertinent text of which we set forth in the year term in prison caused him such harm

margin, are not models of clarity. 2 Yet, that his sentence constituted cruel and

their thrust is clear enough: Alston unusual punishment; and 2) that his

questioned the basis of his transfer to involuntary commitment, as Alston put it

“without victim without evidence,”

violated due process. With respect to the

1

Although Alston also named “Carroll latter claim, the Magistrate Judge cited

Simmon” as a defendant, the parties have Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980), in

been unable to identify such an individual. which the Supreme Court articulated the

minimum procedural protections that must

2

With the exception of misspellings, we be afforded to a prisoner who is

set out Alston’s allegations verbatim. In transferred to a psychiatric institution.

o n e com plaint, A lst o n s ta t e d: Such procedures include fair notice and a

“Defendant(s) slanderous allege that I was hearing at which evidence may be

a threat(s) that got me six (6) month(s) presented. This Vitek claim is at the heart

more in jail without victim without of Alston’s complaint. The Magistrate

evidence when than know I have no other Judge recognized the legal sufficiency of

right to petitioner the covered which I am these claims, but noted at the same time

exercising.” In the other complaint, the paucity of factual development.

Alston stated: “Plaintiff did seventeen (17) Nevertheless, after considering other

years in hard labor and maximum security factors, including his doubt that Alston

jail after serving this cruel and unusual could adequately present his case without

punishment(s) I am denied release as the assistance, he ordered counsel to be

judiciary promised at the completion of my appointed.

jail term I was transfer to another jail for

Four years later, in August of 2000,

an year now for allege medical reason(s)

the District Court finally appointed

that never had existed until I got in this

jail.”

2

counsel for Alston.3 By that time, Alston that it was “well settled” that civil rights

had been released from Greystone and his complaints must be pled with factual

whereabouts were unknown. Eventually, specificity. Concluding that Alston’s

his counsel successfully located him and complaint was unsubstantiated and did not

entered into a representation agreement on specifically set forth how each defendant

November 7, 2000. One month later, on infringed Alston’s rights, the District

December 6, 2000, Alston’s counsel filed Court found that Alston had not met the

a status update with the District Court. pleading requirements necessary to pursue

Counsel informed the District Court that it a § 1983 action. The District Court further

was attempting to locate, and serve held that Alston had sufficient notice of

Alston’s pro se complaint on, the this pleading defect, referring to the

Defendants. A similar status update was Magistrate Judge’s admonition in 1996

filed on February 21, 2001. that the allegations lacked factual support. 4

Notwithstanding these updates, on March Accordingly, the District Court entered an

20, 2001, the District Court dismissed the order granting the Defendants’ 12(b)(6)

case for lack of prosecution. motion and dismissing the complaint. The

order did not specify whether the dismissal

Subsequently, Alston’s counsel

was with or without prejudice, but

successfully served the complaint on three

pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b), we treat

out of the four named defendants and

the dismissal as an “adjudication upon the

petitioned the District Court to reconsider

merits.” Subsequently, the District Court

its dismissal. On January 29, 2002, the

rejected Alston’s motion for reargument

District Court reinstated the case upon

and reconsideration. Alston appeals both

Alston’s motion and vacated its earlier

the orders dismissing his complaint and

dismissal order. The Defendants

denying reconsideration.

responded by filing a 12(b)(6) motion,

invoking various defenses, such as defects

in the pleading, witness immunity,

qualified immunity, and sovereign

immunity.

The District Court determined that 4

The District Court initially misspoke

Alston’s complaint was fatally defective,

when it stated that counsel had seven years

and on that basis, granted the motion to

after its appointment to rectify the

dismiss. Citing Darr v. Wolfe, 767 F.2d

pleadings, since counsel had only been

79, 80 (3d Cir. 1985), the Court observed

appointed in 2000. The Court corrected

this error in its response to Alston’s

motion for reconsideration, noting that

3

There is nothing in the record before us Alston’s counsel nevertheless had more

that explains this unfortunate delay in the than enough notice and time to amend the

appointment of counsel. defective complaint.

