Opinion

Spruill v. Gillis

Court: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
Filed: Jun 18, 2004
Status: Published
Cited by: 0 cases
Authority: More cited than 40.1%

holding that “the Spruill had by then been transferred to scope of § 1997e(a)’s applicability, which SCI-Chester, the District Court held that is a question of law” is subject to plenary his claim for injunctive relief against review

How later courts described this case

holding that “the Spruill had by then been transferred to scope of § 1997e(a)’s applicability, which SCI-Chester, the District Court held that is a question of law” is subject to plenary his claim for injunctive relief against review
“[T]he PLRA, like 28 U.S.C. § in the first instance. A habeas 2254, contains a procedural default petitioner who has defaulted his c o n c e p t w i t h in i t s e x h a u s t i o n federal claims in state court meets requirement.”
quotation marks and citations system. There are many other points at omitted

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The opinion

Opinions of the United

2004 Decisions States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

6-18-2004

Spruill v. Gillis

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Precedential

Docket No. 02-2659

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PRECEDENTIAL MICHAEL A. FARNAN (Argued)

Department of Corrections

UNITED STATES COURT OF Office of Chief Counsel

APPEALS P.O. Box 598

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT Camp Hill, PA 17011

Attorney for Appellees Gillis and Goolier

No. 02-2659

ALAN S. GOLD (Argued)

Sean Robins

ROBERT SPRUILL, Gold, Butkovitz & Robins

7837 Old York Road

Appellant Elkins Park, PA 19027

v. Attorney for Appellees McGlaughlin and

Brown

FRANK GILLIS; GOOLIER, C.O.;

MCGLAUGHLIN, M.D.; BROWN, P.A. ______________________

_________________ OPINION

______________________

On Appeal From The United States

District Court For

The Middle District Of Pennsylvania BECKER, Circuit Judge.

(D.C. No. 3:01-CV-1625)

This appeal raises important questions

District Judge: Honorable Thomas I.

of construction of the Prison Litigation

Vanaskie, Chief Judge

Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA), Pub. L. No.

_________________

104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 at 66 (1996).

Plaintiff Robert Spruill is an inmate in the

Argued January 13, 2004

custody of the Pennsylvania Department of

Corrections. Spruill filed a civil rights

Before: ALITO, CHERTOFF, and

complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against

BECKER Circuit Judges.

four defendants at the State Correctional

I n s t i t u t io n a t C o a l T o w n s h i p ,

(Filed: June 18, 2004)

Pennsylvania: two prison officials (Frank

Gillis and Stephen Gooler1 ); a prison

ERIC R. SONNENSCHEIN (Argued)

doctor (Dr. Shawn McGlaughlin); and a

Covington & Burling

1201 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.

Washington, DC 20004 1

Spruill in his complaint spells the

name “Goolier,” but we will use the

Attorney for Appellant correct spelling, “Gooler.”

prison physician’s assistant (Brian Brown). exhaustion requirement, and we have not

In his complaint, Spruill alleges that, as a had occasion to pass on whether the

result of the deliberate indifference of the exhaustion requirement is merely a

defendants, his serious back condition was termination requirement or also includes a

left untreated, or was inadequately treated, procedural default component—that is,

resulting in excruciating pain and whether a prisoner may bring a § 1983 suit

susceptibility to other injuries. Pursuant to so long as no grievance process remains

Pennsylvania’s Inmate Grievance System open to him, or whether a prisoner must

Policy (the “Grievance System Policy”), properly (i.e., on pain of procedural

Spruill filed a series of three inmate default) exhaust administrative remedies

grievances, and he ultimately received as a prerequisite to a suit in federal court.

some measure of medical care. In his This case requires us to confront that issue,

grievances, Spruill did not seek money and we hold that § 1997e(a) includes a

damages, but in the instant suit under 42 procedural default component. We further

U.S.C. § 1983, he does seek money hold that the determination whether a

damages for the alleged violation of his prisoner has “properly” exhausted a claim

rights under the Eighth Amendment to the (for procedural default purposes) is made

