Opinion

Consolidation Coal Co. v. Kramer

  • 305 F.3d 203
  • 2002 WL 31111838
Court
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
Filed
Sep 24, 2002
Status
Published
Author
Becker
On the bench
Becker, Roth, Rendell
Cited by
6 cases
Authority
More cited than 67.9%

The opinion

Opinions of the United

2002 Decisions States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

9-24-2002

Consolidation Coal v. Kramer

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Precedential

Docket No. 01-4398

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PRECEDENTIAL

Filed September 24, 2002

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 01-4398

CONSOLIDATION COAL COMPANY,

Responsible Operator/Petitioner

v.

BEATRICE J. KRAMER, widow of

MARION W. KRAMER, deceased,

Claimant/Respondent

and

DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION

PROGRAMS, United States Department of Labor

Party-in-Interest

On Appeal from the Benefits Review Board

U.S. Department of Labor

(BRB Docket No. 01-0118 BLA)

Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

July 30, 2002

Before: BECKER, Chief Judge, Roth and Rendell,

Circuit Judges.

(Filed: September 24, 2002)

WILLIAM S. MATTINGLY, ESQUIRE

Jackson & Kelly, PLLC

6000 Hampton Center

P.O. Box 619

Morgantown, WV 26507

Counsel for Petitioner

Consolidation Coal

CHERYL CATHERINE COWEN,

ESQUIRE

769 Lippencott Road

Waynesburg, PA 15370

Counsel for Respondent

Beatrice J. Kramer, widow of

Marion W. Kramer, deceased

HELEN H. COX, ESQUIRE

PATRICIA M. NECE, ESQUIRE

United States Department of Labor

Office of the Solicitor

Suite N-2117

200 Constitution Avenue, NW

Washington, D.C. 20210

Counsel for Respondent

Director, Office of Workers’

Compensation Programs

OPINION OF THE COURT

BECKER, Chief Judge.

Consolidation Coal Company ("Consolidation") petitions

for review of a determination of the United States

Department of Labor Benefits Review Board (the "Board")

that occupational pneumoconiosis hastened the death of

Claimant Beatrice J. Kramer’s deceased spouse, Marion W.

Kramer ("Kramer"), who also suffered from metastasized

colon cancer. Because we conclude that the Board’s

October 10, 2001 Decision and Order affirming the award

to Claimant of survivor’s benefits pursuant to Title IV of the

Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, as

2

amended, 30 U.S.C. SS 901 et seq. (the "Act") was supported

by substantial evidence, including the competent opinion of

the examining forensic pathologist, and was in accordance

with the law, the petition will be denied.

I.

Kramer had more than thirty-three years of coal mine

employment, and the parties have stipulated that he

suffered from occupational black lung disease, a form of

pneumoconiosis.1 During his lifetime, Kramer’s claims for

benefits were denied because testing conducted by

Consolidation’s examining physicians did not establish that

Kramer was "totally disabled" by a respiratory or pulmonary

impairment, as required for lifetime benefits. See 30 U.S.C.

SS 901 et seq.

The Act and its implementing regulations provide

compensation and other benefits to living coal miners and

their dependents where the miner is totally disabled due to

pneumoconiosis, and to miners’ surviving dependents

where death is due to pneumoconiosis. For purposes of the

Act, death is considered due to pneumoconiosis if the

disease was a "substantially contributing cause or factor"

leading to death. 20 C.F.R. S 718.205(c). This term has

been held to encompass situations in which

pneumoconiosis "actually hastened" the miner’s death. See,

e.g., Shuff v. Cedar Creek Coal Co., 967 F.2d 977, 980 (4th

Cir. 1992); Lukosevicz v. Director, OWCP, 888 F.2d 1001,

1004 (3d Cir. 1989) (stating that the test is whether the

black lung disease "even briefly" hastened the miner’s death).2

_________________________________________________________________

1. Pneumoconiosis is a chronic dust disease of the lungs and its

sequelae that includes respiratory and pulmonary impairments. Black

lung disease is a form of pneumoconiosis that arises out of exposure to

coal dust.

2. It should be noted that the parties agreed by briefing to the ALJ that,

as Kramer’s last coal mine work (his final 17 years) was in West Virginia,

the decisions of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit controlled

this claim. See September 14, 2000 Decision and Order Granting

Benefits at 3. Consolidation appealed to this Court on the basis of

Kramer’s prior employment history in Pennsylvania.

