Ezeagwuna v. Atty Gen USA

Opinions of the United

2002 Decisions States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

7-30-2002

Ezeagwuna v. Atty Gen USA

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Precedential

Docket No. 01-3294

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PRECEDENTIAL

Filed July 30, 2002

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 01-3294

GLORY OBIANUJU EZEAGWUNA,

Petitioner

v.

JOHN ASHCROFT, ATTORNEY GENERAL

OF THE UNITED STATES,

Respondent

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

(D.C. No. 0090-1:A76 142 746)

Argued April 25, 2002

Before: BECKER, Chief Judge, SCIRICA, and

RENDELL, Circuit Judges

(Filed: July 30, 2002)

Sidney S. Rosdeitcher [ARGUED]

Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton &

Garrison

1285 Avenue of the Americas

New York, NY 10019-6084

Counsel for Petitioner

Glory Obianuju Ezeagwuna

Michael T. Dougherty [ARGUED]

United States Department of Justice

Office of Immigration Litigation

1331 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20530

Richard M. Evans

Terri J. Scadron

John M. McAdams, Jr.

United States Department of Justice

Office of Immigration Litigation

P. O. Box 878

Ben Franklin Station

Washington, D.C. 20044

Brian G. Slocum

United States Department of Justice

1331 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20530

Counsel for Respondent

John Ashcroft, Attorney General

of the United States

James C. La Forge

Chadbourne & Parke

539 Valley Road

Upper Montclair, NJ 07043

Counsel for Amicus-Appellant

Lawyers Committee for

Human Rights

OPINION OF THE COURT

RENDELL, Circuit Judge.

Glory Obianuju Ezeagwuna ("Ms. Obianuju"), a citizen of

Cameroon, seeks political asylum and withholding of

deportation. She claims to have been persecuted because of

her membership in two political organizations in Cameroon

that represent the interests of the English-speaking

minority population. The Immigration Judge ("IJ") denied

her application, and the Board of Immigration Appeals

("BIA" or "Board") dismissed her appeal. The BIA’s decision

2

was based on a finding that Ms. Obianuju had submitted

fraudulent documents and therefore was not credible. The

BIA relied almost entirely on a letter from the Department

of State that contained the conclusions of an investigation

in Cameroon. We conclude that reliance on this letter

denied Ms. Obianuju her due process rights and

undermined the fundamental fairness of the administrative

process. Further, we find that a reasonable factfinder would

be compelled to conclude that Ms. Obianuju was persecuted

because of her political opinions and faces a clear

probability of persecution if returned to Cameroon. We will

accordingly grant the petition for review, find Ms. Obianuju

eligible for asylum, order withholding of deportation, and

remand to the BIA to present this matter to the Attorney

General for the exercise of his discretion.

I.

A. Background

Glory Obianuju Ezeagwuna, a citizen of Cameroon, seeks

asylum in the United States. Prior to her alleged

persecution she lived in Bamenda, a city in the Northwest

Province of Cameroon. She is a member of the English-

speaking minority population, French being the language of

the majority. She claims to have been persecuted because

of her political opinion, and she points to mistreatment

resulting from her membership in two political groups

representing the interests of this Anglophone population --

the Social Democratic Front ("SDF ") and the Southern

Cameroons National Council ("SCNC").

Ms. Obianuju provided a detailed account of her abuse in

affidavits, testimony, and corroborating documents.

Following is a summary of the account presented by

Ms. Obianuju in her affidavit in support of her application

for asylum.

Ms. Obianuju’s parents and other family members were

very active members of SDF. In 1994, Ms. Obianuju began

participating in SDF activities, and in 1996, at the age of

eighteen, she became an official member of SDF.

Ms. Obianuju tells of three times that she was jailed and

physically abused because of her political activism. The

3

first incident took place in 1996 when she joined other SDF

members in protesting the appointment of Francis Faie

Yengo as the leader of the Bamenda Urban Council.

Government police sprayed tear gas on the protestors and

arrested them. Ms. Obianuju claims that she was then

dragged through the gravel on her knees and taken by force

to Bamenda Central Prison where she was beaten on the

soles of her feet and on her knees with police sticks.

Ms. Obianuju’s parents retained an attorney, Robert Nsoh

Fon, to obtain her release from prison and on the fourth

day she was released on bail. Upon her release she visited

a doctor, Dr. Nji, who applied ointment to her hands and

knees, and provided her with painkillers.

Next, in January 1997, Ms. Obianuju and other students

marched to protest a substantial fee increase for taking a

university entrance exam only imposed in the English-

speaking areas of Cameroon. Ms. Obianuju marched at the

front of the group. The government police began beating the

students with their belts and spraying tear gas in an effort

to disperse the students. She was kicked in the stomach

and then dragged by an officer through the gravel. In

prison, she was further hit and kicked by the officers. Her

attorney was able to negotiate her release from prison. After

her release, Ms. Obianuju left the SDF and became a

member of the SCNC. Although the SCNC did not hold

demonstrations, its goals were otherwise similar to the

SDF.

In March and April 1997 there were a series of attacks on

police and civilian establishments in Bamenda. According

to Ms. Obianuju, the government blamed the SCNC for the

attacks, but she denies any involvement. Ms. Obianuju

claims that a few weeks after the attacks the police entered

her home at 10 p.m. while she was asleep and physically

removed her from her home without providing any

explanation. During the course of the family’s struggle to

protect her, a police officer cut her mother’s hand with a

knife. Ms. Obianuju was taken to prison and placed in a

cell with other SCNC members where she remained for six

days. During the first day she and the others were beaten

with police sticks on the soles of their feet and on their

knees. During the second day an officer removed her from

4

her cell and attempted to rape her, but was stopped by

another officer. He bit her on the chest and scratched her

back with his nails, leaving scars. She was repeatedly

kicked in the stomach and hit across her face during the

remainder of her detention. When her lawyer sought her

release, he was told that she was being imprisoned for the

March and April attacks mentioned above. On April 30, she

was released upon payment of 1,500,000 francs.

Upon release she was taken to a doctor, because she was

discharging blood. She subsequently became more ill and

underwent an emergency appendectomy because her

appendix "had been destroyed" by the abuse she suffered.

She remained in the hospital for thirty days thereafter.

