explaining that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) allows district courts to correct their own errors, thus avoiding “unnecessary appellate procedures” (quoting Moro v. Shell Oil Co., 91 F.3d 872, 876 (7th Cir. 1996))
How later courts described this case
- explaining that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) allows district courts to correct their own errors, thus avoiding “unnecessary appellate procedures” (quoting Moro v. Shell Oil Co., 91 F.3d 872, 876 (7th Cir. 1996))
- noting that “it is the responsibility of the district court, if it conducts the instruction conference without a court reporter, (continued...
- holding that the defendant had waived violations of Court Reporters Act but noting that the “safe course” was to “let the reporter record what takes place” during side bars
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
__________
No. 09‐2264
IN RE:
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Petitioner.
__________
Petition for Writ of Mandamus
from the Eastern District of Wisconsin.
No. 2:05‐cr‐00145‐JPS‐1‐‐J.P. Stadtmueller, Judge.
__________
JULY 10, 2009*
__________
Before RIPPLE, ROVNER and WOOD, Circuit Judges.
RIPPLE, Circuit Judge. The United States (“the Government”) has
filed this petition for a writ of mandamus seeking the recusal of the
respondent district judge currently presiding over a criminal action
pending in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Wisconsin. Because the Government has established that a reasonable,
well‐informed observer might question the impartiality of the district
*
This opinion is being released initially in typescript form.
No. 09‐2264 Page 2
judge, we must grant the requested writ, disqualifying the judge from
presiding over the proceeding and requiring that he vacate all orders
entered since the filing of the recusal motion in the district court.
I
BACKGROUND
A.
In January 2003, Rashid A. Salahuddin failed to return to a
corrections facility while he was on work‐release. Local authorities in
Milwaukee, Wisconsin, obtained an escape warrant and searched for
Mr. Salahuddin in the home of his estranged wife, where he may have
been living at the time. During the course of the search, the officers
discovered two guns in a bedroom closet, but they did not find Mr.
Salahuddin. The next day, they returned, found Mr. Salahuddin and
placed him under arrest. Before the officers were able to administer
Miranda warnings, Mr. Salahuddin stated that there were two guns in the
closet of the bedroom where the guns had been found the previous day.
Mr. Salahuddin was charged in state court with being a felon in
possession of a firearm. Later that month, a state court commissioner
dismissed the case for lack of probable cause on the ground that there
was insufficient evidence connecting the guns to Mr. Salahuddin. The
state appealed, arguing that Mr. Salahuddin’s statement indicated an
ability to possess the guns. The state court disagreed, however, and, in
April 2003, affirmed the commissioner’s dismissal of the case.
More than two years later, in June 2005, a federal grand jury
indicted Mr. Salahuddin on one count of being a felon in possession of a
firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The case was assigned to
No. 09‐2264 Page 3
Judge Clevert. Shortly thereafter, the parties began plea negotiations.
The assistant United States attorney prosecuting the case suggested in a
letter to Mr. Salahuddin’s attorney that Mr. Salahuddin would not
qualify as an armed career criminal and therefore would not be subject
to the fifteen‐year mandatory minimum sentence. See 18 U.S.C. §
924(e)(1). According to the prosecutor’s letter, Mr. Salahuddin’s criminal
history included juvenile convictions for resisting or obstructing an
officer, receiving stolen property, possession of a controlled substance
and three separate incidents of burglary. He also had adult convictions
for armed robbery (for which he had been imprisoned for almost eight
years), being a felon in possession of a firearm, carrying a concealed
weapon, possession of marijuana and escape. The assistant United States
attorney calculated Mr. Salahuddin’s advisory guideline range as 46‐57
months’ imprisonment, but also advised Mr. Salahuddin that “the judge
will ultimately decide the defendant’s criminal history score.” R.20, Att.
1.1 Mr. Salahuddin elected to plead guilty. At the change of plea hearing,
Mr. Salahuddin hesitated when the court explained that, by pleading
guilty, he could no longer challenge the admissibility of the
Government’s evidence against him as the fruits of an unlawful search.
