Opinion

Planned Parenthood of Central New Jersey v. Farmer

  • 220 F.3d 127
  • 2000 WL 1025617
Court
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
Filed
Jul 26, 2000
On the bench
Alito, Barry, Garth
Cited by
5 cases
Authority
More cited than 40.1%

The opinion

Opinions of the United

2000 Decisions States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

7-26-2000

Planned Parenthood v. Farmer

Precedential or Non-Precedential:

Docket 99-5272

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Filed July 26, 2000

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

Nos. 99-5042 and 99-5272

PLANNED PARENTHOOD OF CENTRAL NEW JERSEY;

HERBERT HOLMES, M.D.; DAVID WALLACE, M.D.;

GERSON WEISS, M.D.; on behalf of themselves

and their patients

v.

JOHN FARMER, JR.*, Attorney General of the State of

New Jersey, in his official capacity, and his successors in

office; NEW JERSEY BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS,

and their successors in office; CHRISTINE GRANT*,

Commissioner of the Department of Health and

Senior Services, in her official capacity, and

her successors in office

NEW JERSEY LEGISLATURE, by and through DONALD T.

DIFRANCESCO, in his official capacity as President of the

New Jersey Senate, and JACK COLLINS, in his official

capacity as Speaker of the New Jersey Assembly, and as

the representative of the New Jersey Assembly

(Intervenors in D.C.),

Appellants

*Amended Pursuant to F.R.A.P. 43 (c)(2)

ON APPEAL FROM THE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

D.C. No.: 97-cv-06170

District Judge: The Honorable Anne E. Thompson

Argued: November 19, 1999

Before: ALITO, BARRY and GARTH, Circuit Judges .

(Opinion Filed: July 26, 2000)

Richard F. Collier, Jr., Esquire

(Argued)

Collier, Jacob & Mills

580 Howard Avenue

Corporate Park III

Somerset, NJ 08873

Attorney for Appellants

Talcott Camp, Esquire (Argued)

Cora K. Tung, Esquire

Louise Melling, Esquire

Reproductive Freedom Project

American Civil Liberties Union

Foundation

125 Broad Street, 18th Floor

New York, NY 10004-2400

Lenora Lapidus, Esquire

American Civil Liberties Union

of New Jersey Foundation

35 Halsey Street, Suite 4B

Newark, NJ 07102

Dara Klassel, Esquire

Roger Evans, Esquire

Planned Parenthood Federation

of America

810 Seventh Avenue

New York, NY 10019

Attorneys for Appellees

OPINION OF THE COURT

BARRY, Circuit Judge.

The majority opinion which follows was in final form

before the Supreme Court of the United States heard

argument in the appeal of Carhart v. Stenberg , 192 F.3d

1142 (8th Cir. 1999). The Supreme Court has now issued

2

its opinion in that case, finding Nebraska's "partial birth

abortion" statute -- a statute nearly identical to the one

before this Court -- unconstitutional. See Stenberg v.

Carhart, ___ U.S. ___, 2000 WL 825889 (U.S. June 28,

2000). Because nothing in that opinion is at odds with this

Court's opinion; because, in many respects, that opinion

confirms and supports this Court's conclusions and, in

other respects, goes both further than and not as far as,

this opinion; and, because we see no reason for further

delay, we issue this opinion without change.

Defendant-Intervenor, the New Jersey State Legislature

(the "Legislature"), appeals the decision of the United States

District Court for the District of New Jersey holding the

New Jersey Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 1997 (the

"Act") unconstitutional and permanently enjoining

enforcement of the Act. In a comprehensive opinion, the

District Court found the Act unconstitutional because it: (1)

is void for vagueness; and (2) places an undue burden on

a woman's constitutional right to obtain an abortion. See

Planned Parenthood of Cent. N.J. v. Verniero, 41 F. Supp. 2d

478, 504 (D.N.J. 1998). We will affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

On December 15, 1997, the New Jersey State Legislature,

overriding the governor's veto, joined what is now a

majority of states in enacting a law banning "partial-birth

abortions."1 Since the first such statute was passed in

Ohio, statutes similar to the Act have been wending their

way through the judicial system with various courts

attempting to ascertain the constitutionality of each statute

within the context of over twenty-five years of abortion

rights jurisprudence.

While the vast majority of courts have enjoined the

enforcement of these statutes because they are

unconstitutionally vague and impose an undue burden on

_________________________________________________________________

1. See App. at 1846 (listing state statutes). The Congress of the United

States also passed federal "partial birth abortion" bans in 1995 and

1997. Both were vetoed by the President.

3

women who seek to have an abortion, it is the statute

before us on which we must focus our attention. As we do

so, we are fully aware that this dispute is framed by deeply

held convictions concerning abortion by men and women of

good will, convictions which we recognize and respect. On

the one side of the abortion issue, and the emotionally

charged public debate that issue engenders, are those who

believe that all abortion procedures are equally

objectionable, not merely the "partial birth abortion"

procedure at issue in this case, a position largely

foreclosed, as a matter of law, by Roe and Casey. On the

other side of the issue and the debate are those who fear

any encroachment on a woman's right to seek an abortion.

It is not for us to decide who is right and who is wrong as

a matter of conviction or philosophy. Rather, after carefully

analyzing the statute before us, we must decide whether

that statute passes constitutional muster.

A. Procedural History

The day the Act was to become effective, Planned

Parenthood of Central New Jersey ("Planned Parenthood")

and several physicians (collectively as "plaintiffs"), filed suit

on their own behalf and on behalf of their patients against

the Attorney General of the State of New Jersey, the New

Jersey Board of Medical Examiners, and the Commissioner

of the Department of Health and Senior Services of New

Jersey ("HSS") (collectively as "defendants"). Plaintiffs

sought declaratory and injunctive relief pursuant to 42

U.S.C. SS 1983 and 1988 and 28 U.S.C. SS 2201 and 2202

with one goal in mind: to prevent the Act from taking effect.

The Attorney General, the New Jersey Board of Medical

Examiners and the Commissioner of the HSS all declined to

defend the Act. Accordingly, the Legislature sought leave to

intervene for that purpose, and leave was granted. See

Planned Parenthood of Cent. N.J. v. Verniero, No. 97-6170,

slip. op. at 1 (D.N.J. Dec. 24, 1997) (Order). On December

16, 1997, the District Court entered a Temporary

Restraining Order preventing enforcement of the Act

pending a hearing on the application for an injunction.

After a four-day hearing, at which the three individual

plaintiff physicians and four defense witnesses testified, the

District Court permanently enjoined enforcement of the Act,

4

and the Legislature appealed. We exercise appellate

jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1291.

B. The Act

New Jersey's partial-birth abortion statute prohibits "an

abortion in which the person performing the abortion

partially vaginally delivers a living human fetus before

killing the fetus and completing the delivery." N.J.S.A.

S 2A:65A-6(e). The Act purports to define the phrase

"vaginally delivers a living human fetus before killing the

fetus" to mean "deliberately and intentionally delivering into

the vagina a living fetus, or a substantial portion thereof,

for the purpose of performing a procedure the physician or

other health care professional knows will kill the fetus, and

the subsequent killing of the human fetus." N.J.S.A.

S 2A:65A-6(f). The Act provides a single exception whereby

this otherwise banned procedure may be used: namely,

when the procedure "is necessary to save the life of the

mother whose life is endangered by a physical disorder,

illness or injury." N.J.S.A. S 2A:65A-6(b).

Unlike almost all of the "partial-birth abortion" statutes

enacted throughout the country, the Act is civil, not

criminal. The penalties for violations of the Act are,

nonetheless, severe. Under the Act, those who perform

"partial-birth abortions" are subject to immediate

professional license revocation and a $25,000 fine for each

abortion performed. See N.J.S.A. S 2A:65A-6(c). An

ambulatory health care facility at which such a banned

procedure takes place is also subject to the immediate

revocation of its license. See N.J.S.A.S 2A:65A-6(d). A

woman upon whom a "partial-birth abortion" is performed,

however, is not subject to any penalties. See Senate

Women's Issues, Children and Family Services Committee

Statement, No. 2409-L. 1997, c. 262.

C. Facts

Because the District Court's findings of fact are not

clearly erroneous, see Lanning v. Southeastern Pa. Transp.

Auth., 181 F.3d 478, 481 (3d Cir. 1999), we will draw

heavily from its opinion in setting forth those facts below.

5

1. Abortion Procedures

The term "partial-birth abortion" does not exist in

medical parlance and, thus, scrutiny of the Act depends

largely on determining precisely what abortion procedure or

procedures the Act prohibits and whether this prohibition

creates an undue burden on a woman's right to an

abortion. It is, therefore, necessary to describe and examine

abortion procedures generally recognized by the medical

community, a description and examination that will, of

necessity, be somewhat graphic. Relying upon expert

testimony, the District Court detailed several abortion

procedures: (1) suction curettage; (2) dilation and

evacuation ("D&E"); (3) intact dilation and extraction

("D&X"); (4) induction and installation; (5) hysterotomy; and

(6) hysterectomy.2

Ninety percent of all abortions are performed during the

first trimester of pregnancy. Suction curettage, also known

as vacuum aspiration, is the standard procedure forfirst

trimester abortions. During this procedure, a physician

mechanically dilates the cervix and then inserts a cannula

-- a hollow tube with blunt openings -- into the uterus.

The cannula is attached to a vacuuming device and suction

is used to remove the uterine contents, including the

amniotic fluid, the fetus and the placenta. Afterwards, the

physician may scrape the uterine walls to ensure that the

uterus is fully evacuated. The fetus may be intact or

disarticulated, meaning dismembered, when it is suctioned

out of the uterus and through the cervix and vaginal canal.

In addition, at times, part of the intact fetus may be in the

vagina and part in the uterus, or a disarticulated part of

the fetus may be in the vagina while the remainder is in the

uterus. In either of these situations, the fetus may still have

a heartbeat.

_________________________________________________________________

2. These descriptions of the procedures are consistent with the

description utilized by the American College of Obstetricians and

Gynecologists ("ACOG"), a non-profit professional association of

physicians specializing in women's health care and representing

approximately 95% of all board-certified obstetricians and gynecologists

practicing in the United States. ACOG is appearing as amicus curiae in

this action.

6

The dilation and evacuation ("D&E") procedure is

performed during the second trimester, between thirteen

and twenty weeks measured from the first day of the

woman's last menstrual period ("lmp"). Eighty to ninety

percent of the abortions performed after the first trimester

are D&E procedures. During the D&E, the physician dilates

the cervix either mechanically or by using osmotic dilators

which are inserted into the cervical canal twelve to thirty

hours prior to the procedure. Once the cervix is sufficiently

dilated, the physician uses light suction to rupture the

amniotic sac. Then, largely without the benefit of seeing the

contents of the uterus, the physician inserts forceps into

the uterus, grasps hold of a part of the fetus and extricates

it from the woman's body. This process is repeated until the

entire fetus has been removed. The physician then uses

suction to remove the placenta.

During this procedure, the fetus may be removed from

the uterus and pulled through the cervix and the vaginal

canal either intact or disarticulated. The amount of

disarticulation depends upon the width of the dilated cervix

as well as the gestational stage of the fetus because the

fetus is more prone to disarticulate at earlier stages of the

pregnancy. As with the suction curettage procedure, the

D&E may result in a situation in which part of an intact

fetus is in the vagina and part in the uterus or a

disarticulated part of the fetus is in the vagina while the

remainder of the fetus is in the uterus. In either

circumstance, the fetus may still have a heartbeat.

After fourteen weeks lmp, the physician may use a

similar procedure in which he or she grasps the fetus by its

feet or legs and attempts to draw the fetus intact through

the cervix and into the vagina. The fetal head may become

stuck in the internal cervical os requiring the physician to

apply suction to dislodge the head. If the suction does not

work, the physician must either disarticulate the fetal head

and deliver it apart from the body or collapse the head in

order to deliver the fetus intact. The fetus may still have a

heartbeat while its body is in the vagina and the head

lodged in the cervix. This procedure is termed an"intact

dilation and extraction" ("D&X") by the American College of

Obstetricians and Gynecologists ("ACOG"). Although the

7

D&X has not been the subject of clinical trials or peer

reviewed studies, the District Court concluded that the

procedure may pose a lesser risk of cervical laceration and

uterine perforation because the procedure requires less

instrumentation than the D&E and fewer entries into the

uterus. In addition, the D&X generally results in an intact

fetus which is often desirable for diagnostic purposes.

During the second trimester, but generally not before

sixteen weeks lmp, induction abortions account for the

majority of abortions performed which are not D&E

abortions. During an induction procedure, the physician

dilates the cervix twelve to twenty-four hours before

medically inducing labor. Installation abortions, a subset of

inductions, involve the injection of a lethal substance, such

as sodium chloride or concentrated urea, into the uterus

either through the abdomen or through the cervix to cause

uterine contractions. Labor can last anywhere from ten to

thirty hours, resulting in the delivery of an intact fetus.

During an induction abortion, the fetus may die before

delivery. For example, the fetus may die in the uterus by

the injection of a lethal substance or by uterine

contractions. In addition, the fetus may expire during

delivery if, for example, the fetus becomes entangled in the

umbilical cord, or the fetal head becomes lodged in the

internal cervical os, requiring the physician to disarticulate

the head and deliver it separate from the body or deflate

the head in order to remove the intact fetus. Circumstances

requiring an expeditious delivery, such as maternal

hemorrhaging, may result in disarticulation. In addition,

the physician may need to sever the umbilical cord if the

fetus becomes entangled in it during delivery. In any of

these circumstances, fetal death may occur while the fetus

is partially in the uterus and partially in the vagina.

The two remaining methods of abortion are hysterotomy

and hysterectomy, procedures which are very rarely

performed for purposes of aborting a fetus. A hysterotomy

is a pre-term cesarean section in which the fetus is

delivered through an incision in the abdomen. A

hysterectomy is the complete removal of the uterus. Both

procedures carry a higher risk of maternal death than other

methods of abortions due to the possibility of hemorrhage.

The hysterectomy, of course, renders the woman sterile.

8

2. Plaintiffs

Planned Parenthood, an ambulatory health care facility

licensed pursuant to N.J.A.C. S 8:43A-1.3, provides vacuum

aspiration abortions up to fourteen weeks lmp. Plaintiffs

Gerson Weiss, M.D., David Wallace, M.D., and Herbert

Holmes, M.D., are licensed to practice medicine in the State

of New Jersey. Dr. Weiss, a professor in and Chairman and

Chief of Service of the Department of Obstetrics and

Gynecology at the University of Medicine and Dentistry of

New Jersey-New Jersey Medical School ("UMDNJ"), oversees

the provision of all obstetrical and gynecological care at the

hospital, including abortions up through eighteen weeks

lmp. He established a training program and teaches

residents the full range of obstetric and gynecological care,

including abortions. He is also Director of the Center for

Reproductive Medicine, which is affiliated with Hackensack

Hospital. Dr. Weiss is board-certified in obstetrics and

gynecology, and has a subspecialty board-certification in

reproductive endocrinology. He has performed abortions

since 1968 and has personally performed between 500 and

1000 abortions using the vacuum aspiration and D&E

methods. He has also performed hysterotomy abortions.

Dr. Wallace is the President of the Medical Staff at

Monmouth Medical Center, which is affiliated with the St.

Barnabas Health Care System in Long Branch, New Jersey.

He is Chairman of the Department of Obstetrics and

Gynecology and Director of the residency program. Dr.

Wallace is board-certified in obstetrics and gynecology, and

is eligible for certification in maternal-fetal medicine. Since

1980, Dr. Wallace has performed between 1,500 and 2,000

abortions and currently performs about fifty abortions

annually. He performs abortions through twenty-three

weeks lmp, supervises abortions, and teaches abortion

procedures. He utilizes both the vacuum aspiration and the

D&E methods.

Dr. Holmes is a clinical associate professor of obstetrics

and gynecology at UMDNJ, where he is the primary

physician performing abortions. He is also an attending

surgeon at Newark Beth Israel Hospital with primary

responsibility for abortions. Annually, he performs 400 to

500 first trimester vacuum aspiration abortions and 200 to

9

300 second trimester D&E abortions up through eighteen

weeks lmp. He performs D&E abortions after eighteen

weeks lmp where there is a demonstrable fetal abnormality.

Dr. Holmes was previously affiliated with United Hospitals

in Newark, New Jersey, where he performed induction and

installation abortions through twenty weeks lmp, and

through twenty-four weeks lmp in the case of fetal

abnormality or risk to the mother's health.

Each physician was qualified to testify as an expert in

obstetrics and gynecology, including abortion procedures,

and did so during the hearing before the District Court.

II. DISCUSSION

The order of the District Court holding the Act

unconstitutional and granting a permanent injunction is

the focus of the parties' attention, and ours. We review that

order under an abuse of discretion standard. See American

Civil Liberties Union of N.J. v. Black Horse Pike Reg'l Bd. of

Educ., 84 F.3d 1471, 1476 (3d Cir. 1996). "An abuse of

discretion exists where the district court's decision rests

upon a clearly erroneous finding of fact, an errant

conclusion of law, or an improper application of law to

fact." Id. (citation omitted). In addition to the

constitutionality of the Act, however, several other issues --

standing, ripeness, and abstention -- have been raised by

the Legislature. While recognizing that generally such

issues are discussed sooner rather than later, an analysis

of these issues is directly informed by the scope of the Act.

See Audio Tape of Oral Argument before Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit (Nov. 19, 1999) (on file with Court)

(statement by the attorney for the Legislature that the

"central issue in this case" is the scope of the Act and

"every issue in this case turns on the answer to that

question: abstention, ripeness, vagueness, undue burden,

everything else . . ."). We, therefore, will defer our

consideration of these issues until after we have considered

the Act's constitutionality -- or lack thereof. 3

_________________________________________________________________

3. We reject out of hand two additional issues summarily raised by the

Legislature. The Legislature asserts that the District Court abused its

10

A. Constitutionality of Act

1. The Act is Void for Vagueness

The District Court found the Act unconstitutionally vague

because it failed to define with any certainty the conduct

that is proscribed. The Legislature contends that the

District Court erred in so finding because although some

terms may be ambiguous, the Court confused the concepts

of ambiguity and vagueness and, in any event, should have

narrowed the scope of the Act instead of striking down the

Act in its entirety. Conceding that D&E, suction curettage

and induction abortions are constitutionally protected, the

Legislature argues that, if construed narrowly, the Act

simply bans the D&X procedure and not conventional

methods of abortion. The Legislature also points to the

intent element contained within the Act which purportedly

"clearly" restricts its scope. The District Court found that

the Act was not readily susceptible to a narrowing

interpretation and that the intent element does not cure the

vagueness concerns. We agree.

The Supreme Court has been explicit:

It is a basic principle of due process that an enactment

is void for vagueness if its prohibitions are not clearly

defined. Vague laws offend several important values.

First, because we assume that man is free to steer

between lawful and unlawful conduct, we insist that

laws give the person of ordinary intelligence a

_________________________________________________________________

discretion in: (1) excluding materials, such as newspaper articles, that

illustrate the public debate surrounding partial birth abortion, as well

as

testimony of witnesses that the fetus is a human being and able to

experience pain; and (2) refusing to completely correct the transcripts of

the hearings. After examining the record, we find no abuse of discretion

in disallowing the materials and testimony because, among other

reasons, they were not relevant to the issue before the Court, i.e. the

constitutionality of the Act. As for the transcripts, the District Court

did

grant in part the Legislature's motion to amend the transcripts to

adequately reflect significant deviations but refused to order all of the

Legislature's proposed corrections, some of which included replacing

"gonna" with "going to." App. at 1250. We find no error, much less an

abuse of discretion.

11

reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so

that he may act accordingly. Vague laws may trap the

innocent by not providing fair warning. Second, if

arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is to be

prevented, laws must provide explicit standards for

those who apply them.

Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972)

(footnotes omitted). The level of specificity required to pass

constitutional muster is informed by the subject of the

statute. If a statute is so nonspecific as to create

uncertainty regarding the exercise of a constitutionally

protected right, such as a woman's right to abortion, a

higher degree of clarity is required. See Colautti v. Franklin,

439 U.S. 379, 390 (1979), overruled in part on other

grounds, Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S.

490 (1989); see also Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside,

Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 499 (1982) (evaluating

a civil statute for vagueness and stating that "perhaps the

most important factor affecting the clarity that the

Constitution demands of a law is whether it threatens to

inhibit the exercise of constitutionally protected rights").

Indeed, in Colautti, the Supreme Court struck down

provisions of the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act,

stressing the ambiguous nature of both the viability

determination portion of the statute as well as the standard

of care provision. See Colautti, 439 U.S. at 401. The Court

held that the statute was impermissibly vague because

liability was conditioned "on confusing and ambiguous

criteria" which "present[ed] serious problems of notice,

discriminatory application, and [a] chilling effect on the

exercise of constitutional rights." Id. at 394.4

In addition, two basic tenets of statutory construction are

relevant to our analysis. Statutes are to be accorded a

presumption of constitutionality and, under both state and

federal canons of statutory construction, a statute may be

_________________________________________________________________

4. We note that the Court found the statute to be vague on its face

without mention of First Amendment concerns. See Colautti, 439 U.S. at

390. This in and of itself disposes of the Legislature's contention that

plaintiffs cannot bring a facial challenge on vagueness grounds in a case

such as this unless the First Amendment is implicated.

12

narrowed in order to fall within the confines of the

Constitution but only if, an "if " which is important here, it

is "readily susceptible" to such a limiting construction. See

Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 884

(1997) ("[i]n considering a facial challenge, this Court may

impose a limiting construction on a statute only if it is

`readily susceptible' to such a construction"); Hamilton

Amusement Ctr. v. Verniero, 156 N.J. 254, 280, 716 A.2d

1137, 1149 (1998) (holding that New Jersey statute must

be construed "in a constitutional manner if it is reasonably

susceptible to such a construction"), cert. denied, 527 U.S.

1021 (1999). We may not, however, "rewrite a state law to

conform it to constitutional requirements." Virginia v.

American Booksellers Ass'n, Inc., 484 U.S. 383, 397 (1988).

The Act seeks to prevent physicians from performing

"partial-birth abortions." In medical parlance, as we have

noted above, that term does not exist. The subject of the

ban, then, must be determined from the text of the Act. See

Eubanks v. Stengel, 28 F. Supp. 2d 1024, 1033 (W.D. Ky.

1998) (noting that in examining Kentucky's partial birth

abortion statute, "the Court must consider the

constitutionality of the group of words, selected and

arranged by the General Assembly, presumably intended to

ban whatever they encompass."). According to the Act, a

partial-birth abortion is "an abortion in which the person

performing the abortion partially vaginally delivers a living

human fetus before killing the fetus and completing the

delivery." N.J.S.A. S 2A:65A-6(e). The Act thereafter

purports to define "vaginally delivers a living human fetus

before killing the fetus" as "deliberately and intentionally

delivering into the vagina a living fetus, or a substantial

portion thereof, for the purpose of performing a procedure

the physician or other health care professional knows will

kill the fetus, and the subsequent killing of the human

fetus." N.J.S.A. S 2A:65A-6(f). Discerning the meaning of all

of this is a Herculean task and one which illustrates that

the statutory definition of partial birth abortion is so vague

as to encompass almost all forms of abortion.

First, the term "partially vaginally delivers" could

reasonably describe the delivery of an intact fetus partially

into the vaginal canal or the delivery of a fetal part into the

13

vaginal canal. All abortion procedures, save the

hysterotomy and hysterectomy which are typically not

vaginal deliveries, could, therefore, be encompassed within

this definition because during each of the procedures a

fetus may be partially delivered into the vaginal canal and

thereafter killed. For instance, during suction curettage,

when the fetus is suctioned out of the uterus and through

the cervix and vaginal canal, a portion of the fetus may

remain in the uterus, effectuating a partial vaginal delivery.

In addition, during a D&E, parts of the fetus are pulled out

of the uterus and disarticulated, again effectuating a partial

vaginal delivery. Finally, during an induction, the fetus may

become entangled in the umbilical cord or the head may

become lodged in the internal cervical os resulting in the

fetus being partially in the uterus and partially in the

vaginal canal when the umbilical cord is cut or the head is

collapsed. See Little Rock Family Planning Services, P.A. v.

Jegley, 192 F.3d 794, 798 (8th Cir. 1999) (holding that use

of term "partially" in Arkansas partial birth abortion statute

means that "[a] physician who, as part of a D&E procedure,

or as part of a suction-curettage procedure, brings an arm

or a leg or some other part of a living fetus out of the

uterus into the vagina will violate the Act").

Contrary to the Legislature's protestations, following the

phrase "partially vaginally delivers" with"a living human

fetus" does not narrow the reach of the Act. All experts in

this case agree that the term "living" simply means that the

fetus has a heartbeat, a far cry, indeed, from much of the

rhetoric surrounding the partial birth abortion debate as to

what "living" means in the context of partial birth abortion

statutes. It is undisputed that a fetus has a heartbeat from

as early as seven weeks lmp until birth, thus encompassing

the time period during which almost all abortions are

performed. In addition, both an intact and a disarticulated

fetus may have heartbeats and, therefore, be "living." The

record amply supports the District Court's finding that

during a suction curettage, a D&E, or an induction

procedure, the fetus may very well have a heartbeat while

part of the fetus is delivered into the vaginal canal and part

remains in the uterus.

Moreover, far from clarifying anything, use of the term

"living human fetus" adds to the Act's constitutional

14

uncertainty because it does not draw the line at viability, as

the Supreme Court has done. In Roe, the Supreme Court

stressed that the state's interest in potential life may reach

the "compelling" point at viability, or when the fetus is

"potentially able to live outside the mother's womb, albeit

with artificial aid." Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 160, 163

(1973). Thus, prior to viability, the state may not interfere

with the physician's decision, in consultation with his or

her patient, that the pregnancy should be terminated. See

id. at 163. After viability, however, the state may proscribe

abortions altogether except when necessary to protect the

life or health of the mother. See id. at 163-64. Although the

Court in Casey subsequently adopted an undue burden

approach when evaluating abortion regulations, it explicitly

reaffirmed Roe's emphasis on viability, holding that before

viability the state "may not prohibit any woman from

making the ultimate decision to terminate her pregnancy[,]"

while post-viability abortion may be proscribed so long as

there are exceptions for the life and health of the woman.

See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey , 505

U.S. 833, 878-79 (1992).

A fetus typically reaches viability after about twenty-four

weeks of pregnancy. See Verniero, 41 F. Supp. 2d at 492

n.4. Here, however, because a fetus may be "living" as early

as seven weeks lmp, use of the term "living" instead of

"viable" indicates that, contrary to the understanding of a

large segment of the public and the concomitant rhetoric,

the Act is in no way limited to late-term, or even mid-term,

abortions. Rather, the Act is limited only to procedures

which entail vaginally delivering part of a fetus from the

uterus after the fetus is "living," or, in other words, after

seven weeks lmp. As we have already noted, most common

abortion procedures will fall within this limitation when

they entail the partial delivery into the vaginal canal of a

fetus that still has a heartbeat, as they usually do.

The uncertainty of the Act is further compounded by the

term "substantial portion." See Carhart v. Stenberg, 192

F.3d 1142, 1150 (8th Cir. 1999) (finding the "crucial

problem" with Nebraska's partial birth abortion statute to

be the undefined term "substantial portion"), cert. granted

in part, 120 S. Ct. 865, 68 U.S.L.W. 3338, 68 U.S.L.W.

15

3449 (Jan. 14, 2000) (No. 99-830). The Act prohibits

vaginally delivering "a living fetus or a substantial portion

thereof, for the purpose of performing a procedure the

physician . . . knows will kill the fetus, and the subsequent

killing of the fetus." N.J.S.A. S 2A:65A-6(f) (emphasis

added). Questions immediately arise as to whether

"substantial portion" is measured in terms of size or volume

in relation to the remainder of the body, length of the body,

functionality, or a combination of these factors. Even if

"substantial portion" were only interpreted to mean size,

reasonable minds may well differ as to how much of a fetus

is substantial: two limbs, four limbs, at least half of its

body, all but the head? Indeed, the Legislature's own

witness, Dr. Bowes, testified that "substantial" may be

evaluated in terms of function, length, and relative size and

there could be differences of opinion between reasonable

physicians as to whether a portion of a fetus is

"substantial." App. at 1138. It is constitutionally

impermissible to force a physician to guess at the meaning

of this inherently vague term and risk losing his or her

professional license and receiving a heavy fine if he or she

guesses wrong.5

Indeed, the phrase "substantial portion" undermines the

Legislature's assertion that the ban only prohibits the

delivery of intact fetuses. Nowhere does the term"intact"

appear in the Act and the record supports the conclusion

that a "substantial portion" of a living fetus could well refer

to a portion of a disarticulated fetus. Even reading the word

"intact" into the Act, however, does not limit it to the D&X

procedure because an intact fetus may be delivered during

both an induction and a D&E procedure as well.

_________________________________________________________________

5. Not only are physicians bereft of notice as to what procedures are

prohibited by the Act but the vagueness of the Act increases the risk of

disparate enforcement. See City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, ___,

119 S. Ct. 1849, 1859 (1999) (stating that vague statutes authorize and

may even encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement);

Graynard, 408 U.S. at 108 (same). The utter lack of clarity as to the

scope of the Act raises the Due Process concern that the New Jersey

Board of Medical Examiners would have virtually unfettered discretion to

revoke licenses and impose fines.

16

The Legislature argues, however, that the Act's scienter

requirement at least partially cures the vagueness concerns

it candidly admits exist. The Act forbids a physician from

"deliberately and intentionally delivering into the vagina a

living fetus, or a substantial portion thereof, for the

purpose of performing a procedure the physician . . . knows

will kill the fetus." N.J.S.A. S 2A:65A-6(f) (emphasis added).

While a scienter requirement can cure a vague statute, or

at least ameliorate the vagueness, see Colautti , 439 U.S. at

395, it cannot do so here. At a minimum, to limit the scope

of a statute to "deliberately and intentionally" performing a

certain procedure, the procedure itself must be identified or

readily susceptible of identification. See, e.g., Rhode Island

Med'l Soc'y v. Whitehouse, 66 F. Supp. 2d 288, 311-12

(D.R.I. 1999) (holding that scienter requirement could not

save Rhode Island's partial birth abortion statute because

the "scienter requirement modifies a vague term"). Here, it

is not.

Finally, the Legislature asserts that the reach of the Act

is narrowed by its requirement that after the living fetus, or

a substantial portion, is partially delivered into the vagina,

the physician must intentionally perform a separate

"procedure" which he or she knows will kill the fetus, and

does so. This requirement narrows the Act, the Legislature

asserts, to encompass only the D&X procedure in which the

intact fetus -- again, that word "intact"-- is partially

delivered into the vagina and a separate procedure is then

intentionally performed whereby the fetal head is punctured

and the intracranial contents suctioned, killing the fetus

before delivery is completed. Because delivery is not halted

to perform a separate procedure aimed at killing the fetus

during a D&E, suction curettage or induction abortion

(absent a complication), the Legislature argues that those

abortion procedures are not prohibited by the Act.

The words of the Act simply do not support any such

reading. Nowhere does the Act require that the abortion be

halted while a separate procedure is performed to kill the

fetus; indeed, the word "separate" does not even appear in

the Act. The Act simply prohibits "deliberately and

intentionally delivering into the vagina a living fetus, or a

substantial portion thereof, for the purpose of performing a

17

procedure the physician . . . knows will kill the fetus . . . ."

N.J.S.A. S 2A:65A-6(f). All abortions seek to terminate

pregnancy and necessarily entail the intent to deliver a

fetus, or a substantial portion thereof, for the purpose of

killing the fetus.

Even if we were to read the word "separate" into the Act

and find the Act only applicable to abortion procedures

which entail the intentional delivery into the vagina of a

fetus for the purpose of performing a "separate" procedure

aimed at killing the fetus, however, the Act is still not

limited to the D&X. It is uncontested, for example, that

during a D&E, a substantial portion of the fetus may be

intentionally and deliberately delivered into the vagina for

the purpose of performing a procedure, such as

dismemberment, which the physician knows will kill the

fetus. Indeed, Dr. Wallace testified that when performing a

D&E, his "goal" is to bring a part of the fetus down through

the cervix because he "[does not] want to disarticulate

whatever [he] has grabbed within the contents of the

uterine cavity" and will only disarticulate it in the uterus if

necessary. App. at 680. The purpose of this, he testified, is

to avoid unnecessary passes into the uterus. See id. Also

during a D&E, after a substantial portion of the fetus is

delivered, the physician might be required to collapse the

fetal skull in order to deliver the remainder of the fetus, a

procedure he or she knows will kill the fetus. Finally,

during an induction the physician may intentionally deliver

the fetus into the vagina for the purpose of performing a

separate procedure which will kill the fetus, such as cutting

the umbilical cord or collapsing the skull to deliver the

remainder of the fetus intact.

Another difficulty is that, even though treated as separate

procedures, the D&E and the D&X substantially overlap

given that the D&X is essentially a subset of the D&E.

Generally, the only difference between the procedures is

that the fetus is usually disarticulated in the D&E, while

intact removal is the goal of the D&X.6 In an attempt to

_________________________________________________________________

6. The record reflects that there can be benefits in attempting to remove

an intact, rather than a disarticulated, fetus during an abortion

procedure, including aiding in the diagnosis of fetal abnormalities.

18

perform a D&E, however, it is entirely possible that the

physician may extract not simply a portion of the fetus but

an intact fetus, thus transforming the procedure into a

D&X. In addition, during both the D&E and the D&X, the

head of the fetus may become lodged in the cervix,

requiring the physician to collapse the head. Thus, the

conduct of a physician during both procedures may be

identical. Because there is no meaningful difference

between the forbidden D&X procedure and the permissible

and concededly constitutionally protected D&E procedure,

and no reason of conviction or philosophy to prohibit the

former and permit the latter, one must wonder if the true

purpose of the Act is not, pure and simple, to dramatize to

the public the ugly nature of abortions of all types and

deter physicians from performing them.

Be that as it may, the Legislature asserts that the

scienter requirement narrows the application of the Act to

physicians who intend at the outset to perform a D&X, not

to physicians who intend at the outset to perform a D&E

which inadvertently becomes a D&X when the fetus is

extracted intact instead of disarticulated. So that the intent

is clear, the Legislature proposes that physicians

performing abortions register with the State the particular

type of abortion which, at least at the outset, they intend to

perform.

Separate and apart from the fact, and fact it be, that no

one would ever voluntarily register with the State that he or

she intends to perform a procedure which could or would

cost the physician his or her professional license, the Act

does not support any such reading. It does not prohibit

intentionally performing a D&X, but prohibits only the

intentional delivery of a living fetus, or substantial portion

thereof, for the purpose of performing a procedure that will

kill the fetus and subsequent killing of the fetus. As we

have explained, this prohibition could encompass a D&E, in

which a physician intends to partially deliver a living fetus

into the vagina, dismembers the fetus in the vagina,

thereby killing the fetus, and completes delivery. See

Planned Parenthood of Greater Iowa, Inc. v. Miller , 195 F.3d

386, 389 (8th Cir. 1999) (finding that scienter requirement

could not save Iowa's partial birth abortion ban because it

19

could still encompass the D&E procedure); Jegley , 192 F.3d

at 798 (rejecting argument that scienter requirement limits

scope of Arkansas partial birth abortion statute to cover

only D&X procedure); Carhart, 192 F.3d at 1150 (applying

similar reasoning with reference to Nebraska partial birth

abortion statute).

Finally, the Legislature argues that because New Jersey

is one of the most "liberal" states in terms of abortion

rights, it is "clear" that the drafters did not intend to

repudiate decades of abortion rights by banning all

abortions, but only intended the Act to prohibit the D&X

procedure. The District Court, the Legislature continues,

should have read the Act narrowly in order to effectuate

this clear intent. Indeed, when the Attorney General would

not defend the Act (a fact, we note, which has not escaped

our attention but on which we choose not to comment), the

Legislature itself appeared to do so and to declare both its

intent and its request for a narrowing construction.

Despite the Legislature's protestations, it was not the role

of the District Court, nor is it our role, to rewrite statutes

even at the request of the Legislature. Nonetheless, because

there is virtually no legislative history surrounding the

enactment of the Act, and because the Legislature in its

submissions to us did not even attempt to suggest what

that narrowing construction could or should be, at oral

argument we pressed counsel for the Legislature to specify

the narrow construction which was supposedly intended by

the drafters of the Act and which it calls upon us now to

put in place. We received no answer, giving us no reason to

believe that there is an answer. Indeed, all that we have

been told, and then at but one point in the Legislature's

brief, is that the Act only sought to ban a new method of

abortion which

involves the feet-first delivery of a live, intact fetus

almost completely out of the mother's womb, to the

point where only the head remains in the womb and

the legs and lower trunk are actually outside the

mother's body. At this point, the delivery is halted, the

baby's skull is punctured with a scissors, and the

baby's brains are sucked out with a vacuum, which

collapses the skull.

20

Appellant Br. at 6-7.

It is shocking in the extreme that, whatever one may

think of abortion in general and "partial birth abortion" in

particular, this wholesale mischaracterization of what is

necessarily involved in the D&X procedure and, thus, what

the Act supposedly proscribes is what has unquestionably,

at least in large part, inflamed public opinion. This, of

course, is the result of "partial birth abortion" having no

clear definition and, thus, no clear meaning.

But mischaracterization aside, the words of the Act could

not be more divergent from the Legislature's description of

what it purported to ban. The Act nowhere specifies that

the fetus must be intact, that it be delivered feet-first, that

only the head remain in the womb when delivery is halted,

that the legs and the lower trunk be outside the mother's

body, that the skull be punctured with a scissors, or that

the brains be sucked out with a vacuum in order to

collapse the skull. Instead, the Act is filled with vagaries

such as "partially vaginally delivers," "substantial portion,"

and "a procedure the physician . . . knows will kill the

fetus."

If the Legislature intended to ban only the D&X

procedure, it could easily have manifested that intent either

by specifically naming that procedure or by setting forth the

medical definition of D&X utilized by the ACOG, namely:

"(1) deliberate dilation of the cervix, usually over a sequence

of days; (2) instrumental conversion of the fetus to a

footling breech; (3) breech extraction of the body excepting

the head; and (4) partial evacuation of the intracranial

contents of a living fetus to effect vaginal delivery of a dead

but otherwise intact fetus." App. at 1328. We render no

opinion as to whether a statute explicitly prohibiting the

performance of a D&X or containing the ACOG definition

would pass constitutional muster. Cf. Women's Med'l Prof 'l

Corp. v. Voinovich, 130 F.3d 187, 190 (6th Cir. 1997)

(enjoining Ohio statute specifically prohibiting performance

of "a dilation and extraction procedure upon a pregnant

woman" because definition of procedure set forth in the

statute encompasses D&E procedure), cert. denied , 523

U.S. 1036 (1998); Planned Parenthood of Wis. v. Doyle, 162

F.3d 463, 471 (7th Cir. 1998) (commenting that "[t]he

21

singling out of the D&X procedure for anathematization

seems arbitrary to the point of irrationality"). We note only

that naming the procedure or utilizing clear medical

terminology to define that procedure for the physicians at

whom the Act is aimed would at least have indicated the

Legislature's supposed intent to simply ban the D&X.

There is simply no excuse for the failure of the

Legislature to have done so or for the incurably vague Act

which resulted from that failure. Indeed, we, as was the

District Court, are left to wonder whether the drafters chose

a path of deliberate ambiguity, coupled with public outrage

based largely on misinformation, in an attempt to proscribe

legitimate abortion practices. Cf. Eubanks, 28 F. Supp. 2d

at 1036 (in striking down a partial birth abortion statute,

the Court noted that "[t]he legislature focused directly on

protected activity in a manner which everyone knew might

be unconstitutional. The legislature could have passed a

statute of more limited reach and still achieve its supposed

objective. Instead, it decided to go farther. Indeed, as is

sometimes the case in controversial issues, the legislature

seems to have striven for, in Justice Frankfurter's words, a

`purposeful ambiguity.' ") (citation omitted).

The Act, pure and simple, is not susceptible much less

"readily susceptible" to a narrowing construction. To

narrow it to prohibit only the D&X procedure, as the

Legislature now says was the sole procedure it intended to

ban, would entail a complete rewriting, if not "brute force."

Unlike the Seventh Circuit, we decline to use such brute

force in an attempt to save the Act, and reject out of hand

that Court's observation that "courts do it all the time."

Hope Clinic v. Ryan, 195 F.3d 857, 865 (7th Cir. 1999) (en

banc), petition for cert. filed (U.S. Jan. 14, 2000) (Nos. 99-

1152, 1156). As the dissent in Hope Clinic so aptly stated,

it would be an act of "judicial hubris" to narrow the statute

to the D&X when the drafters of the statute decided not to

use that term, "preferring a vaguer term intended to be

broader."7 Id. at 866 (Posner, C.J., dissenting); see also

_________________________________________________________________

7. Numerous courts throughout the country have stuck down similarly

worded statutes after finding them unconstitutionally vague. See, e.g.,

Rhode Island Med'l Soc'y v. Whitehouse, 66 F. Supp. 2d 288, 310-12

22

Carhart v. Stenberg, 192 F.3d at 1150 (striking down

Nebraska's partial birth abortion statute and noting that

while court must give statute a construction that avoids

constitutional doubts, it "cannot, however, twist the words

of the law and give them a meaning that they cannot

reasonably bear").

2. The Act Creates an Undue Burden

In addition to finding the Act void for vagueness, a

finding with which we wholeheartedly agree, the District

Court determined that, under Roe and Casey, the Act

unduly burdened a woman's constitutional right to obtain

an abortion because: (1) the language of the Act is so broad

that it covers many conventional methods of abortion; (2)

the Act contains no health exception, constraining the

physician from performing a procedure which, in his or her

discretion, would preserve the health of the woman; and (3)

the Act's exception for the life of the woman is inadequate.

The Legislature contends that the District Court erred

because Roe and Casey do not apply, and, even if they do,

the Act creates no undue burden. We will address only the

first ground found by the District Court, and we do so

because the reasons which support that ground so closely

track the reasons which compelled our conclusion that the

Act is void for vagueness.

A woman has a constitutional right under the Due

Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to choose to

_________________________________________________________________

(D.R.I. 1999) (holding partial birth abortion statute to be

unconstitutionally vague); Richmond Med'l Ctr. for Women v. Gilmore, 55

F. Supp. 2d 441, 493-500 (E.D. Va. 1999) (same); Causeway Med'l Suite

v. Foster, 43 F. Supp. 2d 604, 615-19 (E.D. La. 1999) (same); Evans v.

Kelley, 977 F. Supp. 1283, 1304-11 (E.D. Mich. 1997) (same); see also

Women's Med'l Prof 'l Corp. v. Voinovich, 130 F.3d 187 (6th Cir. 1997)

(finding statute explicitly prohibiting the dilation and extraction method

of abortion to be impermissibly vague because it covered D&E procedure

as well), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1036 (1998); but see Hope Clinic v. Ryan,

195 F.3d 857, 869 (7th Cir. 1999) (rejecting vagueness challenges to

Illinois and Wisconsin partial birth abortion statutes but recommending

that the district court enter "precautionary injunctions" prohibiting the

statutes from applying to D&E or induction abortions), petition for cert.

filed (U.S. Jan. 14, 2000) (No. 99-1152).

23

terminate her pregnancy. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,

153 (1973). While affirming the essential holding in Roe

that a state may not prohibit a woman from choosing to

terminate her pregnancy prior to viability, the Supreme

Court subsequently rejected the rigidity of Roe 's trimester

framework. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v.

Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 870 (1992). Instead, the Casey Court

determined that before viability, the state may regulate

abortion but only insofar as it does not create an undue

burden on a woman's ability to choose to have an abortion.

See Casey, 505 U.S. at 874 (stating that "[o]nly where a

state regulation imposes an undue burden on a woman's

ability to make this decision does the power of the State

reach into the heart of the liberty protected by the Due

Process Clause"). In evaluating state regulations, the Court

explained that "[a]n undue burden exists, and therefore a

provision of law is invalid, if its purpose or effect is to place

a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an

abortion before the fetus attains viability." Id. at 878.

Although the state may freely regulate, and even proscribe,

abortion after viability, any such restriction must still

contain an exception "where it is necessary, in appropriate

medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or health

of the mother." Id. at 879 (citing Roe, 410 U.S. at 164-65).

Before examining whether the Act creates an undue

burden, and finding that it surely does, we will briefly

address the Legislature's threshold argument that Roe and

Casey do not apply to New Jersey's "partial-birth abortion"

statute because: (1) the applicable test is that enunciated in

United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987), and

plaintiffs' facial challenge fails to meet Salerno's

requirement that no set of circumstances exists under

which the Act would be valid; and (2) "partial-birth

abortion" is not a Casey-protected abortion procedure, but

rather is tantamount to infanticide. We join numerous

other courts in rejecting both arguments.

First, citing Salerno, the Legislature asserts that in order

to mount a facial challenge to an Act, plaintiffs must

establish that no set of circumstances exists under which

the Act would be valid. See Salerno, 481 U.S. at 745.

According to the Legislature, plaintiffs cannot meet this

24

burden because, as narrowly construed -- assuming it

could be narrowly construed -- the Act is constitutional as

applied to them given that they do not perform the D&X

procedure.

But as several courts, including our own, have noted, the

Casey Court muted the Salerno requirement in the abortion

context by stating that a statute regulating abortion is

facially invalid if "in a large fraction of the cases in which

[the statute] is relevant, it will operate as a substantial

obstacle to a woman's choice to undergo an abortion."

Casey, 505 U.S. at 895. On remand to this Court, we

immediately recognized that the Supreme Court set a"new

standard for facial challenges to pre--viability abortion

laws" by requiring only that "a plaintiff show an abortion

regulation would be an undue burden `in a large fraction of

the cases.' " Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v.

Casey, 14 F.3d 848, 863 n.21 (3d Cir. 1994) (citing Casey,

505 U.S. at 895, and noting that Salerno was the "old

rule"). Numerous courts have recognized the substitution of

the Casey standard for the Salerno test. See, e.g., Women's

Med'l Prof 'l Corp. v. Voinovich, 130 F.3d 187, 194-97 (6th

Cir. 1997) (stating that "[a]lthough Casey does not

expressly purport to overrule Salerno, in effect it does"),

cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1036 (1998); Jane L. v. Bangerter,

102 F.3d 1112, 1116 (10th Cir. 1996) (noting that Supreme

Court did not apply Salerno in Casey and that "the proper

test after Casey is the `undue burden' standard applied by

the Court in that case"), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1274 (1997);

Planned Parenthood, Sioux Falls Clinic v. Miller, 63 F.3d

1452, 1456-58 (8th Cir. 1995)("We choose to follow what

[Casey] actually did -- rather than what it failed to say --

and apply the undue-burden test. It is true that the Court

did not expressly reject Salerno's application in abortion

cases, but it is equally true that the Court did not apply

Salerno in Casey."), cert. denied , 517 U.S. 1174 (1996); but

see Causeway Med'l Suite v. Ieyoub, 109 F.3d 1096, 1102-

04 (5th Cir.) (finding it "ill-advised" to assume that the

Supreme Court abandoned Salerno in Casey but

invalidating statute under either standard), cert. denied,

522 U.S. 943 (1997).

Thus, in order to mount a facial challenge to an abortion

regulation, a plaintiff need not establish that no set of

25

circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid.

Rather, a plaintiff must show that an abortion regulation

would be an undue burden in a large fraction of the cases

in which that regulation is relevant.

Second, the Legislature contends that Roe and Casey are

inapplicable because they apply only to aborting the

"unborn," while the Act attempts to prohibit"the deliberate

killing of a living human being who has almost completed

the process of birth." Appellant Br. at 45. Because, the

argument goes, the Act pertains to fetuses that are in the

process of being "born" and that are more outside than

inside the uterus when they expire, the procedure is more

akin to infanticide than abortion. Indeed, the Legislature

stresses, the Supreme Court in Roe deliberately left open

the possibility of protecting "partially born" human beings

when it declined to review a Texas statutory provision

criminalizing "destroy[ing] the vitality or life in a child in a

state of being born and before actual birth." Roe, 410 U.S.

at 118 n.1.

The Legislature's argument that Roe and Casey are

inapplicable to "partial-birth" abortion procedures because

such procedures are infanticide rather than abortion is

based on semantic machinations, irrational line-drawing,

and an obvious attempt to inflame public opinion instead of

logic or medical evidence. Positing an "unborn" versus

"partially born" distinction, the Legislature would have us

accept, and the public believe, that during a "partial-birth

abortion" the fetus is in the process of being"born" at the

time of its demise. It is not. A woman seeking an abortion

is plainly not seeking to give birth.

Moreover, that the life of the fetus is terminated when a

"substantial portion" has passed through the cervix and is

in the vaginal canal, does not without more transform an

abortion procedure into infanticide. Again, the medical

evidence clearly indicates that in many conventional

abortion procedures the fetus may be killed, i.e. the heart

ceases beating, when a substantial portion of the fetus

(whether it be disarticulated limbs or part of the body of the

fetus) is in the vagina and a portion remains in the uterus.

In what can only be described as a desperate attempt to

circumvent over twenty-five years of abortion

26

jurisprudence, the Legislature would draw a line based

upon the location in the woman's body where the fetus

expires. Establishing the cervix as the demarcation line

between abortion and infanticide is nonsensical on its face

as well as inaccurate because that line may be crossed in

any number of abortion procedures which the Legislature

concedes are constitutionally protected. While there are

unquestionably numerous ethical, philosophical, and moral

issues surrounding abortion, we are unpersuaded that

these issues -- or our legal analysis -- should turn on

where in the woman's body the fetus expires during an

abortion.

Finally, the Legislature's reliance on the fact that the

Supreme Court in Roe did not review a provision of the

Texas Penal Code entitled "Destroying unborn child" is

misplaced. In Roe, the Supreme Court noted in a footnote

that numerous provisions of the Texas Penal Code,

including the above mentioned provision, were not

challenged by the parties. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 118 n.1.

The fact that the Supreme Court did not sua sponte review

a provision no party asked it to review says nothing about

its position on that provision or on this issue.

In any event, the Legislature neglected to cite the

remainder of the Texas statutory provision which clearly

illustrates its inapplicability to the situation at hand. In

full, that provision states that:

Whoever shall during parturition of the mother destroy

the vitality or life of a child in a state of being born and

before actual birth, which child would otherwise have

been born alive, shall be confined in the penitentiary

for life or for not less than five years.

Roe, 410 U.S. at 118 n.1 (quoting Article 1195 of Chapter

9 of Title 15 of the Texas Penal Code)(emphasis added). By

its own terms, then, the Texas provision applies explicitly to

killing the fetus during parturition, or during the process of

giving birth, not during an abortion procedure.

Furthermore, the provision applies only where the child

would otherwise be born alive. Absolutely nothing in the

Act before us restricts its application to circumstances

where the child would otherwise be born alive.

27

Quite simply, the one thing that is clear about the Act is

that the drafters sought to restrict abortion. The Act

explicitly states that " `partial-birth abortion' means an

abortion" encompassing the conduct specified in the Act.

N.J.S.A. S 2A:65A-6(e). Indeed, if the abortion procedure the

Legislature now tells us it purported to ban were

tantamount to infanticide, it would have been criminalized

in the Act itself or in State homicide statutes, and the

women upon whom this procedure is performed would not

have been immunized from liability. The Legislature's

attempt to label the Act a birth, instead of an abortion,

regulation is nothing more than an effort to cloud the

issues and avoid clear precedent. As an abortion regulation,

the Act is subject to the analytical framework of Roe and

Casey.

Applying the principles of Roe and Casey , it is clear that

the Act is unconstitutional because it creates an undue

burden on a woman's right to obtain an abortion. As Casey

teaches, an abortion regulation creates an undue burden,

and hence is invalid, "if its purpose or effect is to place a

substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an

abortion before the fetus attains viability." Casey, 505 U.S.

at 878. The Act erects a substantial obstacle because, as

already discussed in great detail, it is so vague as to be

easily construed to ban even the safest, most common and

readily available conventional pre- and post-viability

abortion procedures. Separate and apart from whether

such a widespread proscription was intended by the

drafters, because physicians are unable to determine

precisely what the Act bans, they will be chilled from

performing suction and curettage, D&E and induction

abortions in order to avoid the risk of license revocation

and fines. The Court has long recognized that ambiguous

meanings cause citizens to " `steer far wider of the unlawful

zone' . . . than if the boundaries of the forbidden areas were

clearly marked." Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 372 (1964)

(citation omitted). Indeed, Drs. Weiss, Wallace, and Holmes

testified that they would "stop performing all abortions" if

the Act were to go into effect because they were unsure of

28

what conduct would fall within its confines. See Verniero,

41 F. Supp. 2d at 499.8

And if physicians who continued to perform abortions

were to take steps to avoid the reach of the Act by, for

example, killing the fetus by insertion of a toxic substance

into the uterus or limiting their practices to hysterectomies

and hysterotomies, the attendant health risks to women

would significantly increase. Dr. Weiss testified that

injecting a toxic substance such as digitalis or a high

concentration of potassium into the heart of the fetus to

ensure its demise before it is removed from the womb is

usually not done because of the increased health risks to

the woman. See App. at 484. Such a procedure requires

injecting a sizeable needle either through the cervix and

into the uterus or through the abdomen into the uterus. In

addition, because the fetus is relatively small and

oftentimes shifting, it is difficult, even with the aid of

ultrasound, to inject the substance into the heart of the

fetus. Such a procedure "increase[s] the chance of

damaging the woman, increase[s] the risk of infection and

even potentially increase[s] the risk of inducing or

instill[ing] toxic substances into her." Id. Moreover, as the

District Court found, injection of a toxic substance carries

the risk of hemorrhage and is contraindicated for women

who are obese. Verniero, 41 F. Supp. 2d at 500.

Performing a D&E by disarticulating the fetus while it is

completely within the uterus and then waiting for the

heartbeat to cease in order to avoid the tentacles of the Act

would also increase the health risk to the woman by

increasing the length of the procedure. Moreover, as Dr.

Weiss testified, "[t]he last thing [a doctor] would like to do

is disarticulate an advanced fetus and leave it in the uterus

because that would run the risk of causing additional

damage to the woman [due to sharp edges of bone

potentially perforating the uterus]." Id. at 486.

_________________________________________________________________

8. And, of course, were physicians in New Jersey to stop performing

these methods of abortion, women would be forced to go elsewhere to

obtain procedures to which they are constitutionally entitled. Not only

would this interfere with a woman's right to privacy and her relationship

with her doctor, but it could create a wholly unnecessary risk to the

woman's health or life due to delay.

29

Finally, aside from the sheer absurdity of performing only

hysterotomies and hysterectomies in order to avoid the Act,

those procedures carry an enhanced risk of morbidity and

mortality to the woman due to the incidence of hemorrhage.

See Verniero, 41 F. Supp. 2d at 485. In addition, a

hysterectomy renders the woman sterile. Absent an

independent reason such as cervical cancer to perform

these procedures, they are, therefore, rarely used as

abortion techniques.

The increased risk of injury or death to the woman by

attempting to ensure fetal demise in utero, or sterilization in

the case of hysterectomies, clearly constitutes an undue

burden. Indeed, the District Court found -- afinding

certainly not clearly erroneous -- that the D&X may be a

relatively safer second trimester procedure because it

involves fewer entries into the uterus, thereby creating

fewer risks of cervical laceration and uterine perforation.

See Verniero, 41 F. Supp. 2d at 485.

In sum, the Act's chilling effect on a woman's ability to

obtain a conventional and constitutionally permissible

method of abortion, coupled with the attendant health

risks, creates an undue burden under Casey and, thus,

renders the Act unconstitutional.9 In so finding, we need

_________________________________________________________________

9. Our conclusion is consistent with those of numerous other courts

which have struck down similarly worded partial birth abortion statutes

because they created an undue burden. See, e.g. , Little Rock Family

Planning Services v. Jegley, 192 F.3d 794, 798 (8th Cir. 1999) (holding

Arkansas's partial birth abortion statute unconstitutional because it

created an undue burden by encompassing D&E and suction curettage

procedures); Carhart v. Stenberg, 192 F.3d 1142, 1151 (8th Cir. 1999)

(holding Nebraska's partial birth abortion statute to be unconstitutional

because it prohibited most common second trimester abortions, thereby

creating undue burden), cert. granted in part , 120 S. Ct. 865, 68

U.S.L.W. 3338, 68 U.S.L.W. 3449 (Jan. 14, 2000) (No. 99-830); Planned

Parenthood of Greater Iowa v. Miller, 195 F.3d 386, 388 (8th Cir. 1999)

(holding Iowa's partial birth abortion statute unconstitutional because it

banned D&E, and in some circumstances suction curettage, abortions,

thereby creating an undue burden); Richmond Med'l Center for Women v.

Gilmore, 55 F. Supp. 2d 441, 487 (E.D. Va. 1999) (concluding that

Virginia's partial birth abortion ban created undue burden because it

prohibited D&E abortions); Eubanks v. Stengel , 28 F. Supp. 2d 1024,

30

not and, thus, do not discuss the Act's lack of a health

exception or whether its life exception is adequate.

B. Standing, Ripeness and Abstention

Having determined what the Legislature describes as the

"central issue in this case" -- the scope of the Act -- we

turn our attention to three of the issues which, the

Legislature argues, themselves turn on that determination:

standing, ripeness and abstention. The Legislature

contends that plaintiffs do not have standing to raise their

constitutional challenges, that the matter is not ripe for

review, and that the District Court should have abstained

from evaluating a state statute before it has been

interpreted by the state courts. We disagree.

1. Standing

The Legislature contends that plaintiffs lack standing

because they do not, by their own admission, perform the

D&X procedure, the only method which the Legislature now

posits is banned by the Act. Therefore, according to the

Legislature, plaintiffs would not sustain any injury were the

Act to be enforced.

The District Court found that plaintiffs had standing to

challenge the Act because the Act encompasses the

conventional methods of abortion plaintiffs currently

perform and, thus, they would be exposed to civil liability

and license revocation. In addition, the District Court

stressed well-established precedent for the proposition that

abortion providers have third party standing to assert the

rights of their patients in the face of governmental intrusion

into the abortion decision in order to determine whether

_________________________________________________________________

1035 (W.D. Ky. 1998) (finding Kentucky partial birth abortion ban

created undue burden because it prohibited D&E procedure); see also

Women's Med'l Prof 'l Corp. v. Voinovich, 130 F.3d 187 (6th Cir. 1997)

(holding that statute explicitly prohibiting D&X procedure created undue

burden), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1036 (1998); but see Hope Clinic v. Ryan,

195 F.3d 857 (7th Cir. 1999) (finding no undue burden in partial birth

abortion statute, but only after limiting statute to cover only D&X

procedure), petition for cert. filed (U.S. Jan. 14, 2000)(Nos. 99-1152,

1156).

31

such interference would constitute an undue burden. We

exercise plenary review over the District Court's

determination. See Conte Bros. Automotive, Inc. v. Quaker

State-Slick 50, Inc., 165 F.3d 221, 224 (3d Cir. 1998).

In order to meet the constitutional requirements of

standing which emanate from Article III of the Constitution,

plaintiffs were required to allege and ultimately prove that:

(1) they have suffered or imminently will suffer an"injury in

fact"; (2) the injury is "fairly traceable" to the defendant's

conduct; and (3) the requested relief is likely to redress the

injury. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't , 523 U.S. 83,

103 (1998); see also Northeastern Fla. Chapter of the

Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of Jacksonville,

508 U.S. 656, 663-64 (1993).

As we have already discussed in much detail, the Act is

so vague as to be impervious to a readily susceptible

narrowing construction, effectuating a ban on the

conventional types of abortions currently performed by

plaintiffs. Given that the Act is not subject to a narrowing

construction, it occasions an imminent "injury in fact"

upon plaintiffs because, as written, it threatens them with

severe civil penalties, namely, license revocation and a

$25,000 fine.10 In addition, plaintiffs have satisfied the

_________________________________________________________________

10. The District Court found Planned Parenthood had standing for

essentially the same reasons as the plaintiff physicians, i.e. that it

provides constitutionally protected abortions which may be disallowed by

the broad and vague Act, subjecting it to license revocation. The

Legislature asserts that Planned Parenthood does not have standing

because no evidence was introduced at the hearing concerning the

abortions allegedly performed at Planned Parenthood. See Appellants' Br.

at 37 n.18; Reply Br. at 15 n.17. Plaintiffs point to the declaration

submitted to the District Court in support of the motion for preliminary

restraints certifying that Planned Parenthood is a licensed ambulatory

health care facility which performs abortions. See Appellees' Br. at 55

n.28. We need not address this argument, buried within and argued

exclusively in footnotes, because it is uncontested that the plaintiff

physicians perform abortions and, therefore, at least they have standing

to assert the claims. See, e.g., Doe v. Bolton , 410 U.S. 179, 189 (1973)

(declining to decide whether additional appellants have standing because

"the issues are sufficiently and adequately presented by" appellants with

standing).

32

second and third prongs of the standing inquiry: the harm

is more than "fairly traceable" to the State's enforcement of

the Act, and the requested relief, a permanent injunction,

will clearly redress the injury.

Moreover, the District Court correctly concluded that

plaintiffs had standing to bring an undue burden challenge

on behalf of their patients whose abortion rights were

allegedly unconstitutionally impinged. Pointing to the close

relationship between a physician and his or her patients,

privacy interests, and imminent mootness concerns, the

Supreme Court explicitly held that "it generally is

appropriate to allow a physician to assert the rights of

women patients as against governmental interference with

the abortion decision[.]" Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106,

118 (1976). Indeed, in Casey, where, it should be

remembered, the Court first articulated the undue burden

standard, the challenge to state abortion restrictions was

brought by abortion clinics and physicians who performed

abortions on behalf of their patients. See Planned

Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833

(1992).

Accordingly, plaintiffs had standing to bring their claims.

2. Ripeness

The Legislature next argues that the challenge to the Act,

filed the day the Act was to have become effective and

before the Act had been interpreted by the state courts or

enforcement agencies, was not ripe for review. Moreover,

the Legislature argues, as it did with regard to standing,

that if construed narrowly, the Act does not cover the

procedures that plaintiffs perform and, thus, there is no

danger that it will be enforced against them. The District

Court rejected these arguments and found the matters ripe

for review. Again, we agree.

Intertwined with Article III's requirement that a party

suffer injury or be in danger of imminent injury, is the

ripeness doctrine which seeks to "prevent the courts,

through the avoidance of premature adjudication, from

entangling themselves in abstract disagreements." Artway

v. Attorney Gen. of N.J., 81 F.3d 1235, 1246-47 (3d Cir.

1996) (quoting Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148

33

(1967), overruled on other grounds, Califano v. Sanders, 430

U.S. 99, 105 (1977)). To determine whether a claim is ripe,

a court must weigh: "(1) the hardship to the parties of

withholding court consideration; and (2) the fitness of the

issues for judicial review." Id. at 1247.

Federal court review is not foreclosed merely because

there is a pre-enforcement challenge to a state statute.

Indeed, in both Casey and Colautti, the Supreme Court

entertained constitutional challenges to state abortion

statutes which were filed before the statutes took effect.

See, e.g., Casey, 505 U.S. at 845; Colautti v. Franklin, 439

U.S. 379, 383 (1979), overruled in part on other grounds,

Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989).

This matter was ripe for review because there would have

been hardship to the parties had review been withheld and

the issues were fit for review. With reference to the latter,

a comprehensive factual record was amply developed

during a four-day hearing, allowing the District Court to

fully delineate the legal issues. See Artway, 81 F.3d at

1249 (noting that the "principal consideration" in deciding

whether the issue is fit for review is "whether the record is

factually adequate to enable the court to make the

necessary legal determinations").

With reference to the hardship to the parties of

withholding review component of the ripeness test, and as

discussed with reference to standing, even though the

plaintiffs do not perform the D&X procedure, the threat

that the Act would have been enforced against plaintiffs

was credible and not speculative. As in the criminal

context, "[w]hen the plaintiff has alleged an intention to

engage in a course of conduct arguably affected with a

constitutional interest, but proscribed by a statute, and

there exists a credible threat of prosecution thereunder, he

`should not be required to await and undergo a criminal

prosecution as the sole means of seeking relief.' " Babbitt v.

United Farm Workers Nat'l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 298 (1979)

(citation omitted). Similarly, plaintiffs have performed in the

past, and intend to perform in the future, concededly

constitutionally protected procedures such as the D&E. The

Act fairly easily can be read to prohibit those

constitutionally protected procedures, and plaintiffs

34

received no assurances that it would not be enforced

against them if they performed such procedures. They were

entitled to know what they could not do. Cf. Virginia v.

American Booksellers Ass'n, Inc., 484 U.S. 383, 393 (1988)

(stating that it was "not troubled" by pre-enforcement

challenge to state statute because "[t]he State has not

suggested that the newly enacted law will not be enforced"

and "plaintiffs have alleged an actual and well-founded fear

that the law will be enforced against them").

The District Court did not err in finding the challenge to

the Act ripe for review.11

3. Abstention

The Legislature argues that the District Court should

have but did not abstain pursuant to Railroad Comm'n of

Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941). Essentially, the

argument goes, the District Court should not have

undertaken to analyze the Act under the United States

Constitution because the Act has not yet been interpreted

by the New Jersey courts. According to the Legislature,

interpretation of the Act by the state courts, the courts

empowered to render binding interpretations of state

statutes, could significantly narrow the scope of the Act,

thereby eliminating, or at least limiting, the scope of the

federal constitutional concerns raised here. While on its

face the Act may seem ambiguous, the Legislature

continues, New Jersey courts frequently perform"judicial

surgery" to narrowly interpret statutes to relieve

constitutional concerns. The doctrine of Pullman

abstention, the Legislature concludes, dictates that the

state courts be given the opportunity to do just that before

a federal court swoops in and strikes down a statute.

The District Court carefully considered whether it should

abstain under Pullman and concluded that abstention was

not warranted because the Act was so vague that it was not

_________________________________________________________________

11. The Legislature's contention that the matter is not ripe for review

because a federal court should not attempt to decipher a state statute

without the benefit of interpretation by the state courts is better framed

as an argument for abstention and will be addressed in our discussion

of abstention.

35

susceptible to a state court interpretation which would

render unnecessary, or substantially limit, the federal

constitutional question. See Verniero, 41 F. Supp. 2d at

488-90. Yet once again, we agree.

The obligation of a federal court to adjudicate claims

which fall within its jurisdiction has been deemed by the

Supreme Court to be "virtually unflagging." New Orleans

Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of City of New Orleans , 491 U.S.

350, 359 (1989) (citations omitted). It has long been said

that "[federal courts] have no more right to decline the

exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that

which is not given. The one or the other would be treason

to the Constitution." Id. at 358 (quoting Cohens v. Virginia,

6 Wheat. 264, 404 (1821)). This is because "Congress, and

not the Judiciary, defines the scope of federal jurisdiction

within the constitutionally permissible bounds." Id. at 359.

Abstention is an "extraordinary and narrow exception to

the duty of a District Court to adjudicate a controversy

properly before it" and one which should be invoked "only

in the exceptional circumstances." Colorado River Water

Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 813

(1976) (citation omitted); see also City of Houston v. Hill,

482 U.S. 451, 467 (1987) (stating that "[a]bstention is, of

course, the exception and not the rule"); Marks v. Stinson,

19 F.3d 873, 881 (3d Cir. 1994) (same); City of Pittsburgh,

757 F.2d at 45 (same).

One type of abstention, commonly referred to as Pullman

abstention, applies "in cases presenting a federal

constitutional issue which might be mooted or presented in

a different posture by a state court determination of

pertinent state law." Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 814

(citation omitted). In other words, abstention under Pullman

"is appropriate where an unconstrued state statute is

susceptible of a construction by the state judiciary`which

might avoid in whole or in part the necessity for federal

constitutional adjudication, or at least materially change

the nature of the problem.' " Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132,

147 (1976) (citation omitted). The purpose of abstaining is

twofold: (1) to avoid a premature constitutional adjudication

which could ultimately be displaced by a state court

adjudication of state law; and (2) to avoid "needless friction

36

with state policies." Pullman, 312 U.S. at 500. While these

are compelling considerations, we reiterate that Pullman

abstention should be rarely invoked. See Artway , 81 F.3d

at 1270 (recognizing that Pullman abstention is an

"exception to the general rule that federal courts must hear

cases properly brought within their jurisdiction").

Before a federal court may abstain under Pullman , three

"exceptional circumstances" must be present. First, there

must be "uncertain issues of state law underlying the

federal constitutional claims." Presbytery of N.J. of the

Orthodox Presbyterian Church v. Whitman, 99 F.3d 101,

106 (3d Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1155 (1997).

Second, the state law issues must be amenable to a state

court interpretation which could "obviate the need to

adjudicate or substantially narrow the scope of the federal

constitutional claim." Id. Third, it must be that "an

erroneous construction of state law by the federal court

would disrupt important state policies." Id. If all three

circumstances are present, the District Court is then

required to determine, in the Court's discretion,"whether

abstention is appropriate by weighing such factors as the

availability of an adequate state remedy, the length of time

the litigation has been pending, and the impact of delay on

the litigants." Artway, 81 F.3d at 1270.

We agree with the District Court that, even though the

state courts have not had the opportunity to interpret the

Act, all of the "exceptional circumstances" requisite for

Pullman abstention are simply not present. Arguably

inherent in plaintiffs' vagueness challenge to the Act is that

there is an uncertain question of state law, namely, what

procedures are covered by the Act. The Supreme Court has

explicitly held, however, that "not every vagueness

challenge to an uninterpreted state statute or regulation

constitutes a proper case for abstention." Procunier v.

Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 401 (1974), overruled on other

grounds, Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401 (1989). In any

event, we need not reach the first and third "exceptional

circumstances" because it is clear that the second

circumstance is not present in this case.

