Rick Knight v. Mark Wiedau

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 09-1435

R ICK L. K NIGHT,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

O FFICER K ENNETH W ISEMAN and

O FFICER M ARK W IEDAU,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Illinois.

No. 07-CV-127—David R. Herndon, Chief Judge.

A RGUED O CTOBER 29, 2009—D ECIDED D ECEMBER 22, 2009

Before F LAUM, M ANION, and W OOD , Circuit Judges.

F LAUM, Circuit Judge. Rick Knight, plaintiff-appellant,

appeals a grant of summary judgment in favor of

defendants-appellees Kenneth Wiseman and Mark Wiedau.

Knight is a prisoner at Vandalia Correctional Center in

Vandalia, Illinois, where Wiseman and Wiedau worked

as correctional officers. In a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim,

Knight alleged that the appellees violated his Eighth and

Fourteenth Amendment rights by requiring him to

2 No. 09-1435

work despite a prior shoulder injury and delaying

medical treatment following Knight’s subsequent

re-injury. The district court granted summary judgment

in favor of the officers, finding that the evidence in the

record did not create an issue of material fact regarding

whether the defendants acted with deliberate indiffer-

ence to plaintiff’s medical needs and that the defendants

were protected by qualified immunity.

For the following reasons, we now affirm.

I. Background

This case revolves around a repeat shoulder injury

Rick Knight sustained on February 16, 2005, while

serving a four-year sentence in the Illinois Department

of Corrections (“IDOC”).

In July 2004, Knight had arthroscopic surgery to repair

a torn rotator cuff in his right shoulder. On December 8,

2004, Knight began serving his sentence at the Graham

Correctional Center. On January 27, 2005, IDOC trans-

ferred Knight to the Vandalia Correctional Center

(“Vandalia”). After several weeks in a segregation dormi-

tory at Vandalia, Knight was assigned to a work camp

adjacent to the prison. Inmates at the work camp live in

a different section of the facility and leave daily for super-

vised work detail.

Vandalia Assignment Officers determine the eligibility

of inmates for work camp duty on the basis of several

factors, paying particular attention to an inmate’s

medical condition. To that end, individuals who bear a

No. 09-1435 3

work restriction issued by a licensed medical professional

cannot transfer to the camp. Eligible inmates at the camp

participate in a work gang where at least one correc-

tional officer supervises every eight inmates at all times.

These work gangs usually cut down tree branches and

pick up stray logs alongside highways.

Prior to his February 16, 2005, injury, Knight did not

have any medical work restrictions. Upon his initial

arrival at Vandalia, he told the medical staff about his

shoulder surgery, explaining that his shoulder “popped

the other night and now hurts.” The prison’s medical

records appropriately reference the complaint. Knight

also stated that while he could use his right arm, he

had difficulty pulling himself up to the top bunk. Ac-

cordingly, he requested and received a bottom-bunk

permit with an eighteen-month duration from Dr. Vipin

K. Shah, the Facility Medical Director. Knight did not

request or receive a light-duty restriction, a gym restric-

tion, or a yard restriction while at Vandalia.

When Knight arrived at the work camp, he immediately

told the officer making the transfer that he could not

do extremely heavy work. The officer, who is not a defen-

dant in this case, told Knight that he was going to the

work camp anyway. At the camp, Knight successfully

procured a transfer from a top bunk to a bottom bunk

after showing his segregation bunk pass and explaining

why he had it. Appellant performed work on several

dates prior to February 16, 2005, all of which involved

“general maintenance and clean-up,” the description

provided for the February 16 th detail. On the morning of

4 No. 09-1435

his very first assignment, Knight informed the officer at

the front desk that he had a shoulder injury and was not

supposed to do heavy lifting or throwing. The officer

replied, “[E]ither you go to work or you go to [segrega-

tion],” and Knight went to work. Officers Wiseman and

Wiedau were present but not within hearing range for

this conversation. Knight also testified that at some

unspecified point in time either Wiseman or Wiedau

made the same comment to him.