On July 31, 1997, Ms. Obianuju’s attorney informed her

that the police had a warrant for her arrest claiming that

she had been improperly released in April. She therefore

traveled to Bafut, a city in the Northwest province, to stay

with a family friend, George Moma. She remained in hiding

there indoors until December 1998. She then obtained a

fake passport in the name of George Moma’s sister,

Francisca Biwie Moma. She used this passport to fly to

Jamaica in February 1999. She stayed with a series of new

acquaintances in Jamaica for three weeks. At that time her

return trip was scheduled, and she requested asylum from

the Jamaican immigration office, but they denied her

application and attempted to take her into custody. She

again went into hiding. A Jamaican provided her with a

fake English passport in the name of Rebecca Channon,

and she left on a flight to Newark, New Jersey on

August 13, 1999. Upon her arrival at Newark International

Airport, United States immigration officers determined that

the passport was false, and upon questioning by the INS,

Ms. Obianuju sought political asylum. Ms. Obianuju was

deemed inadmissible by the INS under sections

212(a)(6)(C)(i)1 and 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I)2 of the INA ("Immigration

_________________________________________________________________

1. "Any alien who, by fraud or willfully misrepresenting a material fact,

seeks to procure (or has sought to procure or has procured) a visa, other

documentation, or admission into the United States or other benefit

provided under this chapter is inadmissible." 8 U.S.C. S 1182(a)(6)(C)(i).

2. A person is inadmissible if she "is not in possession of a valid

unexpired immigrant visa, reentry permit, border crossing identification

card, or other valid entry document required by this chapter. . . ." 8

U.S.C. S 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I).

5

and Nationality Act") because she entered the country with

invalid documents, and she was detained and has remained

in detention ever since. She seeks political asylum and

withholding of deportation, and, in the alternative, relief

under the Convention Against Torture ("CAT"). 3 She claims

that Cameroonian authorities continue to look for her and

believes that her well-being and even her life would be in

jeopardy if she returned to Cameroon.

B. Proceedings Before the INS

Ms. Obianuju first appeared before the Immigration

Judge ("IJ") on September 2, 1999 pro se. She subsequently

obtained counsel, and a hearing on the merits was held

first on March 3, 2000 and continued on May 9, 2000.

Ms. Obianuju testified at great length and was cross-

examined by INS counsel, Irene Feldman. Ms. Obianuju

submitted a large number of corroborating documents,

including affidavits and declarations of family, friends, and

SDF members, SDF membership cards, and U.S. State

Department Country Reports. At the time of the hearing,

the IJ had before her 37 exhibits provided by Ms. Obianuju

and the INS. Dr. David S. Kang, a family medicine

practitioner who conducted a physical examination of

Ms. Obianuju on November 9, 1999, testified on her behalf.

He concluded that she was credible, in part because she

did not claim that every scar on her body resulted from

torture. Furthermore, the scars she claimed were caused by

torture were consistent with the acts she claimed caused

them, specifically, scars on her knees from being dragged

through the gravel, a scar on her chest from being bitten,

and a surgical scar on her abdomen resulting from her

appendectomy. Ms. Obianuju also moved to admit

Dr. Kang’s affidavit. At the close of this hearing the IJ said:

I have spoken with, to both counsels. I need to, this

matter has to be continued, of course, for the issuance

of the oral decision. And of course Ms. Feldman is

waiting response of the [forensic document laboratory]

report regard, as to one document just recently

_________________________________________________________________

3. As the relief provided by the CAT is subsumed by the relief provided

by the grants of asylum and withholding of deportation, we will not

address whether she qualifies for relief under the CAT.

6

submitted. Therefore, this hearing is adjourned for the

26th of May, at 1 p.m. in the afternoon.4

On June 7, 2000, during a continuance of the May 26

hearing, the INS provided a two-page letter from John

Larrea, Vice Consul of the Embassy of the United States in

Yaounde, Cameroon (the "Larrea letter"). The Larrea letter

sets forth in a summary fashion the results of an

investigation conducted into five documents submitted by

Ms. Obianuju: a medical certificate from her doctor in

Cameroon; the arrest warrant; an application for bail; an

affidavit by Ms. Obianuju’s father; and, an affidavit by her

attorney in Cameroon, Robert Nsoh Fon. The letter

concludes that each of these documents is fraudulent. A

copy of each document is attached to the Larrea letter with

notations allegedly made by government officials setting

forth why the document is believed to be fraudulent. No

investigative report is provided, nor is there any information

about the investigation or the investigator.

In order to respond to the letter, on June 16, 2000,

Ms. Obianuju’s counsel requested a 30-day continuance.

She explained: "An additional 30 days would enable us to

address the allegations in the June 7, 2000 letter from the

United States Embassy concerning Ms. Obianuju’s asylum

application, and make any necessary motions with regard

to the findings in that letter." The continuance was granted.

On July 27, 2000, Ms. Obianuju filed a motion in limine

setting forth five reasons why the Larrea letter should be

excluded: 1) no foundation was laid for Larrea’s opinions,

2) the letter’s admission would violate the due process

requirement of fundamental fairness; 3) its admission

would violate INS regulations prohibiting the disclosure of

asylum applications to third parties; 4) the admission of

evidence based on this type of investigation would frustrate

future asylum proceedings; and, 5) the letter was not

authenticated in accordance with INS regulations. As

_________________________________________________________________

4. In support of her motion to reopen, Ms. Obianuju claims that this

statement by the IJ closed the record. We must disagree and find that

the record did not close until the IJ explicitly said so on September 21,

2000. This is further evidenced by the fact that both parties submitted

new evidence in support of motions after the May hearing.

7

support for the motion, Ms. Obianuju included a July 26,

2000 affidavit from Milton Krieger, a scholar of politics in

Cameroon ["first Krieger affidavit"]. 5 Dr. Krieger shared his

detailed knowledge of Cameroon, particularly regarding the

government’s persecution of SDF and SCNC members, the

U.S. Embassy’s limited knowledge of the political situation

in Bamenda, and the difficulty of authenticating documents

in Cameroon. Finally, he explained that Ms. Obianuju’s

account of what occurred was credible and shared his

opinion that if she returned there was "a significant

probability that Ms. Obianuju would be severely harassed,

beaten, tortured or possibly even killed."

