In Re: Rajesh Mehta

Opinions of the United

2002 Decisions States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

11-14-2002

In Re: Rajesh Mehta

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Precedential

Docket No. 01-2586

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PRECEDENTIAL

Filed November 13, 2002

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 01-2586

IN RE: RAJESH MEHTA,

Debtor

BOSTON UNIVERSITY,

Appellant

v.

RAJESH MEHTA

Appeal from the United States District Court

For the District of New Jersey

(D.C. No. 00-cv-05448)

District Judge: Hon. William H. Walls

Argued: February 4, 2002

Before: BECKER, McKEE and BARRY, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: November 13, 2002)

Louis G. Rubino, Esq. (Argued)

White & Williams

222 Haddon Avenue

Suite 300

Westmont, N.J. 08108

Attorney for Appellant

Theodore Kozlowski, Esq. (Argued)

Suite 201

20 Park Place

Morristown, N.J. 07960

Attorney for Appellee

OPINION OF THE COURT

McKEE, Circuit Judge:

In this case of first impression, we are asked to decide if

a student’s outstanding tuition balance at the university he

was attending can be discharged in bankruptcy. Rajesh

Mehta initiated a bankruptcy proceeding in which he

attempted to discharge tuition and fees he owed to Boston

University. The university opposed discharge arguing that

the outstanding balance of Mehta’s tuition and fees

constituted either a "loan" or a debt for an"educational

benefit" under 11 U.S.C. S 523(a)(8), and was therefore not

dischargeable in bankruptcy. The district court entered

partial summary judgment for Mehta and against the

university, and this appeal followed.1 For the reasons that

follow, we will affirm.2

I. Background.

Rajesh Mehta attended Boston University (hereinafter

referred to as "BU") from the Fall 1992 semester through

the end of the Fall 1993 semester. He received federally

guaranteed student loans for the Fall 1992 and Spring

1993 semesters. However, his loan application for the Fall

1993 semester was denied, and he failed to secure any

other financial assistance for that semester. Nevertheless,

BU allowed Mehta to register and continue taking classes.

Mehta completed the semester, and received academic

credit for three classes. As a result, he incurred charges for

delinquent tuition and related costs totaling $9,331.00.

That amount subsequently increased to $12, 953.73 when

interest and late fees were added. Mehta eventually filed a

petition for voluntary bankruptcy under Chapter 7 without

_________________________________________________________________

1. The bankruptcy court also ruled that the student’s delinquent

federally guaranteed loans were not dischargeable in bankruptcy. That

ruling has not been appealed, and is therefore not before us.

2. Inasmuch as our inquiry is limited to the proper interpretation of a

provision of the Bankruptcy Code, our review is plenary. In re Roth Am.,

Inc., 975 F.2d 949, 952 (3d Cir. 1992).

2

satisfying his obligation to BU, and his petition listed BU as

a general unsecured creditor in the amount of $15, 434.00.3

He subsequently filed an adversary complaint with the

bankruptcy court to determine the dischargeability of his

obligation to BU.

BU opposed discharge under 11 U.S.C. S 523(a)(8), and

both parties eventually filed motions for summary

judgment. The parties agreed that $2,000 of the

outstanding balance was for a federally guaranteed

educational loan that was not dischargeable. The court

rejected BU’s argument that the remainder of Mehta’s debt

was not dischargeable under 11 U.S.C. S 523(a)(8), and

granted partial summary judgment in favor of Mehta in the

amount of his delinquent tuition, late fees and interest. The

district court affirmed.

II. Discussion.

11 U.S.C. S 523 provides in relevant part:

(a) a discharge under section 727, 1141, 1228(a),

1228(b) or 1328(b) of this title does not discharge an

individual debtor from any debt--

***

(8) for an educational benefit overpayment or loan

made, insured or guaranteed by a governmental unit,

or made under any program funded in whole or in part

by a governmental unit or nonprofit institution, or for

an obligation to repay funds received as an educational

benefit, scholarship or stipend, unless excepting such

debt from discharge under this paragraph will impose

an undue hardship on the debtor and the debtor’s

dependents

11 U.S.C. S 523(a)(8) (1994).

We look to the text of a statute to determine

congressional intent, and look to legislative history only if

the text is ambiguous. New Rock Asset Partners, L.P. v.

