Renda v. King

Opinions of the United

2003 Decisions States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

10-16-2003

Renda v. King

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Precedential

Docket No. 01-2421

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PRECEDENTIAL

Filed October 16, 2003

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

Nos: 01-2421 and 01-2498

VALERIE RENDA

v.

PAUL KING;

DAVID B. KELSEY

Paul King,

Appellant in Docket No. 01-2421

Valerie Renda,

Appellant in Docket No. 01-2498

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Civil Action No. 97-cv-00721)

District Judge: Honorable William L. Standish

Argued: May 2, 2002

Before: ROTH and STAPLETON, Circuit Judges

POLLAK,* District Judge

(Opinion filed: October 16, 2003)

* Honorable Louis H. Pollak, District Court Judge for the Eastern District

of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.

2

William G. Walker, Esquire (Argued)

145 South Sixth Avenue

Tucson, AZ 85701

Carol S. Rosenbloom, Esquire

Carol Rosenbloom Associates

5530 Walnut Street

Pittsburgh, PA 15232

Counsel for Valerie Renda:

Appellee in 01-2421 & Appellant

in 01-2498

D. Michael Fisher

Attorney General

Kemal Alexander Mericli (Argued)

Senior Deputy Attorney General

Rodney M. Torbic

Senior Deputy Attorney General

Calvin R. Koons

Senior Deputy Attorney General

John G. Knorr, III

Chief Deputy Attorney General

Appellate Litigation Section

Office of Attorney General

6th Floor, Manor Complex

564 Forbes Avenue

Pittsburgh, PA 15219

Counsel for Paul King:

Appellant in 01-2421 & Appellee

in 01-2498;

and David B. Kelsey:

Appellee in 01-2498

OPINION OF THE COURT

ROTH, Circuit Judge:

In this appeal, defendant Trooper Paul King contends

that the District Court abused its discretion in excluding

evidence of his good character for truthfulness and that the

3

jury’s verdict against him and in favor of plaintiff Valerie

Renda1 is irreconcilable with its verdict against Renda and

in favor of co-defendant Corporal David Kelsey. As

discussed below, we conclude that the District Court

abused its discretion in excluding evidence of King’s good

character for truthfulness because Renda opened the door

for such evidence when she argued that King was corrupt

in his conduct of an official police investigation. Since we

will remand for a new trial as to Trooper King on this

ground, there is no need to address his argument that the

jury’s verdict was inconsistent.

Plaintiff Valerie Renda cross-appealed on the ground that

the District Court abused its discretion in denying her

motion to vacate the grant of summary judgment to

defendants King and Kelsey on her claim that they violated

her constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by

engaging in a custodial interrogation opinion without

providing warnings pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384

U.S. 436, 444 (1966). As discussed below, we conclude that

the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying

Renda’s motion to vacate. The Supreme Court’s recent

holding in Chavez v. Martinez, ___ U.S. ___, 123 S.Ct. 1994

(2003) reaffirms our holding in Giuffre v. Bissell, 31 F.3d

1241 (3d Cir. 1994) that a plaintiff may not base a § 1983

claim on the mere fact that the police questioned her in

custody without providing Miranda warnings when there is

no claim that the plaintiff ’s answers were used against her

at trial.2

I. Facts and Procedural History

This case began with a domestic dispute between Renda

and her boyfriend Joe Sonafelt, a Pennsylvania State

Trooper. In May 1995, Renda was living with Trooper

Sonafelt and their two year old son, Joe, Jr., in Lower

1. At trial, plaintiff went by her maiden name, Krah, rather than her

married name, Renda.

2. As we state in footnote 4, there is no issue here that the nature of

defendants’ interrogation of Renda violated the Due Process Clause

because Renda did not appeal the dismissal of her Fourteenth

Amendment Due Process claim.

4

Burrel, Pennsylvania. On May 15, Renda left Sonafelt and,

together with her son went to the apartment of her friend

Tina Stone. Sonafelt called the local police, claiming that

Renda had abducted their son in violation of a custody

order. The local police then contacted the Pennsylvania

State Police. Defendant Kelsey, a Pennsylvania State Police

Corporal, determined that the complaint, along with a

complaint from Renda that Sonafelt had kicked her in the

back on May 14, would be handled by the Pennsylvania

State Police. Corporal Kelsey assigned the matter to

defendant King, a Pennsylvania State Police Trooper.