On August 7, 2000, the INS moved for a continuance of

the hearing set for August 9 in order to obtain an original

of the Larrea Letter. On that very same day, August 7,

counsel for the INS obtained a letter from Marc J. Susser,

Director, Office of Country Reports and Asylum Affairs,

United States Department of State (the "Susser letter"). The

entire text of the Susser letter is set forth in the appendix

to this opinion. Susser explained in his opening paragraph:

"I am writing to forward the results of an investigation, by

a Foreign Service post, of documents presented in support

of the asylum application of [Glory Obianuju]. These

documents were forwarded to us by your office." The Susser

letter is simply a restructured version of the Larrea letter,

utilizing almost the exact same language. Significantly,

however, the referenced documents are not attached to the

Susser letter.

Although the Susser Letter is dated August 7, 2000, it

was not provided to the IJ or Ms. Obianuju’s counsel until

September 18, 2000, three days before the hearing date.6

On September 18, the INS sent a letter to the IJ as a

response to Ms. Obianuju’s motion in limine. In addition to

_________________________________________________________________

5. Milton Krieger has spent many months in Cameroon studying its

political system. Since 1989 he has been to Cameroon four times and

stayed there each time for between four and ten months. He is the

author of African State and Society in the 1990s: Cameroon’s Political

Crossroads (Joseph Takougang co-author, 1998).

6. Ms. Obianuju’s counsel claims not to have received the letter until

September 19, 2000.

8

rebutting the arguments made in the motion in limine, the

INS provided the Susser letter "since [Ms. Obianuju] has

objected to the admissions of the letter from John Larrea."

The INS contended:

In an effort to provide Your Honor with an original

letter, the Service respectfully submits the more recent

Department of State letter in lieu of the prior

submission. To date, the Service has not received the

original copy of the Larrea Letter. Although the

respondent has questioned the integrity of the

Embassy staff, it would be beyond the realm for the

respondent to question the recent letter submitted by

Marc J. Susser, Director of the Office of Country

Reports and Asylum Affairs.

The INS, therefore, no longer sought to admit the Larrea

letter nor did it submit copies of the allegedly fraudulent

documents for consideration as part of the record. It only

moved for admission of the two-page Susser letter.

On September 21, 2000, the day of the hearing, counsel

for Ms. Obianuju presented the IJ with a letter expressing

her objections to the Susser letter, primarily reiterating the

concerns set forth in the motion in limine. On September

21, the IJ heard from both counsel regarding the

admissibility of the Susser letter and other documents. As

the INS no longer sought admission of the Larrea letter, it

was marked for identification purposes only. Without any

explanation, the IJ admitted the Susser letter over

Ms. Obianuju’s objections. The IJ closed the record at this

hearing.7

On October 30, 2000, the IJ issued a written opinion.

The IJ found that Ms. Obianuju had not established that

she suffered past persecution or a well-founded fear of

persecution, and therefore denied her applications for

_________________________________________________________________

7. "The record is closed, but for the decision of the Court. Understood,

counsels? I will accept no further documents unless there’s a showing

that this document was unavailable, and is germane to the case, and it

was unavailable at the, and it was clearly unavailable, and this clearly

this document is extraordinary, and would clearly substantiate the

respondent’s claim. So the record is closed but for the submission, the

issuance of the decision."

9

asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the

Convention Against Torture. The IJ’s decision was based

almost entirely on its finding that Ms. Obianuju was not

credible. First, the IJ said that Ms. Obianuju’s testimony

seemed exaggerated and rehearsed. Second, the IJ believed

that details of her testimony "simply did not add up." She

pointed specifically to the implausibility of Ms. Obianuju’s

explanation for discrepancies with her membership cards,

that she was repeatedly mistreated by officers in exactly the

same manner, and that the government would search so

actively for a girl who was only moderately involved in

political activity. Third, the IJ found that several reports

provided by the INS questioned the authenticity of

documents submitted by Ms. Obianuju, as well as the

veracity of her testimony. Specifically, the IJ pointed to the

Susser letter, the INS Forensic Document Laboratory

("FDL") report questioning the authenticity of one SDF card,

and a document entitled "Abuse of Membership of the

Social Democratic Front by Asylum Seekers" prepared by

the SDF in Cameroon. Finally, the IJ explained that it was

unbelievable that a person in her position would be the

subject of the persecution she claimed.

Ms. Obianuju filed an appeal with the Board of

Immigration Appeals on November 27, 2000. On July 10,

2001, Ms. Obianuju filed a motion to supplement the record

for her asylum application. She asked the BIA to consider

three additional documents that were not part of the record

before the IJ: an affidavit of Sister Jane Mankaa, a

Cameroonian nun living in New Jersey who visited

Ms. Obianuju’s parents in August 2000; a second affidavit

of Dr. Milton Henry Krieger commenting in part on Sister

Mankaa’s affidavit; and, an affidavit of Dr. Frances Gelles,

a certified clinical psychologist who examined Ms. Obianuju

in July 2001. All three affidavits provide support for

Ms. Obianuju’s version of events and bolster her credibility.

Ms. Obianuju also asked the BIA to consider a June 21,

2001 memorandum from Bo Cooper, General Counsel to

the INS. Cooper set forth the proper procedure to follow

when conducting overseas investigations in order to ensure

the confidentiality of the asylum applicant. Ms. Obianuju

offered the letter as support for her argument on appeal

10

that the confidentiality of her application was breached by

the investigation reflected in the Susser letter.

Without oral argument, the BIA issued its decision on

August 17, 2001. The BIA first denied Ms. Obianuju’s

motion to supplement the record. It explained: "[T]he Board

is an appellate body whose function is to review, not create

a record. Thus it would be inappropriate for us to accept

the evidence proffered by the respondent." (citation

omitted). The BIA also refused to remand to the IJ for it to

consider the additional evidence, because, with the

exception of Dr. Gelles’s affidavit, it was "not shown that

the affidavits could not have been presented on or before

close of the hearing on the merits which was concluded on

September 21, 2000." The BIA further found that

Dr. Gelles’s affidavit would not change the outcome in the

case and therefore did not admit it.

The BIA then conducted a de novo review of the record

and dismissed the appeal finding that the IJ’s decision was

correct. In the course of its analysis, however, the BIA

disagreed with much of the IJ’s reasoning, specifically two

of the primary grounds on which the IJ relied when

concluding that Ms. Obianuju was not credible. The BIA

explained: "We disagree with the Immigration Judge that it

is implausible that the respondent may have been abused

on different occasions in similar ways or that as a rank and

file member of the SDF she would not have been subject to

custodial abuse." The BIA also found that the IJ’s

description of Ms. Obianuju’s testimony did not reflect

whether her demeanor was a result of rehearsal, as the IJ

concluded, or instead "related to the respondent’s repetition

of stressful events in different venues with resulting

emotional numbness." The BIA concluded: "Consequently,

to the extent that the Immigration Judge’s decision is based

upon finding these accounts of the respondent incredible

solely based upon their implausibility and/or the manner

in which the testimony was provided, we disagree with the

Immigration Judge."