Mr. Salahuddin decided at that time to plead not guilty. Judge Clevert
set the matter for trial, but, only days later, Mr. Salahuddin again
changed his mind and entered a guilty plea.
After the change of plea hearing, but shortly before the sentencing
hearing, the Government altered its position and informed
Mr. Salahuddin that it now believed he did qualify as an armed career
criminal. Mr. Salahuddin then moved to withdraw his plea, which the
Government opposed. Judge Clevert granted Mr. Salahuddin’s motion
1
Citations to the record are to the district court’s docket available on
CM/ECF. There is no record on appeal.
No. 09‐2264 Page 4
to withdraw his plea and, in the same order, recused himself from further
participation in the case.
The matter was reassigned to Chief Judge Randa. Although the
deadline for filing pretrial motions had expired, Mr. Salahuddin moved
in March 2006 for leave to file instanter two motions to suppress both the
guns and statements he allegedly had made. The motions were referred
to Magistrate Judge Goodstein who, reasoning that the delay in filing the
suppression motions resulted from the dispute over the applicability of
the armed career criminal statute, concluded that “in the interests of
justice” the motions should be entertained. R.39 at 3. The Government
sought review of that order in the district court. Chief Judge Randa
concluded in May 2006 that Mr. Salahuddin had not met the “good
cause” requirement of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(e) and,
therefore, reversed the magistrate judge’s decision.2
After a two‐day trial in August 2006, Mr. Salahuddin was
convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm. See 18 U.S.C. §
922(g)(1). Mr. Salahuddin’s post‐trial motions for a judgment of acquittal
and for a new trial were denied, and Chief Judge Randa sentenced him
to 180 months’ imprisonment; the sentence was the mandatory minimum
for career criminals sentenced under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) and also was
below the advisory guidelines range.
Mr. Salahuddin appealed to this court. He argued that the district
court should have entertained his motions to suppress. We agreed and
2
Around the same time, the Government petitioned for Mr. Salahuddin’s
pretrial bond to be revoked. This matter was heard before Magistrate Judge
Callahan, who agreed with the Government that Mr. Salahuddin’s failure to return
home, as required by the conditions of his release, necessitated the revocation of his
bond. Mr. Salahuddin did not challenge the petition for detention, and he was
remanded into custody.
No. 09‐2264 Page 5
held that it was “incongruous to permit a defendant to withdraw a guilty
plea and go to trial while not permitting him to litigate the admissibility
of significant evidence.” United States v. Salahuddin, 509 F.3d 858, 862 (7th
Cir. 2007). We remanded the case with instructions to hear the
suppression motions and, if they were found to be meritorious, to order
a new trial.
B.
On remand, the motions were referred to Magistrate Judge
Goodstein, who recommended that the motions be denied in their
entirety. Mr. Salahuddin objected to the magistrate judge’s report and
recommendation, and the Government filed a response. However, before
the district court issued a ruling on the report and recommendation,
Chief Judge Randa sua sponte recused himself under Circuit Rule 36.3 The
case was reassigned to the respondent district judge (hereinafter “the
Judge”).
3
Circuit Rule 36 provides in relevant part: “Whenever a case tried in a
district court is remanded by this court for a new trial, it shall be reassigned by the
district court for trial before a judge other than the judge who heard the prior trial
unless the remand order directs or all parties request that the same judge retry the
case. . . .” Circuit Rule 36. It is not immediately clear whether this rule required
Chief Judge Randa to recuse himself before ruling on the suppression motions.
Although the rule requires cases remanded for new trials to be reassigned, this
court’s opinion only conditionally directed a new trial, which would be necessary
only if the district court first concluded that Mr. Salahuddin’s arguments were
meritorious. Orders directing the district court to undertake further proceedings are
routinely heard by the district judge who entered the order that was the subject of
the appeal. Chief Judge Randa probably could have, consistent with Circuit Rule
36, heard the suppression motions and, if necessary, ordered the case reassigned if
he concluded that a new trial was warranted.
No. 09‐2264 Page 6
The Judge reviewed the report and recommendation, and he
called a meeting in chambers on October 9, 2008, with then‐United States
Attorney Steven M. Biskupic and Federal Defender Daniel W. Stiller.