Trooper King contacted Renda by telephone on the night

of May 15. She told him that Sonafelt had slammed her

into a wall at their residence earlier that day during an

argument. Renda also indicated that she did not want to

give a statement or file charges and that she wanted to be

left alone. Based on Renda’s allegations of domestic abuse,

Trooper King conducted a tape recorded interrogation of

Trooper Sonafelt at approximately 10:00 p.m. at the station

house. Trooper King provided Miranda warnings, and

Trooper Sonafelt waived his rights.

Despite an earlier request that the police not interview

her, at 2:30 a.m. on May 16, Trooper King and Corporal

Kelsey conducted an in-person interview of Renda at

Stone’s apartment. They did not provide Miranda warnings

to Renda, but she gave them a written statement. The

statement did not mention the assault of May 15 that she

had reported earlier that evening. King and Kelsey both

testified at trial that, when they asked Renda why she did

not mention the incident, she responded that she did not

include the allegation in the written statement because she

had lied about it earlier on the telephone. Renda on the

other hand testified at trial that the alleged May 15 assault

did occur and that she never told King and Kelsey that she

had lied. She testified that she did not mention the May 15

incident in the written statement because she did not want

to file a complaint against Sonafelt nor did she want him to

go to prison. She stated that she provided the written

statement because King and Kelsey threatened her.

On June 7, 1995, Trooper King filed a charge of giving

false reports to law enforcement authorities against Renda

5

and obtained an arrest warrant. The local police in Altoona,

Pennsylvania, arrested Renda at her place of employment.

She was arraigned and bond was set at $10,000. She was

incarcerated at Westmoreland County Jail until June 20, at

which point she was released on her own recognizance. On

August 28, 1996, the Court of Common Pleas,

Westmoreland County, suppressed any statements from the

morning of May 16, 1995, because defendants had not

provided plaintiff Miranda warnings prior to the custodial

interrogation. The case was nolle prossed by the District

Attorney of Westmoreland County because of the evidence

problems.

Renda then filed this § 1983 civil action alleging that King

and Kelsey violated her constitutional rights under the

First, Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments when

they subjected her to a coercive interrogation; she also

claimed that she was interrogated without Miranda

warnings and subjected to an unlawful search, arrest,

imprisonment, and malicious prosecution. Defendants

moved for summary judgment on all of Renda’s claims,

except the allegation of coercive interrogation. On May 14,

1999, the District Court granted the motion on Renda’s

First Amendment, false arrest, false imprisonment, and

Miranda warnings claims but denied the motion as to the

rest. A jury trial followed on plaintiff ’s malicious

prosecution and coerced interrogation claims. During the

trial, the District Court dismissed the coerced interrogation

claim. The jury returned a verdict on the malicious

prosecution claim, finding against Trooper King and in

favor of Renda in the amount of $80,000, and against

Renda and in favor of Corporal Kelsey.

Renda then moved for relief from the judgment relating to

her Miranda claim. The District Court denied the motion on

July 17, 2000.

A separate trial was held on the punitive damages issue.

The jury could not reach a decision, and a mistrial was

declared. The District Court ordered a new trial on the

punitive damages issue. On May 21, 2001, pursuant to an

agreement by the parties, the District Court dismissed the

punitive damages claim. Trooper King appealed, and Renda

filed a cross-appeal.

6

II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review

The District Court had jurisdiction over this federal civil

rights action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343. We

have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. While

District Court interpretations of the Federal Rules of

Evidence are subject to plenary review, rulings to admit or

exclude evidence are reviewed for an abuse of discretion if

they are based on a permissible interpretation of the

Federal Rules of Evidence. See United States v. Saada, 212

F.3d 210, 220 (3d Cir. 2000). Since the issue in the present

case is the District Court’s application of Rule 608, rather

than its interpretation of Rule 608, we review that ruling for

an abuse of discretion. See Johnson v. Elk Lake School

District, 283 F.3d 138, 145 n. 2 (3d Cir. 2002). We review

denials of motions for relief from judgment for abuse of

discretion. See Resolution Trust Corp. v. Forest Grove, 33

F.3d 284, 288 (3d Cir. 1994).

