Dargis, Liutauras v. Sheahan, Michael

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

____________

No. 05-2575

LIUTAURAS DARGIS,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

MICHAEL F. SHEAHAN, Sheriff of Cook County,

a/k/a and d/b/a Cook County Sheriff’s Office

of Corrections, MARCUS LYLES, Sheriff’s Assistant

Executive Director of the Cook County Sheriff’s

Office of Corrections, ERNESTO VELASCO, Executive

Director of the Cook County Sheriff’s Office

of Corrections, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

____________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 02 C 6872—Rebecca R. Pallmeyer, Judge.

____________

ARGUED NOVEMBER 9, 2007—DECIDED MAY 16, 2008

____________

Before BAUER, MANION, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.

MANION, Circuit Judge. Beginning in 1982, Liutauras

Dargis was employed as a correctional officer with the

Cook County Sheriff’s Office. In February 2000, Dargis

suffered a stroke while on duty. When Dargis attempted

to return to work in July 2001, the Sheriff’s Office declined

2 No. 05-2575

to reinstate him due to physical restrictions imposed

by Dargis’s physician, placing him instead on leave

without pay. After exhausting his administrative rem-

edies, Dargis filed suit in federal court against the Cook

County Sheriff’s Office, Cook County Sheriff Michael

Sheahan, Assistant Executive Director Marcus Lyles,

Executive Director Ernesto Velasco, and Cook County.1

Dargis alleged, in pertinent part, that the Sheriff’s Office

violated his due process rights by not providing him

with a hearing prior to placing him on leave, and vio-

lated the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) by

failing to reinstate him following his stroke. The Sheriff’s

Office moved for summary judgment on all claims. The

district court denied the motion on the issue of due pro-

cess, entering judgment instead for Dargis on those

claims, and directing the Sheriff’s Office to hold a

hearing on Dargis’s employment status within thirty

days. The motion was granted as to Dargis’s ADA

claims, and Dargis’s remaining claims, all based in state

law, were dismissed due to the district court’s decision

not to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over them.

Dargis now appeals, arguing that the district court erred

by not proceeding to trial on the damages he sustained

as a result of the due process violation, and by entering

summary judgment against him on his ADA claims.

Additionally, Dargis argues that the district court erred

by not exercising supplemental jurisdiction over his

state law claims and by denying a post-judgment motion

to alter or amend the judgment. We affirm the district

court.

1

We hereafter refer to the Defendants collectively as the

“Sheriff’s Office.”

No. 05-2575 3

I.

Dargis earned a Bachelor of Arts in Criminal Justice

from the University of Illinois in 1981, and became a

correctional officer with the Sheriff’s Office on May 1, 1982.

By all accounts, Dargis gave exemplary service and at

the time of the events giving rise to this suit, he had

risen to rank of Sergeant having supervisory authority

over seventy-five other officers. On February 9, 2000,

Dargis suffered a stroke while on duty. This stroke re-

sulted in Dargis’s hospitalization, and he was placed on

short-term disability leave by the Sheriff’s Office. Dargis

remained on disability leave for over a year.

On June 28, 2001, Dargis’s physician, Dr. Margaret

Wade, provided him with a letter setting forth numerous

medical conditions from which he suffered. In addition

to listing his status as post-Cerebral Vascular Accident

(stroke), Dr. Wade indicated that Dargis suffered from

Type 1 Diabetes, Coronary Artery Disease, Chronic

Myofacial Pain Syndrome, Bilateral Retinopathy, Vitreous

Hemorrhages, Peripheral Vascular Disease, and a

Neuropathic Bladder. Dr. Wade stated her belief that

Dargis could return to work as of July 2, 2001, subject to

the following limitations: (1) no physical contact,2 (2)

no physical activity other than sitting in a chair with

brief episodes of standing and walking, (3) no lifting,

kneeling, stooping, or running, and (4) a work environ-

ment with adequate heat and air conditioning. Before

the date of his return, Dargis claims to have been told by

an Assistant Executive Director of the Sheriff’s Office,

2

While not clear from the letter, the parties are in agreement

that this restriction means no physical contact with inmates.

4 No. 05-2575

John Maul, that he would be placed in a position re-

quiring no contact with inmates upon his return.3 Upon

returning to work on July 2, 2001, Dargis met with his

supervisor, Assistant Executive Director Marcus Lyles,

and presented him with the letter from Dr. Wade. Dargis

also clarified for Lyles that not having any inmate con-

tact was necessary because a blow to his head might

result in blindness or other serious medical problems.