The remainder of the BIA’s decision focused on the

allegedly fraudulent corroborating documents submitted by

Ms. Obianuju based on the "investigation" results set forth

in the Susser letter. The BIA concluded that the Susser

11

letter was properly admitted and considered by the IJ. The

BIA essentially adopted the conclusions of the Susser letter

and concluded that the five pieces of evidence discussed

therein were fraudulent: the medical certificate from her

doctor in Cameroon; the arrest warrant; the bail

application; the affidavit of Ms. Obianuju’s father; and, the

affidavit by her attorney in Cameroon, Robert Nsoh Fon.

The BIA also concluded that one of the SDF membership

cards she submitted was fraudulent because of the

discrepancy between the dates of contribution, beginning in

1991, and the date she claims to have joined, in 1996. The

BIA specifically rejected Ms. Obianuju’s explanation,

supported by affidavits of SDF members, regarding the

practice of backdating membership cards when a member

paid dues for previous years.

The BIA’s finding that the evidence described in the

Susser letter was fraudulent was the linchpin of its

decision:

In essence, there is a pattern in the evidence consistent

with the repeated fabrication of identities for

individuals signing documents presented by the

respondent and this pattern is reinforced by stamps on

affidavits which appear to be fake and the failure to

register documents in the High Court of Bamenda as

required. We find this pattern consistent with the

production of counterfeit evidence as opposed to the

administrative lapses and corruption described by the

respondent or intentional efforts to discredit her

persecution claim.

The BIA focused on Ms. Obianuju’s submission of

fraudulent documents, and not the substance of the

evidence supporting Ms. Obianuju’s claims:

We find that the respondent’s failure to meet the

burden of proving eligibility for relief is directly related

to the adverse credibility determination and the

presence of counterfeit evidence presented in an

attempt to corroborate the respondent’s account. It is

the presentation of counterfeit documents to bolster

her claim, rather than the failure to present any

specific supporting evidence, which has resulted in the

failure of proof.

12

Notwithstanding its concerns regarding the IJ’s analysis,

the BIA ultimately reached the same conclusion and

rejected Ms. Obianuju’s application due to her lack of

credibility, although based on the submission of falsified

documents. The BIA concluded:

Despite the fact that we do not agree with all aspects

of the Immigration Judge’s decision, we see no reason

to disturb the adverse credibility determination. We

find that the respondent’s efforts to explain and/or

rebut the findings of United States officials are

inadequate and that such counterfeit corroborative

evidence discredits not only the specific evidence itself,

but indicates an overall lack of credibility regarding the

entire claim. As the adverse credibility determination is

dispositive for purposes of eligibility, the respondent’s

appeal from the denial of her applications for asylum,

withholding of removal, and relief under the CAT is

dismissed.

(citations omitted).

Ms. Obianuju then filed this petition for review.

II.

We have jurisdiction to review the BIA’s final order

pursuant to 8 U.S.C. S 1252(a)(1). The BIA had jurisdiction

under 8 C.F.R. S 3.1(b)(9). As it conducted an independent

analysis of the record, we limit our review to the BIA’s final

order. Abdulai v. Ashcroft, 239 F.3d 542, 549 (3d Cir.

2001). We review the BIA’s findings of fact, including an

adverse credibility finding, to determine whether they are

based on substantial evidence. "Substantial evidence is

more than a mere scintilla and is such relevant evidence as

a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a

conclusion." Senathirajah v. INS, 157 F.3d 210, 216 (3d Cir.

1998) (quoting Turcios v. INS, 821 F.2d 1396, 1398 (9th

Cir. 1987)). We will uphold the District Court’s findings of

fact unless the evidence compels the contrary conclusion.

INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 & n.1 (1992);

Abdille v. Ashcroft, 242 F.3d 477, 484 (3d Cir. 2001).

However, we have also explained that "deference is not due

where findings and conclusions are based on inferences or

13

presumptions that are not reasonably grounded in the

record, viewed as a whole." Balasubramanrim v. INS, 143

F.3d 157, 162 (3d Cir. 1998) (quoting Cordero-Trejo v. INS,

40 F.3d 482, 487 (1st Cir. 1994)). Furthermore, whether

Ms. Obianuju’s due process rights were violated is a legal

question which we subject to de novo review. Chong v. INS,

264 F.3d 378, 386 (3d Cir. 2001).

The Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA") provides that

"[t]he Attorney General shall be charged with the

administration and enforcement" of the INA. 8 U.S.C.

S 1103. The Attorney General has the discretion to grant

asylum to an alien applicant "if [he] determines that such

alien is a refugee within the meaning of section

1101(a)(42)(A)." 8 U.S.C. S 1158(b)(1). However, this

discretion is not unfettered. For example, he abuses his

discretion if he does not specify the reasons for refusing to

exercise his denial. de la Llana-Castellon v. INS, 16 F.3d

1093, 1098 (10th Cir. 1994). Furthermore, the stated

reasons must not be "arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to

law." Andriasian v. INS, 180 F.3d 1033, 1040 (9th Cir.

1999). As provided by the INA, the Attorney General has

authorized "the Board [to] exercise such discretion and

authority conferred upon the Attorney General by law." 8

C.F.R. S 3.1(d)(1). A "refugee" is defined as "any person who

is outside any country of such person’s nationality . . . and

is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the

protection of, that country because of persecution or a well-

founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion,

nationality, membership in a particular social group, or

political opinion. . . ." 8 U.S.C. S 1101(a)(42)(A).

Ms. Obianuju claims that she was persecuted because of

her political opinion, and has a fear of further persecution

if she returns to Cameroon. If an asylum applicant can

establish that she was persecuted, then she does not need

to establish a fear of future persecution. The regulations

provide: "An applicant who has been found to have

established such past persecution shall also be presumed

to have a well-founded fear of persecution on the basis of

the original claim." 8 C.F.R. S 208.13(b)(1). While this

presumption may be rebutted by the government in specific

circumstances, for example, if there has been a

14

fundamental change in the country’s circumstances, such

provisions are not implicated here. See 8 C.F.R.