Assistant United States Attorney Gordon P. Giampietro and Associate
Federal Defender Nancy Joseph, who were the attorneys actually
litigating the case, were not invited. No court reporter was present, and
no meeting minutes are reflected on the district court’s docket. The Judge
began by telling Mr. Biskupic and Mr. Stiller that he would not hear
discussion, comment or response from either of them. According to the
parties’ submissions, the Judge then recounted the procedural history of
the case and reminded the office heads that, before the confusion
surrounding application of the armed career criminal statute, both parties
had preferred to resolve the case with a plea bargain. The Judge also
suggested that his pending ruling on the motions to suppress would not
satisfy either party and recommended that they consult with the assigned
attorneys to explore the possibility of resolving the case without
additional litigation.
The Government adds that, in discussing the procedural history
of the case, the Judge suggested that there was “an awful lot of blame to
be spread around for what he considered to be a total breakdown of
justice.” Pet. 4. The Government states that the Judge mentioned the
length of time that had passed between Mr. Salahuddin’s arrest by state
authorities and the commencement of his federal prosecution and
questioned why the case was accepted for federal prosecution at all,
given that the qualifying conviction for armed career criminal status was
an armed robbery Mr. Salahuddin had committed while a juvenile (he
had been waived into adult court). The Government further recites that
the Judge said the case should be resolved without further litigation and
that he recommended that the parties agree to a guilty plea to a false‐
statement count (which carries a ten‐year statutory maximum, as
opposed to the fifteen‐year statutory minimum under § 924(e)),
recognizing that Mr. Salahuddin would have to waive the statute of
No. 09‐2264 Page 7
limitations.4 The Government submits that the Judge suggested in the
alternative that the case be sent back to state court. Finally, the
Government suggests that, although the Judge recognized that he should
not be involved in plea negotiations, he opined that this was an
“extremely rare” case that needed to be addressed “at the top”; that he
was disturbed that there were 100 docket entries in a one‐count gun case;5
that if the case were to go forward there may be another appeal; that the
case was “an embarrassment to the justice system;” and that he would
recuse himself if requested. Pet. 5. Neither the Judge nor Mr. Salahuddin
challenges the accuracy of the Government’s recitation of these additional
facts.
Eleven days later, on October 20, 2008, the Government moved for
the Judge’s recusal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). On January 5, 2009,
the Government inquired as to the status of the case. Three days later,
the Judge issued an order adopting in part the report and
recommendation of the magistrate judge. He granted Mr. Salahuddin’s
motions to suppress statements, denied the motion to suppress the gun,
ordered a new trial and denied the Government’s motion for recusal.
The portion of the order denying the recusal motion reads in its entirety:
There remains but one additional matter ‐ a recusal motion filed
by the government. The motion followed a joint meeting between
the court and counsel for the parties as more fully detailed in an
4
This account is corroborated by the Judge’s order of April 10, 2009, which
denied the Government’s motion for reconsideration of its request for recusal. See
R.117 at 5 n.1. (stating that “the court thought it prudent to suggest an alternative
disposition under an otherwise appropriate statute that would not trigger
application of the enhancement”).
5
This concern also is corroborated by comments in the Judge’s order of
January 8, 2009, denying the Government’s motion for recusal. R.107 at 1.
No. 09‐2264 Page 8
earlier footnote. To be sure, on its face the motion represents
nothing more than an ill‐considered, poorly‐disguised,
preemptive collateral attack, albeit through the convenience of
forum shopping, on the wisdom of the court’s decision
announced today. The motion is denied.
R.107 at 30‐31. The earlier footnote explains that:
The court was prepared to issue its decision on de novo review of
the magistrate’s recommendations on October 10, 2008. As part
of its review, the court took note of the troubling procedural
history of this case and the ever‐mounting commitment of limited
prosecution, defense, and judicial resources that, when taken
together, have become prohibitively expensive and certainly less
cost effective to taxpayer interests. Thus, the confluence of these
factors together with the interests of justice more than suggest that
the court and counsel for the parties make a good faith effort
toward resolution of the case without the necessity of further
litigation. Toward that end, on October 9, 2008, the court met in
chambers with the Federal Defender, Daniel Stiller, and the
United States Attorney, Steven Biskupic, to explain that the court
had completed its review of the magistrate’s recommendation
and, without further elaboration, indicated that neither side
would be happy with the court ruling since litigation in the case
would likely continue unabated. The court then provided counsel
with additional relevant background facts leading to the court’s
recommendation that the parties explore potential alternatives to
the current charge. The court concluded by stating that it would
withhold release of today’s ruling for a reasonable period of time
so as to provide the parties with a safe harbor within which to
consider an alternative disposition.