United States Constitution. by evaluating the prisoner’s compliance

with the prison’s a dm inistrativ e

42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), enacted as part

regulations governing inmate grievances,

of the PLRA, provides that a prisoner may

and the waiver, if any, of such regulations

not bring a § 1983 suit with respect to

by prison officials.

prison cond itions “u ntil such

administrative remedies as are available Applying this framework to Spruill’s

are exhausted.” Because Spruill had failed grievances under the Grievance System

to seek money damages in his grievances, Policy, we hold that (1) Spruill was not

the District Court concluded that he had required to seek money damages in his

failed to meet the exhaustion requirement grievances, and therefore has not

of § 1997e(a), and therefore dismissed procedurally defaulted his claim for money

Spruill’s suit in its entirety. The District damages; (2) Spruill was required to name

Court also held in the alternative that Brown in his grievances, but that the

Spruill’s failure to name Brown in his officials handling Spruill’s grievances

grievances constituted a failure to exhaust waived his default on this requirement;

his claims against Brown. Spruill appeals a n d ( 3 ) S p r u il l e x h au s t e d t h e

the dismissal of his claims against Gooler, administrative remedies under the

Dr. McGlaughlin, and Brown. He does Grievance System Policy.

not appeal the dismissal of his suit against

Finally, turning to the merits-based

Gillis.

arguments that the defendants advance as

Courts have only recently begun to alternate grounds for affirmance of the

define the contours of the PLRA’s District Court, we conclude that Spruill

does not state a claim for deliberate Bureau of Prisons, 355 F.3d 1204, 1212

indifference against Gooler, but that his (10th Cir. 2003) (quoting GFF Corp. v.

allegations against Dr. McGlaughlin and Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc., 130

Brown are sufficient to withstand a motion F.3d 1381, 1384 (10th Cir. 1997) (noting

to dismiss. We will therefore affirm in that “a defendant may submit an

part, reverse in part, and remand for indisputably authentic [document] to the

f u r t h e r p r o c e e d in g s a g a in s t D r. court to be considered on a motion to

McGlaughlin and Brown. dismiss”)). We now chronicle the facts as

set forth in Spruill’s complaint.

A. Spruill’s Complaint

I. Facts and Procedural History

Spruill is currently incarcerated at the

As this case comes to us on the District

State Correctional Institution at Chester,

Court’s grant of a motion to dismiss, we

Pennsylvania (“SCI-Chester”), but he has

must accept as true the facts as pled in

been housed in at least two other facilities.

Spruill’s complaint. E.g., Bd. of Trs. of

His complaint alleges that, shortly after he

Teamsters Local 863 Pension Fund v.

was transferred to the State Correctional

Foodtown, Inc., 296 F.3d 164, 168 (3d Cir.

Institution at Coal Township, Pennsylvania

2002). Given that the exhaustion issue

(“SCI-Coal”) in May 2001, the defendants

turns on the indisputably authentic

were deliberately indifferent to his medical

documents related to Spruill’s grievances,

needs and subjected him to unnecessarily

we hold that we may also consider these

painful medical treatment. Named as

without converting it to a motion for

defendants in the complaint are Frank

summary judgment.2 See Steele v. Fed.

Gillis, the Superintendent at SCI-Coal;

Lieutenant Steven Gooler, the Unit

2 Manager of the Restricted Housing Unit

Strictly speaking, the motion acted on

(RHU) at SCI-Coal, where Spruill was

by the District Court should not have

housed during the events at issue; Dr.

been captioned as a Fed. R. Civ. P.