In his deposition, Knight testified that on the first three

work details he would always try to pick lighter work and

use his left arm for heavy lifting. He did not incur any

injuries or experience any soreness in his shoulder

during these assignments. Indeed, prior to February 16,

2005, Knight filed no grievance stating that work detail

put him at risk of re-injury, made no request for laundry

duty, and sought no medical attention for his shoulder.

Knight testified that he “enjoyed” being on work detail

“because [he] got to leave the prison.”

On the morning of February 16, 2005, Wiseman and

Wiedau took a group of inmates to do roadside mainte-

nance. They arrived at the site shortly after 8 a.m. Once the

gang began working, Wiseman realized that one of the

chainsaws was broken, returned to the van, and radioed

another officer to request a replacement. He then at-

tempted to fix the broken tool himself. Meanwhile,

Knight began the detail by doing light work. Defendants-

appellees demanded he do more and, after some verbal

prodding, Knight threw a log and felt his shoulder “rip.”

Knight immediately grabbed his arm and went to tell

No. 09-1435 5

Wiseman and Wiedau what had happened. Neither

officer saw the event, which Knight testified took place

at approximately 9 a.m. (Wiseman put the time at 8:15 a.m.

in his testimony). After Knight complained about being

in pain, Wiedau instructed him to go back to the ditch

and do whatever work he could with one arm. Knight

attempted to pick up branches and twigs but could not

do so because of the pain. He again complained to

Officer Wiedau. Together, the two approached Officer

Wiseman, who explained that he could not drive

Knight to the Health Care Unit (“HCU”), but that Knight

could ride back with the officer delivering the replace-

ment chainsaw.

Notably, at some point during the morning, Knight

stated that he should not have been at the work camp

at all because of his shoulder injury, to which Officer

Wiseman responded that if Knight said as much at the

beginning of the day, he would have been left behind at

the work camp. Knight argues that this exchange took

place as soon as the gang arrived at the work site, but the

record belies his assertion. In his own testimony,

appellant never contends that he specifically informed

Wiseman and Wiedau about his shoulder problems

before the re-injury. Furthermore, Officer Wiseman testi-

fied, “[Knight] told me that he had previously hurt his

shoulder and that he shouldn’t even be at the work camp.

I said that’s fine with me. If he would have said that

before we left, I wouldn’t have even took him out.” Wise-

man added that immediately after this conversation he

told Knight, “[W]e’ve got a guy on the way out with a

saw, you can go back with him,” which would mean that

6 No. 09-1435

Knight made his comment while complaining to the

officers after re-injury.

Eventually, the officer carrying the replacement chain-

saw arrived, picked up Knight, and drove back to

Vandalia. Before taking the plaintiff-appellant to the

Health Care Unit, the officer dropped off two items at a

parking lot about a mile beyond the work camp. A nurse

saw Knight at 10:45 a.m. and gave him ibuprofen.

Dr. Shah examined Knight the next day, again prescribed

ibuprofen, ordered an X-ray, and assigned plaintiff-appel-

lant a week-long “lay in.” While Dr. Shah initially diag-

nosed Knight’s injury as a shoulder sprain, a CT scan

performed in April 2005 revealed a torn rotator cuff,

for which plaintiff received physical therapy.

The district court granted summary judgment in favor

of Officers Wiedau and Wiseman. It found that the evi-

dence created a question of fact as to whether Knight’s

condition was “serious” for Eighth Amendment pur-

poses but did not create a material question of fact as to

whether either officer acted with deliberate indifference.

The court held that the record contains no evidence that

Wiedau and Wiseman knew of Knight’s shoulder injury

before they made him begin work on February 16, 2005, or

that Wiedau and Wiseman actually forced Knight to

continue working after his injury, thereby exacerbating

it. Finally, Judge Herndon determined that Knight did not

present any evidence that the delay in transportation

worsened his medical condition. The court also con-

cluded that since defendants-appellees acted consis-

tently with the appellant’s constitutional rights, qualified

No. 09-1435 7

immunity shielded them from liability and provided a

parallel ground for summary judgment. Knight does not

challenge this finding and we do not reach it because

the merits of the deliberate indifference claim are

dispositive of the case before us.