III. Discussion

1. Exclusion of Evidence Regarding Trooper King’s Good

Character for Truthfulness:

Generally, evidence of a person’s character is not

admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity

therewith. See Fed. R. Evid. 404(a). However, evidence of a

witness’s good character for truthfulness is admissible

under some circumstances to show that the witness is

acting in conformity with that character for truthfulness

when testifying in the particular case. See id. Those

circumstances are that

(1) the evidence may refer only to character for

truthfulness or untruthfulness, and (2) evidence of

truthful character is admissible only after the character

of the witness for truthfulness has been attacked by

opinion or reputation evidence or otherwise.

Fed. R. Evid. 608(a). Evidence of a witness’s good character

for truthfulness is not admissible absent an attack on the

witness’s character for truthfulness due to the cost of

engaging in a fruitless “swearing match,” particularly in

light of the fact that a witness is presumed to tell the truth

7

until his character for truthfulness is attacked. See 3

Christopher B. Mueller and Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Federal

Evidence § 269 (2d ed. 1994); 4 John Henry Wigmore,

Evidence in Trials at Common Law § 1104 (Chadbourn rev.

1972).

Under Rule 608(a), whether a witness’s credibility has

been attacked depends on the nature of the opponent’s

impeaching evidence. See United States v. Dring, 930 F.2d

687, 690-91 (9th Cir. 1991); 4 Wigmore § 1104. Direct

attacks on a witness’s veracity in the particular case do not

open the door for evidence of the witness’s good character.

See Dring, 930 F.2d at 690. For example, evidence of bias

or prior inconsistent statements generally does not open

the door for evidence of good character for truthfulness. See

Dring, 930 F.2d at 691; 4 Wigmore §§ 1104, 1105. The

reason that evidence of bias does not open the door for

evidence of good character for truthfulness is because

evidence of bias only relates to a motive to lie in the

particular case, not a general predisposition to lie. See

United States v. Medical Therapy Sciences, Inc., 583 F.2d

36, 41 (2d Cir. 1978); 3 Mueller and Kirkpatrick § 270; 4

Wigmore § 1107. Similarly, prior inconsistent statements do

not open the door for evidence of good character for

truthfulness because there can be a number of reasons for

the error, such as defects in knowledge or memory, a bias

or interest to lie in this particular instance, or a general

character trait for untruthfulness. See 3 Mueller and

Kirkpatrick § 270; 4 Wigmore § 1108. Thus, although the

inconsistency may be due to a dishonest character, it is not

necessarily, or even probably, due to this cause. Thus, the

relatively minor value of permitting a response to such an

inference does not justify the cost of litigating the tangential

issue of character for truthfulness. See id.

In addition to direct attacks on a witness’s general

character for truthfulness, indirect attacks also open the

door for evidence of a witness’s good character for

truthfulness. See Dring, 930 F.2d at 691. “[I]ndirect attacks

on truthfulness include opinion evidence, reputation

evidence, and evidence of corruption, which require the jury

to infer that the witness is lying at present simply because

he has lied often in the past.” Id. As the Advisory

8

Committee Notes for Rule 608(a) state, “[o]pinion or

reputation that the witness is untruthful specifically

qualifies as an attack under the rule, and evidence of

misconduct, including conviction of crime, and of

corruption also fall within this category. Evidence of bias or

interest does not.” Fed. R. Evid. 608 Advisory Committee

Notes to the 1972 Proposed Rules. The reason that an

indirect attack on a witness’s character for truthfulness

opens the door for testimony about the witness’s good

character for truthfulness is because such attacks directly

call into question the witness’s moral character for

truthfulness. See id. at § 1107; 3 Mueller and Kirkpatrick

§ 270. Likewise, “[a]n act of corruption directly affects moral

character; and the corroboration should therefore depend

upon the rule for acts involving character.” 4 Wigmore

§ 1107; see also 3 Mueller and Kirkpatrick § 270. As the

Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held in Medical

Therapy Sciences, Inc.:

Some types of bias, for example bias stemming from a

relationship with a party, do not necessarily involve

any issue relating to the moral character of the

witness, but suggest only that the witness’ testimony

may perhaps unwittingly be slanted for reasons

unrelated to general propensity for untruthfulness. As

such, character evidence is not relevant to meet such

an attack. On the other hand, alleged partiality based

on hostility or self-interest may assume greater

significance if it is sought to be proven by conduct rising

to the level of corruption.