R.117 at 2 n.1.
No. 09‐2264 Page 9
Two weeks later, the Government filed a motion for
reconsideration; it contended that the October 9, 2008 meeting violated
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 and that the Judge’s comments,
both during the meeting and in his order, called into question his
impartiality. At the final pretrial conference, the district court did not
rule on the motion for reconsideration, but did invite the United States
to respond to Mr. Salahuddin’s waiver of recusal, which Mr. Salahuddin
had filed in response to the Government’s motion for reconsideration.
The Government declined to do so on the ground that, under In re
National Union Fire Insurance Co., 839 F.2d 1226, 1231 (7th Cir. 1988), it
was inappropriate for the court to solicit the parties’ views on recusal.
The Judge denied the motion for reconsideration on April 10,
2009. He reasoned that he did not violate Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 11 for three reasons: (1) Neither the Government nor Mr.
Salahuddin proposed or reached a plea agreement; (2) The discussion
was with the United States Attorney and Federal Defender, not the
attorneys litigating the case (although the Judge acknowledged that
otherwise it might be considered a “classic negotiation session”); and (3)
The rule protects the defendant, not the Government, from judicial
coercion. The Judge further held that recusal was not necessary because
Mr. Salahuddin had waived recusal, because neither the denial of the
Government’s motion nor comments made in judicial rulings were a
basis for recusal, and because the October 9 meeting did not amount to
interference with the Government’s prosecutorial function.
Trial was set for May 18, 2009. On May 12, the Government filed
in the district court a motion to stay proceedings pending a petition for
writ of mandamus in this court. The next day, the Government filed in
this court a petition for a writ of mandamus and a motion to stay district
court proceedings pending resolution of the petition. The Government
requests a writ of mandamus directing the Judge to recuse himself from
the case and vacate all orders entered after October 20, 2008, when the
No. 09‐2264 Page 10
Government filed its motion for recusal. Both this court and the district
court granted motions to stay the proceedings. We ordered Mr.
Salahuddin to respond and invited a response from the Judge. Those
responses have now been filed.
II
DISCUSSION
In considering a petition for a writ of mandamus seeking the
disqualification of a district judge, we review that judge’s denial of a
recusal motion de novo. Hook v. McDade, 89 F.3d 350, 353‐54 (7th Cir.
1996).
A.
The All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651, permits courts created by Act
of Congress to “issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their
respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of
law.” 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a). See generally United States v. Denedo, 120 S. Ct.
2213, 2220‐22 (2009). Courts of appeals traditionally have employed the
writ of mandamus to confine a district court to the “lawful exercise of its
prescribed jurisdiction.” See Cheney v. United States Dist. Court, 542 U.S.
367, 380 (2004) (quoting Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass’n, 319 U.S. 21, 26
(1943)). We have held that a petition for writ of mandamus under the All
Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a), is the proper‐‐indeed the only‐‐means of
reviewing a district court’s denial of a motion for recusal.6 The
6
See, e.g., In re United States, 398 F.3d 615, 617 (7th Cir. 2005); United States
v. Boyd, 208 F.3d 638, 645 (7th Cir. 2000); In re Hatcher, 150 F.3d 631, 637 (7th Cir.
1998); United States v. Horton, 98 F.3d 313, 316‐17 (7th Cir. 1996); Hook v. McDade, 89
(continued...)
No. 09‐2264 Page 11
Government’s petition is therefore the appropriate means of seeking
review in this court of the district court’s denial of the Government’s
motion for recusal.
Section 455(a) of the Judicial Code provides: “Any justice, judge,
or magistrate judge of the United States shall disqualify himself in any
proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.”