II. Discussion

We review a district court’s grant of summary judg-

ment de novo. Argyropoulos v. City of Alton, 539 F.3d 724,

732 (7th Cir. 2008). Summary judgment is proper where

“there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . .

the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.

R. Civ. P. 56(c). In resolving a summary judgment motion,

we draw all reasonable inferences and resolve factual

disputes in favor of the non-moving party. Schneiker v.

Fortis Ins. Co., 200 F.3d 1055, 1057 (7th Cir. 2000).

Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Knight claims that

defendants-appellees violated his Eighth and Fourteenth

Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual

punishment by acting with deliberate indifference to

his serious medical needs. Section 1983 creates a cause

of action against “[e]very person, who, under color of any

statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any

State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or

causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States

or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the

deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities

secured by the Constitution and laws.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Since a § 1983 cause of action is against a “person,” in order

“[t]o recover damages under § 1983, a plaintiff must

8 No. 09-1435

establish that a defendant was personally responsible

for the deprivation of a constitutional right.” Johnson v.

Snyder, 444 F.3d 579, 583 (7th Cir. 2006) (citing Gentry v.

Duckworth, 65 F.3d 555, 561 (7th Cir. 1995)). To be per-

sonally responsible, an official “must know about the

conduct and facilitate it, approve it, condone it, or turn

a blind eye.” Id.

The Eighth Amendment imposes a duty on prison

officials to provide humane conditions of confinement.

Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). Prison

officials must take reasonable measures to guarantee

the safety of the inmates and ensure that they receive

adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care. Id. A

“display [of] deliberate indifference to serious medical

needs of prisoners” constitutes a breach of this duty.

Johnson, 444 F.3d at 584. Thus, a claim that a prison

official has violated the Eighth Amendment must demon-

strate two elements: (1) an objectively serious medical

condition, and (2) deliberate indifference by the prison

officials to that condition. Id. (citing Zentmyer v. Kendall

County, 220 F.3d 805, 810 (7th Cir. 2000)). To be “serious,”

a medical condition must be one that a physician has

diagnosed as needing treatment or “one that is so

obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the

necessity for a doctor’s attention.” Johnson, 444 F.3d at 584-

85. To show deliberate indifference, the plaintiff must

demonstrate that the defendant was actually aware of a

serious medical need but then was deliberately indif-

ferent to it. Deliberate indifference requires a showing

of more than mere or gross negligence, but less than

purposeful infliction of harm. Matos v. O’Sullivan, 335

No. 09-1435 9

F.3d 553, 557 (7th Cir. 2003); Proffitt v. Ridgway, 279 F.3d

503, 506 (7th Cir. 2002) (explaining that deliberate indif-

ference to a prisoner’s safety implies avoidance of

known risk, not merely foreseeable risk).

The district court found that Knight may have actually

had a serious medical condition with his shoulder. Appel-

lant does not challenge that determination and we do not

review it. The only issue before us is whether a genuine

question of material fact exists about the possibility of

deliberately indifferent conduct by the defendants-appel-

lees. Knight asserts that Wiseman and Wiedau acted

with deliberate indifference at three different points in

time: (1) when they initially made Knight work despite

knowing that his history of shoulder problems made it

unsafe for him to do so; (2) when they made Knight

return to work after he re-injured his shoulder; and

(3) when they delayed Knight’s medical treatment fol-

lowing his February 16 th re-injury. We address each of

these contentions in turn.

Knight’s first argument is that the defendants displayed

deliberate indifference to his serious medical condition

because they knew of his prior shoulder issues before

he began working on February 16, 2005, but made him

work anyway. The evidence in the record points to the

contrary conclusion. Wiseman and Wiedau both signed

affidavits stating that they did not know of any

physical disability stemming from or pre-existing

injuries associated with Knight’s shoulder before the

gang arrived at the work site. They also swore that they

did not instruct Knight to continue working after

learning about his February 16 th shoulder injury.

10 No. 09-1435

Knight fails to present any piece of evidence that con-

tradicts these statements. To survive summary judgment,

a non-moving party must “show through specific

evidence that a triable issue of fact remains on issues for

which the nonmovant bears the burden of proof at trial.”