Shawn McGlaughlin, a prison physician;

12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, but rather as

and Brian Brown, a physician’s assistant.

a Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c) motion for

judgment on the pleadings, because we On May 2, 2001, Spruill was

have held that failure to exhaust transferred from the State Correctional

administrative remedies under § 1997e(a) Institution at Rockview (SCI-Rockview),

is an affirmative defense. See Ray v. Pennsylvania to SCI-Coal, where he was

Kertes, 285 F.3d 287, 295 (3d Cir. 2002). housed in the RHU. Upon his arrival,

There is no material difference in the Spruill immediately requested to see a

applicable legal standards, so for the sake medical staff member about severe pain he

of familiarity, we shall use the “motion was experiencing in his lower back area

to dismiss” formulation of Fed. R. Civ. and his right leg. “Several hours later,” he

P. 12(b).

was interviewed by a nurse. After Spruill

described his pain, and stated that he

“suffers from a chronic and debilitating

well as severe pain up and down

lower back disorder, spondylotic spinal

the front and back sides of the

stenosis with recurrent compression of L3

right leg. It was at that point this

and/or L4 nerve root on right,” the nurse

writer fell to the floor in a forceful

said, “There is nothing I can do, you will

manner, hitting the left side of my

need to sign up for sick call.”

face on the edge of the “metal”

Spruill signed up for sick call on May toilet in the cell. This writer did

3, but the next morning, he fell due to a as well also jammed and/or

severe pain in his leg and back, striking the injured his right thumb in the

left side of his face on the metal toilet in same fall. This writer has reason

his cell. Spruill believes he was knocked to believe that he may have passed

unconscious and also injured his right out due to the forceful blow he

thumb. That same day, May 4, he received to the left side of his face

informed the nurse of his fall, his when he fell. This writer has

additional injuries, and continuous back made repeated request, prior, to

pain; the nurse said that she would inform see the doctor, only to be told that

the doctor. Spruill also informed Gooler the doctor does not visit the RHU.

about his fall, to which Gooler responded, To date, and even in light of this

“so, what do you want me to do?” Spruill writer’s sick call request and most

filed an official inmate grievance on May recent fall incident, this writer has

4 complaining about the fall and new yet to be examined by this

injury. Gooler did not notify health care institution’s doctor and/or RHU

providers once he was informed of security staff. This writer also

Spruill’s injuries; at that point, Spruill had informed RHU Lt. Goolier, about

yet to be examined by a medical doctor. 3 the aforementioned fall. His reply

was: so, what do you want me to

do. The writer finds Lt. Goolier

The grievance filed by Spruill dated said remarks to be highly

May 4, 2001, reads as follows: unprofessional. He is required to

notify medical respecting this

On the above stated date at writer’s fall and blow to the head.

approx. 5:35 a.m., this writer What must I do, die, before I can

attempted to get up out of the bed. get medical attention?

I took perhaps approximately 3 to

4 short steps, wherein, at that In response to the prompt on the

juncture, this writer received grievance form to “[l]ist actions taken

and/or experienced an extremely and staff you have contacted, before

sharp pain in the lower back & as submitting this grievance,” Spruill wrote:

On May 5, Dr. McGlaughlin came to Spruill was seen by the physician’s

Spruill’s cell regarding the sick call assistant, Brown, on May 7. At that

request. Dr. McGlaughlin refused to encounter, Brown accused Spruill of

examine Spruill and stated that Spruill faking his injuries and did not examine

would never go to the infirmary. Spruill him. On May 9, Spruill complained to the

filed a second grievance on May 6 nurse that the pain medication he was

complaining that McGlaughlin had failed prescribed for his back5 “wasn’t working,”

to conduct a physical examination of him.4 and later that morning Spruill experienced

another “extremely sharp pain” in his

Submitted sick call request(s)

about back pain, spoke to the the continued severe pain I am

nurse(s) about my back pain and having. More pointedly, the

seeing the doctor—they said that aforementioned doctor never once

it was nothing they could do, and conducted a physical examination

that the doctor will not come to in which to determine the full

the RHU to see me. I spoke to Lt. extent of my pre-existing back

Goolier about my situation, he condition or the injuries I

demonstrated no “care” or sustained relative to my fall on 5-

concern regarding my health 4-2001. In addition, said doctor’s

and/or well being. visit to the RHU with me lasted

approximately 30 seconds maybe

The grievance filed by Spruill dated less. To date, I am still

May 6, 2001, reads as follows: experiencing a considerable

amount of pain.