S 208.13(b)(1)(i)(A)-(B). Therefore, Ms. Obianuju only needs

to prove past persecution on the basis of her political

opinion to establish that she is a refugee. The burden is on

the applicant to establish that she qualifies as a refugee

under the statute. 8 C.F.R. S 208.13(a); see

Balasubramanrim, 143 F.3d at 161.

While the decision to grant asylum is discretionary, if an

applicant demonstrates qualification for withholding of

removal under INA S 241(b)(3) the applicant cannot be

removed to the country where the persecution occurred.

INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407 (1984); Cardoza-Fonseca, 480

U.S. at 428-29 & n.5, n.6. "To qualify for mandatory relief

under withholding of deportation, . . . [the applicant] must

show that it is more likely than not that he will face

persecution if he is deported." Li Wu Lin v. INS, 238 F.3d

239, 244 (3d Cir. 2001). However, where past persecution

has been established, the threat of future persecution is

assumed and the burden in on the INS to prove by a

preponderance of the evidence that there has been a

fundamental change in circumstances or that the

individual could avoid a future threat by relocating within

the country. 8 C.F.R. S 208.16(b)(1).

Our analysis will proceed in three parts. First, we must

consider Ms. Obianuju’s due process challenge to the BIA’s

reliance on the Susser letter. Second, we will consider Ms.

Obianuju’s claim that the BIA abused its discretion when it

refused to permit her to supplement the record. Finally, we

will consider whether the BIA’s conclusion that

Ms. Obianuju failed to qualify for asylum and withholding

of deportation was supported by substantial evidence.

A. Reliance on Susser Letter Violated Ms. Obianuju’s Due

Process Rights

We must first consider Ms. Obianuju’s challenge to the

BIA’s consideration of the Susser letter. This is a crucial,

threshold consideration, because, as we noted, the BIA’s

decision was based almost entirely on the Susser letter,

and it is clearly the underpinning for the BIA’s conclusion

that Ms. Obianuju’s testimony was not credible and that

15

her corroborative evidence was fraudulent. Without the

Susser letter, the majority of the BIA’s reasoning actually

supports Ms. Obianuju’s case. Because we believe that the

BIA’s reliance on the letter violated her Fifth Amendment

right to due process, we need not address Ms. Obianuju’s

other challenges to the letter.

Due process protections are afforded to aliens facing

removal. See, e.g., Abdulai v. Ashcroft , 239 F.3d 542, 549

(3d Cir. 2001) ("Despite the fact that there is no

constitutional right to asylum, aliens facing removal are

entitled to due process."); Chong v. INS, 264 F.3d 378, 386

(3d Cir. 2001) ("Aliens facing removal are entitled to due

process."). Because the Federal Rules of Evidence do not

apply in asylum proceedings, "[t]he test for admissibility of

evidence . . . is whether the evidence is probative and

whether its use is fundamentally fair so as not to deprive

the alien of due process of law." Bustos-Torres v. INS, 898

F.2d 1053, 1055 (5th Cir. 1990); see Lopez-Chavez v. INS,

259 F.3d 1176, 1184 (9th Cir. 2001) ("The sole test

governing the admission of evidence in deportation

proceedings is whether the evidence is probative and its

admission is fundamentally fair.") (quotation omitted). As

the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has explained:

"In the evidentiary context, fairness is closely related to the

reliability and trustworthiness of the evidence." Felzcerek v.

INS, 75 F.3d 112, 115 (2d Cir. 1996). Therefore, our

analysis as to whether an individual’s constitutional rights

are violated turns on whether the evidence considered by

the BIA is reliable and trustworthy. For the reasons

discussed below, we find that the admission of the Susser

letter violated Ms. Obianuju’s due process rights.

Succinctly stated, the Susser Letter does not satisfy our

standards of reliability and trustworthiness. Initially, we are

troubled by the dates of the INS’s procurement of the

Susser Letter and the timing of its being provided to

Ms. Obianuju’s counsel and the IJ a few days before the

final hearing. As we noted above, the date that INS counsel

requested an extension in order to obtain the original of the

Larrea letter -- August 7, 2000 -- is the very same date

that appears on the Susser letter. However, the INS only

provided the Susser letter to the IJ and Ms. Obianuju’s

16

counsel nearly six weeks later, on September 18, 2000,

when it sought to introduce it into evidence as a

replacement for the Larrea letter which was ultimately

marked for identification purposes only. Furthermore,

Susser noted in his August 7 letter: "These documents were

forwarded to us by your office."

Second, although hearsay can be admitted in asylum

cases under certain circumstances, see, e.g., Kiareldeen v.

Ashcroft, 273 F.3d 542, 549 (3d Cir. 2001), reliance on

such evidence here raises the precise concerns that are

fundamental to its general inadmissibility in civil

proceedings, and raises concerns that it is not

fundamentally fair. As we have previously explained:

"Hearsay is generally inadmissible because the statement is

inherently untrustworthy: the declarant may not have been

under oath at the time of the statement, his or her

credibility cannot be evaluated at trial, and he or she

cannot be cross-examined." U.S. v. Reilly, 33 F.3d 1396,

1409 (3d Cir. 1994) (quotation omitted). Although the

Federal Rules do not apply in this case, exceptions set forth

in the Rules focus on trustworthiness, further indicating

why we regard hearsay with a level of suspicion. See, e.g.,

Fed. R. Evid. 803(6)-(8) ("Hearsay Exceptions; Availability of

Declarant Immaterial"); Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(3) ("Hearsay

Exceptions; Declarant Unavailable"); Fed. R. Evid. 807

("Residual Exception").

The Susser letter is multiple hearsay of the most

troubling kind. It seeks to report statements and conduct of

three declarants who are far removed from the evidence

sought to be introduced. They are purportedly individuals

who told the investigator that certain aspects of the

documents appeared to be fraudulent. Not only does Susser

have no direct knowledge of the investigation, he did not

even directly communicate with John Larrea, the declarant

whose hearsay statements he is repeating. Therefore, the

current speaker -- Susser -- was unable to even evaluate

the credibility of the immediate preceding declarant--

Larrea -- who of course was himself only a proponent of

hearsay. Further, we do not know whether Larrea had any

interaction with "the investigator," only referred to as "she,"

who reports to Larrea what others have purportedly told

17

her. Given that the consul is in Yaounde and the

investigation necessarily took place in Bamenda, it seems

entirely possible that Larrea’s sole source for the hearsay

statements was the notations written on the document.