_________________________________________________________________

3. A portion of that delinquency included the amount Mehta owed on

nondischargeable government student loans.

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Preferred Entity Advancements, Inc., 101 F.3d 1492 (3d Cir.

1996). Where statutory language is plain and

unambiguous, " ‘the sole function of the court is to enforce

it according to its terms.’ " Id. At 1498 (quoting United

States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 481 U.S. 235, 241 (1989)).

Plain meaning is therefore conclusive, " ‘except in the ‘rare

cases [in which] the literal application of a statute will

produce a result demonstrably at odds with the intentions

of its drafters.’ " Id.

Congress did not define "loan" in S 523, and courts that

have been called upon to interpret that provision have not

agreed upon its meaning. BU urges us to broadly interpret

the statute and thus declare that Mehta’s debt constitutes

a loan or a debt for an educational benefit that is not

dischargeable in bankruptcy. Mehta of course disagrees. He

argues for a narrow interpretation consistent with the

remedial purpose of bankruptcy.

Courts have long recognized that bankruptcy is intended

to "relieve the honest debtor from the weight of oppressive

indebtedness and permit him to start afresh." In re

Renshaw, 222 F.3d 82, 86 (2d Cir. 2000)(quoting Williams

v. U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co., 236 U.S. 549, 554-555 (1915)).

However, bankruptcy is not only an ameliorative right of

the debtor; it is also a remedy of the creditor. Matter of

Marchiando, 13 F.3d 1111, 1115 (7th Cir. 1994).

Accordingly, although bankruptcy is concerned with giving

honest debtors a new beginning, "there are circumstances

where giving a debtor a fresh start in life is not the

paramount concern and protection of the creditor becomes

more important." Renshaw, 222 F.3d at 86. Thus, the law

does not allow debtors to escape all financial obligations by

declaring bankruptcy. However, in large part because of

bankruptcy’s underlying concern for affording a new

beginning, statutory exceptions to discharge are generally

construed "narrowly against the creditor and in favor of the

debtor." In re Pelkowski, 990 F.2d 737, 744 (3d Cir. 1993).

The creditor opposing discharge therefore has the burden of

establishing that an obligation is not dischargeable. Grogan

v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279 (1991).

These conflicting policy considerations have created a

certain tension that is reflected in the exclusions contained

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in S 523 and the legislative history of the Bankruptcy Code.

That history has been detailed in In re Johnson , 218 B.R.

449, 451-54 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 1998), and outlined in

Renshaw. Accordingly, we will only touch upon it here.

A. Overview of 11 U.S.C. S 523(a)(8).

When Congress established the Guaranteed Student

Loan Program under the Higher Education Act of 1965, it

sought to increase the availability of low interest, federally

guaranteed loans in order to make higher education more

affordable for a greater number of qualified students. S.

Rep. No. 89-673, (1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N.

4027, 4055. However, the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978,

11 U.S.C. S 523(a)(8), placed restrictions on students’ ability

to discharge these loans in bankruptcy because Congress

was concerned about reported abuses of students who

obtained the benefits of higher education while avoiding

repaying student loans by declaring bankruptcy shortly

after graduation. Subsequent amendments expanded the

scope of the statute to its current form.

Prior to the Reform Act of 1978, loans were fully

dischargeable in bankruptcy. The law provided as follows:

"Upon default by the student borrower on any loan covered

by Federal loan insurance . . . the insurance beneficiary

shall promptly notify the Commissioner, and the

Commissioner shall . . . pay to the beneficiary the amount

of the loss sustained by the insured . . .". Higher Education

Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-329, S 430(a), 79 Stat. 1219,

1260 (1965) (amended 1976). Thus, the statute required

the federal government to repay the educational institution

if the student defaulted. A Congressional Commission

subsequently recommended prohibiting discharge of

educational obligations for the first five years after

graduation unless the student faced undue hardship. See

Report of the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the

United States, H.R. Doc. No. 93-137, at pts 1 & 11 (1973).