This writer avers the following: I

was seen on 5-5-2001, by a In response to the prompt on the

member of the medical staff grievance form to “[l]ist actions taken

whom identified himself as the and staff you have contacted, before

institutional medical “doctor.” I submitting this grievance,” Spruill wrote:

explained to the doctor that I

suffer from a “chronic back Spoke to nurses and RHU staff

disorder” and currently experience members who stated there’s

severe pain around my lower back nothing they can do. I will need

& right leg. And that I had fallen to submit a grievance.

in the cell the day prior, “hitting

my face on the metal toilet & also It is not clear from Spruill’s

hurting my right hand in said fall. complaint whether this medication was

Moreover, I advised the doctor prescribed by an SCI-Coal physician, or

that my fall was directly related to by a physician from SCI-Rockview, from

my not being able to walk—due to which Spruill had just been transferred.

lower back and leg which caused him to On May 14, Dr. McGlaughlin had

fall again. Spruill submitted another sick Spru ill brought into the medical

call request, and was seen on May 10 by e x a m i n a t io n r o o m , w h e r e D r .

Brown in response to that request. Spruill McGlaughlin deliberately bent and twisted

told Brown that “the current medication Spruill’s legs “as if he was trying to shape

was not working to reduce his pain,” but a pretzel.” Dr. McGlaughlin did not

Brown did not take any actions to help examine Spruill’s face or thumb for

him. Spruill submitted another sick call injuries sustained on the morning of May

request on May 11, following which he 4.

was seen by Dr. M cGlaughlin on May 12.

The grievances were consolidated and

Dr. McGlaughlin stated that he did not

denied upon Initial Review, and Spruill

believe there was anything wrong with

filed administrative appeals. The first

Spruill’s back, and accused Spruill of

appeal was denied, and Spruill filed a final

“playing games.” Spruill filed a third

appeal, which was also denied. The stated

grievance that day. 6

particular instance, since he has

The grievance filed by Spruill dated never conducted any physical

May 12, 2001, reads as follows: examination on this writer.

This writer avers that at To date, this writer remains in

approximately 8:34 a.m. on the constant sever[e] pain. And Dr.

above indicated date, SCI-Coal McGlaughlin’s continued

Chief M edical Director Dr. course of treatment that he knows

McGlaughlin, came to my cell is painful & ineffective may soon

regarding my sick call request. entail a substantial risk of me

Dr. McGlaughlin stated to me: seriously harming myself in this

that I had been evaluated back in cell “falling.”

“February 2001,” by Dr. Osgood,

who has said that I am pain-free, In response to the prompt on the

and that there’s nothing wrong grievance form to “[l]ist actions taken

with my back. and staff you have contacted, before

submitting this grievance,” Spruill wrote:

In addition: Coal’s Chief Medical

Director stated to this writer that Spoke to officer Shay—“Pod

this: “brings an end to your little officer” who indicated that it is

back playing games.” This writer very little if anything at all he

contends that Dr. McGlaughlin’s could do, the matter will need to

remarks as stated herein above be addressed by medical or by

were highly unprofessional in this way of the grievance system.

reasons behind the denials were that timely notice of appeal from the final order

Spruill was, at the time, receiving dismissing the action and we have

appropriate medical care. As our jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We

rescription of the grievances demonstrates, exercise plenary review over a district

see supra notes 3, 4 & 6, Spruill did not court’s decision to grant a motion to

seek monetary relief from the prison, nor dismiss. Broselow v. Fisher, 319 F.3d

do the grievances identify Brown by name 605, 607 (3d Cir. 2003). To the extent that

or by description. our review turns on the statutory

construction of the exhaustion requirement

B. Proceedings in the District Court

in § 1997e(a), our review is also plenary.

Spruill filed the present suit seeking Concepcion v. Morton, 306 F.3d 1347,

monetary and injunctive relief. Because 1352 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding that “the

Spruill had by then been transferred to scope of § 1997e(a)’s applicability, which

SCI-Chester, the District Court held that is a question of law” is subject to plenary

his claim for injunctive relief against review); see also Nyhuis v. Reno, 204 F.3d

officials at SCI-Coal was moot under 65, 66 (3d Cir. 2000).

Abdul-Akbar v. Watson, 4 F.3d 195, 206-

The defendants advance several

07 (3d Cir. 1993). The District Court

grounds on which to affirm the judgment

granted all four defendants’ motions to

of the District Court. First, they argue that

dismiss on several grounds, holding, inter

Spruill’s failure to seek money damages in

alia, that (1) Spruill’s failure to seek

his grievances precludes him from now

money damages in his grievances

seeking damages in federal court. Second,

constituted a failure to exhaust

Brown argues that Spruill’s failure to

administrative remedies; (2) because

name him in the grievances is a failure to

Spru ill received adequate medical

exhaust. Third, all defendants argue that

treatment, he had stated no claim for a

Spruill has not alleged facts sufficient to

violation of his Eighth Amendment rights;

establish a violation of his Eighth

and (3) Spruill had failed to exhaust his

Amendment rights.7 We will treat each of

claim against Brown because the

these arguments in turn.

grievances did not name Brown.

C. This Appeal

II. Exhaustion Under the PLRA

Spruill appeals the dismissals of Lt.

Gooler, Dr. McGlaughlin, and Brown, but

does not appeal the dismissal of 7

Gooler captions this issue as a

Superintendent Gillis. The District Court

qualified immunity defense, which it is

had jurisdiction over this action pursuant

not. The substance of his argument is

to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and § 1343, as a suit

that Spruill’s complaint does not

arising under a federal law securing civil

establish that Gooler acted with a mental

rights, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Spruill filed a

state of deliberate indifference.

A. The CRIPA discretionary continuance provision with a

mandatory dismissal provision:

In 1980, Congress enacted the Civil

Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act No action shall be brought with

(CRIPA), Pub. L. No. 96-247, 94 Stat. 349 respect to prison conditions under

(1980). CRIPA § 7 (originally codified at section 1979 of the Revised

42 U.S.C. § 1997e) took several steps to Statutes of the United States (42

foster the development of administrative U.S.C. 1983), or any other Federal

grievance systems in prisons: First, it law, by a prisoner confined in any

directed the Attorney General to jail, prison, or other correctional

promulgate, after consultation with others, facility until such administrative

“minimum standards for the development remedies as are available are

of a plain, speedy, and effective system for exhausted.

the resolution of [inmate] grievances.”

PLRA § 803(d) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §

CRIPA § 7(b)(1). Second, it directed the

1997e(a) and amending CRIPA § 7(a)).

Attorney General to set up a certification

As the Supreme Court explained in Nussle:

program for inmate grievance systems.

CRIPA § 7(c). Third, it gave District [This] exhaustion provision differs

Courts discretion to continue (i.e. stay) § markedly from its predecessor.

1983 cases brought by prisoners “in order Once within the discretion of the

to require exhaustion of such plain, district court, exhaustion in cases

speedy, and effective administrative covered by § 1997e(a) is now

remedies as are available.” CRIPA § 7(a). mandatory. All “available”

The Supreme Court “described this remedies must now be exhausted;

provision as a ‘limited exhaustion those remedies need not meet

requirement.’” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. federal standards, nor must they be

516, 523-24 (2002) (quoting McCarthy v. “plain, speedy, and effective.”

Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 150-51 (1992)); Even when the prisoner seeks relief

see also Concepcion, 306 F.3d at 1352. not a va ila ble in grievance

proceedings, n o ta b ly m oney

B. The PLRA

damages, exhaustion is a

This regime of discretionary prerequisite to suit. And unlike the

continuance to exhaust administrative prev ious prov ision, w hich

remedies lasted until the 1996 enactment encompassed only § 1983 suits,

of the Prison Litigation Reform Act of exhaustion is now required for all

1995, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 “action [s] . . . brought with respect

at 66 (1996). Section 803(d) of the PLRA to prison conditions,” whether

amended CRIPA § 7 to, inter alia, remove under § 1983 or “any other Federal

the standards-setting and certification roles law.”

of the Attorney General, and replace the

534 U.S. at 524 (citing Booth v. Churner,

532 U.S. 731, 739-41 & n.5). interpreting § 1997e(a)’s exhaustion

requirement.

Several courts have recounted the

legislative history of the PLRA, and we C. Exhaustion and Procedural Default

need not do so once again. See, e.g.,

We have previously addressed the

Johnson v. Daley, 339 F.3d 582, 598-99

applicability of § 1997e(a) to actions by

(7th Cir. 2003) (Ripple, J., concurring in

prisoners who have filed suit in federal

the judgment); Nussle v. Willette, 224 F.3d

court before pursuing all avenues of relief

95, 106 (2d Cir. 2000), rev’d sub nom.

available to them within their prison’s

Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516 (2002);

inmate grievance system. In Nyhuis, 204

Alexander v. Hawk, 159 F.3d 1321, 1324-

F.3d 65, we held that an inmate seeking

25 (11th Cir. 1998). The Supreme Court

relief that the prison’s administrative

summarized the objectives of the

grievance system cannot provide (in

exhaustion requirement of the PLRA in

Nyhuis, it was money damages) must

Nussle:

nonetheless pursue the grievance process

Beyond doubt, Congress enacted § to its end before coming to federal court.

1997e(a) to reduce the quantity and We concluded that the PLRA “make[s]

improve the quality of prisoner exhaustion of all administrative remedies

suits; to this purpose, Congress mandatory.” Id. at 67 (emphasis added).

afforded corrections officials time The question we now consider is whether

and opportunity to address “all administrative re medies” are

com plaints internally before exhausted whenever there is no further

allowing the initiation of a federal process available to the inmate within the

case. In some instances, corrective grievance system (which would happen if,

action taken in response to an say, an inmate fails to file an

inmate’s grievance might improve administrative appeal), or whether it is

prison administration and satisfy necessary that the inmate reach this

the inmate, thereby obviating the endpoint having availed himself of every

need for litigation. In other process at every turn (which would require

instances, the internal review might all appeals to be timely pursued, etc.). Put

“filter out some frivolous claims.” another way, we ask whether the PLRA

And for cases ultimately brought to requires simple exhaustion or something

court, adjudication could be more— “proper” exhaustion, as it were.

facilitated by an administrative To borrow terms from other areas of the

record that clarifies the contours of law that recognize an exh austion

the controversy. requirement, we consider whether the

PLRA’s exhaustion requirement is merely

534 U.S. at 524-25 (quoting and citing

a termination requirement, or also includes

Booth, 532 U.S. at 737). With this

a procedural default component.

background to guide us, we turn next to

We recognize that there is an emerging failed to me et the State’s

split among the circuits on whether the procedura l requirements for

PLRA includes a procedural default presenting his federal claims has

component. Compare Ross v. County of deprived the state courts of an

Bernalillo, 365 F.3d 1181,1186 (10th Cir. opportunity to address those claims

2004) (“[T]he PLRA, like 28 U.S.C. § in the first instance. A habeas

2254, contains a procedural default petitioner who has defaulted his

c o n c e p t w i t h in i t s e x h a u s t i o n federal claims in state court meets

requirement.”), and Pozo v. McCaughtry, the technical requirements for

286 F.3d 1022 (7th Cir.) (same), cert. exhaustion; there are no state

denied 537 U.S. 949 (2002), with Thomas remedies any longer “available” to

v. Woolum, 337 F.3d 720, 723 (6th Cir. him. In the absence of the

2003) (“[W]e hold that so long as an independent and adequate state

inmate presents his or her grievance to ground doctrine in federal habeas,

prison officials and appeals through the habeas petitioners would be able to

available procedures, the inmate has avoid the exhaustion requirement

exhausted his or her administrative by defaulting their federal claims in

remedies, and a prison’s decision not to state court.

address the grievance because it was

Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 732

untimely under prison rules shall not bar

(1991) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b); Engle

the federal suit.”).