Therefore, Larrea would also have been unable to judge the

credibility of the investigator, also a proponent of hearsay.

Therefore, Susser was three steps away from the actual

declarants; all we know about the two individuals who have

forwarded these written statements is that one is a

Cameroonian Foreign Service National who conducted"an

investigation" for the U.S. Embassy in Cameroon and the

other is John Larrea, who worked as Vice Consul for the

U.S. Embassy in Cameroon but now, according the INS,

cannot be located by the Government.8

A comparison of the letters shows that Susser simply

repeated Larrea’s representations with slight variations in

sentence construction, bolstering the conclusion that

Susser’s knowledge of the investigation was limited solely to

the Larrea letter itself.9 Consideration of the first

representations, regarding the medical certificate, is

illustrative. Larrea explained:

The Director of Administrative Affairs in the Provincial

Hospital of Bamenda told us that no doctor named

Chefor James N. has ever worked at the hospital. He

added that there is no medical record at the hospital

for Glory Obianuju and the round stamp and the form

used for the Medico-Legal Certificate are fake. It is our

conclusion that this document is fraudulent.

Susser similarly stated:

_________________________________________________________________

8. While counsel for Ms. Obianuju suggested that Embassy personnel

often had pressures on them which could lead to less than accurate

reports, and the INS contends that these individuals would not risk their

jobs to undermine an asylum application, we make no judgment

regarding the veracity or motives of these individuals. Our analysis is

based not on these aspects, but on the information the BIA had before

it when it based its decision on the Susser letter.

9. The Susser letter does not recite Larrea’s statement that he "does not

believe that any claims for asylum in recent years based upon political

beliefs or SDF membership have any merit." Larrea’s statement is in

direct conflict with the State Department Country Reports on Cameroon.

18

Regarding the Medico Legal Certificate, the Director of

Administrative Affairs in the Provincial Hospital of

Bamenda stated that the round form and the stamper

used for the Certificate are fake, and that there is no

medical record at the hospital for Glory Obianuju. He

also noted that no doctor by the name of James N.

Chefor has ever worked at the hospital. The

investigator in the U.S. Embassy in Yaounde,

Cameroon, concluded that this document is

fraudulent.

Susser provided no information in his letter which was not

already stated in almost the precise same words in the

Larrea letter. The INS has not contended before us or the

BIA that Susser has any personal or even second-hand

knowledge of the investigation. His knowledge is limited to

the Larrea letter which was not even sought to be admitted

in this case because of the INS’s inability to obtain the

original.

Third, we are concerned that the INS is attempting to use

the prestige of the State Department letterhead to make its

case and give credibility to the letter’s contents. As we have

previously noted,

the Board’s decisions cannot be sustained simply by

invoking the State Department’s authority. We are

expected to conduct review of the Board’s decisions,

and that procedural safeguard would be destroyed if

the Board could justify its decisions simply by invoking

assertions by the State Department that themselves

provide no means for evaluating their validity. See

Galina v. INS, 213 F.3d 955, 958-59 (7th Cir. 2000).

The Board cannot hide behind the State Department’s

letterhead.

Li Wu Lin v. INS, 238 F.3d 239, 246 (3d Cir. 2001). This

seems to be precisely what the INS intended to do in this

case, as it explained: "Although the respondent has

questioned the integrity of the Embassy staff, it would be

beyond the realm for the respondent to question the recent

letter submitted by Marc J. Susser, Director of Office of

Country Reports and Asylum Affairs."

19

Fourth, partially due to the multiple levels of hearsay

involved here, we have absolutely no information about

what the "investigation" consisted of, or how the

investigation was conducted in this case.10 In combination

with the concerns we note above, we believe that the

complete dearth of information about the investigator or the

investigation undermines the Susser letter as not only

untrustworthy, but also unhelpful. Further adding to our

concern, Dr. Milton Krieger, a scholar of politics in

Cameroon, expressed his belief "that it is very difficult to

prove and/or disprove the authenticity of documents

created in Cameroon since political tensions and

administrative lapses and corruption intensified in the early

1990s." We also agree with Ms. Obianuju’s contention that

the persons contacted provided only indirect attacks as to

the genuineness of the documents. For instance, rather

than locate the individual who supposedly signed the

warrant, or confirm through authorities that such person

existed, the investigator presented the warrant to a different

magistrate who states: "After a thorough search in my

chambers, I have not been able to get any trace of evidence

that a warrant of arrest was ever issued." JA41. There is no

reason to expect that the warrant would be in this

magistrate’s chambers.

We have previously expressed concern about the BIA’s

attributing significance to activities such as interviews at

airports when it lacked key information regarding the

manner in which interviews were conducted.

Balasubramanrim v. INS, 143 F.3d 157, 164 (3d Cir. 1998);

Senathirajah v. INS, 157 F.3d 210, 216 (3d Cir. 1998).

Although we did not consider whether there was a due

process violation in those cases, we did conclude that the

BIA’s adverse credibility determination was faulty because

the airport interviews were not "valid grounds upon which

_________________________________________________________________

10. The Lawyers Committee for Human Rights filed an amicus curiae

brief arguing that we should rule the Susser letter inadmissible because

the confidentiality of Ms. Obianuju’s asylum application was violated by

the investigation. We agree that the guarantee of confidentiality is

significant, but the issue in this case is resolved by the violation of

Ms. Obianuju’s due process rights and therefore we do not reach this

argument.

20

to base a finding that the applicant [was] not credible."

Balasubramanrim, 143 F.3d at 164 (quotation omitted); see

Senathirajah, 157 F.3d at 216. In Balasubramanrim, we

noted that we did "not know how the interview was

conducted or how the document was prepared." 143 F.3d at

162. In Senathirajah, relying in large part on our reasoning

in Balasubramanrim, we likewise were troubled by the

interview because "[t]he government offered no testimony as

to the circumstances under which that affidavit was

obtained." 157 F.3d at 218. The manner of eliciting such

information is crucial to their probative value. Similarly,

here, the nature of the purported "investigation" is a matter

of pure conjecture and can provide no basis for a finding of

falsification on the part of Ms. Obianuju.

We find that the BIA violated Ms. Obianuju’s due process

rights by basing its credibility finding almost entirely on the

Susser letter, because it appears neither reliable nor

trustworthy. As in Lin, Balasubramanrim , and Senathirajah,

"[t]he Board’s performance in this case was less than it

should have been." Lin, 238 F.3d at 248.

