Opinion

Michael S. Lambert v. United States Postal Service

Court
Merit Systems Protection Board
Filed
Sep 28, 2015
Status
Unpublished
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 39.9%

The opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

MICHAEL S. LAMBERT, DOCKET NUMBER

Appellant, AT-0752-13-0368-B-1

v.

UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE, DATE: September 28, 2015

Agency.

THIS ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Norman Jackman, Esquire, Cambridge, Massachusetts, for the appellant.

Christopher Pearson, Atlanta, Georgia, for the agency.

BEFORE

Susan Tsui Grundmann, Chairman

Mark A. Robbins, Member

REMAND ORDER

¶1 The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which

dismissed his age discrimination affirmative defense without a hearing. For the

reasons discussed below, we GRANT the appellant’s petition for review and

REMAND the case to the regional office for further adjudication in accordance

with this Order.

1

A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add

significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,

but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not

required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a

precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board

as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).

2

DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW

¶2 In a previous remand order, we found that although the appellant freely and

voluntarily entered into a last chance settlement agreement resolving his removal

appeal, the settlement agreement did not comply with the provisions of the Older

Workers Benefit Protection Act, and we remanded the appellant’s age

discrimination affirmative defense to the administrative judge for further

adjudication. See Lambert v. U.S. Postal Service, MSPB Docket No. AT-0752-

13-0368-I-1, Remand Order at 3-5 (May 15, 2014) (citing Hinton v. Department

of Veterans Affairs, 119 M.S.P.R. 129, ¶¶ 7, 9 (2013)). Upon remand, the

administrative judge allowed the parties an additional opportunity to conduct

discovery, and the agency subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment.

Remand File (RF), Tab 15. After the motion was fully briefed, the administrative

judge granted summary judgment, finding there was no genuine issue of material

fact warranting a hearing on the appellant’s claim that he was discriminated

against on the basis of age. RF, Tab 26, Remand Initial Decision (RID) at 5-8.

¶3 The appellant has filed a petition for review arguing that the administrative

judge improperly credited the agency’s evidence and that there are sufficient

factual disputes warranting a hearing. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1.

The agency has filed a response in opposition to the petition for review. PFR

File, Tab 3.

¶4 In her remand initial decision, the administrative judge relied upon Redd v.

U.S. Postal Service, 101 M.S.P.R. 182, ¶ 5 (2006), for the proposition that an

appellant does not have an unconditional right to a hearing on his discrimination

claims. RID at 3. Under the facts of this case, where the only remaining issue

for the administrative judge’s adjudication was the appellant’s age discrimination

affirmative defense, we find no error with the administrative judge’s decision to

3

allow the agency to move for summary judgment under Redd and its progeny. 2

See Redd, 101 M.S.P.R. 182, ¶ 5; see also Davis v. Department of the

Interior, 114 M.S.P.R. 527, ¶¶ 9-10 (2010).

¶5 Subsequent to the administrative judge’s remand initial decision, however,

the Board overruled Redd and found that the Board’s procedures for deciding

discrimination claims are a matter of civil service law rather than discrimination

law. See Savage v. Department of the Army, 2015 MSPB 51, ¶¶ 45-46 & n.10. In

Savage, the Board explained that its appellate procedures do not provide a

mechanism for granting summary judgment, and that it must decide

discrimination claims only after the record is complete, in accordance with its

appellate procedures as defined in Title 5. Id., ¶ 45. Importantly, under the

Board’s appellate procedures, an appellant has a right to a hearing in a chapter 75

adverse action appeal. See Pignataro v. Department of Veterans

Affairs, 104 M.S.P.R. 563, ¶ 9 (2007) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 7701(a)).

¶6 Thus, pursuant to our decision in Savage, the appellant has a right to a

hearing on his age discrimination affirmative defense under the Board’s appellate

procedures. See Savage, 2015 MSPB 51, ¶¶ 46. We accordingly vacate the initial

decision and remand the appellant’s age discrimination claim for a hearing

consistent with the standards set forth in Savage. See id., ¶¶ 46, 48-51.

2

In making this finding, we express no view on the merits of the agency’s motion for

summary judgment or the administrative judge’s remand initial decision granting the

motion.

4

ORDER

For the reasons discussed above, we remand this case to the regional office

for further adjudication in accordance with this Remand Order.

FOR THE BOARD: ______________________________

William D. Spencer

Clerk of the Board

Washington, D.C.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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