28 U.S.C. § 455(a). The Supreme Court has explained that “‘[t]he goal of
section 455(a) is to avoid even the appearance of partiality.’” Liljeberg v.
Health Serv. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 860 (1988) (quoting Hall v.
Small Bus. Admin., 695 F.2d 175, 179 (5th Cir. 1983)). Accordingly, we
have required recusal “whenever there is ‘a reasonable basis’ for a
finding of an ‘appearance of partiality under the facts and circumstances’
of the case.” PepsiCo, Inc. v. McMillen, 764 F.2d 458, 460 (7th Cir. 1985)
(quoting SCA Servs., Inc. v. Morgan, 557 F.2d 110, 116 (7th Cir. 1977)).
Recusal is required when a “reasonable person perceives a significant
risk that the judge will resolve the case on a basis other than the merits.”
In re Mason, 916 F.2d 384, 385 (7th Cir. 1990); Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., 839
F.2d at 1229.7
Of course, needless recusals exact a significant toll; judges
therefore should exercise care in determining whether recusal is
6
(...continued)
F.3d 350, 354 n.2 (7th Cir. 1996); In re Mason, 916 F.2d 384, 385 (7th Cir. 1990); Taylor
v. O’Grady, 888 F.2d 1189, 1201 (7th Cir. 1989); United States v. Balistrieri, 779 F.2d
1191, 1204‐05 (7th Cir. 1985); SCA Servs., Inc. v. Morgan, 557 F.2d 110, 117‐18 (7th Cir.
1977); but see Boyd, 208 F.3d at 649‐50 (Ripple, J., dissenting) (noting that this position
is in tension with two decisions by the Supreme Court and has not been followed
by other courts of appeals).
7
See also Cheney v. United States District Court, 541 U.S. 913, 924 (2004)
(Scalia, J., in chambers); Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 530 U.S. 1301, 1302 (2000)
(statement of Rehnquist, C.J.).
No. 09‐2264 Page 12
necessary, especially when proceedings already are underway. “[A]
change of umpire mid‐contest may require a great deal of work to be re‐
done . . . and facilitate judge‐shopping.” Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., 839 F.2d
at 1229 (citation omitted).
B.
Mr. Salahuddin submits that the Government’s petition is
untimely. He suggests that this court requires litigants to petition for
mandamus “immediately after a judge grants or denies a motion for
recusal.” Salahuddin Br. at 8 (citing United States v. Horton, 98 F.3d 313
(7th Cir. 1996), and United States v. Balistrieri, 779 F.2d 1191 (7th Cir.
1985)). Here, the district court denied the Government’s motion for
recusal on January 8, 2009, and the Government did not file this petition
until May 12, 2009, four months after the motion was denied and one
month after the motion for reconsideration was denied.
We cannot accept this submission. The time during which the
Government sought reconsideration of the district court’s order denying
its motion for recusal should not be considered in determining the
timeliness of the petition.8 Mr. Salahuddin suggests no reason why the
rule should be otherwise, and, indeed, there are significant benefits in
excluding that period. Most importantly, there is significant judicial
economy in not requiring a party to file a petition for writ of mandamus
in the court of appeals while the district court reconsiders its earlier
denial. This approach gives the district court adequate time to reflect on
its order and, if necessary, correct its own error before another court
becomes involved. Both the parties and the court of appeals are spared
8
Neither the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a), nor Federal Rule of
Appellate Procedure 21, provides a specific time frame within which all petitions for
writ of mandamus must be filed.
No. 09‐2264 Page 13
the burden of an additional round of litigation.9 Requiring the petition
to be filed any earlier would accomplish very little; indeed, in most
instances this court would withhold judgment until the district court had
ruled on the motion to reconsider.
Here, the Government’s petition was filed more than a month
after the district court denied its motion to reconsider. Mr. Salahuddin
suggests that this delay does not comport with this court’s requirement
that a petition for a writ of mandamus to compel the recusal of a district
judge must be made “immediately” or not at all. Horton, 98 F.3d at 316‐
17; Balistrieri, 779 F.2d at 1205. Read in context, however, these cases
simply stand for the proposition, well‐established in this circuit, that a
motion for recusal under section 455(a) must be made before trial; after
trial, the damage to the public perception of the judicial system already
has been done, and the party may not then seek relief because the simple
appearance of partiality is, at most, harmless error.10
Rather than turning on the term “immediately,” our cases have
taken a fact‐specific, pragmatic approach in determining whether a
petition seeking recusal is timely. We have examined the prejudice to
any other party or to the district court caused by the delay and have
9
Cf. United States v. Dieter, 429 U.S. 6, 8 (1976) (per curiam) (noting that
deferring appellate consideration until disposition of a petition for rehearing saves
time and reduces the burden on appellate courts by “giving district courts the
opportunity promptly to correct their own alleged errors”); Divane v. Krull Elec. Co.,
194 F.3d 845, 850 (7th Cir. 1999) (explaining that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
59(e) allows district courts to correct their own errors, thus avoiding “unnecessary
appellate procedures” (quoting Moro v. Shell Oil Co., 91 F.3d 872, 876 (7th Cir.
1996))).
10
See United States v. Ruzzano, 247 F.3d 688, 694 (7th Cir. 2001); United States
v. Troxell, 887 F.2d 830, 833 (7th Cir. 1989) (collecting cases); N.Y. City Hous. Dev.
Corp. v. Hart, 796 F.2d 976, 978‐79 (7th Cir. 1986) (per curiam).
No. 09‐2264 Page 14
examined the amount of work that the delay would cause the new judge
to redo. See Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., 839 F.2d at 1232. Here, neither the
Judge nor Mr. Salahuddin have suggested any prejudice caused by the
time it has taken the Government to file its petition. Since denying the
Government’s motion for recusal, the Judge has issued, in addition to the
denial of the Government’s motion for reconsideration and the order
staying proceedings pending this petition, only a handful of orders, most
of which concern scheduling. The Judge did rule on the major issue on
remand, the suppression motions, after the Government filed its motion
for recusal. However, the Judge’s decision to resolve all the suppression
motions in the same order as the denial of the recusal motion cannot be
attributed to the Government. Any delay attributable to the Government
would not require significant work to be redone by a new judge.
Moreover, the Government has given a significant reason for the
four‐week intermission between the denial of its motion for
reconsideration and the filing of this petition. The United States
Attorney’s office was required, under the policies of the Department of
Justice, to obtain the permission of the Solicitor General before filing the
petition for a writ of mandamus.11 See United States Attorneys’ Manual,
§ 2‐2.124. The petition was filed the day after permission was received.
While this requirement necessarily slows the progress of a case, it has
long been recognized as a salutary device to ensure that governmental
litigation is conducted in a manner consonant with national norms rather
than provincial priorities.
11
This reason is mentioned in footnote 1 of the motion for stay, but not in
the petition for a writ of mandamus.
No. 09‐2264 Page 15
C.
We now turn to the merits of the Government’s submission. At
bottom, this matter requires that we decide one fundamental issue:
whether a reasonable, well‐informed observer could question the Judge’s
impartiality. See, e.g., Hatcher, 150 F.3d at 637.12
In answering this question, we must examine carefully the nature
of the Judge’s meeting with the heads of the two governmental offices
involved. The Judge called an off‐the‐record meeting with the United
States Attorney and the Federal Defender. This manner of proceeding in
a federal criminal matter is indeed unusual and necessarily raises
substantial concerns in the mind of any well‐informed observer. We
must take special note of the fact that no record was taken of the meeting.
In other contexts, this and other courts have pointed out the need to make
a record whenever substantive discussions take place between court and
counsel, and we see no reason to exempt the present situation from that
admonition.13 Indeed, the extraordinary nature of this meeting,
12
This is an objective standard. Hook, 89 F.3d at 353‐54. In denying the
motion for reconsideration, the Judge suggested that the fact that Mr. Salahuddin
did not desire his recusal demonstrates that such a standard has been met. We
respectfully disagree. Mr. Salahuddin is not an impartial observer. The Judge’s
view of the future course of this prosecution clearly was favorable to the defendant.