3

II. We have plenary review of the District

Court’s grant of a motion to dismiss for

Alston’s principal contention on

failure to state a claim pursuant to Fed. R.

appeal is that he should have been

Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d

permitted to have discovery so as to

63, 65 (3d Cir. 1996). In considering this

comply with the fact-pleading standard

appeal from a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, we

imposed by the District Court. This Court

accept all allegations as true and attribute

has long recognized the importance of

all reasonable inferences in favor of

discovery in the successful prosecution of

Alston. Thus, we will affirm the District

civil rights complaints. See Colburn v.

Court’s dismissal only if it appears that

Upper Darby Township, 838 F.2d 663, 666

Alston could prove no set of facts that

(3d Cir. 1988) (“[I]n civil rights cases

would entitle him to relief. Id. at 65. We

‘much of the evidence can be developed

review the District Court’s denial of

only through discovery’ of materials held

reconsideration for abuse of discretion.

by defendant officials.” (quoting Frazier v.

Max’s Seafood Café ex rel. Lou-Ann, Inc.

Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 785 F.2d

v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 673 (3d Cir.

65, 68 (3d Cir. 1986)). We acknowledge

1999).

Alston’s need for discovery to present his

case, which we discuss more fully below.

But, the lack of discovery was not the real

B.

barrier blocking Alston’s path to relief.

Rather, it was the stringent pleading The District Court tested Alston’s

standard presupposed by the parties and complaint against a pleading requirement

the District Court. Our discussion for civil rights cases based on our opinion

therefore begins by examining the District in Darr v. Wolfe. The District Court

Court’s requirement of factual specificity, observed that it was “well settled” that

which is in conflict with Fed. R. Civ. P. Third Circuit law requires civil rights

8(a)’s simplified notice pleading standard. plaintiffs to plead with particularity. 5 We

We will then consider Alston’s contention disagree.

that the District Court should have

Alston’s § 1983 complaint should

presented an opportunity to amend the

have been considered not under a

complaint before dismissing it with

prejudice. Lastly, we will comment on the

right to discovery in actions such as this.

5

In seeking to affirm the District Court’s

order, the Defendants argue that pro se

A. plaintiffs like Alston are not exempt from

the strictures of heightened pleading.

Jurisdiction was proper in the trial

Brief for Appellee at 9 (citing Ressler v.

court based on 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Our

Scheipe, 505 F. Supp. 155, 156 (E.D. Pa.

review is predicated on 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

1981)).

4

heightened pleading requirement, but 67; Ross v. Meagan, 638 F.2d 646, 650

under the more liberal standards of notice (3d Cir. 1981); Rotolo v. Borough of

pleading. Although once enforced in Charleroi, 532 F.2d 920, 922 (3d Cir.

several circuits, including ours, a fact- 1976), none of which have been expressly

pleading requirement for civil rights overruled, these pronouncements preceded

complaints has been rejected by the and cannot be reconciled with the Supreme

Supreme Court in no uncertain terms. Court’s holdings in Leatherman and

Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Swierkiewicz. Insofar as our decisions,

Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 such as Darr, run counter to the principle

U.S. 163, 168 (1993). In Leatherman, the of notice pleading in § 1983 actions, they

Court instructed that Rule 9’s standard for are not controlling. Fundamentally, a

averments of fraud and mistake should not heightened pleading requirement for civil

be imported to the notice pleading rights complaints no longer retains vitality

standard of Rule 8, which requires only “a under the Federal Rules.6

short and plain statement of the claim

showing that the pleader is entitled to

relief.” Id. More recently, in 6

The Defendants likewise argue on

Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S.

appeal that Alston’s complaint lacked

506, 513 (2002), the Court reaffirmed its

sufficient factual support. But a plaintiff

holding in Leatherman and stated that

need not plead facts. To withstand a

“Rule 8(a)’s simplified pleading standard

12(b)(6) motion, a plaintiff need only

applies to all civil actions, with limited

make out a claim upon which relief can be

exceptions.” Our Court of Appeals has

granted. If more facts are necessary to

r e c o gnized the Supre me C ourt’ s

resolve or clarify the disputed issues, the

abrogation of a heightened pleading

parties may avail themselves of the civil

requirement for § 1983 actions. See Ray

discovery mechanisms under the Federal

v. Kertes, 285 F.3d 287, 297 (3d Cir.