Walker v. Shansky, 28 F.3d 666, 670-71 (7th Cir. 1994), aff’d

sub nom. Walker v. Ghoudy, 51 F.3d 276 (7th Cir. 1995); see

also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986);

Hemsworth v. Quotesmith.com, Inc., 476 F.3d 487, 490 (7th

Cir. 2007). “Furthermore, the evidence submitted in

support of the nonmovant’s position must be sufficiently

strong that a jury could reasonably find for the

nonmovant.” Walker, 28 F.3d at 671. Under this standard,

the district court correctly concluded that, in the absence

of evidence showing that Wiseman and Wiedau

actually knew of Knight’s shoulder injury before Knight

reinjured it on February 16, it could not reasonably

infer that the defendants exhibited deliberate indiffer-

ence to any serious medical condition of the plaintiff

when they made him work upon arrival to the site.

Knight makes several arguments attacking this result.

He begins by pointing to statements in his own deposi-

tion that defendants-appellees “knew [his] situation.” Yet

Knight never specified how the defendants could have

learned about his “situation.” Moreover, he does not

explain what facts constituting the “situation” the defen-

dants actually knew. These could have amounted to

nothing more than an awareness by the officers that

Knight had a tendency to complain about his health or

the slightly more weighty belief that Knight had

previously undergone some shoulder surgery. Under the

No. 09-1435 11

prevailing standard for deliberate indifference claims,

neither of these states of mind could form the basis for a

constitutional violation. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S.

825, 837 (1994) (holding that deliberate indifference

occurs when an official “knows of and disregards an

excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official

must both be aware of facts from which the inference

could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm

exists, and he must also draw the inference.”) (emphasis

added). Knight simply does not provide facts that

would enable a reasonable jury to reach a conclusion

favorable to him.

Knight attempts to further substantiate his first deliber-

ate indifference claim by pointing to the conversation

between himself and the officer at the front desk, during

which Knight said that he had a shoulder injury and

should not be doing heavy lifting or throwing. While

such an announcement could conceivably serve as the

basis for the subjective awareness element required by

Farmer, Knight specifically admitted that neither

Wiseman nor Wiedau were within hearing distance of

that conversation. Additionally, Wiseman testified that

at no point prior to February 16 did he warn Knight that

he either had to come out for work detail or leave the

camp altogether. In his deposition, Wiedau similarly

denied having heard Knight’s complaints before

February 16, 2005. We note here that Wiedau’s deposition

was not part of the trial record and would not constitute

evidence that can defeat a motion for summary judgment

on appellate review even if it contained a contrary asser-

tion. United States v. Phillips, 914 F.2d 835, 840 (7th Cir.

12 No. 09-1435

1990); see also Brokaw v. Weaver, 305 F.3d 660, 668 n.7 (7th

Cir. 2002); United States v. Elizalde-Adame, 262 F.3d 637, 640

(7th Cir. 2001). Therefore, properly introduced evidence

in its entirety cannot support appellant’s contention that

Wiseman and Wiedau knew of his injury before he

began work on the morning of February 16, 2005.

Unrelenting in his effort to prove otherwise, Knight

again highlights the deposition testimony of Wiseman and

Wiedau. Yet the relevant excerpts from Wiseman’s testi-

mony still fail to support Knight’s allegations of

deliberate indifference. As mentioned above, Wiseman

stated: “[Knight] told me that he had previously hurt his

shoulder and that he shouldn’t even be at the work

camp. I said that’s fine with me. If he would have said

that before we left, I wouldn’t have even took him out.”

Subsequent parts of Wiseman’s testimony show that the

exchange took place after Wiseman permitted Knight to

sit in the van and wait for an officer to take him back to

camp. That is, the record indicates that Wiseman said

the line on which Knight hinges much of his case only

after plaintiff-appellant re-injured himself. Thus, the

district court did not err when it determined that a rea-

sonable jury could not reach the conclusion that

the defendants knew about Knight’s shoulder injury.

Additionally, the district court correctly found that even

if the defendants knew of Knight’s previous shoulder

injury, such knowledge would not have raised a question

of material fact as to whether they acted with deliberate

indifference. Knight did not have any medical work

restrictions on his record. Officers Wiedau and

No. 09-1435 13

Wiseman were entitled to rely on this fact and conclude

that appellant could work without endangering his

health. See Hayes v. Snyder, 546 F.3d 516, 527 (7th Cir.

2008) (reiterating “the presumption that non-medical

officials are entitled to defer to the professional judg-

ment of the facility’s medical officials on questions of

prisoners’ medical care”).

In every one of the cases Knight cites to support his

appeal, a court permitted an Eighth Amendment claim to

go forward based on compulsory work only for

prisoners who had an active work restriction issued by

a medical professional. See, e.g., Williams v. Norris, 148

F.3d 983, 987 (8th Cir. 1998) (affirming summary judg-

ment for the plaintiff in a § 1983 action where plaintiff

presented evidence that he had “medical restrictions on

his duties, . . . [that the defendants] knew of the restric-

tions, . . . [that plaintiff’s] work assignment was contrary

to the restrictions, and that neither official took action to

rescue [plaintiff] from work that was dangerous to his

health and that in fact resulted in damage to him”); Grady

v. Edmonds, 2007 WL 2986167, at *7-8 (D. Colo. June 11,

2007) (stating a magistrate judge’s recommendation that

a possible Eighth Amendment violation existed where

the defendant corrections officer said “[Your] restrictions

are changed. You’ll work your job or go to segregation”

and told the doctor in the facility to lift the plaintiff’s

existing work restrictions). The district court reasoned

that imposing liability on a non-medical corrections

officer for making an inmate without work restrictions

participate in work detail would “effectively cause cor-

rectional officers to respond to the whim of the inmates

14 No. 09-1435

each time one thought of some reason he should not

have to perform a given work assignment.” While the

logic of this concern is compelling, we need not draw

such a hard line. Instead, we conclude that the record

presented in this case shows that defendants-appellees

were entitled to rely and did rely on the Vandalia Assign-

ment Officer’s professional determination that Knight

did not face any medical obstacles to performing work

camp duties. See Lee v. Young, 533 F.3d 505, 511 (7th Cir.

2008) (“[I]n determining the best way to handle an

inmate’s medical needs, prison officials who are not

medical professionals are entitled to rely on the opinions

of medical professionals.”). Accordingly, they did not

act with deliberate indifference of any serious

medical condition when they made plaintiff-appellant

do his work.

Knight demarcates a second potential anchor point

for his claim by arguing that Wiseman and Wiedau

acted with deliberate indifference when they forced him

to return to work after he re-injured his shoulder. Even

viewing the facts in a light most favorable to Knight

does not permit us to accept the assertion that defendants-

appellees forced him to continue working once it was

clear that he was in serious pain. Taking Knight’s testi-

mony as true, he informed Wiedau of his injury, and

Wiedau told him to work with one hand. Knight then

picked up a few branches, complained about the pain

again, and did not go back to work. In Knight’s words, he

“went down in the area where the other guys were at

working [sic] and just stood there.” This course of events

does not amount to deliberate indifference. The officers

No. 09-1435 15

appropriately heeded all signs of appellant’s medical

condition. Their skepticism of complaints about shoulder

pain by a petulant prisoner at a work camp does not

constitute a violation of the Eighth Amendment. See

Riccardo v. Rausch, 375 F.3d 521 (7th Cir. 2004) (“The

Constitution does not oblige guards to believe whatever

inmates say.”). The record demonstrates without any

material ambiguity that as soon as Knight informed the

officers that he was so hurt that he could not do any work

at all, Wiseman and Wiedau took the necessary steps

to secure him the medical treatment to which he was

entitled, which a doctor in this case determined to be

ibuprofen and bed rest. Moreover, we see no evidence

that Knight’s brief attempt to pick up twigs with his

left hand aggravated his injury to his right shoulder or

caused him significant additional pain. Accordingly,

appellant’s attempt to recover damages under § 1983

on the grounds that the correctional officers forced him

to return to work would be undermined even if he had

successfully demonstrated their deliberate indifference

to his medical condition.

Lastly, Knight contends that the period of time between

when he re-injured his shoulder and when he received

medical treatment amounts to a delay that is independ-

ently sufficient to trigger an Eighth Amendment viola-

tion. “A delay in the provision of medical treatment for

painful conditions—even non-life-threatening condi-

tions—can support a deliberate indifference claim so

long as the medical condition is ‘sufficiently serious or

painful.’ ” Grieveson v. Anderson, 538 F.3d 763, 779 (7th Cir.

2008) (internal citations omitted). However, the action

16 No. 09-1435

will not lie unless the plaintiff introduces verifying med-

ical evidence that shows his condition worsened because

of the delay. Id.; see, e.g., Williams v. Liefer, 491 F.3d

710, 715 (7th Cir. 2007) (stating that plaintiff must “offer

‘verifying medical evidence’ that the delay (rather than

the inmate’s underlying condition) caused some degree

of harm”); see also Petty v. County of Franklin, Ohio, 478

F.3d 341, 344 (6th Cir. 2007); Laughlin v. Schriro, 430 F.3d

927, 929 (8th Cir. 2005). Knight submitted no such evi-

dence. Furthermore, viewing the record in the light

most favorable to the non-moving party, at most two

and a half hours passed between the injury, which

could have taken place as early as 8:15 a.m., and the

treatment, which uncontested medical records place at

10:45 a.m. An unincarcerated individual may well

consider oneself fortunate if he receives medical atten-

tion at a standard emergency room within that short of

a period of time.

The cases Knight cites to support his claim of uncon-

stitutional delay are factually inapposite. For example,

appellant invokes Sparks v. Rittenhouse, 164 Fed. Appx. 712,

717-18 (10th Cir. 2006) (unpublished), where a prisoner

filed a § 1983 complaint after spending twenty-one

months without treatment for a shoulder injury, during

which time the defendant medical professional

allegedly denied care because of her personal views. Any

delay in treatment Knight experienced was minimal and

had no adverse consequences. Furthermore, there is no

evidence that the delay here was caused by willful igno-

rance or malice on behalf of either Wiseman or Wiedau,

starkly contrasting the case with the situations in Gil v.

No. 09-1435 17

Reed, 535 F.3d 551 (7th Cir. 2008) (upholding Eighth

Amendment claim where physician assistant refused to

fill inmate’s antibiotics prescription despite holding the

necessary pills in his hand), and Williams v. Liefer, 491

F.3d 710, 716 (7th Cir. 2007) (finding potential liability

for an officer who forced an obese plaintiff to carry a 200-

pound box up several flights of stairs despite the plain-

tiff’s persistent complaints about chest pain and a

known history of chronic hypertension). The officers

could not abandon the remainder of the work gang and

the severity of the injury did not appear to call for the

cancellation of the detail altogether, so they placed Knight

on the next available transport back to Vandalia. Our

precedent does not fault this conduct.

The independent decision of the van’s driver to take a

brief, mile-long detour caused no detriment to Knight’s

condition and has little bearing on the extent to

which Wiseman’s or Wiedau’s own actions amounted

to deliberate indifference. As we have previously re-

marked, “it is difficult to generalize about the civilized

minimum of public concern necessary for the health of

prisoners except to observe that this civilized minimum

is a function both of objective need and cost.” Gil v. Reed,

381 F.3d 649, 662 (7th Cir. 2004); see also Ralston v.

McGovern, 167 F.3d 1160, 1162 (7th Cir. 1999). The Eighth

Amendment does not require prison officials to provide

flawless treatment, Riccardo v. Rausch, 375 F.3d 521, 525

(7th Cir. 2004), and Knight has done little more than

demonstrate possible shortcomings in the behavior of

defendants-appellees when compared against an

absolute standard of perfect medical care. The evidence

18 No. 09-1435

before us shows without any issue of material fact that

the officers responded to Knight’s injury as prudently

as they could while maintaining proper safety pro-

cedures at the work site.

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we A FFIRM the district

court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants-

appellees Wiseman and Wiedau.

12-22-09