583 F.2d at 41 (emphasis added).

In the present case, the District Court abused its

discretion in excluding evidence of Trooper King’s good

character for truthfulness. Renda clearly engaged in an

indirect attack on Trooper King’s character for truthfulness

by arguing during her opening statement that the jury

should not believe Trooper King when he claimed that

Renda had told him that she lied — not because of bias in

this case but because he was being corrupt in his conduct

of his official duties as a police officer. See United States v.

Jones, 763 F.2d 518, 522 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding that

attacks on a witness’s character for truthfulness in opening

9

statements may qualify under the “otherwise” portion of

Rule 608(a)). Renda’s counsel made the following comments

in the opening statement:

So I’m here to tell you a little bit about the Plaintiff ’s

version of the case. And, basically, what I’m here to tell

you is that, in a nutshell, Valerie Krah Renda, who is

the Plaintiff in this case, is basically claiming that

during the course of a police investigation, a State Police

investigation about an incident between her and a

state trooper, who was at the time her boyfriend, that

these officers, these Defendants, misconducted

themselves; that they maliciously harassed her; that

they attempted to coerce her into making false

confessions; and that when she would not do so, they

filed false charges against her. They caused her to be

arrested and incarcerated and caused her to hire a

lawyer and fight a criminal case against her. . . .

****

. . . . And after all the evidence is in, we’re going to

ask that you conclude from your deliberations and

from the evidence presented to you that this young

woman was not only unfairly treated, but she was

maliciously and willfully mistreated by these officers in

an attempt to help Joe Sonafelt; that they used illegal

investigative techniques; that they coerced her into

talking to them on the morning of the 16th at two

o’clock in the morning; they barged into her friend’s

house; that they terrorized her; that they lied about the

statements that she gave; that they caused her to be

prosecuted illegally; and that she has suffered

significant damages because of that.

App. 138, 162 (emphasis added).

This argument that Trooper King would lie and engage in

illegal police investigative techniques and frame an innocent

person in order to help a fellow Trooper goes beyond

alleging that Trooper King is biased in his testimony. It

suggests that he is corrupt and improperly performed his

official duties. See Sutkiewicz v. Monroe Co. Sheriff, 110

F.3d 352, 361 (6th Cir. 1997) (holding that it was proper for

a District Court to permit a defendant to introduce evidence

10

of good character for truthfulness in response to allegations

that the defendant withheld exculpatory information in an

attempt to frame the plaintiff). Since this impeachment

went beyond a claim of a simple interest in the outcome of

the case and rose to the level of corruption, “counterproof

of good character should no doubt be admitted.” 3 Mueller

and Kirkpatrick § 270.

Having determined that the District Court erred in

excluding the evidence of Trooper King’s good character for

truthfulness does not end our inquiry; we must determine

whether that error was harmless. Federal Rule of Evidence

103(a) provides that an evidentiary ruling is not reversible

error “unless a substantial right of a party is affected . . . .”

Fed. R. Evid. 103(a). Under this test, a reviewing court

should affirm the District Court despite the error if the

reviewing court believes “that it is highly probable that the

error did not contribute to the judgment . . . .” McQueeney

v. Wilmington Trust Co., 779 F.2d 916, 924 (3d Cir. 1985)

(quoting Government of the V.I. v. Toto, 529 F.2d 278, 284

(3d Cir. 1976)).

In the present case, however, we do not believe that it is

highly probable that the error did not affect the judgment

because the central issue in the present case was the

credibility of the parties. As Renda’s counsel made clear in

closing argument:

The real fact for you to determine in this case, and it’s

the one thing that counsel and I agree on, is whether

or not you believe these police officers, based on all the

evidence, that on the night of May 15th and early

morning of May 16th she said to those officers, “I lied,

it never happened,” or whether you believe, based on

the circumstances that you’ve heard, that that

statement was never made. That is the sole basis of the

reason for her prosecution in this case; and if she

didn’t say it, then she has been maliciously prosecuted

in this case.