3

At the time of his initial application for lifetime benefits

in 1991, Kramer testified that shortness of breath interfered

with his ability to continue employment, prompting his

early retirement at age 55, and Kramer’s internist was of

the opinion that Kramer was disabled by pneumoconiosis.

The administrative law judge’s (the "ALJ") 1992 decision

concluded that Kramer’s alleged shortness of breath was

not totally disabling, based on testing performed by

Consolidation’s physician, Dr. Gregory Fino, whose

diagnosis included pneumoconiosis. See September 14,

2000 Decision and Order Granting Benefits at 7. The last of

Kramer’s non-qualifying pulmonary function and blood gas

studies was administered in 1996, when Kramer filed a

duplicate claim, approximately two-and-one-half years prior

to his death.3 Shortly thereafter, Kramer was diagnosed

with cancer of the colon, which metastasized to his liver

and then to his lungs.

Following Kramer’s death in October, 1998, Dr. Cyril

Wecht ("Wecht") conducted an autopsy, reviewed Kramer’s

medical records, and concluded that Kramer died due to

adenocarcinoma of the sigmoid colon with multiple

metastases. Wecht also concluded that Kramer’s

"moderately severe pneumoconiosis" was a substantial

contributing factor to his death in that the presence of this

secondary disease process further compromised Kramer’s

respiratory function and added to his cardiovascular

burden. Wecht explained that, were it not for the

pneumoconiosis, Kramer’s non-cancerous lung tissue

would have been better able to maintain normal blood gas

exchange, allowing Kramer to compensate for a longer time

for the respiratory burden caused by the lung tumors.

Kramer’s treating surgeon, Dr. Michael Reilly ("Reilly"),

concurred in the conclusion that pneumoconiosis hastened

death, noting that as a result of this condition Kramer’s

lung tissue was less capable of maintaining oxygenation

and CO2 exchange than it otherwise would have been, so

_________________________________________________________________

3. Although they remained within normal limits, Kramer’s pulmonary

function results decreased from a high of 110% of normal to 85% of

normal. See September 14, 2000 Decision and Order Granting Benefits

at 27 (citing deposition testimony of Dr. Fino).

4

that Kramer could tolerate and compensate for less"tumor

load" than an individual with otherwise healthy lung tissue.

In the original hearing on Claimant’s request for

survivor’s benefits, Consolidation submitted to the ALJ the

medical opinions of its own pathologists, Drs. Jerome

Kleinerman, Joseph Tomashefski, and Richard Naeye, and

that of a pulmonary disease specialist, Dr. Gregory Fino.4

Each of Consolidation’s experts concluded that Kramer’s

pneumoconiosis did not hasten death. As a basis for this

conclusion each expert cited the absence of clinically

significant lung dysfunction during Kramer’s lifetime and

the premise that Kramer’s pneumoconiosis was a non-

progressive disease, i.e., one that does not worsen after a

miner leaves employment.

In the Decision and Order Granting Benefits, the ALJ

concluded that Kramer’s pneumoconiosis hastened, and

was therefore a substantially contributing factor in,

Kramer’s death, pursuant to 20 C.F.R. S 718.205(c)(2).5 In

so holding, the ALJ discussed the medical evidence in great

detail and declined to accept the lifetime studies as

dispositive. Rather, the ALJ focused on the evidence of

Kramer’s pulmonary condition near the time of death. In

addition, he expressly accorded less weight to

Consolidation’s experts because of the import they affixed

to the lifetime studies.6 On appeal to the Board,

_________________________________________________________________

4. As discussed above, Dr. Fino performed the lifetime studies which

were the basis of the 1992 denial of Kramer’s claim. At that time, Dr.

Fino diagnosed pneumoconiosis, but the studies did not demonstrate

total disability, as required for lifetime benefits. See supra at 2.

5. See September 14, 2000 Decision and Order Granting Benefits at 36

(accepting as viable the theory that "a [m]iner’s condition can be so

weakened that he had a susceptibility caused by pneumoconiosis that

hastened death"); id. at 14 n.16 (citing Kirk v. Director, OWCP, 86 F.3d

1151 (4th Cir. 1996) (holding that increased susceptibility can hasten

death because "[d]iseases . . . kill the weak more readily than the

strong").

6. See September 14, 2000 Decision and Order Granting Benefits at 37.

The ALJ also accorded less probative value to these reports because he

found them to be internally inconsistent and inadequately reasoned, and

because they omitted consideration of other physical evidence of

pneumoconiosis, such as enlargement of the right side of the heart and

clubbing of the fingers. These conclusions are discussed in detail

throughout the Decision and Order Granting Benefits. See id.