B. Additional Evidence

Ms. Obianuju moved for the BIA to reopen the record in

order to consider four additional pieces of evidence. Our

review of the BIA’s denial of the motion to reopen is for

abuse of discretion. Lu v. Ashcroft, 259 F.3d 127, 131 (3d

Cir. 2001). The regulations provide: "A motion to reopen

proceedings shall not be granted unless it appears to the

Board that evidence sought to be offered is material and

was not available and could not have been discovered or

presented at the former hearing." 8 C.F.R. S 3.2(c)(1). The

materiality of the evidence is quite apparent. Sister

Mankaa’s affidavit describes in part a visit she had with

Ms. Obianuju’s parents in Cameroon during which they

expressed their concern for their daughter and detailed

what she had experienced and spoke of the danger she

would face if she returned. The second affidavit from

Dr. Krieger expresses his opinion that Sister Mankaa’s

description of the situation in Cameroon was consistent

with his own experience and knowledge. Finally, the

psychologist concludes in his report that "Ms. Obianuju

possesses a psychiatric profile consistent with and strongly

21

corroborative of her claim that she was a victim of

persecution and continues to suffer the effects of those

experiences." The issue then is whether each piece of

evidence could not have been available before the record

closed in September 2000 and even if it could not have

been, such that the reopening may have been permissible,

whether the BIA’s denial was an abuse of discretion.

However, we need not reach this issue because we

conclude below that the record before us provides a

sufficient basis upon which to conclude that Ms. Obianuju

qualifies for asylum and withholding of removal. While we

find the BIA’s summary rejection of the motion somewhat

troubling in light of Ms. Obianuju’s obvious inability to

respond in a timely fashion to a substantial piece of

evidence provided to her only two days before the hearing,

we find it unnecessary to conduct this analysis.

C. Qualification for Asylum

At this point, we consider whether the BIA’s

determination that Ms. Obianuju did not qualify for asylum

and withholding of deportation were supported by

substantial evidence. See Chang v. INS, 119 F.3d 1055,

1065-66, 1068 (1997) (reversing the BIA and concluding

that petitioner is eligible for asylum because "a reasonable

fact-finder would be forced to conclude that [petitioner]

ha[d] shown the requisite fear of persecution"). While we

review the BIA’s findings based on the administrative

record, the Susser letter must first be removed from that

record because of our ruling that its consideration violates

Ms. Obianuju’s due process rights. Based on the record

before the BIA, a reasonable factfinder would have to

conclude that Ms. Obianuju was persecuted because of her

political opinion and is therefore a "refugee" as defined by

the statute and satisfies the requirements for asylum.11 As

_________________________________________________________________

11. The INS places significant weight on a document from the SDF

explaining that asylum seekers have been known to fraudulently claim

membership in their organization in order to obtain asylum in various

countries. While this document can be useful, the fact that some

individuals fraudulently make claims does not eliminate the

government’s burden to show that Ms. Obianuju made a fraudulent

claim of membership in this particular case.

22

the government has not rebutted the presumption that she

also faces a likelihood of future persecution if she returns

to Cameroon, we find that she is also entitled to

withholding of deportation.

We conclude that Ms. Obianuju’s story is consistent.12 As

we reject the Susser letter because it violates principles of

fundamental fairness, we also cannot conclude that

Ms. Obianuju submitted fraudulent documents. Therefore

the BIA’s adverse credibility determination has virtually no

basis, and is certainly not supported by substantial

evidence. The credibility of Ms. Obianuju’s story is further

confirmed by the consistency of the story she presented to

her various questioners, as well as the affidavits of those

familiar with her plight and documents illustrating her

story. Although her credible testimony alone may be

sufficient to satisfy her burden, she has submitted

numerous documents that corroborate her claims. See 8

C.F.R. S 208.13(a) ("The testimony of the applicant, if

credible, may be sufficient to sustain the burden of proof

without corroboration."). The evidence discussed in the

following paragraphs both boosts her credibility and

corroborates her claim of persecution.

David S. Kang, M.D., a family medicine practitioner who

has examined numerous asylum applicants, conducted a

physical examination of Ms. Obianuju while she was in

detention. His examination report, as well as his testimony

before the IJ, is powerful evidence in Ms. Obianuju’s favor.

He recounted her version of the events surrounding her

torture in Cameroon, and described the scars that she had

on her body and her explanation of how they occurred. He

concluded: "It is my assessment that Miss Obianuju has

been a victim of torture. Her explanations of scars and

injury are consistent with the physical finding. Her

explanation of the events as well as the mechanism is

_________________________________________________________________

12. It is important to note that the BIA never suggested that the evidence

provided by Ms. Obianuju did not support her claim. Instead, it focused

on the fraudulent documents. The BIA explained:"It is the presentation

of counterfeit documents to bolster her claim, rather than the failure to

present any specific supporting evidence, which has resulted in the

failure of proof."

23

consistent and leads me to believe that she is most likely

telling me the truth."

Ms. Obianuju’s testimony is also consistent with the

State Department’s country reports and Amnesty

International reports about Cameroon. Indeed, the INS

concedes that human rights violations are prevalent in

Cameroon. The U.S. Department of State 1998 Profile of

Asylum Claims and Country Conditions reports:

[T]he government’s human rights record continues to

be generally poor and government officials continue to

commit numerous abuses. . . . Security forces have

committed extrajudicial killings and often beat and

otherwise abused detainees and prisoners, generally

with impunity. Conditions in most prisons remain life-

threatening. Security forces have arrested and detained

opposition politicians, local human rights activists and

ordinary citizens, often holding them for prolonged

periods and, occasionally, incommunicado.

The 1999 Country Report on Cameroon, also prepared by

the State Department, provides a more detailed description

of these abuses, including "security forces subject prisoners

and detainees to degrading treatment that includes

stripping, confinement in severely overcrowded cells, and

denial of access to toilets or other sanitation facilities."13 It

also explains that a form "of physical abuse commonly

reported to be inflicted on detainees include the‘bastinade,’

in which the victim is beaten on the soles of the feet."

Dr. Milton Krieger’s description of the conditions is

likewise consistent with Ms. Obianuju’s version of events. In

his first affidavit, admitted into evidence by the IJ, he

addresses in some detail the imprisonment of SDF and

SCNC members after the alleged attacks on government

buildings in March and April of 1997. He specifically noted

his knowledge of 42 SCNC and SDF members who were

_________________________________________________________________

13. Also attached to Ms. Obianuju’s asylum application were country

reports for 1996, 1997, and 1998. Each of these reports, like the 1999

report, provides specific instances of conflicts between the security forces

and Cameroonians, as well as extrajudicial killings. Each provides a

similar portrayal of conditions in Cameroon.

