Opinion

In Re Unisys Corp. Retiree Medical Benefit "Erisa" Litigation

  • 242 F.3d 497
  • 25 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 2105
  • 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 3551
  • 2001 WL 235874
Court
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
Filed
Mar 9, 2001
On the bench
Mansmann, Nygaard, Stapleton
Cited by
1 cases
Authority
More cited than 40.1%

The opinion

Opinions of the United

2001 Decisions States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

3-9-2001

In Re: Unisys Corp.

Precedential or Non-Precedential:

Docket 99-1929

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Filed March 9, 2001

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

NO. 99-1929

IN RE: UNISYS CORP. RETIREE

MEDICAL BENEFIT "ERISA" LITIGATION

FREDERICK E. TONNIES; WILLIAM M. LEONHARDT;

DAVID S. KAHL; ROBERT E. WILT; CLAY A. BERNICHON;

SOLVEIG TSCHANN; FREDERICK W. HORPE; LUDSON F.

WORSHAM; EDWIN MARJALA; KENYON T. BEMENT;

DONALD E. WAGNER; LUCIUS O. BROWNE, DONALD F .

FABRY; THOMAS L. DURKIN; BERNARD J. HAR T;

RONALD R. BENNETT; HERMAN HEIN; DONALD L.

THOMPSON, individually and on behalf of all members of

the Sperry, Burroughs and Unisys Classes

Appellants

On Appeal From the United States District Court

For the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

(MDL 969)

District Judge: Honorable Bruce W. Kauf fman

Argued July 18, 2000

BEFORE: MANSMANN, NYGAARD and STAPLETON,

Circuit Judges

(Opinion Filed March 9, 2001)

Arnold Levin

Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & Berman

510 Walnut Street, Suite 500

Philadelphia, PA 19106

Joseph A. Golden

Carl B. Downing

Sommers, Schwartz, Silver &

Schwartz

2000 Town Center, Suite 900

Southfield, MI 48075

Bryan L. Clobes

Miller, Faucher, Cafferty & W exler

One Penn Square West, Suite 2500

Philadelphia, PA 19102

Seymour J. Mansfield

Mansfield & Tanick

900 Second Avenue South,

Suite 1560

Minneapolis, MN 55402

Sarah E. Siskind

Miner, Barnhill & Galland

44 East Miffline Street, Suite 803

Madison, WI 53703

Henry H. Rossbacher

Rossbacher & Associates

445 South Flower Street

Citibank Center, Suite 2100

Los Angeles, CA 90071

Charles Gottlieb

Gottlieb & Goren

30150 Telegraph, Suite 249

Bingham Farms, MI 48025

Joseph F. Roda

Roda & Nast

801 Estelle Drive

Lancaster, PA 17602

2

Alan M. Sandals (Argued)

Sandals, Langer & Taylor

1650 Market Street

One Liberty Place, 50th Floor

Philadelphia, PA 19103

Attorneys for Appellants

Joseph J. Costello (Argued)

Joseph B.G. Fay

Morgan, Lewis & Bockius

1701 Market Street

Philadelphia, PA 19103

Joseph A. Teklits

UNISYS Corporation

P.O. Box 500

Blue Bell, PA 19424

Attorneys for Appellee

OPINION OF THE COURT

STAPLETON, Circuit Judge:

We are asked to review two or ders granting partial

summary judgment to the defendant in this ERISA action.

Review of one order requires us to interpret ERISA's statute

of limitations for breach of fiduciary duty claims, 29 U.S.C.

S 1113. Review of the other requir es us to determine

whether the defendant fiduciary, if found to have made

material misrepresentations to the plaintiffs, may be held

accountable to those plaintiffs who relied to their detriment

in making decisions other than decisions to r etire.

I.

The factual and procedural history of this case is

extensive and has been recounted elsewher e in detail.1 We

_________________________________________________________________

1. See e.g., In re Unisys Corp., 57 F.3d 1255, 1257-61 (3d Cir. 1995),

cert.

denied sub nom, Unisys v. Pickering, 517 U.S. 1103 (1996); In re Unisys

Corp., 957 F. Supp. 628, 631-32 (E.D. Pa. 1997); In re Unisys Corp., 837

F. Supp. 670, 672 (E.D. Pa. 1993), aff 'd, 58 F.3d 896 (3d Cir. 1995).

3

will explain only the status of the case as it comes to us on

this appeal. This is a class action filed on behalf of retirees

and disabled former employees of the Sperry, Burroughs,

and Unisys Corporations ("retirees" or "plaintiffs") against

Unisys Corporation ("Unisys"). The dispute arises out of

Unisys' termination of its post-retir ement medical plans for

retirees and disabled former employees of the three

companies.

On November 3, 1992, Unisys announced that it would

terminate all of its preexisting medical benefit plans and

replace them with a new one effective January 1, 1993.2

Under the majority of the old plans, Unisys paid the entire

medical premium for the lives of the retir ees and provided

continuing benefits for their spouses. The new plan, in

contrast, required the retirees to contribute escalating

amounts to the cost of the premiums until January 1,

1995, at which time the retirees would become responsible

for the entire premium.

Upon learning about this planned change in r etirement

benefits, retirees of Sperry, Burr oughs, and Unisys

separately filed eight different lawsuits against Unisys in

four jurisdictions. See In re Unisys Corp., 837 F. Supp. 670,

672 n.1 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (citing cases). These lawsuits were

eventually consolidated. The retirees asserted three causes

of action: breach of contract, estoppel, and br each of

fiduciary duty.

The District Court granted summary judgment to Unisys

on the breach of contract claims of the Burr oughs and

Unisys retirees, as well as on the estoppel and breach of

fiduciary duty claims of all plaintiffs. See In re Unisys Corp.,

837 F. Supp. 670 (E.D. Pa. 1993). After a non-jury trial, the

District Court granted judgment to Unisys on the contract

_________________________________________________________________

2. In September 1986, Sperry Corporation and Burr oughs Corporation

merged to form Unisys Corporation. Following the merger, Unisys

maintained the preexisting medical benefit plans of its component

corporations until 1989. That year, Unisys cr eated its own Post-

Retirement and Extended Disability Medical Plan to cover employees who

retired after April 1, 1989, most of whom were former Sperry and

Burroughs employees. Even with the addition of the new plan, however,

Unisys kept its predecessor plans intact.

4

claims of the Sperry retirees. See In re Unisys Corp., 1994

WL 284079 (E.D. Pa.).

During the trial, Unisys relied upon the fact that the

applicable ERISA plans and summary plan descriptions

("SPDs") contained a reservation of rights clause, reserving

to Unisys the right to amend or terminate the plan at any

time for any reason. The Sperry retir ees advanced two

theories in response. The first was that, when the

applicable ERISA plans and summary plan descriptions

described the health care benefits as "lifetime" benefits, this

was intended to convey not only that the existing plan

provided such benefits for life but also that those benefits

were vested, i.e., guaranteed against change. The second

theory "was that although the SPDs used lifetime language

to describe the benefits of [both] actives and retirees, Sperry

had an unwritten `practice' or `policy' that once an

individual retired, his/her benefits`locked in.' Pursuant to

this `lock in' policy, the company could not r educe the

medical benefits of retirees under any circumstances." In re

Unisys Corp., 1994 WL 284079 at *23.

At the seven day trial, the District Court admitted and

considered extrinsic evidence tendered to show Unisys'

intent in promulgating the plans. The Court concluded that

"lifetime benefits" as used in the plans and SPDs did not

reflect an intent to create "vested" lifetime benefits,

observing that "the plaintiffs conceded thr oughout the

entire trial that an active employee's benefits could always

be awarded or terminated even though lifetime language

was similarly used to describe that benefit . . . implicitly

recogniz[ing] that lifetime is not synonymous with vested."

Id. at *22. With respect to the plaintiffs' second theory, the

District Court found no evidence of a corporate practice or

policy of "locking-in" benefits at r etirement, noting that "not

a single document corroborat[ed] the testimony that an

active/retiree distinction was in for ce." Id. at *23.

The District Court's ultimate conclusion at the end of the

trial was that the plaintiffs lacked any contract right to

lifetime benefits. The evidence that it hear d and our

intervening decision in Bixler v. Cent. Pa. T eamsters Health

& Welfare Fund, 12 F.3d 1292 (3d Cir. 1993), however,

caused it to reconsider its summary judgment in Unisys'

5

favor on the Sperry plaintiffs' breach offiduciary duty

claims. Ultimately, it reinstated those claims. 3 In the course

of doing so, it pointed to evidence that (1) a "r etirement

counselor [had] responded to questions about the

reservation of rights clause raised by potential retirees by

saying that the language `pertained to active employees and

not to retirees' ", and (2) a "personnel manager . . . admitted

to routinely telling inquiring employees that their post-

retirement medical benefits were`guaranteed to them for

life.' " The Court described this evidence as"just a small

sample of the evidence on this issue." In r e Unisys Corp.,

1994 WL 284079 at *34 n.69. The Court also r eferenced

evidence indicating "the highest levels of corporate

management at Sperry, and later Unisys, recognized that

employees might be under the mistaken belief that`lifetime'

meant forever." Id. at *26. The Court explained its

reinstatement decision by stating "that based on [this]

evidence and the law in this circuit, it seems possible that

at least some plaintiffs will be able to sustain a [breach of

fiduciary duty] claim." Id. at *27. 4 The Court declined,

however, to reinstate the estoppel claims.

An interlocutory appeal followed, bringing befor e us the

judgments in Unisys' favor on the contract and estoppel

claims and the decision to reinstate the br each of fiduciary

duty claims. We found judgment appropriate on the breach

of contract claim because the plans and SPDs pr ovided

unambiguous notice that lifetime medical benefits were not

guaranteed, even for those who retired when the plans still

provided for such benefits. On the unambiguous face of the

plans, there was no right to lifetime medical benefits and

extrinsic evidence should not be considered. See In re

Unisys Corp. ("Unisys I"), 58 F .3d 896, 904-06 (3d Cir.

1995).

We found that summary judgment was appr opriate on

the retirees' estoppel claim as well:

_________________________________________________________________

3. After we affirmed this decision, the District Court reinstated the

similar claims of the Burroughs and Unisys r etirees as well. In re Unisys

Corp., 1996 WL 455968 (E.D. Pa.).

4. At the same time, the Court stressed that the breach of fiduciary duty

claim was not before it and that it was "not holding that a breach did in

fact occur." Id. at *27.

6

Due to the unambiguous reservation of rights clauses

in the summary plan descriptions by which Unisys

could terminate its retiree medical benefit plans, the

regular retirees cannot establish"reasonable"

detrimental reliance based on an interpr etation that

the SPDs promised vested benefits. The r etirees'

interpretation of the plans as providing lifetime benefits

is not reasonable as a matter of law because it cannot

be reconciled with the unqualified reservation of rights

clauses in the plans.

Unisys I, 58 F.3d at 907.

In a separate opinion, we also upheld the District Court's

reinstatement decision. See In re Unisys Corp. ("Unisys II"),

57 F.3d 1255 (3d Cir. 1995). W e did so because the record

suggested that some retirees might be able to show one or

both of the following: (1) Unisys representatives counseled

them that they had lifetime medical benefits without

making reference to the reservation of rights clause, even

though the representatives were awar e that many

employees mistakenly understood such counsel to mean

that such benefits became vested at the time of r etirement,

see id. at 1260-61; and (2) Unisys repr esentatives

"affirmatively represent[ed] to them that their medical

benefits were guaranteed once they retir ed, when the

company knew in fact this was not true." Id. at 1266-67.

We held that such conduct could constitute a breach of

Unisys' fiduciary duty as plan administrator .

After the breach of fiduciary duty claim was reinstated for

all classes of plaintiffs, Unisys filed two motions for partial

summary judgment. At the same time, the Sperry r etirees

submitted a motion for summary judgment on their claims.

In its first motion, Unisys asked the District Court to grant

it summary judgment against all Sperry retir ees who retired

before November 17, 1986 (six years befor e the first

complaint by Sperry retirees was filed), and against all

Burroughs retirees who retir ed before December 3, 1986

(six years before the first complaint by Burr oughs retirees

was filed). Unisys argued that these plaintiffs were barred

from having their claims heard by ERISA's statute of

limitations, 29 U.S.C. S 1113.

7

In its second motion, Unisys sought to have the District

Court grant summary judgment against all the plaintiffs

who would not be able to prove that Unisys' alleged breach

of fiduciary duty led them to retire earlier than they

otherwise would have (e.g., retirees who did not voluntarily

retire). It argued that the only legally cognizable harm that

could have resulted from its alleged misr epresentations was

acceleration in individual decisions to retir e. Other

decisions made by the plaintiffs in reliance on Unisys'

misrepresentations, Unisys contended, should not be

considered a "resulting harm" of the alleged breach of

fiduciary duty.

In support of their summary judgment motion, the

Sperry retirees argued that ther e is no material dispute of

fact as to any of the elements of their breach of fiduciary

duty claims. Accordingly, they urged the District Court to

grant them judgment as a matter of law.

The District Court granted Unisys' motions for partial

summary judgment and denied summary judgment to the

Sperry retirees on their motion. Those r etirees whose claims

were extinguished by the partial summary judgments in

Unisys' favor then successfully moved under Fed. R. Civ. P.

54(b) for the entry of a final judgment on their claims so

they could prosecute this appeal. See In r e Unisys Corp.,

189 F.R.D. 149 (E.D. Pa. 1999).

II.

Section 1113 of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. S 1113 states, in its

entirety:

No action may be commenced under this subchapter

with respect to a fiduciary's breach of any

responsibility, duty, or obligation under this part, or

with respect to a violation of this part, after the earlier

of

(1) six years after (A) the date of the last action which

constituted part of the breach or violation, or (B) in the

case of an omission, the latest date on which the

fiduciary could have cured the breach or violation, or

8

(2) three years after the earliest date on which the

plaintiff had actual knowledge of the br each or

violation;

except that in the case of fraud or concealment, such

actions may be commenced not later than six years

after the date of discovery of such breach or violation.

29 U.S.C. S 1113.

The retirees argue that the District Court misapplied

S 1113 in two respects. First, they ar gue that the Court

erred in refusing to hold that under the"fraud or

concealment" provision, the limitations period did not end

until six years after they discovered the truth about their

health care benefits. In the alternative, the retirees argue

that even if we find the "fraud or concealment" provision

inapplicable here, their claims are nevertheless timely

under the six-year provision provided inS 1113(1)(A), which

does not begin to run until "the date of the last action

which constituted a part of the breach or violation." The

retirees contend that the date of the last action constituting

part of the breach in this case was the date on which

Unisys terminated the old benefit plans.

A. "Fraud or Concealment"

The purpose of the "fraud or concealment" pr ovision is to

codify a portion of the common law for ERISA br each of

fiduciary duty claims. The issue raised by this pr ovision is

not simply whether the alleged breach involved some kind

of fraud but rather whether the fiduciary took steps to hide

its breach so that the statute should not begin to run until

the breach is discovered. As we explained in Kurz v.

Philadelphia Elec. Co., 96 F.3d 1544 (3d Cir. 1996):

We now join our sister courts and hold thatS [1113]'s

"fraud and [sic] concealment" language applies the

federal common law discovery rule to ERISA br each of

fiduciary duty claims. In other words, when a lawsuit

has been delayed because the defendant itself has

taken steps to hide its breach of fiduciary duty, . . . the

limitations period will run six years after the date of

the claim's discovery. The relevant question is therefore

9

not whether the complaint "sounds in concealment,"

but rather whether there is evidence that the defendant

took affirmative steps to hide its br each of fiduciary

duty.

Id. at 1552.

In Kurz, the alleged breach of fiduciary duty was the

counseling of employees considering retir ement about their

retirement benefits without revealing that plan

amendments to increase those benefits wer e under serious

consideration. Because the "wrong . . . was neither self-

concealing nor actively concealed," we expr essly reserved

the issue, elsewhere debated, of "whetherS [1113]'s six year

period extends to both `self-concealing' wr ongs as well as

`active concealment' separate from the underlying

wrongdoing." Id. at 1552. In this context, "a self-concealing

act is an act committed during the course of the original

fraud that has the effect of concealing the fraud from its

victims, [while a]ctive concealment refers to acts intended

to conceal the original fraud that are distinct from the

original fraud." Wolin v. Smith Bar ney, Inc., 83 F.3d 847,

852 (7th Cir. 1996). We held in Kurz that, regardless of

whether the acts to conceal the breach occur in the course

of the conduct that constitutes the underlying br each or

independent of and subsequent to the breach, there must

be conduct beyond the breach itself that has the effect of

concealing the breach from its victims.

Here, as in Kurz, the issue is "not whether the complaint

`sounds in concealment' [i.e., not whether Unisys

misadvised the retirees or counseled them without drawing

attention to the reservation of rights clause], but rather

whether there is evidence that the defendant took

affirmative steps [at any point] to hide its breach of

fiduciary duty." Id. at 1552 (emphasis added). Accordingly,

if all that a plaintiff can show is that a counselor

represented to him that he had guaranteed lifetime health

care benefits or failed to give him accurate advice knowing

that he believed he had such benefits, the fraud or

concealment clause is inapplicable. In such cases, Unisys

cannot be said to have taken affirmative steps, either as a

part of the original breach of duty or ther eafter, to cover up

its breach. To the contrary, pursuant to the relevant

10

provisions of ERISA, Unisys regularly distributed to its

employees and retirees SPDs unambiguously explaining

that the plan provisions calling for lifetime benefits could be

amended at any time for any reason. As the District Court

aptly put it,

While . . . compliance with SPD disclosure obligations

does not relieve a company of its fiduciary duty to

avoid confusing participants about their benefits, this

court will not hold that the truth about the "lifetime"

benefits was concealed from participants when the

information about the reservation of rights clause was

unambiguously printed and distributed [by the

company] in the SPD.

In re Unisys Corp., 957 F. Supp. at 635. Accordingly, we

hold that the "fraud or concealment" pr ovision of S 1113(2)

is inapplicable to such cases.5

It is true, as retirees stress, that the doctrine of equitable

tolling can under some circumstances pr event a limitations

period from running in favor of a trustee on a breach of

fiduciary duty claim even in the absence of concealment on

his part. Bailey v. Glover, 21 Wall 342 (1875), upon which

plaintiffs heavily rely, provides one example of such

circumstances. We conclude, however , that superimposing

such equitable tolling rules on the statutory limitations

scheme set forth in S 1113 would be inconsistent with

congressional intent and the clear teachings of the

Supreme Court.

In Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigr ow v. Gilbertson,

501 U.S. 350, 360-62 (1991), the Court held that Rule

10(b)(5) misrepresentation claims ar e governed by S 9(e) and

S 18(c) of the Securities and Exchange Act, each of which

requires that suit be filed befor e the earlier of (a) one year

from the discovery of the facts constituting the violation or

(b) three years from "the violation" (or, in the case of S 18(c),

from the date "the cause of action accrued"). The plaintiff

_________________________________________________________________

5. Notwithstanding plaintiffs' argument to the contrary, we do not regard

the fact that the alleged misrepresentations were repeated (as opposed to

isolated) as satisfying the requirement that there be affirmative steps to

conceal beyond the misrepresentations themselves.

11

there argued that the doctrine of equitable tolling should

apply so that the three-year limitations period would not

start to run until the fraud was discovered even where no

steps where taken by the defendant to conceal the fraud.

The Court rejected that argument, finding it fundamentally

at odds with the legislative scheme:

Plaintiff-respondents note, correctly, that "[t]ime

requirements in lawsuits . . . are customarily subject to

`equitable tolling.' " Irwin v. Department of Veterans

Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 95 (1990), citing Hallstrom v.

Tillamook County, 493 U.S. 20, 27 (1989). Thus, this

Court has said that in the usual case, "wher e the party

injured by the fraud remains in ignorance of it without

any fault or want of diligence or care on his part, the

bar of the statute does not begin to run until the fraud

is discovered, though there be no special

circumstances or efforts on the part of the party

committing the fraud to conceal it from the knowledge

of the other party." Bailey v. Glover, 21 Wall. 342, 348

(1875); see also Holmberg v. Armbr echt, 327 U.S. 392,

396-397 (1946). Notwithstanding this venerable

principle, it is evident that the equitable tolling

doctrine is fundamentally inconsistent with the 1-and-

3-year structure.

The 1-year period, by its terms, begins after

discovery of the facts constituting the violation, making

tolling unnecessary. The 3-year limit is a period of

repose inconsistent with tolling. One commentator

explains: "[T]he inclusion of the thr ee-year period can

have no significance in this context other than to

impose an outside limit." . . . Because the purpose of

the 3-year limitation is clearly to serve as a cutof f, we

hold that tolling principles do not apply to that period.

Id. at 363.

Although the specified duration of the limitations periods

here is different, the legislative scheme is the same.

Congress has determined that the cut-of f date should be

the earlier of (a) three years from the date of discovery of

the claim and (b) six years from the violation. The only

difference is that ERISA's statute makes a single express

12

exception for cases of "fraud or concealment." Just as in

Lampf, it would be fundamentally inconsistent with the

statutory scheme here to accept the argument that the six-

year period does not begin to run until discovery of the

fraud, where the defendant has engaged in no wr ongful

activity beyond the original fraud on which the plaintiffs'

claims are based. Indeed, given the fact that Congress

provided one express exception in S 1113(2), rejection of

equitable tolling here follows a fortiori from the Supreme

Court's holding in Lampf.

Similarly, we must decline plaintiffs' invitation to apply

their equitable tolling principles under the guise of

construing S 1113(2)'s "fraud or concealment" provision.

Accepting that invitation would require us to reject Kurz,

and we are bound by that precedent. Contrary to plaintiffs'

suggestion, we do not read our subsequent case law as

diluting the significance of Kurz in the context of this case.6

This does not end the matter, however . Unlike the District

Court, we are unwilling to say based on the current record

that no retiree will be able to successfully invoke the "fraud

or concealment" provision of S 1113(2). As we have noted,

the District Court, when deciding to reinstate the breach of

fiduciary duty claims, pointed to evidence suggesting that a

"retirement counselor [had] r esponded to questions about

the reservation of rights clause raised by potential retirees

by saying that the language pertained to active employees

and not to retirees." In re Unisys Corp., 1994 WL 284079 at

*34 n.69. It seems to us entirely possible that advice of this

character might well bring the fraud or concealment

provision into play. If, for example, advice about the

_________________________________________________________________

6. In particular, plaintiffs point to this Court's decision in Adams v.

Freedom Forge Corp., 204 F.3d 475 (3d Cir. 2000). As we expressly

noted, no statute of limitations issue was befor e us in that appeal.

Although a footnote in that case makes refer ence to "issues left

unresolved in Kurz about the anatomy and scope of the fraudulent

concealment doctrine," i.e., whether ERISA's statute of limitations

applies to "self-concealing" as well as "active concealment" cases, id. at

494 n.5 (full citations and internal quotations omitted), we do not read

Adams as purporting to second guess the Kurz rule that the "fraud or

concealment" provision requires"affirmative steps to hide [the] breach of

fiduciary duty." Kurz, 96 F.3d at 1552.

13

reservation of rights clause was given under circumstances

such that an employee, who had consulted the SPD, was

dissuaded from consulting counsel regar ding that clause,

we believe that the advice could appropriately be regarded

as an affirmative step having the ef fect of concealing

Unisys' breach.

It would be inappropriate for us to decide at this stage

whether "fraud or concealment" within the meaning of

section 1113(2) has occurred in this case. W e hold only

that, drawing all permissible inferences against the party

seeking summary judgment, there may be r etirees who will

be able to prove that Unisys counselors concealed their

breach from them and that the limitation period did not

foreclose suit until six years after the date they discovered

the breach had occurred.

B. "Date of the last action which constituted

part of the breach"

Having concluded that the six-year limitations period is

applicable to plaintiffs' claims, we must determine when

that period began to run, i.e., "the date of the last action

which constituted a part of the breach." Unisys insists that

this text focuses on the last action of the fiduciary which

was in violation of its fiduciary duty. While it does not

maintain that the current record pinpoints the date upon

which the last alleged misrepresentation was made, it

correctly points out that insofar as decisions to retire are

concerned, a retiree's date of r etirement is necessarily the

last date upon which Unisys could have made a r elevant

misrepresentation or upon which a clarifying

communication could have prevented detrimental reliance.

Unisys therefore asks us to affir m the District Court's grant

of summary judgment against those members of the

plaintiffs' class who retired mor e than six years before the

date on which their case was originally filed, in 1992.

The retirees, on the other hand, contend that the date of

the last action which constituted part of the br each was

November 3, 1992, the date on which Unisys announced

the termination of its "lifetime" plans. They argue that

S 1113 must be interpreted in this manner because no

14

actual harm occurred and thus no legitimate claim of

breach of fiduciary duty arose until Unisys terminated the

plans that it initially had misrepresented. Even though the

retirees concede that the termination of the old plans was

a non-fiduciary act, they nevertheless insist that a non-

fiduciary act can constitute "part of the br each or violation"

of fiduciary duty if it is the final act that gives rise to a

cause of action.

In Adams v. Freedom Forge Corp., 204 F.3d 475 (3d Cir.

2000), this Court recently reviewed the elements of a

breach of fiduciary duty claim like that of the plaintiffs

here. We found the controlling pr ecepts in our prior

decision in this case:

An employee may recover for a breach of fiduciary

duty if he or she proves that an employer , acting as a

fiduciary, made a material misrepresentation that

would confuse a reasonable beneficiary about his or

her benefits, and the beneficiary acted ther eupon to his

or her detriment.

Id. at 492, citing Unisys II, 57 F .3d at 1264.

Given these elements of a claim for breach offiduciary

duty in this context, it necessarily follows that any breach

that may have occurred was completed, and a claim based

thereon accrued, no later than the date upon which the

employee relied to his detriment on the misr epresentations.

Surely, any employee who sought counsel and who took

early retirement based on Unisys' expr ess assurance that

she possessed guaranteed lifetime health car e, thereby

reducing the amount of pension she would otherwise

receive, could bring suit immediately and secur e rescission

of her retirement or some other appr opriate equitable relief.7

_________________________________________________________________

7. The dissenting opinion assumes that an employee misled by Unisys

about guaranteed life care benefits would be entitled to a remedy taking

into account his or her expectancy interest in such benefits rather than,

or perhaps in addition to, the economic loss suffered when he changed

position in detrimental reliance on Unisys' conduct. The District Court

has not yet addressed what remedies may be available to a retiree who

establishes a breach of fiduciary duty, and we, of course, express no

opinion on the availability of expectancy compensation or any other form

15

Accordingly, it seems clear to us that the six-year period for

such plaintiffs commenced no later than the r espective

dates of their retirements.8

We therefore agree with the District Court that the denial

of free health care coverage was not an element of the

plaintiffs' claim. As the District Court pointed out, the

alleged breach of fiduciary duty here concerned the counsel

allegedly given or not given, and there is no causal nexus

between that counsel and the denial of free health care

coverage. In re Unisys Corp., 957 F . Supp. at 639. If Unisys

had provided clear and accurate counsel, some r etirements

may not have occurred when they did, but ther e is no

reason to believe retirees would now have free coverage. As

the District Court held, Unisys had a right to ter minate free

_________________________________________________________________

of relief. We do note, however, that there is a material difference

between

the value of a health care plan with guaranteed lifetime benefits and the

value of a health care plan with benefits that can be canceled at any

time for any reason. Accordingly, if an employee were entitled to an

expectancy remedy as a result of r etiring after being told he had the

former, when in fact he had the latter , he would be entitled to bring

suit

immediately for the difference between the value he was promised and

the value he received or for specific per formance of the promise to

provide a plan or policy with guaranteed lifetime health care. The dissent

is correct, however, that a retir ee who chose not to bring a suit for

guaranteed lifetime benefits or the value ther eof, and who died before

any change in the plan, would serendipitously have wound up in the

same position he would have been in had the misr epresentation been

true. Accordingly, his estate would have no claim based on lost health

care benefits.

8. If the "date of the last action which constitutes a part of the breach"

is the date of Unisys' last misrepresentation, it is theoretically

possible

that the statute could begin to run before a r etiree could seek relief

from

a court since detrimental reliance is a necessary element of a breach of

fiduciary duty of this kind. We need not decide, however, whether the six

year period can begin to run before a br each of fiduciary duty claim

accrues. As we have noted, the District Court and the parties have

regarded the date of the last relevant misrepresentations and the date of

detrimental reliance as being the same date and the only issue briefed

is whether that date or the date of the denial of fr ee health care

coverage

is the legally relevant date. Accordingly, we hold only that the statute

began to run no later than the date of alleged detrimental reliance.

16

health care coverage, and it exercised that right in a non-

fiduciary capacity. Id. at 638.9

It is not clear to us, however, that the claims of all Sperry

retirees who retired befor e November 17, 1986, and all

Burroughs retirees who retir ed before December 3, 1986,

are barred. While the primary theory of liability being

asserted here is clearly that many relied on the

misrepresentations to their detriment by deciding to take

voluntary retirement, as we explain her eafter, Unisys has

not persuaded us that this is the only viable theory of

liability. It may well be that retirees who retired before

those dates relied to their detriment in making other

decisions after those dates. Accordingly, the summary

judgment entered by the District Court was overbroad and

must be reversed. Summary judgment for Unisys would be

appropriate, however, with respect to those who assert

claims based solely on retirement decisions made more

than six years before suit was filed.

III.

Unisys argues that an essential element of the breach of

fiduciary duty claim recognized in our prior opinion is a

voluntary decision to retire made in r eliance on a mistaken

view that health care benefits were guaranteed for life. It

necessarily follows, according to Unisys, that it is entitled

to summary judgment with respect to anyone who was

mandatorily retired at age 65, left the company's employ

involuntarily because of disability, or for some other reason

made no such decision.

In response, the plaintiffs insist that the category of

claims we earlier recognized is not limited to claims based

on retirement decisions and have submitted affidavits from

members of the class who allege that, in reliance on their

_________________________________________________________________

9. It is only fortuitous that the fiduciary who did the alleged counseling

here was the employer who exercised its right to change the plans. If

Unisys had not been the administrator of the plans and an independent

administrator had breached its fiduciary duty by miscounseling retirees,

it would be even more clear that the plan admendments were not "the

last action which constituted a part of the br each."

17

belief that they had guaranteed lifetime benefits, they

declined other employment opportunities, chose to forego

the opportunity to purchase supplemental health

insurance, or made other important financial decisions for

their retirement.

The District Court agreed with Unisys and granted

summary judgment against all who would be unable to

prove a voluntary decision to retir e. We perceive no

principled basis, however, for so cabining our holding in

Unisys II. After all, in Bixler, upon which we heavily relied

there, the decision resulting from the breach of fiduciary

duty was a decision on whether to purchase COBRA

insurance rather than a decision regarding retirement. See

Bixler, 12 F.3d at 1301-03; see also Curcio v. John Hancock

Mut. Life Ins. Co., 33 F.3d 226, 237-39 (3d Cir. 1994)

(fiduciary's misrepresentations about a new life insurance

plan caused plaintiff to fail to obtain adequate coverage). It

is, of course, not clear that the plaintiffs who rely upon

these affidavits will be able to establish their entitlement to

relief, but we decline Unisys' invitation to adopt an across

the board prohibition of relief based upon reasonable

reliance in contexts other than retir ement decisions.

Understanding the import of our decision in Unisys II

requires a recognition of the pr ocedural posture in which

that appeal arose. As we have noted, the District Court

initially granted summary judgment to Unisys on the

breach of fiduciary duty claim. See In r e Unisys Corp., 837

F. Supp. at 679-80. It was only after the trial and our

decision in Bixler that it decided to r einstate that claim. See

In re Unisys Corp., 1994 WL 284079 at *25-27. It was the

propriety of that decision to reinstate, and only the

propriety of that decision, that was befor e us as a certified

issue in that interlocutory appeal. We held that

reinstatement was appropriate and r emanded "for further

proceedings."10 Unisys II, 57 F.3d at 1269.

_________________________________________________________________

10. At times, the plaintiffs appear to r ead our opinion as, in effect,

directing the entry of summary judgment in their favor on at least the

voluntary decision to retire claims. W e do not so read the opinion, and

the District Court did not so read it. At that point, Unisys had been

provided with no opportunity to build a trial or summary judgment

18

It is true, as Unisys stresses, that our opinion addressed

the issue for decision in the context of the plaintiffs having

relied to their detriment in making decisions to retire. That

was our focus because that was the plaintiffs' primary

contention, and the absence of any refer ence to other kinds

of reliance can hardly be taken as a ruling that other forms

of reliance could not provide a valid basis for relief. We

therefore reject the District Court's view that Unisys II, as

a matter of law, limits recovery on the br each of fiduciary

duty claims to claims based on voluntary decisions to

retire. Moreover, we have found no other precedent

supporting that position.

The District Court expressed two related concerns in the

course of granting summary judgment to Unisys on the

claims not based on voluntary retirement decisions: a

concern about opening Unisys to unjustifiably broad relief

and a concern about inconsistency with this Court's

disposition of the estoppel claims. It expressed those

concerns as follows:

In allowing the breach of fiduciary claims to go

forward, this court and the Court of Appeals for the

Third Circuit have essentially held that r eliance by the

employees on the misrepresentations of Unisys, while

not "reasonable reliance" for purposes of a claim of

equitable estoppel, can still support a claim for br each

of fiduciary duty. In a sense, the rulings in this case

_________________________________________________________________

record in opposition to Bixler claims, and any ruling on the merits of

those claims would have been inappropriate. On remand, the District

Court noted that the breach of fiduciary duty claims had not been before

it during the trial on the contract and estoppel claims and that, when

reinstating those claims, it had made no deter mination that any plaintiff

had proven his breach of fiduciary duty claim. On the contrary, the

District Court on remand quoted the following observations it had made

at the time of reinstatement:

[B]ecause some plaintiffs have str onger cases than others based on

their specific inquiries and the information given to them

personally,

the court finds that subclasses, and possibly even individual

hearings, will be necessary to adjudicate these claims.

In re Unisys Corp., 957 F. Supp. at 645.

19

excuse the plan participants from their failur e to read

their summary plan documents in the limited context

of making the retirement decision: because of the

breach of duty, the employees may have r etired earlier

than they otherwise would have, and even if their

reliance on the misrepresentations was not reasonable,

the reliance supports a breach of fiduciary duty claim

because it was at least partially the fault of Unisys.

The "unreasonable" reliance excused here is narrow,

and supports a breach of fiduciary duty claim only in

certain limited circumstances--in this case, where the

employees retired earlier than they might have had

they not been misled by the lifetime

misrepresentations. This court believes that expanding

the concept of "resulting harm" in this case to the

types of reliance alleged in the retir ees' affidavits would

create an unjustified expansion of the narr ow holdings

of this court, and would by indirection r einstate the

claims for equitable estoppel.

In re Unisys Corp., 957 F. Supp. at 644.

The District Court's characterization of our decision in

Unisys II as excusing "unreasonable r eliance" is

inappropriate. We did not there hold that the existence of

the SPD was irrelevant to the analysis of the breach of

fiduciary duty claims. An employer, even when acting in a

fiduciary capacity, is not responsible for harm that is not

reasonably foreseeable. As we pointed out in our prior

opinion in this case and in Adams, in or der for relief to be

afforded, the conduct of the fiduciary must be such as to

create a "substantial likelihood that it would mislead a

reasonable employee in making [a decision to change his or

her position]." Unisys II, 57 F .3d at 1264. Any

determination of whether Unisys conveyed a message that

was "materially misleading" in this sense cannot simply

ignore the existence of the SPD. Rather , what we held on

this score in Unisys II was as follows: (1) that the SPD did

not as a matter of law satisfy Unisys' fiduciary

responsibility; and (2) that there was evidence from which

a trier of fact could conclude that Unisys should have

foreseen that its conduct with respect to at least some of

the class would cause reasonable employees to r ely to their

20

detriment, despite the existence of the SPD. Whether that is

the case depends, of course, on the content of the message

conveyed and the context in which it was conveyed.

We did recognize in Unisys II that there are situations in

which a fiduciary can reasonably foresee unreasonable

reliance and, accordingly, be held accountable. Bixler, 12

F.3d 1292 (3d Cir. 1994), provides an example. Mrs. Bixler

there acknowledged that she had received a notice from the

fiduciary concerning a right to apply for COBRA health care

insurance, but she mistakenly believed that she and her

husband were not eligible to do so because he was already

hospitalized. Shortly after Mr. Bixler's death but still well

within the period when she could have elected to secure

COBRA coverage, Mrs. Bixler called the fiduciary's

representative to inquire about a death benefit. The

fiduciary accurately informed her that ther e was no death

benefit but failed to advise her that she could r eceive

reimbursement for her husband's considerable hospital

expenses by signing and returning the COBRA notice the

fiduciary had sent to her husband. We concluded that there

was evidence from which a trier of fact could infer that the

fiduciary was aware of the Bixlers' cir cumstances and of

Mrs. Bixler's mistaken belief about the unavailability of

COBRA insurance. See id. at 1302-03. In these

circumstances, we held that the trier of fact could find a

breach of fiduciary duty, and we did so without inquiring

whether Mrs. Bixler's understanding of the COBRA notice

was reasonable or unreasonable.

Our decision in Bixler is based on a fiduciary's duty to

deal fairly with its beneficiary and, more specifically, "to

communicate to the beneficiary material facts af fecting the

interest of the beneficiary which he knows the beneficiary

does not know and which the beneficiary needs to know for

his protection." Bixler, 12 F .3d at 1300, quoting

Restatement (Second) of Trusts, S 173, comment (d) (1959).

As we noted in Unisys II, there is evidence here with respect

to some employees from which a trier of fact could conclude

that specific inquiries were made giving notice to Unisys

representatives that the employees could be expected to

make retirement decisions based on the mistaken belief

that their health benefits were guaranteed for life. See

21

Unisys II, 57 F.3d at 1266. Under Bixler, in these

situations, a duty to advise of the reservation of rights

clause would arise, and the existence of the SPD would not

be relevant.

We also recognized in Unisys II that a duty to advise

affirmatively of the reservation of rights clause might have

arisen even in the absence of beneficiary-specific

information concerning confusion or mistake. The evidence

then of record, we suggested, could per mit a finding that

Unisys had acquired knowledge of confusion so pervasive

that a reasonable fiduciary would have done more than

simply rely on its SPD. See id. We did not, however, require

clairvoyance on the part of the fiduciary. The law requires

only that a fiduciary deal fairly with his beneficiaries and,

in doing so, that it "exercise such car e and skill as a man

of ordinary prudence would exercise" in his own affairs.

Restatement (Second) of Trusts, S 174.

A judgment remains to be made as to whether a

reasonable fiduciary in Unisys' position would have

foreseen that its conduct towards the various plaintiffs

would result in important decision making on their part

based on a mistaken belief that they possessed guaranteed

lifetime benefits. In situations involving actual knowledge

on the part of Unisys that an employee was about to rely on

such a misunderstanding, we agree with the District Court

that the existence of the SPD is irrelevant. In other

situations, however, the fact that Unisys had distributed

what purported to be an authoritative guide to benefits is

one of the circumstances that must be consider ed in

passing this judgment on its conduct.

We do not believe holding Unisys to the kind of fair

dealing standard we recognized in Unisys II will impose an

unfair burden upon it even if it is held to that standard in

the context of decisions other than voluntary r etirement.

We stress, however, that the character of the decision made

and reliance claimed will, of course, play an important role

in determining the extent of Unisys' fiduciary duty and

whether that duty was breached. We also note that the

District Court has not yet addressed what equitable

remedies may be available to members of the class.

Common law damages are not recoverable under ERISA for

22

a breach of fiduciary duty, and this fact may also limit

Unisys' exposure. See Mertens v. Hewitt Assoc., 508 U.S.

248 (1993).

Our insistence on reasonable foreseeability as a

prerequisite to legal responsibility on the breach of

fiduciary duty claims is not inconsistent with our resolution

of the plaintiffs' estoppel claims in Unisys I. As our earlier

quotation above from our prior opinion demonstrates, those

claims were predicated on an allegation that the plaintiffs

had relied to their detriment on the text of the plan and

SPD. See Slip at 25, supra. On that occasion, we

summarized our holding as follows:

Because our decisions require that any detrimental

reliance on plan language also be "r easonable," our

finding that the [reservation of rights clauses] are

unambiguous undercuts the reasonableness of any

detrimental reliance by the retirees. Accordingly, we

hold that the district court did not err in concluding,

on summary judgment, that the retirees' estoppel claim

failed as a matter of law.

Unisys I, 58 F.3d at 908. The claim here, however, is not

that the retirees relied on the text of the plans or the SPDs,

but rather that they relied on counseling which they

received from Unisys representatives.

IV.

The District Court's order dated March 10, 1997, will be

reversed and this matter will be remanded to the District

Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

23

MANSMANN, Circuit Judge, concurring in part, and

concurring in the result in part.

I am pleased to join with my colleagues in Part III of the

majority opinion, which recognizes that an ERISA fiduciary

who has created confusion about rights under a benefit

plan has an ongoing responsibility for har m stemming from

beneficiaries' decisions attributable to that confusion. While

I also agree with the holding in Part II of the majority

opinion that summary judgment must be reversed, I am

unable to subscribe to the reasoning of that Part II because

it threatens to undercut a fiduciary's r esponsibility by

allowing a safe harbor so long as the breachingfiduciary

arranges to keep the beneficiaries in the dark for six years

after they rely on his misrepresentations. I believe that the

majority's analysis of the statute of limitations af fords too

little protection for trusting workers by using an artificial

notion of detriment to start the statutory period, by

disregarding the fiduciary's ongoing obligation to correct

known misunderstanding, and by effectively writing out of

the statute the doctrine of tolling until discovery of a self-

concealing wrong.1

_________________________________________________________________

1. Part II of the majority opinion contemplates entry of summary

judgment against retirees whose claims (i) are based solely on retirement

decisions made more than six years befor e this action was filed, and (ii)

were not concealed by Unisys's advice. It is not clear that any actual

person's claim will meet these criteria, however . As the majority

recognizes, retirees may rely on the presence of medical coverage in

making many of life's decisions beyond the decision to retire. Most

people probably take such vital backgroundfinancial circumstances into

consideration, at least tacitly, in everything that they do. Moreover, as

explained below, I believe that all of these participants and

beneficiaries

detrimentally relied on Unisys's ongoing impr oper omission to correct its

misrepresentations in declining to sue before they ultimately brought

this action.

In light of the wide scope of Unisys's alleged concealment, and the

potentially pervasive presence of acts of r eliance beyond the retirement

decision, my disagreement with Part II of the majority's analysis may be

no more than theoretical, as it may well be that no claims at issue are

"based solely on retirement decisions", and that all claims fall within

the

saving provisions of Part IIA or Part III.

24

I.

The applicable statute of limitations requir es that claims

be brought within six years of the "date of the last action

which constituted a part of the breach or violation." 29

U.S.C. S 1113(1)(A). As the majority acknowledges, the "last

action" necessary to make out the claims at issue is

detrimental reliance. See Opinion at 15 (r eferring to

material misrepresentation and detrimental reliance as

elements) (quoting Adams v. Freedom For ge Corp., 204 F.3d

475, 492 (3d Cir. 2000)). See also Unisys II, 57 F.3d at

1265 (defining elements of claim for fiduciary breach as (1)

proof of fiduciary status, (2) misrepr esentations, (3)

company knowledge of confusion, and (4) resulting harm).2

The majority reasons, essentially, that the br each of duty

by Unisys was its misrepresentation of the plan's

provisions, and the detriment or "resulting harm" to the

participants was their retirement without the protection of

a guarantee. See Opinion at 15-16. This ef fectively reads

the element of harm or detriment out of the claim.

Although the retirement decisions wer e made in reliance,

such reliance did not become detrimental until Unisys

announced termination of the promised post-retirement

medical benefits. If the benefits had continued, there would

have been no injury. Cf. Texas v. United States, 523 U.S.

296, 300 (1998) ("A claim is not ripe for adjudication if it

rests upon `contingent future events that may not occur as

anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all.' ") (quoting

Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prod. Co., 473 U.S. 568,

580-81 (1985)). Here, resulting har m was contingent on the

company's future conduct.

The majority argues that actual harm is not a necessary

element of a claim for breach of fiduciary duty. While that

may be correct as a general proposition, it is incorrect as

_________________________________________________________________

2. We recently observed that construction of ERISA's six-year statute

"implicates sophisticated questions about whether the statute begins to

run at the date of the misrepresentations, the date of the plan

amendment, or some other date". Adams, 204 F.3d at 494 n.19. As will

appear, I believe it runs from the date of the detrimental amendment,

while the majority believes it runs from "some other date" -- viz., the

date of the last act undertaken in reliance on the misrepresentations.

25

applied to the subset of fiduciary claims pr edicated on

detrimental reliance. "Actual harm" and "detriment" appear

to be synonymous. To the extent that ther e may be a

difference between legal detriment and actual harm, only

the latter should start the clock running for the statute of

limitations. The significance of harm in the limitations

context is that it brings the existence of the claim home to

the claimant so that he may reasonably be expected to act.

This purpose is not well served by a technical notion of

"detriment" that does not actually impact the claimant.3

The majority illustrates its view of detriment by

hypothesizing that an employee who "sought counsel" and

took early retirement based on the company's assurance of

lifetime health care could "surely" bring suit immediately

and secure rescission of her retir ement or other appropriate

equitable relief.4 Opinion at 15. However, the question of

_________________________________________________________________

3. Moreover, cases holding that it is not necessary to demonstrate harm

to establish a breach of fiduciary duty do not stand for the proposition

that harm, where present, is not part of the breach. See Adams, 204

F.3d 475, 492 (3d Cir. 2000). Fiduciary conduct is measured in light of

all the attendant circumstances. There is a qualitative difference between

an act by a fiduciary which falls short of the standard imposed by law

and an act that also injures cestui que trust. Consequently, even a "non-

fiduciary" act by the company which imposes injury on a beneficiary left

vulnerable by a prior fiduciary breach becomes "part of the breach," and

worsens it character. Thus, the "last action" could consist in the

imposition of harm where it is part of the fiduciary breach, even if it

were not a required element.

4. Although the question of remedy is not now before us, the majority's

reference to rescission as an illustrative remedy is significant. As the

majority recognizes in Part III, participants may rely on their

misapprehension of the plan benefits in many ways beyond deciding to

retire. Some of these acts of reliance -- those involving expenditures or

commitments made in expectation of a strongerfinancial position --

would be difficult to rescind, and rescission would not make the

participant whole. So in general the rescission remedy may be unwieldy

and inadequate. This follows from the majority's unrealistic assumption

that the decisions themselves constitute the detriment to be redressed;

whereas, actually the harm to be r emedied is the unexpected withdrawal

of promised benefits.

If instead of assuming that the object of a suit is to undo the retiree's

life decisions, we recognize that the paradigmatic remedy may be

26

what actual or prospective harm is sufficient to allow suit

by one apprized of her rights is not before us. 5 To my view,

a more apt hypothetical concerns whether the estate of a

participant who died before the old plan was terminated,

and so received the promised medical benefits for life,

would nevertheless be able to sue for breach offiduciary

duty because the promised benefits, though paid, had not

been sufficiently assured by the written plan? Surely not.

The claim would fail due to the absence of actual injury.

Thus, while I am not prepared to say that a retiree may

never bring suit prior to enactment of a thr eatened

detrimental change, I do not believe that the statute of

limitations requires her to bring a pr eemptive action to

ward off potential harm that might never occur.

Accordingly, I would hold that the "last action which

constituted a part of the breach" for statute of limitation

purposes was the termination of the medical benefits that

Unisys had assured the retirees they would receive for life,

rather than any particular decisions the retir ees made on

the strength of that assurance.6

II.