5

Consolidated contended, as it does before this Court, that

the ALJ erred in his weighing of the medical evidence and

substituted his own judgment for that of the medical

experts. The Board rejected these contentions in toto and

affirmed Claimant’s entitlement to survivor’s benefits. We

have appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to 20

C.F.R. S 410(a).

II.

The determinations of the Benefits Review Board are

reviewed only "for error of law and to assure . .. that it has

properly adhered to its scope of review." Walker v. Universal

Terminal and Stevedoring Corp., 645 F.2d 170, 172 (3d Cir.

1981). The decision of the administrative law judge must be

affirmed by the Board if it is supported by substantial

evidence and is in accordance with the law. See 33 U.S.C.

S 921(b)(3); 30 U.S.C. S 932(a); 20 C.F.R. S 802.301; see

also O’Keeffe v. Smith, Hinchman & Grylls Assocs., Inc., 380

U.S. 359 (1965); Oravitz v. Director, OWCP, 843 F.2d 738,

739 (3d Cir. 1988).7 Appellate review thus necessarily

entails an independent review of the record and a decision

as to whether the administrative law judge’s findings were

supported by substantial evidence. Walker, 645 F.2d at

172. Substantial evidence is defined as such relevant

evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to

support a conclusion. See Richardson v. Perales , 402 U.S.

389, 401 (1991); Kertesz, 788 F.2d at 163.

A claimant is entitled to survivor’s benefits pursuant to

20 C.F.R. S 718.205(c) if she demonstrates by a

preponderance of the evidence that the miner had

pneumoconiosis arising from his employment and that the

pneumoconiosis was a substantial contributing cause or

factor in -- defined as one which hastened -- the miner’s

_________________________________________________________________

7. In reaching his decision, the administrative law judge has discretion

to accord varying weight to physician testimony. See 20 C.F.R.

S 718.206; Kertesz v. Crescent Hills Coal Co., 788 F.2d 158 (3d Cir.

1986) (noting that an administrative law judge is not bound to accept the

opinion or theory of any medical expert, but may weigh the medical

evidence and draw his own inferences).

6

death. See 20 C.F.R. SS 718.205(a)(1)-(3), (c)(2), (4) and (5);

see also supra p. 3.

III.

Consolidation first asserts that all evidence attributable

to Wecht should have been disregarded because Wecht

failed to include a uniquely detailed description of his

microscopic findings in his autopsy report. The microscopic

findings portion of that report simply referred to findings

consistent with the gross autopsy report;8 in addition, a

supplemental report contained a detailed, though

standardized, description of his microscopic findings.9

Consolidated asserts that Wecht’s use of a reference to

findings consistent with the gross autopsy in his autopsy

report, and his use of a standard description of microscopic

findings in supplemental reports on pneumoconiosis, do

not comply with statutory requirements and constitute a

"fail[ure] to provide a meaningful microscopic description"

of Kramer’s lung tissue. See Consolidation’s Brief in

_________________________________________________________________

8. Wecht testified that the microscopic portion of the autopsy report

referred to findings that confirmed the gross autopsy, and that he only

includes additional detail in the microscopic description if microscopic

examination reveals findings in addition to those already reflected in the

gross autopsy. In this case, the gross autopsy report encompassed

Kramer’s black lung disease as, for example, in the description of the

lungs as having an "intervening pulmonary parenchyma show[ing] black

anthracotic markings and small nodules, which [were] separate and

discrete from the large tumor masses." See JA 011-012.

9. Wecht wrote:

The microscopic autopsy slides which I have prepared show diffuse

depositions of black anthracotic pigment in the peribronchiolar and

periarteriolar lymphatics. Ruptured alveolar walls, consistent with

pulmonary emphysema, pulmonary fibrosis, thickening of the pleura

with subpleural deposits of anthracotic pigment, fibroanthracotic

and fibrohyaline macules and micronodules, and fibroanthracosis

and fibrohyalinization of mediastinal and peribronchial lymph

nodes, are also noted. In addition, examination of lung tissue under

polarized light reveals scattered birefringent crystals, consistent with

silica. All these findings in the lungs are compatible with the

antemortem history and a clinical diagnosis of pneumoconiosis.

Director’s Exhibit 13 at 2.