Rules. Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512

2002) (“[T]he Court [has] explained that

(“This simplified notice pleading standard

courts should narrowly interpret statutory

relies on liberal discovery rules . . . to

language to avoid heightened pleadings

define disputed facts and issues and to

standards.”); Abbott v. Latshaw, 164 F.3d

dispose of unmeritorious claims.”).

141, 149 (3d Cir. 1998) (observing that

The need for discovery before

nothing more is required of § 1983 cases

testing a complaint for factual sufficiency

than the notice pleading requirement of

is particularly acute for civil rights

Rule 8).

plaintiffs, who often face informational

While our ruling in Darr, 767 F.2d disadvantages. See Colburn, 838 F.2d at

at 80, is one of several decisions in which 667. Plaintiffs may be unaware of the

this Court imposed a higher bar for § 1983 identities and roles of relevant actors and,

pleadings, see, e.g., Frazier, 785 F.2d at owing to the ir inc a r c eration or

institutionalization, unable to conduct a

5

Alston’s complaint should have

been subject only to the “short and plain

statement” requirement of Rule 8(a).

pre-trial investigation to fill in the gaps.

Courts are to construe complaints so “as to

But by itself, this lack of knowledge does

do substantial justice,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(f),

not bar entry into a federal court. The

keeping in mind that pro se complaints in

principles of notice pleading and the

particular should be construed liberally.

liberal discovery rules allow for

Dluhos v. Strasberg, 321 F.3d 365, 369 (3d

meritorious claims to proceed even if a

Cir. 2003). Comprising only two

confined prisoner cannot adduce all the

paragraphs in all, Alston’s pro se

necessary facts at the outset. For instance,

complaint was “short” and, despite some

our cases permit the naming of fictitious

vagueness, sufficiently “plain.” Both the

defendants as stand-ins until the identities

District Court and the Magistrate Judge

can be learned through discovery. Hindes

found that the complaint, construed

v. FDIC, 137 F.3d 148, 155 (3d Cir. 1998).

liberally, set forth cognizable legal claims.

As the Magistrate Judge here recognized,

Likewise, the Defendants never argued

counsel appointed under 28 U.S.C.

that the complaint ran afoul of the short

§ 1915(d) can help litigants like Alston

and plain statement requirement. 7 To the

surmount these obstacles to pleading. But

legal help alone is insufficient; in such

cases, access to discovery may well be identification of responsible defendants or

critical. See Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 the lack thereof, district courts should

F.2d 637, 642 (9 th Cir. 1980) (“[T]he strongly consider granting it. Because

plaintiff should be given an opportunity Alston’s complaint was dismissed before

through discovery to identify the unknown an opportunity for discovery, any

defendants, unless it is clear that discovery expectation of factual sufficiency was

would not uncover the identities, or that premature. It is a first principle of federal

the complaint would be dismissed on other civil procedure that litigants “are entitled

grounds.”); see also Billman v. Indiana to discovery before being put to their

Dep’t of Corr., 56 F.3d 785, 789-90 (7 th proof.” Bennett v. Schmidt, 153 F.3d 516,

Cir. 1995) (Posner, C.J.) (“ The peculiar 519 (7 th Cir. 1998).