****

The statement — the most important question in this

case is did she say that evening “I lied”? Now, who was

there? She was there. Kelsey was there. King was

11

there. Tina Stone was in the bedroom. What’s the

testimony that you heard? She says, “I never said it.”

They say she said it.

App. 1490-1493. Thus, given the significance of the issue of

credibility, we do not believe that it is highly probable that

the District Court’s error in preventing Trooper King from

responding to the plaintiff ’s allegations of corruption did

not have an effect on the judgment. See McQueeney, 779

F.2d at 924, 927.

Renda argues, however, that the error was harmless

because it was cumulative of other evidence. In particular,

she points to testimony from Assistant District Attorney

Koenig that he had an outstanding experience working with

Trooper King. However, when King’s counsel questioned

Assistant District Attorney Koenig about his prior work

experience, Renda’s counsel objected, and the District

Court excluded the testimony as impermissible reputation

evidence. Renda also claims that the excluded evidence was

cumulative of the statement by King’s counsel in closing

argument that Trooper King told the truth because he

received subsequent promotions and increases in

responsibilities that he would not have received if the

Pennsylvania State Police believed that he fabricated

statements. However, such speculation by a defense

attorney in summation does not substitute for witness

testimony regarding a person’s reputation for truthfulness.

We conclude, therefore, that the error in excluding

testimony regarding Trooper King’s good character for

truthfulness was not harmless.

2. Miranda Claim:

The District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying

Renda’s motion to vacate the District Court’s grant of

partial summary judgment to King and Kelsey on Renda’s

Miranda claim. In order to recover under § 1983, a plaintiff

must show that the defendant, under color of state law,

subjected the plaintiff to a deprivation of a right, privilege,

or immunity secured by the constitution or laws of the

United States. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. One of the

constitutional rights that Renda claims the defendants

violated is her right under Miranda to be free from custodial

interrogation.

12

In Miranda, the Supreme Court held that the Self-

Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibits a

prosecutor from using “statements, whether exculpatory or

inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the

defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural

safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-

incrimination.” 384 U.S. at 444. Absent equally effective

means, these procedural safeguards are that a person be

warned prior to custodial interrogation of his right to

remain silent, that anything he says can be used against

him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence

of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one

will be provided to him. See id. at 479. If, after receiving

these warnings, the person knowingly and intelligently

waives these rights and provides a statement, that

statement can be used against the person in a criminal

proceeding. See id.

The District Court granted defendants summary

judgment on Renda’s Miranda claim based on our decision

in Giuffre, 31 F.3d at 1256. In Giuffre, we held that a

plaintiff may not base a § 1983 claim on the mere fact that

the police questioned the plaintiff in custody without

providing Miranda warnings where there is no claim that

the statements obtained in violation of Miranda were used

against the plaintiff because:

violations of the prophylactic Miranda procedures do

not amount to violations of the Constitution itself. The

right protected under the Fifth Amendment is the right

not to be compelled to be a witness against oneself in

a criminal prosecution, whereas the “right to counsel”

during custodial interrogation recognized in Miranda is

merely a procedural safeguard, and not a substantive

right.

Id. (citations omitted).

In her motion to vacate this judgment, Renda argued that

the Supreme Court’s decision in Dickerson v. United States,

530 U.S. 428 (2000), which was decided after the grant of

summary judgment, overruled Giuffre and justified

reconsideration of the grant of summary judgment under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6). In Dickerson, the

13

Supreme Court held that Congress may not supersede

Miranda by passing a statute that lessens the procedural

protections enunciated in Miranda because “Miranda

announced a constitutional rule that Congress may not

supersede legislatively.” Id. at 444.

However, in light of the Supreme Court’s recent decision

in Chavez, it is clear that Giuffre still is good law following

Dickerson, and that the District Court properly ruled that

questioning a plaintiff in custody without providing Miranda

warnings is not a basis for a § 1983 claim as long as the

plaintiff ’s statements are not used against her at trial. The

issue in Chavez was similar to the present case. In Chavez,

the police questioned Martinez without providing Miranda

warnings. Martinez was never charged with a crime, and

his answers were never used against him in a criminal

prosecution. Martinez then brought a § 1983 claim against

the officers alleging that the mere fact that the police

questioned him in custody without providing Miranda

warnings constituted a constitutional violation that could

serve as the basis of a § 1983 claim.