At the risk of redundancy, the Act is so vague that it is

not amenable to a state court interpretation which would

37

render unnecessary or substantially narrow the

constitutional question at issue. Cf. Colautti , 439 U.S. at

392 n.9 (refusing to abstain from deciding vagueness

challenge to abortion regulation because of "the extent of

the vagueness that afflicts [the statute]"). We have

previously noted a leading commentator's observation that

the Supreme Court's "amenability" standard establishes a

"fairly high threshold requiring a `substantial possibility'

that a state interpretation would obviate the need for a

federal constitutional decision." Artway, 81 F.3d at 1271

n.34 (citing to Erwin Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction

692-93 (1994)). "If the statute is not obviously susceptible

of a limiting construction, then even if the statute has

`never [been] interpreted by a state tribunal . . . it is the

duty of the federal court to exercise its properly invoked

jurisdiction.' " Hill, 482 U.S. at 468 (quoting Harman v.

Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528, 535 (1965)).

Abstaining to allow the New Jersey state courts to

interpret the Act would be fruitless because those courts,

even applying "judicial surgery," are not empowered to

completely rewrite statutes. See Hamilton Amusement Ctr.,

156 N.J. at 280 (holding that New Jersey courts may use

" `judicial surgery' to excise a constitutional defect" but the

statute must be "reasonably susceptible to such a

construction"). For the same reasons that we will not

rewrite the Act, we have every confidence that the New

Jersey courts would likewise refuse to do so and would

likely say that it is up to the Legislature to take the Act

back and do it over.

Given how vast the reach of the Act and how vague and

ambiguous its terms, the entire Act is permeated with

defects of constitutional dimension, defects "judicial

surgery" could not cure without a total rewrite. There is, in

other words, nothing to "excise" but the Act itself. As we

have discussed throughout this opinion, and it bears

repetition one last time, the Act could reasonably be

interpreted to prohibit most conventional abortion

procedures. As such, it provides little guidance to

physicians who are attempting to tailor their conduct to

avoid the Act's prohibitions, performance of which could

strip them of their professional licenses. No narrowing

38

construction has even been suggested by the Legislature,

aside from its conclusory assertion that the Act covers only

the D&X procedure, an assertion completely unsupported

by the Act itself. Moreover, given the numerous meanings

that could be attributed to the Act's terms, as well as the

inherent uncertainty of terms such as "substantial portion,"

the Act is simply not susceptible to, much less, readily

susceptible to, a limiting reading by any court, much less

a reading which would bring it within the confines of the

Constitution. Because the Act cannot be reasonably

interpreted to obviate or substantially narrow the federal

constitutional question, the second exceptional

circumstance required for Pullman abstention is lacking.

Not only are all of the requisite exceptional circumstances

absent, but equitable considerations, such as the effect of

delay on the litigants or the public interest, also weigh

against abstention. Cf. Chez Sez III Corp. v. Township of

Union, 945 F.2d 628, 633-34 (3d Cir. 1991) ("When a facial

challenge is involved, abstention is generally not

appropriate because `extensive adjudications, under a

variety of factual situations, [would be required to bring the

statute] within the bounds of permissible constitutional

certainty[.]' ") (quoting Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 378

(1964)), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 907 (1992). Unsure of what

conduct the statute encompasses, physicians would cease

performing conventional abortions such as D&Es for fear of

running afoul of the Act. Thus, if the federal court were to

abstain while cases brought under the Act wend their way

through the state courts, the rights of women to obtain

constitutionally protected abortions would be chilled.

Moreover, such limitations on the abortion procedures

available to women could have dramatic and irreversible

health risks to pregnant women. See, e.g., Verniero, 41 F.

Supp. 2d at 502 (detailing health risks attendant to women

forced to carry pregnancies to term such as liver or kidney

disease, severe hypertension, cardiac conditions, diabetes,

blindness or self-harm due to exacerbated schizophrenia).

The Supreme Court's discussion in Baggett is

illuminating. In Baggett, state employees challenged a

Washington statute requiring loyalty oaths as being

unconstitutionally vague. See Baggett v. Bullitt , 377 U.S.

39

360, 361 (1964). The District Court abstained and

dismissed the case, holding that adjudication was

inappropriate in the absence of a state court interpretation

of the statute as state court interpretation might resolve the

constitutional issues. See id. at 366. The Supreme Court

reversed. It pointed out that, unlike in other cases in which

vagueness was a concern, the Baggett plaintiffs "cannot

understand the required promise, cannot define the range

of activities in which they might engage in the future, and

do not want to foreswear doing all that is literally or

arguably within the purview of the vague terms." Id. at 378.

As such, the Court opined, "[i]t is fictional to believe that

anything less than extensive adjudications, under the

impact of a variety of factual situations, would bring the

oath within the bounds of permissible constitutional

certainty." Id. Abstention, it concluded,"does not require

this." Id.

Likewise, in this case, physicians cannot understand

what conduct is permissible or prohibited under the Act.

Because the Act is subject to multiple interpretations and

can encompass numerous procedures, extensive

adjudication in the state courts would be necessary to

clarify the Act and narrow its scope even assuming, with

little or no confidence, that that could be done at all. In the

meantime, physicians would drastically limit their abortions

practices to avoid the reach of the Act and a woman's

constitutional right to obtain an abortion would be

impermissibly chilled. See Hill, 482 U.S. at 467-68 (noting

that "to force the plaintiff who has commenced a federal

action to suffer the delay of state-court proceedings might

itself effect the impermissible chilling of the very

constitutional right he seeks to protect") (quoting Zwickler

v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 252 (1967)). The District Court did

not abuse its discretion when it refused to abstain. 12

_________________________________________________________________

12. On November 19, 1999, the Supreme Court of New Jersey adopted

Rule 2:12A permitting the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit to

certify questions of state law to the Supreme Court of New Jersey. Rule

2:12A became effective on January 3, 2000. See Notice to the Bar: Rule

Adopted on Certification of Questions of Law, 8 N.J. Lawyer 2560 (Dec.

6, 1999). While the Legislature brought this rule to the attention of the

Court in a letter submitted pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 28(j), it did not

40

specifically request that this Court utilize the rule, nor did it set

forth

proposed questions for certification or argue why certification would be

appropriate in this case.

In any event, certification would be fruitless in light of the multiple

problems which permeate the Act. As the Supreme Court in Hill opined

when the possibility of certification was raised,"[a] federal court may

not

properly ask a state court if it would care in effect to rewrite a

statute."

Id. at 471.

13. Given this disposition, we need not reach plaintiffs' arguments that

the Act discriminates against women in violation of the Equal Protection

Clause and that the Act does not serve a legitimate state interest.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of

the District Court.13

41

ALITO, Circuit Judge, concurring in the judgment.

I do not join Judge Barry's opinion, which was never

necessary and is now obsolete. That opinion fails to discuss

the one authority that dictates the result in this appeal,

namely, the Supreme Court's decision in Stenberg v.

Carhart, 2000 WL 825889 (U.S. June 28, 2000). Our

responsibility as a lower court is to follow and apply

controlling Supreme Court precedent. I write briefly to

explain why Carhart requires us to affirm the decision of

the District Court in this case. This is an appeal by the New

Jersey State Legislature from a decision of the United

States District Court for the District of New Jersey holding

the New Jersey Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 1997,

2A:65A-5 et seq., unconstitutional and permanently

enjoining enforcement of the Act. Planned Parenthood of

Central New Jersey v. Verniero, 41 F. Supp. 2nd 478

(D.N.J. 1998). The New Jersey statute closely resembles

statutes enacted in recent years in many other states.

On January 14, 2000, the Supreme Court granted

certiorari to review the decision in Carhart v. Stenberg, 192

F.3d 1142 (8th Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 120 S.Ct. 865

(2000), which presented the question of the

constitutionality of a similar Nebraska statute. The

Supreme Court recently held that the Nebraska statute is

unconstitutional. Stenberg v. Carhart, 2000 WL 825889

(U.S. June 28, 2000).

The Court based its decision on two grounds. First, in

Part II-A of its opinion, the Court held that the Nebraska

law is unconstitutional because it lacks an exception for

the preservation of the health of the mother. See 2000 WL

825889, *9-*14. Second, in Part II-B of its opinion, the

Court held that the Nebraska statute is unconstitutional

because it imposes an undue burden on a woman's ability

to choose the method most commonly used for second

trimester abortions, the "dilation and evacuation" (D & E)

method. See 2000 WL 825889, *14-*18.

Under Carhart, the decision of the District Court must be

affirmed. First, the New Jersey statute, like its Nebraska

counterpart, lacks an exception for the preservation of the

health of the mother. Without such an exception, the New

Jersey statute is irreconcilable with Part II-A of Carhart.

42

Second, the Supreme Court's holding in Part II-B of

Carhart is also applicable here. As noted, in that portion of

its opinion, the Court held that the Nebraska statute

applied, not only to the "dilation and extraction" or D & X

procedure, but also to the more commonly used D & E

procedure. The wording of the relevant provisions of the

Nebraska statute is nearly identical to that of the New

Jersey statute. Thus, the Supreme Court's holding in Part

II-B of its opinion in Carhart must be regarded as

controlling in this case.

In light of this interpretation of the New Jersey statute,

the Legislature's argument that the plaintiffs lack standing

must fail. As noted above, the New Jersey statute must be

interpreted, in light of Carhart, as applying to the D & E

procedure, and the plaintiff physicians in this case perform

that form of abortion. The Legislature's argument that this

case is not ripe because the New Jersey statute has not

been authoritatively interpreted by the state courts or state

enforcement officials must also fail. In view of the

interpretation in Carhart, there is no reason to wait for

interpretation by state officials or judges.

In a post-Carhart filing, the New Jersey Legislature has

urged us to certify questions concerning the interpretation

of the New Jersey statute to the state supreme court. In

Carhart, however, the Supreme Court of the United States

turned down a similar request for certification by the

Attorney General of Nebraska. 2000 WL 825889, *18. The

decision of the Supreme Court of the United States to deny

certification in Carhart must be regarded as controlling

here, both with respect to the Legislature's request for

certification and with respect to its closely related argument

that the District Court erred in refusing to abstain

pursuant to Railroad Commission v. Pullman Co. , 312 U.S.

496 (1941).

In conclusion, Carhart compels affirmance of the decision

of the District Court.

A True Copy:

Teste:

Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

43

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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