v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 125-26, n.28

1. The Procedural Default Component of (1982)).

the PLRA

The value of a procedural default rule

The Supreme Court has observed in the for enforcing an exhaustion requirement is

federal habeas corpus context that an obvious. For example, both state criminal

exhaustion requirement with out a processes and prison administrative

procedural default component is quite grievance systems normally include time

toothless. To “protect the integrity of the bars; without the backstop of a procedural

federal exhaustion rule, [federal habeas default rule, an aggrieved prisoner could

courts] ask not only whether a prisoner has evade § 1997e(a)’s exhaustion requirement

exhausted his state remedies, but also by simply letting the time to present his

whether he has properly exhausted those grievance expire, and a habeas petitioner

remedies, i.e., whether he has fairly could likewise evade 28 U.S.C. §

presented his claims to the state courts.” 2254(b)’s exhaustion requirement by not

O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 848 timely appealing within the state court

(1999) (quotation marks and citations system. There are many other points at

omitted) (emphasis in original). which an aggrieved prisoner or a habeas

petitioner could similarly deprive the

[A] habeas petitioner who has

prison grievance system or state court

system, respectively, of the opportunity to

fairly consider his claim.

The analogy is far from perfect, have been commenced [before the State

though. For one thing, the Supreme Court authority].” In Oscar Mayer & Co. v.

has consistently located the procedural Evans, 441 U.S. 750 (1979), the Supreme

default component of federal habeas law in Court concluded that this provision

the “independent and adequate state (which is parallel to § 706(c) of Title

ground” doctrine, see, e.g., Lee v. Kemna, VII, see Oscar Mayer, 441 U.S. at 755-

534 U.S. 362, 375 (2002); Coleman, 501 56) makes “resort to administrative

U.S. at 729, a doctrine that, in the habeas remedies in deferral States by individual

context at least, “is grounded in concerns claimants . . . mandatory, not optional.”

of comity and federalism,” id. at 730; see Id. at 758. In substance, then, section

also Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 14(b) implies a sort of exhaustion

453 (2000); Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 requirement, because aggrieved parties in

U.S. 518, 523 (1997). It is at least possible deferral states must at least commence

that the comity-and-federalism rationale the available state administrative

(and hence the “independent and adequate proceedings. The Oscar Mayer Court

state ground” rule) applies with greater went on, however, to also hold that

force to defaults in state judicial section 14(b) does not authorize the

proceedings than it does to defaults in state denial of federal relief in the face of a

administrative proceedings. Another state procedural default. 441 U.S. at

problem with uncritically importing 758-65. Thus, section 14(b) does not bar

principles from federal habeas doctrine a suit by an ADEA plaintiff in a deferral

into this context is that in other federal state who does not avail himself of the

statutory schemes—most prominently, available state administrative process, or

employment discrimination claims under only seeks to invoke that process after a

the Age Discrimination in Employment state time limit for doing so has expired.

Act (ADEA)—the Supreme Court has not In short, the Court explained, “state

interpreted an exhaustion-like requirement procedural defaults cannot foreclose

to imply a procedural default component. 8 federal relief.” Id. at 762. Thus, the

ADEA has an exhaustion requirement

but no procedural default component.

Section 14(b) of the ADEA, 29 But like the federal habeas corpus

U.S.C. § 633(b), provides that, in states analogy, the Oscar Mayer analogy is

that have a “State authority” authorized imperfect. Oscar Mayer emphasizes that

to enforce state laws against age relief before a state agency is based on

discrimination (known as “deferral state law, and “independent [of] federal

states”), an ADEA private plaintiff may relief.” 441 U.S. at 761. Thus, ADEA

not bring a federal lawsuit “before the relief operates substantively in parallel

expiration of sixty days after proceedings with state relief, even though section

objectives will be served by interpreting §

1997e(a)’s exhaustion requirement to

The competing analogies of federal

include a procedural default component.