Chavez produced a split decision. However, six Justices

(Chief Justice Rehnquist, together with Justices Thomas,

O’Connor, Scalia, Souter, and Breyer) agreed that mere

custodial interrogation absent Miranda warnings is not a

basis for a § 1983 claim.3 Justice Thomas, joined by Chief

Justice Rehnquist and Justices O’Connor and Scalia, held

that the “failure to read Miranda warnings to Martinez did

not violate Martinez’s constitutional rights and cannot be

grounds for a § 1983 action.” Id. at 2004. Justice Thomas

reasoned that Miranda is a prophylactic rule intended to

safeguard the right protected by the Self-Incrimination

Clause (namely not to be compelled to be a witness against

oneself in any criminal case), and that rules designed to

safeguard constitutional rights do not expand the scope of

3. Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices Stevens and Ginsburg, concluded

that the use of compulsion to extract a statement from a suspect violates

the Self Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the Due

Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Martinez, 123 S.Ct. at

2013-2018. Justice Stevens, writing separately, concluded that the

police violated both the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. See id. at

2011.

14

the constitutional rights themselves. See id. Justice Souter,

joined by Justice Breyer, agreed that a § 1983 claim cannot

be brought for violating the Fifth Amendment by

questioning a person in custody without providing Miranda

warnings. See id. at 2006-08.4 Justice Souter stated that “I

do not . . . believe that Martinez can make the ‘powerful

showing,’ subject to a realistic assessment of costs and

risks, necessary to expand protection of the privilege

against compelled self-incrimination to the point of the civil

liability he asks us to recognize here.” Id. at 2007.

One factual difference between Chavez and the present

case is that Martinez never was charged with a crime while

Renda was charged but had those charges dropped after

the District Court suppressed the statements obtained in

violation of Miranda. Thus, unlike in Chavez, Renda’s

statement was used in a criminal case in one sense (i.e., to

develop probable cause sufficient to charge her). To the

extent that Chavez leaves open the issue of when a

statement is used at a criminal proceeding, see id. at 2000-

2001 (Thomas, J.) (“We need not decide today the precise

moment when a ‘criminal case’ commences . . . .”), our

prior decision in Giuffre compels the conclusion that it is

4. Chief Justice Rehnquist together with Justices Thomas, Scalia,

Souter, and Breyer disagreed over whether to remand the case for a

determination of if Martinez could prove a § 1983 claim based on the

police’s violation of his Fourteenth Amendment Due Process rights by

obtaining evidence through a method that was so brutal and offensive to

human dignity as to “shock the conscience.” Martinez, 123 S.Ct. at 2005.

Justice Thomas, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia,

concluded that the police interrogation, which involved questioning

Martinez while in the hospital receiving treatment for a gun shot wound,

did not violate Martinez’s due process rights. See id. at 2005-06. Justice

O’Connor did not join Justice Thomas in this portion of his opinion. See

id. at 1999. Justice Souter delivered the opinion of the Court on this

issue. He concluded that remand was required to determine the merits

of this claim. See id. at 2008. In addition to Justice Breyer, who joined

Justice Souter as to his entire opinion, Justices Stevens, Kennedy, and

Ginsburg joined as to this portion of the opinion. See id. at 2006. In the

present case, however, we need not address whether defendants’

questioning of Renda violated the Due Process Clause. Because Renda

did not appeal the dismissal of her Fourteenth Amendment Due Process

claim, that issue is not before us.

15

the use of coerced statements during a criminal trial, and

not in obtaining an indictment, that violates the

Constitution. See 31 F.3d at 1256. In Giuffre, as in the

present case, the police used statements allegedly obtained

from a custodial interrogation where the plaintiff was not

properly warned of his Miranda rights as a basis for filing

criminal charges, but those charges were later dropped. See

id. at 1250-51. Under these circumstances, we held that

Giuffre’s constitutional right against self-incrimination was

not violated. See id. at 1256. The same conclusion applies

here.

IV. Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, the judgment of the District

Court will be vacated as to the judgment against defendant

King on the malicious prosecution claim and the case

remanded to the District Court for a new trial on that claim

against him. The remainder of the judgment of the District

Court will be affirmed.

A True Copy:

Teste:

Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit