Opinion

George Edward Page v. Department of Health and Human Services

Court
Merit Systems Protection Board
Filed
Sep 28, 2015
Status
Unpublished
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 39.9%

The opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

GEORGE EDWARD PAGE, DOCKET NUMBER

Appellant, DC-1221-15-0408-W-1

v.

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND DATE: September 28, 2015

HUMAN SERVICES,

Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

George Edward Page, Berlin, Maryland, pro se.

Christina Patton Black, Esquire, Washington, D.C., for the agency.

BEFORE

Susan Tsui Grundmann, Chairman

Mark A. Robbins, Member

FINAL ORDER

¶1 The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which

dismissed his challenge of the agency’s denial of a differential pay increase for

lack of jurisdiction as an otherwise appealable action or as an individual right of

action (IRA) appeal. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only when:

1

A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add

significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,

but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not

required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a

precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board

as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).

2

the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact; the initial

decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation or the

erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative

judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision

were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion,

and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material

evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due

diligence, was not available when the record closed. See Title 5 of the Code of

Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully

considering the filings in this appeal, and based on the following points and

authorities, we conclude that the petitioner has not established any basis under

section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the

petition for review and AFFIRM the initial decision, which is now the Board’s

final decision. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113(b).

BACKGROUND

¶2 The appellant is a Maintenance Mechanic with the agency’s National

Institute of Health. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 1 at 2. On February 5, 2015,

he filed an IRA appeal, which challenged the agency’s denial of his request for an

environmental differential pay increase due to his potential exposure to

microorganisms. See id. at 6; IAF, Tab 2. The appellant also alleged that the

agency’s actions were taken in reprisal for his protected whistleblowing activity

and stated that he had filed a complaint with the Office of Special Counsel (OSC)

on February 4, 2015. IAF, Tab 1 at 5.

¶3 The administrative judge issued an order informing the appellant that, to

establish Board jurisdiction over an IRA appeal, he had to demonstrate, among

other things, that he had exhausted his whistleblowing claims before OSC and

either that OSC had notified him that it was terminating its investigation of his

allegations or 120 calendar days had passed since he first sought corrective

3

action. IAF, Tab 3 at 3. She ordered the appellant to file evidence and argument

within 15 days to establish Board jurisdiction over his appeal. Id. She also

instructed the appellant to file a copy of the letter he filed with OSC delineating

his whistleblowing allegations. Id. at 2. The agency also filed a motion to

dismiss the appeal, arguing that the appellant did not establish that he exhausted

his administrative remedies with OSC. IAF, Tab 7. The appellant did not

respond to either the administrative judge’s order or the agency’s motion

to dismiss.

¶4 Without holding the appellant’s requested hearing, the administrative judge

dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. IAF, Tab 1 at 3, Tab 8, Initial

Decision (ID). The administrative judge found that the Board lacks jurisdiction

over an alleged denial of a differential pay increase as an otherwise appealable

action. ID at 3. She also found that, to the extent the appellant was attempting to

file an IRA appeal, he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies because

120 days had not passed since he stated that he filed his complaint with OSC. Id.

¶5 The appellant has filed a petition for review. 2 Petition for Review (PFR)

File, Tab 1. The agency has filed a response in opposition to the appellant’s

petition. 3 PFR File, Tab 3.

DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW

¶6 The Board’s jurisdiction is limited to those matters over which it has been

given jurisdiction by law, rule, or regulation. Maddox v. Merit Systems

Protection Board, 759 F.2d 9, 10 (Fed. Cir. 1985). The administrative judge

properly found that the Board does not have jurisdiction over the appellant’s

2

On March 14, 2015, the appellant electronically filed an initial appeal with the

Board’s Washington Regional Office, which the Board construed as a petition for

review of the initial decision in this case. PFR File, Tabs 1-2.

3

The agency’s response was due on April 11, 2015. PFR File, Tab 2. Because

April 11, 2015, fell on a Saturday, the agency’s response that was filed on Monday,

April 13, 2015, is timely. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.23.

4

alleged denial of a differential pay increase as an otherwise appealable action. 4

ID at 3 (citing 5 C.F.R. § 1201.3); see Fair v. Department of Transportation,

4 M.S.P.R. 493, 495-96 (1981) (finding that the loss of premium pay such as a

shift differential is not an appealable adverse action).