Even if our statute of limitations analysis wer e limited to

fiduciary conduct by Unisys, the retir ees' claims still should

_________________________________________________________________

enforcement of the promise on which the participants relied, then it

becomes clear that the injury that triggers the suit results from the

fiduciary's failure to comply with the pr omise, rather than from the

employee's decision to retire. Cf. Unisys II, 57 F.3d at 1269 (indicating

that "an injunction ordering specific per formance of the assurances

Unisys made" is an equitable remedy available under 29 U.S.C.

S 1132(a)(3)).

5. That question concerns the requir ement that we may only decide

cases and controversies, and so turns on different policies from those

underlying the statute of limitations.

6. I disagree with the majority's statement that it is merely "fortuitous"

that the fiduciary that misrepresented the permanency of the benefits is

the same entity that ultimately cut off those benefits. To the contrary,

it

was the ability of Unisys to honor its promises that helped to induce the

retirees' reliance and created a real prospect that they would not be

injured.

27

not be barred on the present recor d, as there is evidence

that Unisys continued to breach its duty by failing to

correct the mistaken beliefs that its prior misstatements

created. Because this continuing breach involved an

omission rather than an act, the six-year limitations period

would not commence until "the latest date on which the

fiduciary could have cured the breach or violation". 29

U.S.C. S 1113(1)(B).

As the majority observes, we have previously r ecognized

that a fiduciary has a "duty to deal fairly with its

beneficiary and, more specifically, `to communicate to the

beneficiary material facts affecting the interest of the

beneficiary which he knows the beneficiary does not know

and which the beneficiary needs to know for his

protection.' " Supra at 21, quoting Bixler v. Central Pa.

Teamsters Health & Welfare Fund , 12 F.3d 1292, 1300 (3d

Cir. 1993).7 Here, the evidence suggests that Unisys

breached this duty continuously from the time it first

misrepresented the terms of the plan until the time the

beneficiaries learned the material facts by receiving notice

of the plan termination. Under the majority's holding, the

beneficiaries' interests were not pr otected by the fiduciary's

word, but could only be protected if they brought suit

within six years. They therefore "needed to know for their

protection" that the plan was not as it had been

represented; and as the majority acknowledges in Part III of

its opinion, there is evidence that Unisys knew that the

employees were unaware of the material facts.

Unisys therefore had an ongoing duty to inform the

participants of the true state of affairs. As long as Unisys

had reason to believe that the retir ees remained unaware of

the material fact that the company retained a right to cut

off their "lifetime" medical benefits, it was a violation of

trust (i.e., a breach of fiduciary duty) every day for Unisys

not to inform them.8 See Adams, 204 F.3d at 493-94

_________________________________________________________________

7. Indeed, "[t]he duty to disclose material information is the core of a

fiduciary's responsibility." Harte v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 214 F.3d 446,

452 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Glaziers & Glassworkers Union Local No. 252

Annuity Fund v. Newbridge Sec., Inc., 93 F .3d 1171, 1182 (3d Cir. 1996)).

8. As the majority recognizes, "a duty to advise affirmatively of the

reservation of rights clause might have arisen even in the absence of

28

("[B]ecause Unisys was aware that it r etained the right to

modify, a knowing failure to clarify the material information

about the retention of power was breach of its fiduciary

duty.").

Had Unisys told plaintiffs the truth, they could have

acted to protect themselves. Cf. Harte v. Bethelehem Steel

Corp., 214 F.3d 446, 448 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding that where

beneficiaries might predictably and r easonably rely on a

misinterpretation of a plan provision,"a fiduciary may be

held liable for failing to inform a beneficiary" of his rights

"in a timely manner . . . (so that he might attempt to

protect himself)."). Consequently, the participants and

beneficiaries should be permitted to pr ove that they relied

to their detriment on Unisys's continuing non-disclosure,

by refraining from bringing the pr esent suit until after the

omitted information was supplied.

Recognition of an ongoing duty to correct prior

misstatements entails that the statute of limitations does

not run while a misstatement remains uncorr ected.9

Conversely, the majority's holding that the statute runs

from the date of retirement amounts to absolving the

fiduciary from any ongoing duty to corr ect the

misstatement. Today's holding is therefor e contrary to our

decisions in Bixler and Harte.

III.

The most troubling aspect of the majority opinion is its

treatment of the self-concealing wrong issue. As the

_________________________________________________________________

beneficiary-specific information of confusion or mistake" where the

fiduciary has "acquired knowledge of confusion so pervasive that a

reasonable fiduciary would have done mor e than simply rely on its SPD."

Supra at 22 (citing Unisys II, 57 F .3d at 1266). This duty is independent

of the reasonableness of, or even the r easons for, the misapprehension.

9. It might be objected that recognition of an ongoing duty would result

in an open-ended statute of limitations. However , I believe that it is

entirely consistent with public policy and the federal common law

embodied in the "fraud or concealment exception" to hold that a

fiduciary who has misled his beneficiary may never seek refuge behind

the statute of limitations as long as he allows the deception to continue

unabated.

29

majority observes, in Kurz v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 96 F.3d

1544, 1552 (3d Cir. 1996) we "expr essly reserved the issue,

elsewhere debated, of `whether S [1113]'s six year period

extends to both "self-concealing" wrongs as well as "active

concealment" separate from the underlying wr ongdoing.' "

Supra at 10. Although the majority does not expr essly state

whether its opinion is meant to address that issue, its

requirement of "affirmative steps to conceal beyond the

misrepresentations themselves" in or der to toll the statute,

supra at 11 n.5, amounts to an outright r ejection of the

self-concealing wrong doctrine. A requir ement of additional

conduct beyond the breach itself is fundamentally at odds

with the concept that a wrong may be self -concealing.

I believe that the majority errs in interposing an

additional requirement of an affir mative act of concealment

on self-concealing wrongs. In so holding, it permits the

ERISA statute of limitations to become an instrument to

immunize fiduciary wrongdoing.

The "fraud or concealment" provision incorporates the

long-established principle of federal common law that a

statute of limitations is tolled until discovery of the wrong

where there is either underlying fraud or separate acts to

conceal wrongdoing.10 As the Seventh Circuit has explained,

The reading we adopt . . . interprets the phrase "fraud

or concealment" in a way that gives both ter ms

meaning. An ERISA fiduciary can delay a wr onged

beneficiary's discovery of his claim either by

misrepresenting the significance of facts the beneficiary

is aware of (fraud) or by hiding facts so that the

beneficiary never becomes aware of them

(concealment).

. . . [T]his interpretation of "fraud or concealment"

harmonizes the phrase's meaning with the widely

known doctrine of fraudulent concealment, which tolls

the running of a statute of limitations when the

_________________________________________________________________

10. The effect of the majority's requirement of additional acts of

concealment even in cases of self-concealing fraud is to allow tolling

only

in cases of concealment, and so to write the fraud alternative out of the

statutory exception.

30

defendant has prevented the plaintiff 's timely discovery

of the wrong she has suffered.

Radiology Ctr., S.C. v. Stifel, Nicholas & Co., 919 F.2d 1216,

1220 (7th Cir. 1990). See also Kurz v. Philadelphia Elec.

Co., 96 F.3d 1544, 1552 (3d Cir. 1996) (observing that

S 1113 "does not protect defendants in instances involving

concealment or fraud") (quoting Gluck v. Unisys Corp., 960

F.2d 1168, 1177 (3d Cir. 1992)) (emphasis added).

The majority misinterprets our decision in Kurz as

holding that even where concealing acts occur in the course

of the underlying breach, "there must be conduct beyond

the breach itself that has the effect of concealing the breach

from its victims." Supra at 10. On the contrary, in Kurz, we

expressly distinguished "self-concealing wr ongs" from

" `active concealment' separate from underlying wrong". Id.

at 1552 n.5.11

This case is not like Kurz. There was no occasion to

address the effect of a self-concealing wrong there, because

there was no concealment. Indeed, we observed in Kurz

that the employer's announcement of the amendment at

issue just 35 days after the alleged misrepr esentation

"exemplifie[d] the type of timely notification that companies

should give their employees", and "for eclosed any

suggestion that [the employer] attempted to conceal its

plans or engaged in a campaign of fraud to pr event the

plaintiff class from suing for the alleged breach". 96 F.3d at

1552. In the present case, in contrast, the company's

conduct was far from exemplary, as it engaged in a

_________________________________________________________________

11. See also Bailey v. Glover, 88 U.S. 342, 349-50 (1874) (distinguishing

between a fraud which "has been concealed" and one which "is of such

character as to conceal itself "). Indeed, the majority opinion expressly

acknowledges this distinction: "In this context,`a self-concealing act is

an act committed during the course of the original fraud that has the

effect of concealing the fraud from its victims, [while a]ctive

concealment

refers to acts intended to conceal the original fraud that are distinct

from

the original fraud.' Wolin v. Smith Bar ney, Inc., 83 F.3d 847, 852 (7th

Cir. 1996)." Supra at 10. Nevertheless, it proceeds to conflate the two

concepts by requiring acts distinct from the original breach even where

concealment occurs in the course of the underlying breach. See supra at

10-11.