In 1976, Congress passed S 439A of the Education

Amendments of 1976, which added a limited

nondischargeability provision. See Education Amendments

of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-482, S 439A(a), 90 Stat. 2081, 2141

(codified at 20 U.S.C. S 1087-2) (1976) (repealed 1978).

5

Section 439A was repealed in 1978, and 11 U.S.C.

S 528(a)(8) -- the current provision -- took effect on October

1, 1979.4

B. Is Mehta’s Tuition Debt a "loan"?

BU contends that Mehta’s tuition debt arose from an

extension of credit for educational services, and that it is

therefore tantamount to an educational "loan" that is

excluded from discharge in bankruptcy under 11 U.S.C.

S 523(a)(8). The university rests this argument in large part

upon various provisions of its Student Accounting Services

Department’s handbook. That booklet is referred to as "The

Guide," and it is apparently given to all BU students upon

registration or enrollment. BU notes that "The Guide states

that ‘[b]y registering for any class in the University, each

student accepts and agrees to be bound by’ certain

University regulations and policies." (Brackets in original).

Appellant’s Br. at 19. These regulations and policies include

each student’s obligation to pay all applicable fees and

charges, including tuition.5 Accordingly, BU argues: "when

Mehta registered for class at BU a contract was formed

whereby Mehta agreed to pay a defined quantity of money

in exchange for a defined set of services, i.e.

classes/tutition credits." Appellant’s Br. at 19. BU allowed

Mehta to attend classes during the Fall 1993 semester

without first paying tuition, and BU claims that the parties

to the resulting "agreement" therefore clearly understood

_________________________________________________________________

4. For an explanation of the "stop-gap" legislation that filled the gap

between the repeal of S 439A and the effective date of S 523(a)(8), see

Johnson, 218 B.R. at 453.

5. More specifically, The Guide provided:

Boston University’s policy requires the withholding of all credit,

educational services, issuance of transcripts, and certification of

academic records from any person whose financial obligations to the

University (including delinquent student accounts, deferred

balances, and liability for damages) are due and/or unpaid. . . . By

registering for any class in the University, each student accepts and

agrees to be bound by the foregoing University policy as applied to

any preexisting or future obligation to the University.

App. at A.39.

6

that BU was extending a "loan" to Mehta in the amount of

the Fall 1993 tutition, and that both BU and Mehta

intended that result. However, the Court of Appeals for the

Second Circuit rejected an analogous argument in

Renshaw, and we find that court’s analysis persuasive.

In Renshaw, the court consolidated the appeals of two

students from different colleges who were each attempting

to discharge delinquent tuition obligations in bankruptcy,

222 F.3d at 84. In both cases, the respective colleges

objected, arguing that S 523(a)(8) excluded delinquent

tuition from discharge. Id. Renshaw had been allowed to

register and attend classes without first paying tuition after

he signed a "Reservation Agreement" that the college had

executed before Renshaw signed. Id. at 85.

That agreement obligated [the college] to hold a place

open for Renshaw, provided he paid the amounts billed

when due, and not to charge him more for tuition than

the amount that was in effect on the applicable

registration date. The Agreement further required

Renshaw to pay a $285 reservation fee when he

returned it, to pay tuition, room, and board for the

1992 summer session and 1992-93 academic year, and

to be bound by various payment-related provisions set

out on the back of the Agreement and in the college

catalog. These provisions included an obligation to pay

a "service charge" with an effective annual rate of 19.2

percent if payments on the student’s account were not

made by their due dates.

Id. The college claimed that the executed Registration

Agreement constituted a loan under S 523 because it

allowed Renshaw to register without prepaying based upon

his promise to pay at a future date pursuant to the terms

of the Reservation Agreement. Id. at 89. The court rejected

that argument. Id.

The court looked first to the common law definition of

"loan" to interpret the meaning of S 523(a)(8). Id. at 88.

Under common law, "[t]o constitute a loan there must be (i)

a contract, whereby (ii) one party transfers a defined

quantity of money, goods, or services, to another, and (iii)

the other party agrees to pay for the sum or items

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transferred at a later date." 222 F.3d at 88; see also, In re

Grand Union, 219 F. 353, 356 (2d Cir. 1914). The court

reasoned that "[t]his definition implies that the contract to

transfer items in return for payment later must be reached

prior to or contemporaneous with the transfer. Where such

is the intent of the parties, the transaction will be

considered a loan regardless of its form." 222 F.3d at 88.