¶7 To the extent the appellant is attempting to file an IRA appeal, under

5 U.S.C. § 1214(a)(3), an employee is required to exhaust his administrative

remedies with OSC before seeking corrective action from the Board in such an

appeal. Mason v. Department of Homeland Security, 116 M.S.P.R. 135, ¶ 8

(2011). An appellant filing an IRA appeal has not exhausted his OSC remedy

unless he has filed a complaint with OSC and either OSC has notified him that it

was terminating its investigation of his allegations or 120 calendar days have

passed since he first sought corrective action. Simnitt v. Department of Veterans

Affairs, 113 M.S.P.R. 313, ¶ 8 (2010). To establish Board jurisdiction, the

appellant must prove exhaustion with OSC, not just present nonfrivolous

allegations of exhaustion. Mason, 116 M.S.P.R. 135, ¶ 9. He may meet this

burden by providing his OSC complaint, any amendments to the complaint,

OSC’s correspondence discussing the claims, and his responses to OSC’s

correspondence discussing the claims. See Baldwin v. Department of Veterans

Affairs, 113 M.S.P.R. 469, ¶ 8 (2010).

¶8 It is undisputed that, as of the date the initial decision was issued, 120 days

had not elapsed since the appellant stated that he filed his OSC complaint, and he

had not alleged that he had been notified that OSC had terminated its

investigation into his allegations. IAF, Tab 1 at 5. Thus, the administrative judge

properly found that the Board lacked jurisdiction over the appellant’s potential

IRA appeal. ID at 3. The appellant has not addressed the issue of exhaustion

4

In the absence of an otherwise appealable action, the Board lacks jurisdiction to hear

the appellant’s claim that the agency’s actions breached the terms of a collective

bargaining agreement. IAF, Tab 1 at 6; see Smith v. Department of Defense,

106 M.S.P.R. 228, ¶ 13 (2007).

5

either below or on review. Under these circumstances, we find that the appellant

has failed to prove that he exhausted his administrative remedies with OSC and,

thus, the Board lacks jurisdiction over his IRA appeal.

NOTICE TO THE APPELLANT REGARDING

YOUR FURTHER REVIEW RIGHTS

You have the right to request review of this final decision by the

United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.

The court must receive your request for review no later than 60 calendar

days after the date of this order. See 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(A) (as rev. eff.

Dec. 27, 2012). If you choose to file, be very careful to file on time. The court

has held that normally it does not have the authority to waive this statutory

deadline and that filings that do not comply with the deadline must be dismissed.

See Pinat v. Office of Personnel Management, 931 F.2d 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1991).

If you want to request review of the Board’s decision concerning your

claims of prohibited personnel practices under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8),

(b)(9)(A)(i), (b)(9)(B), (b)(9)(C), or (b)(9)(D), but you do not want to challenge

the Board’s disposition of any other claims of prohibited personnel practices, you

may request review of this final decision by the United States Court of Appeals

for the Federal Circuit or any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction. The

court of appeals must receive your petition for review within 60 days after the

date of this order. See 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(B) (as rev. eff. Dec. 27, 2012). If

you choose to file, be very careful to file on time. You may choose to request

review of the Board’s decision in the United States Court of Appeals for the

Federal Circuit or any other court of appeals of competent jurisdiction, but not

both. Once you choose to seek review in one court of appeals, you may be

precluded from seeking review in any other court.

If you need further information about your right to appeal this decision to

court, you should refer to the Federal law that gives you this right. It is found in

Title 5 of the United States Code, section 7703 (5 U.S.C. § 7703) (as rev. eff.

6

Dec. 27, 2012). You may read this law as well as other sections of the

United States Code, at our website, http://www.mspb.gov/appeals/uscode.htm.

Additional information about the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal

Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular

relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is

contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, and 11.

Additional information about other courts of appeals can be found at their

respective websites, which can be accessed through

http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.

If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to the

United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website

at http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono

representation for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal

Circuit. The Merit Systems Protection Board neither endorses the services

provided by any attorney nor warrants that any attorney will accept representation

in a given case.

FOR THE BOARD: ______________________________

William D. Spencer

Clerk of the Board

Washington, D.C.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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