7

Support of Petition for Review at 9; 20 C.F.R. S 718.106(a)

(requiring that an autopsy report include a "detailed gross

macroscopic and microscopic description" of the lung). The

ALJ and the Board found that the autopsy report was

"consistent in form with the regulation." October 19, 2001

Decision and Order at 8 (citing Dillon v. Peabody Coal Co.,

11 BLR 1-113, 114-15 (1988)).

In Dillon, the Board held that "while the[ALJ] should

consider the quality standards found in Section 718.106,

the standards are not mandatory, and autopsy or biopsy

reports cannot be mechanically precluded from

consideration . . . solely because [of failure] to comply with

those standards." To the contrary, in reviewing the autopsy

evidence, the ALJ "should determine whether the missing

information is essential to the reliability or the probative

value of the report" and, where such information is non-

essential, the ALJ may consider and accept the report. The

Board held that this determination "can only be made by

the [ALJ], as fact-finder, based on the unique facts of each

case" and that the ALJ is not limited to "the four corners"

of the autopsy report in determining its reliability, but "may

look to other supportive documents in the record in an

attempt to cure any defects in the actual report." Id.

Although the regulations require that the report include

a microscopic description of the lungs, they contain no

express requirements regarding the form or nature thereof.

Here, the autopsy report stated that the microscopic

findings were "consistent with", i.e., confirmed, the gross

autopsy findings, and incorporated by reference the detailed

findings contained elsewhere in the report. The report

therefore complied with the letter of the regulation, and

Consolidation is thus asking this Court to impose

additional formal requirements which both the ALJ and the

Board expressly declined to impose. Most importantly, it

should be noted that there is no suggestion that the

microscopic findings reflected in Wecht’s standardized

language were in any way inaccurate nor that they did not

represent his actual findings in this case. Cf. Director,

OWCP v. Mangifest, 826 F.2d 1318, 1327 (3d Cir. 1987)

(holding that medical judgment contained in a

noncomplying report may constitute substantial evidence of

8

disability if it is reasoned and based on medically

acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques).

Each of Wecht’s findings and conclusions was agreed

with by one or more of Consolidation’s medical experts.

Moreover, the microscopic findings on which Consolidation

sought to bar consideration of Wecht’s evidence, including

his testimony, are collateral to Consolidation’s current

disagreement with Wecht’s testimony, which turns on his

finding of causation. That finding was manifestly not

boilerplate, but was specifically explained in the context of

this case. Nothing in the regulations or authority suggests

that a technical deficiency in an autopsy report renders

separate expert opinions delivered by the examining

pathologist incompetent.

Finally, we owe substantial deference to the Board’s

interpretation of its own administrative regulatory

requirements. The Board’s finding that Wecht’s autopsy

report was consistent with the applicable regulation was a

reasonable interpretation of that regulation and,

accordingly, Consolidation’s petition for review will be

denied.10

IV.

Consolidation maintains that the Board’s affirmance of

the ALJ’s decision must be set aside because it was not

supported by substantial evidence. Consolidation’s position,

and that of its experts, is that pneumoconiosis is a non-

progressive disease. Each of Consolidation’s experts cites to

and expressly relies upon Kramer’s continued ability to

_________________________________________________________________

10. Consolidation also asserts that Wecht’s reports and testimony should

have been disregarded because Wecht testified that, in his experience,

where there is evidence of a significant degree of pneumoconiosis, it is a

contributing factor to death in the great majority of cases (approximately

85 to 90%). See Consolidation’s Brief in Support of Petition for Review at

20. Consolidation argues that this testimony evinces a "dogmatic" view

that must be disregarded. See id. at 25. To the contrary, an opinion

couched in terms of a range of probability cannot fairly be characterized

as an article of faith. In addition, Wecht’s extensive pathology experience

renders him well qualified to form an opinion with respect to that

probability range.

9

complete pulmonary function testing and arterial blood gas

studies with results within normal limits -- testing that

demonstrated no clinically significant impairment in his

pulmonary capacity up to two and one-half years prior to

death -- in concluding that Kramer’s pneumoconiosis could

not have contributed in any degree to his pulmonary

burdens and consequently hastened death.11

Thus, Consolidation’s experts expressly predicated their

opinions on the tenet that Kramer’s pneumoconiosis could

not have progressed.12 Consolidation argues that the ALJ’s

"failure to meaningfully weigh and analyze" these experts’

evidence "requires the decision be set aside and remanded."

Consolidation’s Brief in Support of Petition for Review at

22.