However, the court concluded that the delinquent tuition

obligations of the two students before it did not amount to

loans because there was no "agreement" to extend credit,

"or to permit the student to attend classes in return for a

payment of tuition at a future date." Id. Instead, in both

cases, the student simply "unilaterally decided not to pay

tuition when it came due." Id. The court concluded that the

colleges could well have prohibited the students from

attending classes but they "chose not to do so." Id. The

court also noted that both colleges had failed to reach any

agreement "about future class attendance or an extension

of credit." Id.

Here, BU attempts to draw support from the analysis in

Renshaw by emphasizing that the court there stressed that

the exclusion contained in S 523(a)(8) applies if the parties

intended a loan "regardless of its form." Id. at 88. We agree

that form can not be elevated over substance, and that the

intent of the parties must therefore dictate whether Mehta’s

debt to BU is excluded from discharge under S 523(a)(8).

However, this only undermine’s BU’s claim; it does not

advance it.

Mehta, like the students in Renshaw, simply"unilaterally

decided not to pay tuition when it came due." 222 F.3d at

88. This record simply does not allow us to conclude that

BU intended to loan Mehta the amount of the tuition for

the Fall 1993 semester when it allowed him to register and

attend classes or that Mehta understood that to be BU’s

intent. It does not appear that BU ever made any inquiry

into Mehta’s creditworthiness or that it ever required him to

execute any kind of promissory note or loan agreement. The

document that allegedly constitutes Mehta’s loan agreement

-- The Guide -- is nothing more than the type of

generalized informational handbook that colleges and

universities routinely supply to all students. It contains

8

various fee schedules, and informs students of their

financial obligations, optional payment plans, and refund

procedures, as well as various remedies the university may

exercise to collect delinquencies. It also explains how to

replace meal and identification cards; and it provides

information about medical insurance, as well as students’

entitlement to "admission to Boston University football,

hockey, and basketball games." App. at A.41.

The Guide is, therefore, far less suggestive of a"loan"

than the Reservation Agreement in Renshaw. In Renshaw,

the university and the student both executed the

Reservation Agreement. That agreement contained language

far more characteristic of a loan agreement than The Guide.

For example, as noted above, it provided that interest would

accrue at a specified rate. Yet, the various provisions of the

Reservation Agreement were still insufficient to transform

the understanding between the university and student into

a loan under S 523. Rather, the Renshaw court concluded

that "none of [those] casual covenants[met] the definition

of loan." Renshaw, 222 F3d at 84.

Although courts have reached different results when

determining if forbearance in collecting tuition amounts to

a loan, we agree with the distinction drawn in Renshaw

between those cases holding that delinquent tuition is

dischargeable under S 523(a)(8) and those holding it is not.6

Renshaw instructs that courts have generally held that

nonpayment of tuition can qualify as an educational loan

under S 523(a)(8) "only in two classes of cases." See

Renshaw, 222 F.3d at 90. Courts have reached that

conclusion "where funds have changed hands," or where

"there is an agreement . . . whereby the college extends

credit . . . ."Id. The court included In re Joyner, 171 B.R.

762, 763 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1994), as an example of the first

class of cases, and In re Merchant, as an example of the

_________________________________________________________________

6. Compare In re DePasquale, 225 B.R. 830 (Bankr. 1st Cir. 1998); In re

Johnson, 218 B.R. 449 (Bankr. 8th Cir. 1998); In re Merchant, 958 F.2d

738 (6th Cir. 1992); In re Hill, 44 B.R. 645 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1984); Najafi

v. Cabrini College, 154 B.R. 185 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1993) (disallowing

discharge) with In re Renshaw, 222 F.3d 82 (2nd Cir. 2000), and Seton

Hall Univ. v. Van Ess, (In re Van Ess) 186 B.R. 375 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1994)

(allowing discharge).