habeas corpus and federal civil rights law

Based on our earlier discussion of the

are developed in greater detail in the

PLRA’s legislative history, see supra Part

majority and dissenting opinions in the

III.B, Congress seems to have had three

Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit’s

interrelated objectives relevant to our

opinion on the same exhaustion question

inquiry here: (1) to return control of the

we consider here. See Thomas, 337 F.3d

inmate grievance process to prison

720 (Moore, J.); id. at 737 (Rosen, J.,

administra tors; (2) to encou rage

dissenting in part and concurring in the

development of an administrative record,

judgment). Suffice it to say that we find

and perhaps settlements, within the inmate

neither position entirely satisfactory. But

grievance process; and (3) to reduce the

the foregoing discussion at least suggests

burden on the federal courts by erecting

that an exhaustion rule can (though need

barriers to frivolous prisoner lawsuits.

not) be fairly read to include a procedural

Each of these goals is better served by

default component. Therefore, the best

interpreting § 1997e(a)’s exhaustion

course, we think, is to examine Congress’s

language to include a procedural default

policy objectives in enacting § 1997e(a),

component than by interpreting it merely

and to evaluate whether those are better

to require termination of all administrative

served by a procedural default rule, or the

grievance proceedings.

absence of one.

All three goals are obviously served by

We believe that Congress’s policy

a procedural default rule because such a

rule prevents an end-run around the

exhaustion requirement, and thereby

14(b) encourages that, procedurally, they creates an overwhelming incentive for a

be pursued consecutively. In contrast, § prisoner to pursue his claims to the fullest

1997e(a) is addressed only to “[§ 1983 within the administrative grievance

and] any other Federal law.” While system. There are subtler benefits too: A

relief is to be pursued consecutively procedural default rule enhances the

under § 1997e(a) (first in the prison integrity of prison administration because

grievance system, and then in federal it ensures prisoner compliance with the

court), the substantive rights are specific requirements of the grievance

exclusively federal in character. If the system. A procedural default rule ensures

PLRA charged state prison authorities that an administrative record will be

with remedying only state law, we might developed in the best fashion (i.e., under a

find the parallel to the ADEA more grievance system designed to create just

persuasive; but in the PLRA regime state such a record), and that the possibility of

prison authorities are called upon to settlement will be explored within a

remedy violations of federal law.

framework where prison administrators identify a specific person does not

will be receptive to settlement. Finally, prevent a later suit against that

Congress wanted to erect any barrier it person. Brown v. Sikes, 212 F.3d

could to suits by prisoners in federal court, 1205, 1208 (11th Cir. 2000).

and a procedural default rule surely Presumably the sixth circuit

reduces caseloads (even though it may be likewise would require legal claims

a blunt instrument for doing so). to be identified, while the eleventh

would not. Yet both of these

2. Measuring Procedural Default

decisions skip over a vital question:

Having concluded that, as a matter of what body of law governs the

statutory construction, § 1997e(a) includes specificity inquiry?

a procedural default component, we must

Id.

identify the source of the rules that a

prisoner must follow to avoid procedurally We agree that this is a critical question:

defaulting his claim. Judge Easterbrook Is procedural default under § 1997e(a)

has aptly referred to this question as “the governed by express federal law, federal

choice of law issue.” Strong v. David, 297 common law, or by the “law” of the state

F.3d 646, 649 (7th Cir. 2002). He prison grievance system (as stated in this

elaborates: case in the Grievance System Policy)? By

“federal common law” we refer to some

Very few courts have addressed

putative set of rules, or at least general

what things an administrative

standards, for assessing whether a

grievance must contain, and none

grievance was timely, included a

has attended to the choice-of-law

sufficiently detailed factual account,

issue. Courts—and presumably

requested appropriate relief, etc. At all

litigants too—have assumed that

events, we agree with Judge Easterbrook’s

the general objectives that inspired

conclusion that prison grievance

§ 1997e(a) also determine how a

procedures supply the yardstick for

prisoner must go about exhausting

measuring procedural default. Accord

state remedies. The sixth circuit,

Pozo, 286 F.3d at 1025. This result is

for example, demands that the