As both the ALJ and the Board found, the tenet that

pneumoconiosis is non-progressive is simply inconsistent

with the "assumption of [disease] progressivity that

underlies much of the statutory regime." October 19, 2001

Decision and Order at 9. See 20 C.F.R. S 718.201(c)

("[P]neumoconiosis is recognized as a latent and progressive

disease which may first become detectable only after the

cessation of coal mine dust exposure."); Mullins Coal Co. of

Va. v. Director, OWCP, 484 U.S. 135, 151 (1987). Indeed,

our sister Courts of Appeals have uniformly observed this

presumption and have gone so far as to caution the

industry against continuing to advance an insufficiently

supported position to the contrary. See, e.g. , Peabody Coal

_________________________________________________________________

11. It should be noted that although Consolidation continues to dispute

Wecht’s diagnosis of Kramer’s pneumoconiosis as"moderately severe", as

opposed to "simple", both Reilly and Consolidation’s own expert, Dr.

Naeye, agreed with Wecht’s diagnosis. See September 14, 2000 Decision

and Order Granting Benefits at 13 (citing Dr. Naeye’s testimony that the

autopsy slides showed moderately severe pneumoconiosis). Cf. LaBelle

Processing Co. v. Swarrow, 72 F.3d 308, 315 (3d Cir. 1995) (rejecting

employer’s contention that simple pneumoconiosis is not progressive).

12. Two of Consolidation’s experts, Drs. Kleineman and Fino, specifically

conclude that there can be no contributing factor finding absent a

substantiation of lifetime impairment. A third expert, Dr. Naeye, does

allow a few exceptions to the rule of non-progressivity, including where

a miner was employed as a roof bolter, which in fact Kramer had been.

See September 14, 2001 Decision and Order Granting Benefits at 12.

10

Co. v. Spese, 117 F.3d 1001 (7th Cir. 1997) (en banc)

(noting that progressivity is inherent in the duplicate claims

regulation itself); Lovilla Coal Co. v. Harvey , 109 F.3d 445

(8th Cir. 1997); Orange v. Island Creek Coal Co. , 786 F.2d

724, 727 (6th Cir. 1986); Old Ben Coal Co. v. Scott, 144

F.3d 1045 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding that the Department of

Labor’s view that the disease is progressive "may be upset

only by medical evidence of the kind that would invalidate

a regulation"). See also LaBelle, 72 F.2d at 314-315.13

Accordingly, the ALJ was well within his discretion in

discounting the opinions of Consolidation’s experts as, if

not hostile to the Act, at least premised on a legally

untenable presumption.14

In addition, even if the disease were not progressive, the

mere absence of any "clinically significant" pulmonary

impairment two and one-half years prior to Kramer’s death

-- in tests conducted to determine Kramer’s qualification

for lifetime benefits, which depended on a finding of total

disability -- certainly does not establish that Kramer had

_________________________________________________________________

13. In LaBelle, we observed that:

A latent condition such as pneumoconiosis may not become maniest

until long after exposure to the caustive agent (i.e. coal dust).

Indeed, Congress, in enacting the BLBA, recognized the perniciously

progressive nature of this disease.

Id. (citations omitted).

14. See, e.g., Thorn v. Itmann Coal Co., 3 F.3d 713, 719 (4th Cir. 1993)

(directing that an administrative law judge must not rely upon the

opinion of an expert who expresses an opinion based on a premise

"antithetical to the Black Lung Benefits Act" because such opinion "is

not probative" and stating that a physician’s opinion may be discredited

when it is based on "a premise fundamentally at odds with the statutory

and regulatory scheme"). See also September 14, 2000 Decision and

Order Granting Benefits at 18 n.20 (citing additional Courts of Appeals

cases)

For these same reasons, Consolidation’s argument that Wecht’s

evidence should be disregarded because he dismissed the lifetime

studies as irrelevant to the question of the contribution to death is

without merit. Cf. Consolidation’s Brief in Support of Petition for Review

at 21-22 (asserting that Wecht’s opinion was not well reasoned because

he failed to compare the pathology results to the lifetime studies of

ventilatory function and arterial blood gas analysis).