9

latter class. As the Renshaw court noted, the university in

In re Merchant required the student to sign a promissory

note evidencing the student’s agreement with the

university, and the university’s extension of credit. That

was found probative of the parties’ intent even though

neither a formal promissory note, nor written agreement, is

a prerequisite to proving a "loan" so long as the

circumstances allow the educational institution to satisfy

its burden of proof.7

Ironically, BU relies heavily upon In re DePasquale, 225

B.R. 830 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 1998), in arguing that allowing

Mehta to attend classes without first paying the tuition he

knew he owed constituted a loan. There, BU allowed

DePasquale to attend classes without prepaying tuition only

after engaging in protracted discussions with the student

that lasted for two years. 225 B.R. at 831. BU finally

relented and allowed DePasquale to register and attend

classes without prepaying, but only after reaching an

individualized agreement that BU would continue to bill her

but allow her to register and pay tuition at some later time.8

Furthermore, "[a]s a condition of receiving her degree,"

Depasquale executed a promissory note "promising to pay

BU $22,607.05." Id. The court held that BU’s arrangement

with DePasquale constituted a loan within the meaning of

S 523(a)(8). Id. at 833. However, that is very different than

the situation here.

In fact, when we compare how BU handled DePasquale’s

delinquency with how it handled Mehta’s, it is even more

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7. See generally, Renshaw, 222 F.3d at 90. See also In re Hill, 44 B.R.

645 (Bankr. D. Mass.1984), wherein a student’s loan application in the

amount of the semester’s tuition was pending, and the university

extended a credit in the amount of the loan application without interest

"to be paid as soon as he received the proceeds of his student loan." 44

B.R. at 647. The bankruptcy court held that the credit in the amount of

the loan was nondischargeable under S 523(a)(8). Id.

8. The court noted, "In the fall of 1998, after more than two years of

negotiations, BU permitted DePasquale to attend classes without

prepaying her tuition. Although BU billed DePasquale for tuition, it was

agreed that she would pay tuition later. They did not set a payment

schedule." 225 B.R. at 831. The record is not clear as to the interest that

was charged in DePasquale though it appears that interest did accrue.

10

evident that BU can not establish that Mehta’s delinquency

is excluded from discharge under S 523(a)(8). BU’s

argument to the contrary would have us equate the

generalized information in The Guide with the specific

undertakings contained in the promissory note it demanded

of DePasquale.9 As noted above, the court in Renshaw

referred to the obligations specified in the Reservation

Agreement (including the promise for a specific amount of

interest accruing) as "casual covenants." 222 B.R. at 84.

The terms of The Guide are even more "casual," and can

hardly be considered "covenants." Although Mehta was no

doubt aware of his obligations, as BU contends, awareness

of an obligation does not establish that the parties intended

a "loan."

BU’s attempt to distinguish Seton Hall v. Van Ess (In re

Van Ess), 186 B.R. 375 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1994), where the

court did grant discharge is equally unpersuasive. The

court there held that a student’s delinquent tuition was

dischargeable because the exceptions to discharge

contained in S 523(a) "should be narrowly construed against

the creditor in order to carry out the rehabilitative policy of

the Bankruptcy Code." Id. at 377-8. Inasmuch as the

contrary construction urged by the university there would

have been inconsistent with that liberal, rehabilitative

policy, the court held that "a common sense reading of 11

U.S.C. S 523(a)(8) reveals that the Debtor’s nonpayment of

his tuition bill did not result in an extension of credit." Id.

at 378. After examining the legislative history, the court

concluded "[t]here is no overriding policy that warrants

treating [the university] differently from any other creditor.

Indeed, given the ready availability of student grants and

loans, one might very well conclude that [the university] is

particularly well situated to avoid defaults on tuition

obligations." Id. at 379. The accuracy of that observation is

demonstrated by BU’s actions in DePasquale. All BU had to

do here was have Mehta sign the same kind of agreement

it had DePasquale sign.

BU suggests that Van Ess is distinguishable because the

_________________________________________________________________

9. The record does not reflect whether BU issued The Guide to students

when DePasquale registered there.

11

court there expressed doubt about the number of classes

the student actually attended during the semester in

question, and because that student, unlike Mehta,"did not

participate in any student loan programs." Appellant’s Br.

at 14. However, those distinctions do not establish a

difference. It is clear from the portion of the court’s opinion

quoted above that the court in Van Ess simply concluded

that delinquent tuition, without more, is not exempted from

discharge under S 523(a)(8). Here, as in Van Ess, the record

contains nothing that would allow us to find that the

university and the student actually intended a loan.