perversity of imposing heightened

7

pleading standards in prisoner cases . . . is It is likely, however, that the

that it is far more difficult for a prisoner to Defendants’ pleading defect argument was

write a detailed complaint than for a free a reaction to the fact that portions of

person to do so, and again this is not Alston’s complaint made little sense. But

because the prisoner does not know the in that case, the parties and the District

law but because he is not able to Court still had several procedural tools at

investigate before filing suit.”). If their disposal. The Defendants, or the

discovery is sought by a plaintiff, as it was District Court on its own initiative, may

here, and if it would aid in the have sought a more definite statement to

6

contrary, their 12(b)(6) motion was replete discovery. Cf. McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d

with defenses that responded to claims 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 1996) (stating that a

they discerned in Alston’s complaint. complaint should set forth “who is being

sued, for what relief, and on what theory,

Although Alston’s complaint

with enough detail to guide discovery.”).

arguably complies with Rule 8(a), we

Thus, we have no doubt that the complaint

recognize that it lacks clarity and will

will require amendment. We are equally

likely require amendment. Indeed, his

certain that Alston may have made some

c o m p l a i n t h a s y ie l d e d v a r i e d

progress in that regard had he been

interpretations. The Magistrate Judge

afforded the opportunity. The denial of

recognized two claims, one involving the

that opportunity to amend will be taken up

cruel and unusual punishment clause and

next.

the other a deprivation of due process.

The Defendants, in their 12(b)(6) motion,

focused instead on Alston’s allegations of

C.

“slander,” i.e., that he was committed to

Greystone as a result of false testimony. In While the District Court’s error in

addition to these claims, Alston’s response granting Defendants’ 12(b)(6) motion by

to the 12(b)(6) motion included claims imposing a fact-pleading requirement on

concerning the double jeopardy and ex Alston’s complaint mandates that we

post facto clauses of the constitution. remand the case to the District Court for

Given these varying interpretations of further proceedings, Alston argues that

what is at issue, we concede that Alston’s irrespective of the appropriate pleading

complaint may have lacked enough detail standard, he should have been given an

to have served its function as a guide to opportunity to amend his complaint before

dismissal. Indeed, Alston’s counsel stated

at oral argument that Alston intends to

resolve any ambiguity or vagueness. Fed. amend both the allegations and the parties

R. Civ. P. 12(e). Matters in the complaint named in the complaint. In particular, it

that w ere deemed imm aterial o r appears that Alston will seek to strike all

impertinent could have been stricken. Fed. but the claim that his involuntary

R. Civ. P. 12(f). Alternatively, the District commitment violated due process and seek

Court could have dismissed the complaint to add New Jersey state officials in their

without prejudice permitting Alston to official capacity. We therefore discuss the

amend the complaint to make it plain. By issue of amendment as guidance for the

contrast, dismissals with prejudice may be District Court’s consideration on remand.

appropriate where a party refuses to file an

amended complaint or if the repleading

We have held that even when a

does not remedy the Rule 8 violation. See

plaintiff does not seek leave to amend, if a

In re Westinghouse Sec. Litig., 90 F.3d

complaint is vulnerable to 12(b)(6)

696, 703-04 (3d Cir. 1996).

7

dismissal, a District Court must permit a principles apply equally to pro se plaintiffs

curative amendment, unless an amendment and those represented by experienced

would be inequitable or futile. Grayson v. counsel. 213 F.3d at 116 (citing District

Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 Council 47 v. Bradley, 795 F.2d 310, 316

(3d Cir. 2002) (citing Shane v. Fauver, 213 (3d Cir. 1986)). Dismissal without leave

F.3d 113, 116 (3d Cir. 2000)). In Shane, to amend is justified only on the grounds

we held that this aspect should be of bad faith, undue delay, prejudice, or

considered and noted in dismissing a claim futility. Id. at 115 (citing In re Burlington

for failure to state a claim: Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410,

1434 (3d Cir. 1997)).