11

incurred no damage to his lung tissue and no pulmonary

burden of any degree whatsoever as a result of his

occupational exposure. Indeed, nothing in the evidence that

Consolidation points to would negate the conclusion that a

preexisting pulmonary burden, albeit insufficient standing

alone to result in a measurable loss of lung function, could

nonetheless in combination with a further affront to the

pulmonary system through advancing cancer have

decreased to some degree the lungs’ ability to continue to

compensate.15

As the Board noted, the ALJ applied the proper test,

which is whether pneumoconiosis hastened the miner’s

death in any way. See 20 C.F.R. S 718.205(c)(4). And as the

ALJ correctly concluded, lifetime disability or impairment

"is not an element of proof in ‘hastening’." September 14,

2000 Decision and Order Granting Benefits at 30.

Assessing the evidence from the proper perspective, and

taking into account the statutory assumptions regarding

the progressive nature of the disease, the ALJ reasonably

discounted the evidence of those experts who relied heavily

on lifetime studies administered between 1991 and 1996 in

concluding that pneumoconiosis did not hasten Kramer’s

death in October, 1998. See October 19, 2001 Decision and

Order at 10 (citing Milburn Colliery Co. v. Hicks. 138 F.3d

524, 533 (4th Cir. 1998) (observing that an administrative

law judge must assess the quality of a physician’s

reasoning). In addition, as the Board also noted, the

unequivocal opinions of Wecht and Reilly, on which the ALJ

relied, explained clearly how pneumoconiosis hastened the

_________________________________________________________________

15. As Reilly testified, pulmonary function tests taken years prior to

Kramer’s death are unhelpful to the determination of causation, as the

lungs have a great ability to compensate for underlying disease. While

pulmonary function studies may be an appropriate measure for a

determination of lifetime disability, an ability to pass such tests within

normal limits simply does not demonstrate that the subject’s lungs are

healthy. To the contrary, as noted above, Consolidation’s examining

physician, Dr. Fino, diagnosed Kramer’s pneumoconiosis in 1991. In

addition, another of Consolidation’s experts, Dr. Tomashefski, testified

that, on the basis of Kramer’s 1996 pulmonary studies, the degree of

pneumoconiosis present in Kramer’s lung tissue may have caused mild

respiratory impairment and some physical limitations.

12

miner’s death.16 Where the ALJ has discussed the

qualifications of the competing physicians and the quality

of their respective reasoning, and substantial evidence

supports the ALJ’s findings, which are in accordance with

law, the Board will not be held to have erred in affirming

his decision.17

_________________________________________________________________

16. See, e.g., September 14, 2000 Decision and Order Granting Benefits

at 29 (quoting Wecht’s evidence that "[t]he secondary disease process,

pneumoconiosis, added to the cardiovascular burden, added to the

presence of hypoxemia . . . some diminution of oxygenation, and thereby

contributed to [Kramer’s] death"); id. at 30 (quoting Reilly’s evidence that

the cancer cells "cause death when their replacement of normal tissue

causes residual noncarcinogenic tissue to fail in their normal physiologic

mechanism, therefore the pneumoconiosis . . . certainly did contribute to

the patient’s death").

Consolidation’s assertions on appeal that Wecht’s determination of

causation turned on a controversial finding of hypoxemia

notwithstanding, the ALJ was careful to note in his decision that

causation did not turn on hypoxemia, but was based on multi-faceted

findings, including Wecht’s findings of right-side hypertrophy of the

heart (concurred in by Consolidation’s expert, Dr. Tomashefski), cor

pulmonale (a right ventricular enlargement secondary to lung

malfunction), and a widening of Kramer’s fingers (commonly called

"clubbing"), all indicative of chronic obstructive pulmonary disease.

Compare Consolidation’s Brief in Support of Petition for Review at 24

with September 14, 2000 Decision and Order Granting Benefits at 9, 25,

30, 32-33 & n.44.

17. Finally, Consolidation argues that the ALJ erred in premising his

decision on a "presumption" that pneumoconiosis is always progressive.

See Consolidation’s Reply Brief at 6, 42. However, we do not read the

opinion of the ALJ, or that of the Board, as adopting or applying any

such presumption. Rather, the ALJ and the Board properly accorded

diminished weight to the opinions of Consolidation’s experts to the

extent they were predicated on the impermissible assumption that the

disease process is never progressive. See, e.g., September 14, 2000

Decision and Order Granting Benefits at 24 n.32 (discussing Dr.

Kleinerman’s position as in contrast to the often stated rule that

pneumoconiosis is a disease process which may be progressive in

nature).

13

V.

It is not the function of this Court to weigh conflicting

evidence. Competent evidence for the Claimant tends to

establish that pulmonary burden from occupational

pneumoconiosis hastened her husband’s death from

cancer. The ALJ was entitled to accept this evidence and to

assign it greater weight than Consolidation’s contrary

evidence; it is not for us to re-weigh. The petition for review

of the decision of the Board will therefore be denied.

A True Copy:

Teste:

Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

14

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