Accordingly, we will not now create a loan agreement where

none otherwise exists.

C. Mehta’s Delinquency is not a Debt for an

Educational Benefit Under S 523(a)(8).

BU relies in part upon Najafi v. Cabrini College, (In re

Najafi), 154 B.R. 185 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1993) in making an

alternative argument. BU claims that even if its"extension

of credit" to Mehta was not a "loan," Mehta’s delinquency is

still not dischargeable because it represents an

"educational benefit" under S 523(a)(8). As noted above, in

addition to excluding educational loans from discharge,

S 523(a)(8) also excludes "any debt . . . for an educational

benefit overpayment or loan made, insured or guaranteed

by a governmental unit, or made under any program

funded in whole or in part by a governmental unit or

nonprofit institution, . . . ."

However, we are not persuaded by the analysis in Najafi.

The court there inserted commas into the relevant sections

of S 523(a)(8) and interpreted the statute as it read after

that change in punctuation. The court explained:

We believe that the absence of commas in the phrase

"educational benefit overpayment or loan made" makes

this phrase difficult to interpret. However, as

Pelkowski, supra, teaches, 990 F.2d at 742-44, there is

no support for the Debtor’s contention, similar to that

asserted by the Pelkowski debtor, that S 523(a)(8) must

be read narrowly. We believe that, when reading the

Code section more broadly than the Debtor suggests,

12

the terms "benefit," "overpayment," and"loan" should

be construed as a series of nouns, all modified by the

adjective "educational." Therefore, we conclude that his

debt, assuming arguendo that it could not be classified

as an "educational loan," falls within the scope of

S 523(a)(8).

154 B.R. at 190.

However, the statute that resulted from the court’s

editing is not the statute that Congress drafted. The court

in Renshaw properly rejected the analysis in Najafi, and so

do we. Renshaw concluded that the exemption in

S 523(a)(8) only applies where there has actually been an

overpayment for an educational benefit program such as

the GI bill. 222 B.R. at 92. This is because Congress

concluded, as a policy matter, that the fiscal integrity of

such educational programs takes priority over giving the

individual debtor a fresh start. It therefore excluded such

programs from the discharge that is otherwise available in

bankruptcy. Accordingly, if a program such as a federally

funded loan program makes an overpayment to a student,

the student can not escape repayment by filing for

bankruptcy. See Renshaw, 222 B.R. at 92. That is not the

situation here.

We also reject any attempt to suggest that Mehta’s

obligation falls within S 523(a)(8)’s exclusion of obligations

for "funds received as an educational benefit. . . ." No funds

have been advanced by BU or received by Mehta for the

semester in question.

D. Equitable Considerations.

Finally, BU makes an equitable argument in support of

its opposition to discharging Mehta’s outstanding tuition.

The university reminds us that it has litigated the same

issue of dischargeability in a different jurisdiction and

prevailed. See Appellant’s Br. at 22 (citing DePasquale).

Accordingly, argues BU, lack of uniformity in various

jurisdictions will leave it vulnerable to the "luck of the

draw" and promote forum shopping by students seeking to

discharge educational debts.

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However, we have already explained that Mehta’s

situation differs from DePasquale’s and that the holding in

DePasquale undermines BU’s claim here to the extent that

DePasquale does apply. Furthermore, we fail to see how

this logistical problem of BU’s own making translates into

the kind of equitable consideration that is cognizable in

bankruptcy. As noted above, BU does not have to do

anything more than it did in DePasquale to protect itself

from the parade of horribles it now marches in front of us.

Absent some similar evidence of a "loan,"S 523(a)(8) does

not apply. Therefore, neither equity nor our construction of

the statute allows us to reach the result BU urges upon us.

See Peller v. Syracuse Univ. (In re Peller), 184 B.R. 663

(Bankr. D.N.J. 1994).

III. Conclusion.

Accordingly, for the reasons set forth herein, we will

affirm the judgement of the district court.

A True Copy:

Teste:

Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

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