31

"systematic campaign of confusion." In r e: Unisys Corp.

Retiree Medical Benefit "ERISA" Litigation, 1994 WL 284079

at 33 (E.D. Pa. June 24, 1994); see also In r e: Unisys Corp.

Retiree Medical Benefit "ERISA" Litigation, 1996 WL 455968

at *4-6 (discussing sufficiency of evidence of systematic

misrepresentation and confusion in r einstating claims of

Burroughs and Unisys plaintiffs). As discussed above, one

effect of the resultant confusion was to mislead

beneficiaries into believing they had no need or cause to sue.12

Consequently here, unlike in Kurz, it is necessary to

consider the effect of such self-concealing misconduct on

ERISA's statute of limitations.

The rationale underlying the self-concealing wr ong

doctrine has long been recognized in our law:

To hold that . . . by committing a fraud in a manner

that it concealed itself until such time as the party

committing the fraud could plead the statute of

limitations to protect it, is to make the law which was

designed to prevent fraud the means by which it is

made successful and secure.

Bailey v. Glover, 88 U.S. 342, 349 (1874). This principle

that the law should not reward concealment is particularly

applicable in the context of a fiduciary r elationship. See

Amen v. Black, 234 F.2d 12, 26 (10th Cir . 1956) ("The law

does not require one to suspect his fiduciary. Surely no one

would contend that the . . . statute of limitations was

intended to impose upon the defrauded party the bur den of

discovering a fraud perpetrated by one standing in a

position of trust.").13

_________________________________________________________________

12. See Barker v. American Mobile Power Corp. , 64 F.3d 1397, 1402 (9th

Cir. 1995) (fraudulent concealment involves"affirmative conduct upon

the part of the defendant which would, under the cir cumstances of the

case, lead a reasonable person to believe that he did not have a claim for

relief "). Cf. Lettrich v. J.C. Penney Co., Inc., 213 F.3d 765 (3d Cir.

2000)

(holding placement of amendment notice within technical document and

failure to use more effective channels would support inference that

employer intended to conceal amendment from af fected employees).

13. Congress enacted ERISA to "pr otect . . . the interests of

participants

in employee benefit plans . . . by establishing standards of conduct,

responsibility and obligation for fiduciaries." 29 U.S.C. S 1001(b). ERISA

32

If ever a case calls for application of the self-concealing

wrong doctrine, this is such a case. Considering the facts in

the light most favorable to the participants, as the party

opposing summary judgment: Unisys purposely

systematically misled its workers into believing that they

had a legally protected right to medical benefits for life;14 it

perpetuated the misinformation by repeating its

misstatements to many employees over a period of years;15

and it avoided any action that would have br ought the

misrepresentation to the participants' attention, by paying

the benefits until after the statutory period had passed.

Thus, Unisys's conduct may be distinguished fr om a

garden-variety fiduciary breach by two important factors:

first, the beneficiaries were deceived, and remained so, to

Unisys's knowledge, for several years, until shortly before

suit was filed; and second, the deception was pr ocured by

a systematic course of repeated misrepr esentations

calculated to prevent the entire class of aggrieved retirees

from learning the truth. I believe this amounts to a self-

concealing wrong, sufficient to toll the statute without

regard to "additional" conduct -- such as telling retirees

_________________________________________________________________

should therefore be applied to avoid r esults that "would afford less

protection to employees and their beneficiaries than they enjoyed before

ERISA was enacted." Heasley v. Belden & Blake Corp., 2 F.3d 1249,

1257 (3d Cir. 1993). Enabling fiduciaries to secure immunity for their

self-concealing misrepresentations by lapse of time would violate this

principle.

14. See Unisys II, 57 F.3d at 1266 (noting that the District Court "found

that the company, both actively and affirmatively, systematically

misinformed its employees about the duration of their benefits").

15. See Unisys II, 57 F.3d at 1265 ("Here the district court found that

virtually the entire company management had consistently

misrepresented the plan, not just on one occasion to one employee, but

over a period of many years and both orally (in gr oup meetings) and in

writing (in newsletters) as well."). I disagr ee with the majority's

offhand

remark that mere repetition of a misr epresentation cannot constitute

concealment -- especially in the present context, where the

misrepresentation was repeated to all and sundry, creating pervasive

misunderstanding. It seems clear that consistent r epetition of a

falsehood to all employees would well serve to pr event the truth from

becoming known.

33

that the reservation of rights in the SPD did not apply to

them -- which the majority properly finds sufficient to

create a triable issue of concealment.16

The majority gives great weight to Unisys's distribution of

a Summary Plan Description with a reservation of rights

clause. Any implication that there can be no concealment

where an accurate SPD is provided is inconsistent with our

cases holding that participants can be misled despite an

accurate SPD, and that a fiduciary should not be permitted

to prey upon the participants' foreseeable confusion.17

Moreover, it is inconsistent with the majority's own

recognition of evidence that, "despite the existence of the

SPD", employees had "the mistaken belief that their health

benefits were guaranteed for life." Supra at 21.18

_________________________________________________________________

16. I agree with the majority's conclusion that the company's advice that

the reservation of rights clause "pertained to active employees and not to

retirees" supra at 6, quotingIn re Unisys Corp., 1994 WL 284079 at*34,

amounts to an affirmative step to conceal the effect of the clause at

issue, and thus to conceal the retirees' potential injury. Cf. Adams, 204

F.3d at 492 (finding participants likely to succeed on merits

notwithstanding explicit reservation of rights where participants

contended that, based on the employer's communications, they

"reasonably believed that the active employees' booklets did not apply to

them").

17. See, e.g., Adams, 204 F.3d at 492-93 ("[A] company cannot insulate

itself from liability by including unequivocal statements retaining the

right to terminate the plans at any time in the SPDs. . . . .

[C]onflicting

assertions cannot be ignored because they ar e not in the formal ERISA

document."); Harte, 214 F.3d at 451 n.6 ("[T]he fiduciary duty to disclose

and explain is not achieved solely by technical compliance with the

statutory notice requirements."); Unisys II, 57 F.3d at 1264

("[S]atisfaction . . . of . . . disclosur e obligations [through an SPD] .

. .

does not foreclose the possibility that the plan administrator may

nonetheless breach its fiduciary duty . . . to communicate candidly, if

the plan administrator simultaneously or subsequently makes material

misrepresentations to those [to] whom the dut[ies] of loyalty and

prudence are owed.").

18. The majority holds that the SPD is but "one of the circumstances

that must be considered" on the question offiduciary breach. Supra at

22. The same must hold true for the role of the SPD on the question of

concealment.

34

In sum, this case involves systematic conduct by Unisys

that foreseeably led participants and beneficiaries to believe

that they did not have a claim.19 That the concealing acts

were woven into the fabric of Unisys's initial wrongdoing

should be of no moment. Accordingly, I concur with the

majority's holding that the plaintiffs have established at

least a triable issue as to whether this is a case of "fraud

or concealment", so that the statute of limitations would

only begin to run upon discovery of the breach.

A True Copy:

Teste:

Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

_________________________________________________________________

19. As the majority concludes in Part III of its opinion, "there was

evidence from which a trier of fact could conclude that Unisys should

have foreseen that its conduct . . . would cause reasonable employees to

rely to their detriment, despite the existence of the SPD." Supra at 20.

By

the same token, a factfinder could conclude that Unisys's conduct would

cause those employees "to believe that [they] did not have a claim for

relief " -- which is the essential characteristic of concealment. Barker,

64

F.3d at 1402.

35

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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