13
See United States v. Head, 927 F.2d 1361, 1376 (6th Cir. 1991) (observing
that the parties’ divergent recollections of what occurred during an off‐the‐record
presentence conference demonstrated the the “serious dangers of such discussions
off the record” and, “[b]ecause of the uncertainties attendant to this procedure,”
remanding “with directions to afford a full opportunity to defendant to address
those parts of the sentencing” affected by the in‐chambers conference); cf. Maltby v.
Winston, 36 F.3d 548, 561 n.18 (7th Cir. 1994) (noting that “it is the responsibility of
the district court, if it conducts the instruction conference without a court reporter,
(continued...)
No. 09‐2264 Page 16
evidenced by the Judge’s initial willingness to disqualify himself, should
it be requested, and his recognition that such a proceeding was
extraordinary, should have made the need to memorialize the event even
more obvious to the participants.
The substance of the discussion at the meeting convinces us that
the Judge misapprehended the limits of his authority. The parties agree
that, at the October 9 meeting, the Judge suggested a specific plea
bargain. This participation was clearly violative of the specific
prohibition in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure that forbids the
court from becoming involved in plea negotiations. See Fed. R. Crim. P.
11(c)(1).14 As the Fifth Circuit has noted, “such involvement ‘is likely to
13
(...continued)
to provide the parties with an opportunity to specifically object to jury instructions
on the record”); United States v. Gallo, 763 F.2d 1504, 1532 (6th Cir. 1985) (holding
that the defendant had waived violations of Court Reporters Act but noting that the
“safe course” was to “let the reporter record what takes place” during side bars).
14
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1) states:
(c) Plea Agreement Procedure.
1) In General. An attorney for the government and the defendant’s
attorney, or the defendant when proceeding pro se, may discuss
and reach a plea agreement. The court must not participate in these
discussions. If the defendant pleads guilty or nolo contendere to
either a charged offense or a lesser or related offense, the plea
agreement may specify that an attorney for the government will:
(A) not bring, or will move to dismiss, other charges;
(B) recommend, or agree not to oppose the defendantʹs
request, that a particular sentence or sentencing range is
(continued...)
No. 09‐2264 Page 17
impair the trial court’s impartiality. The judge who suggests or
encourages a particular plea bargain may feel a personal stake in the
agreement . . . and may therefore resent the defendant who rejects his
advice.’” United States v. Miles, 10 F.3d 1135, 1139 (5th Cir. 1993) (quoting
United States v. Adams, 634 F.2d 830, 840 (5th Cir. 1981)) (omissions in
original). We have expressed the same view in United States v. Kraus, 137
F.3d 447, 452 (7th Cir. 1998), when we wrote that “[e]xcluding the judge
from the plea discussions thus serves three purposes: it minimizes the
risk that the defendant will be judicially coerced into pleading guilty, it
preserves the impartiality of the court, and it avoids any appearance of
impropriety.” The judge who advocates a particular plea bargain may
resent the government for disagreeing.15
Here we must conclude that the Judge did more than simply
participate in a plea bargain.16 He questioned the Government’s decision
14
(...continued)
appropriate or that a particular provision of the Sentencing
Guidelines, or policy statement, or sentencing factor does
or does not apply (such a recommendation or request does
not bind the court); or
(C) agree that a specific sentence or sentencing range is the
appropriate disposition of the case, or that a particular
provision of the Sentencing Guidelines, or policy
statement, or sentencing factor does or does not apply
(such a recommendation or request binds the court once
the court accepts the plea agreement).
15
Because of the distinct possibility of such resentment, the Rule is violated
even when no plea negotiation actually takes place. See United States v. Baker, 489
F.3d 366, 371 n.3 (7th Cir. 2007).
16
See United States v. Kraus, 137 F.3d 447, 457 (7th Cir. 1998) (evaluating
(continued...)
No. 09‐2264 Page 18
to prosecute the matter as a federal case in terms that a reasonable
observer might well interpret as critical of the Government’s position in
the case. The statement that neither party would be pleased with his
ruling on the suppression motions could have been interpreted as
indicating that he was ill‐disposed toward the Government’s position
and might rule based not on the merits, but on his distaste for its
prosecutorial decision. A reasonable, well‐informed observer well may
have concluded that the Judge was no longer acting as a neutral arbiter,
but was advocating for his desired result.