24

sentenced to up to life in prison by a military court for their

alleged involvement in the attacks. He also explained that

"SDF rank and file members are often caught in security

sweeps during ‘crisis’ times such as the alleged attacks on

government buildings in March and April 1997, and these

rank and file members are frequently subject to human

rights abuses perpetrated by the government."

The five pieces of evidence that the BIA concluded were

fraudulent based solely on the Susser letter can now be

properly considered. First, the medical certificate confirms

that Ms. Obianuju underwent an emergency appendectomy

because her appendix was ruptured. Second, in his

affidavit, Glory’s father, Isaiah Ezeagwuna, tells about the

security police’s continual harassment of his family in an

effort to locate Ms. Obianuju. Third, Robert Nsoh Fon’s

affidavit describes the other evidence submitted, including

the warrant, bail bond, and SDF and SCNC membership

cards. Fourth, the warrant provides that Ms. Obianuju is to

be arrested because she jumped bail. Fifth, the bail

application provides that 1,500,000 francs were paid for

her release from jail in April 1997.

In Fon’s March 10, 1999 affidavit, which was not a

subject of the investigation described in the Susser letter,

he confirmed Ms. Obianuju’s version of events. He

explained that she was known to be "amongst those who

were strong student supports [sic] of the SDF political

party." He concluded that if she returned to Cameroon she

would certainly be at risk of further persecution, and very

possibly death.

We also have an affidavit from Ngu George Moma. He

confirms that he hid Ms. Obianuju in his home when her

parents discovered that security forces were seeking to

arrest her again. He also explained that he obtained a visa

for her in the name of Francisca Moma. And finally, he

explained that he took such drastic measures to protect her

and to get her out of Cameroon because he believed that

she faced an imminent threat of persecution, and noted

that such a threat continued to exist.

The only evidence casting any doubt on Ms. Obinanuju’s

claims that she was persecuted is the alleged fraudulent

25

SDF card she submitted. The FDL report explained that the

card dated 1991 did not match the cards they had on file

for that year and that the card dated 1998 appeared to be

genuine. However, as the BIA acknowledged, Ms. Obianuju

had volunteered an explanation, even before the FDL

completed its examination of the cards, that the 1991 card

was actually issued in 1996 when she joined the SDF and

only bears the 1991 date because she paid dues for the

previous years. She provided affidavits of SDF members

from Cameroon who confirmed that backdating cards to

reflect this was common practice, and expressed their own

belief that the cards were genuine.14 However, the BIA

rejected the proffered explanation: "it seems unlikely that

SDF records would not list the respondent as a contributor

in 1996 when she became an official member yet would

show retroactive contributions to 1991." The BIA stated no

basis for its view, that this custom appears unlikely, and it

seems to be no more than its belief that the same result

could have been accomplished by a different means.

Furthermore, the same FDL report says that the 1998 card

does conform to the samples for that year. This ambiguity

regarding the SDF cards is certainly not enough to

overcome the significant evidence provided by Ms. Obianuju

and her powerful and credible evidence.

We therefore find that a reasonable factfinder would be

compelled to conclude that Ms. Obianuju was persecuted

because of her political opinion. This showing of past

persecution gives rise to a presumption that she will be

persecuted if returned to Cameroon, and the INS has failed

to rebut this presumption.

_________________________________________________________________

14. Januarius J. Asongu, a citizen of Cameroon and SDF member who

was granted political asylum in the United States, examined

Ms. Obianuju’s membership cards. He explained:"Based on my

experience as a long-time SDF member and as Secretary of the Texas

SDF, I have determined that the cards appear to be genuine." He also

explained that it was common practice for members to pay dues for

previous years. Another Cameroonian and SDF member, Kenneth

Numfor Ngwa, also reviewed the cards and said they"are entirely

consistent with every SDF card that I have seen, and I believe that the

cards are genuine." He also explained that he knew several people whose

cards were dated years earlier because they had paid the previous years’

dues upon joining.

26

III.

In conclusion, we hold that Ms. Obianuju is eligible for

asylum because of past persecution on account of her

political opinion, and that she also is entitled to

withholding of deportation.

Accordingly, we will GRANT the petition for review,

REVERSE the order of the BIA dismissing petitioner’s

appeal, and REMAND this case to the BIA with instructions

to grant Ms. Obianuju’s application for withholding of

deportation and to present this matter to the Attorney

General for the exercise of his discretion as to asylum

under S 1158(b) consistent with this opinion.

27

Appendix

Susser Letter

Bureau of Democracy,

Human Rights and Labor

August 7, 2000

NAME: Obianuju, Glory

A #: 76 142 746

COUNTRY: Cameroon

Irene Feldman

Assistant District Counsel

U.S. Department of Justice

Immigration and Naturalization Service

Elizabeth, NJ 07201

Dear Ms. Feldman:

I am writing to forward the results of an investigation, by

a Foreign Service post, of documents presented in support

of the asylum application of the above-named individual.

These documents were forwarded to us by your office.

Regarding the Medico Legal Certificate, the Director of

Administrative affairs in the Provincial Hospital of Bamenda

stated that the round form and the stamp used for the

Certificate are fake, and that there is no medical record at

the hospital for Glory Obianuju. He also noted that no

doctor by the name of James N. Chefor has ever worked at

the hospital. The investigator in the U.S. Embassy in

Yaounde, Cameroon, concluded that this document is

fraudulent.

Regarding the affidavits dated October 22 and November

15, 1999, the president of the High Court of Bamenda

stated that the round stamp and the Commissioner for

Oaths stamps are fake. He further stated that neither

affidavit had been registered or sworn in the High Court of

Bamenda. It is the Embassy investigator’s conclusion that

this document is fraudulent.

It is the Embassy investigator’s conclusion that arrest

warrant and application for bail documents are also

fraudulent. The arrest warrant lacks key information such

as the charge number and dates of appearance and time.

28

The application for bail was allegedly signed by an

individual who has never served as president of the court.

We hope that this information is helpful. If we can be of

any further assistance. Please do not hesitate to contact us.

Sincerely,

Marc J. Susser

Director

Office of Country Reports and

Asylum Affairs

A True Copy:

Teste:

Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

29