[W]e suggest that district

judges expressly state, On remand, the District Court

where appropriate, that the should offer Alston leave to amend

plaintiff has leave to amend pursuant to the above procedures for

within a specified period of 12(b)(6) dismissals, unless a curative

time, and that application amendment would be inequitable, futile, or

for dismissal of the action untimely. Neither the District Court nor

may be made if a timely the Defendants made or advocated such a

amendment is not finding, or even argued that there was bad

forthcoming within that faith, undue delay, prejudice, or futility.

time. If the plaintiff does not

Amendments to pleadings are

desire to amend, he may file

governed by Rule 15 of the Federal Rules

an appropriate notice with

of Civil Procedure. In particular, Rule

the district court asserting

15(a) provides that a party can amend the

his intent to stand on the

complaint to add or substitute parties, as

complaint, at which time an

Alston is apparently intending to do. Rule

order to dismiss the action

15(c), however, sets forth requirements

would be appropriate.

that determine whether an amendment

adding an entirely new defendant will

relate back to the original date of the filing

Id. at 116 (quoting Borelli v. City of

of the complaint for purposes of the

Reading, 532 F.2d 950, 951 n.1 (3d Cir.

1976)).8 As we noted in Shane, these

of factual specificity, he should be given a

8

In the very case cited by the District reasonable opportunity to cure the defect,

Court to justify a heightened pleading if he can, by amendment of the complaint

requirement, Judge Maris went on to note and that denial of an application for leave

that “this court has consistently held that to amend under these circumstances is an

when an individual has filed a complaint abuse of discretion.” Darr, 767 F.2d at 81.

under § 1983 which is dismissable for lack

8

governing statute of limitations. Alston argues that he should have been

given the opportunity to engage in some

The relation back provision of Rule

discovery in order to live up to the

15 aims to relieve the harsh result of the

“specificity” standard the District Court

strict application of the statute of

imposed. We note, first, that, as discussed

limitations. Garvin v. C ity o f

above, no such standard exists. Second, to

Philadelphia, 354 F.3d 215, 220 (3d Cir.

the extent that in a civil rights action the

2003). The issue then becomes whether

Court finds that plaintiff may be

the proposed pleading amendment to add

disadvantaged by not having access to

or substitute defendants will relate back to

precisely who the relevant actors were, and

the date of the filing of the original

their precise roles, perhaps access to some

complaint. 9 Rule 15(c)(3) requires that for

initial discovery would be advisable. We

an amendment adding a new party to relate

have noted the difficulty faced by

back, the proposed new defendants must

plaintiffs in such situations. See Colburn,

have had actual or constructive notice of

838 F.2d at 667. While the Federal Rules

the institution of the action within the

do not provide for discovery in aid of

period set forth by Rule 4(m), i.e., 120

pleading, as such, nonetheless it would be

days. See Garvin, 354 F.3d at 220

beneficial in difficult cases such as this.

(explaining that “[t]he parties to be

But, again, we note that it is not essential

brought in by amendment must have

at the pleading stage in order to satisfy the

received notice of the institution of the

standard of notice pleading, and the

action within 120 days following the filing

District Court did not abuse its discretion

of the action, the period provided for

in not ordering it. 11

service of the complaint by Rule 4(m) of

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure”). The District Court dismissed

Alston’s complaint with prejudice and

The District Court should make all

without leave to amend. We conclude that

these determinations in the first instance.10

the District Court erred in applying a

III. heightened pleading standard, and that, in

light of the procedures for 12(b)(6)

As we indicated at the outset,

dismissal, the District Court should offer

Alston an opportunity to amend his

9

Neither party discussed the issue in its complaint absent inequity, futility, or

brief, but were requested by the Court in untimeliness. Therefore, we will vacate

advance to be prepared to discuss it at oral

argument.

11

Rule 26(d) provides that discovery is

10

Given the nature of our disposition, we not to commence until a discovery

need not address Alston’s contention that conference has occurred pursuant to Rule

the District Court erred by denying his 26(f), which the District Court here did not

motion for reconsideration. schedule. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(d), (f).

9

the order dismissing the complaint and will

remand for further proceedings in

accordance with this opinion.

10