The Supreme Court has noted that:
[O]pinions formed by the judge on the basis of facts introduced or
events occurring in the course of the current proceedings, or of
prior proceedings, do not constitute a basis for a bias or partiality
motion unless they display a deep‐seated favoritism or
antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible. Thus,
judicial remarks during the course of a trial that are critical or
disapproving of, or even hostile, to, counsel, the parties, or their
cases, ordinarily do not support a bias or partiality challenge. . .
. they will do so if they reveal such a high degree of favoritism or
antagonism as to make fair judgment impossible.
Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994) (emphasis in original). The
parties therefore correctly acknowledge that “[e]xpressions of impatience,
16
(...continued)
whether “the error in this case, or the appearance of error, was harmless” and
quoting Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(h) for the proposition that “[a]ny
variance from the procedures required by this rule which does not affect substantial
rights shall be disregarded,” but also noting that “insofar as judicial intervention in
the negotiation of a plea agreement is concerned, the possibility of harmless error
may be more theoretical than real”).
No. 09‐2264 Page 19
dissatisfaction, annoyance, and even anger,” do not establish bias or
partiality. Id. at 555‐56. We must conclude, however, that, taken in
context, some of the Judge’s comments go further and comment on
substantive matters, rather than the conduct of the proceedings. For
example, as we have just noted, the Judge questioned why this case was
accepted for federal prosecution, expressed concern about the time that
had passed between Mr. Salahuddin’s initial arrest and the
commencement of federal proceedings, and suggested that this case was
an embarrassment to the justice system and an inefficient allocation of
taxpayer resources. He also sought to avoid a conviction under 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c), so as to prevent imposition of the fifteen‐year mandatory
minimum sentence.
In expressing these views and insisting that action be taken to
conform the future course of litigation to those views, the Judge
misapprehended the limits of his authority as the presiding judicial
officer and undertook to participate in determinations that are in the
proper domain of the Department of Justice.17 The power of the
Executive Branch to make these decisions is a safeguard of liberty. As
this court has noted, entrusting these prerogatives to the Executive
ensures that “‘no one can be convicted of a crime without the concurrence
of all three branches.’” United States v. O’Neill, 437 F.3d 654, 660 (7th Cir.
2006) (Posner, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting In re United States,
345 F.3d 450, 454 (7th Cir. 2003)). Judges do not possess, and should not
attempt to exercise, prosecutorial discretion.
17
We cannot accept the suggestion that the appearance of impropriety was
somewhat lessened by the participation at the meeting of policy‐level officers‐‐the
United States Attorney and the Federal Defender‐‐rather than the litigating
attorneys. The United States Attorney has the ultimate authority to prosecute cases.
See 28 U.S.C. § 547. A reasonable observer certainly could conclude that the purpose
of the meeting was to pressure the officers present at the meeting to direct their
subordinates to undertake the course of action preferred by the Judge.
No. 09‐2264 Page 20
A motion under section 455(a) is “directed against the appearance
of partiality, whether or not the judge is actually biased.” Balistrieri, 779
F.2d at 1204 (emphasis supplied). We must conclude that the Judge’s
actions, assessed in their totality, are such that a reasonable, well‐
informed observer would question his partiality. Hook, 89 F.3d 350 at
353‐54.
The question before us is not whether the Judge is biased. If the
Government had the burden to establish that fact, it would have indeed
a high mountain to climb in light of the Judge’s distinguished public
service of almost forty years. However, we must conclude that the
Government is entitled to the issuance of the writ of mandamus for
which it has petitioned because it has established that a reasonable well‐
informed observer could question the Judge’s impartiality. Accordingly,
all orders entered by the Judge after the motion for recusal was filed must
be vacated.18 The Judge is directed to remove himself from further
proceedings in this matter.
It is so ordered.19
18
See N.Y. City Hous. Dev. Corp., 796 F.2d at 979.
19
Because we have granted the Government’s writ of mandamus, the
Government’s motion to compel disclosure is dismissed as moot.