Believing that Dargis could no longer perform the essen-

tial functions of a correctional officer, Lyles made the

decision not to return him to work.

The parties dispute whether positions exist within the

Sheriff’s Office that do not require inmate contact. In an

affidavit submitted in support of the Sheriff’s Office’s

summary judgment motion, Lyles stated that correc-

tional officers are primarily responsible for maintaining

vigil, standing guard, counting inmates, breaking up

fights among inmates, inspecting for contraband,

escorting inmates outside their cells, searching inmates

and visitors, and searching for escaped inmates. Lyles

conceded that there are some positions requiring less

inmate contact than others, but asserted that all officers,

regardless of the position to which they were assigned,

must be able to respond to emergencies such as riots or

escapes, and must be able to rotate through various

positions as needed. This requirement, often occurring

due to unforeseeable events, meant that the Sheriff’s

Office was unable to guarantee that any assignment

would shield an officer from all inmate contact.

Lyles’s description of the range of duties for which a

correctional officer is responsible is confirmed by the

3

There is no statement by Maul contained in the record.

No. 05-2575 5

Correctional Officer Job Description provided by Cook

County’s Position Classification Agency and submitted

at the summary judgment stage by Dargis. The Job De-

scription sets forth a correctional officer’s duties as follows:

Observes and supervises the behavior of inmates

confined to Cook County’s Correctional Institutions.

Enforces rules and regulations established for the

maintenance of order, discipline and safety. Makes

rounds of assigned area to insure that all security

procedures are adhered to and all inmates under

surveillance are accounted for. Communicates

with inmates to ascertain attitudes, problems and

rehabilitation. Performs a variety of other related

duties to assist with jail operations.

The Job Description also lists certain desirable qualifica-

tions a correctional officer should exhibit, including

“[c]onsiderable good judgment and initiative . . . to assure

prompt and thorough action during routine and

emergency situations,” and the “[a]bility to supervise

and control inmate crews.” The Job Description as filed

had attached seventeen descriptions of specific positions

and duties.

In his affidavit submitted in opposition to the motion

for summary judgment, Dargis stated that he had per-

formed all seventeen positions attached to the County’s

Job Description, and conceded that the majority of them

involve contact with inmates. Dargis asserted, however,

that there were a number of assignments not requiring

any inmate contact, including the prison’s tower, the

master control security center, various points of entrance

to and egress from the prison, the records department,

the training academy, the computer room, and the firing

range. Dargis claims that he repeatedly requested of

6 No. 05-2575

Lyles to be placed in one of these positions, believing

that such placement would accommodate the limitations

imposed by Dr. Wade,4 but that his requests were

ignored. Additionally, Dargis requested a hearing on

Lyles’s decision, but this request was denied. Dargis was

instead placed on what the parties refer to as “zero pay

status.” Specifically, he was not terminated, which

would have necessitated the filing of a charge with the

Cook County Sheriff’s Merit Board and a subsequent

hearing. See 55 ILCS 5/3-7012. Instead, Dargis remained

officially in the employ of the Sheriff’s Office, however,

he received no pay and had no recourse to a hearing.

On November 29, 2001, Dargis filed charges of dis-

crimination with both the Illinois Department of Human

Rights and the United States Equal Employment Opportu-

nity Commission, and he received a right to sue letter

on June 28, 2002. Dargis initiated this action in the dis-

trict court on September 26, 2002. On April 4, 2003, he

filed an Amended Complaint stating claims for violation

of the ADA, violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and

the Due Process Clause of the Constitution pursuant to

42 U.S.C. § 1983, constitutional violations resulting from

an alleged constructive discharge pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983, conspiracy to violate the ADA and Dargis’s civil

4

The number and nature of Dargis’s requests to Lyles are

unclear because there is no documentation of them in the

record save Dargis’s statement in his affidavit that they were

made. The only request contained in the record was made

to Maul on Dargis’s behalf by the American Federation of

State, County and Municipal Employees asking that he be

allowed to return to work, and be considered specifically for

an assignment to the “Record Office, 7-3 Shift.”

No. 05-2575 7

rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985, and eight

state law claims arising from the Illinois Constitution,

statutes, and common law. The Sheriff’s Office moved

for summary judgment on all of Dargis’s claims on

March 29, 2004. On March 25, 2005, the district court

entered an order concluding that the Sheriff’s Office

had violated Dargis’s due process rights as protected

by federal and state law. Specifically, the district court

found that the “[Sheriff’s Office’s] placement of [Dargis]

on ‘zero pay status’ and refusal to return him to active

duty constitutes a deprivation of a protected property

interest, despite the fact that [Dargis] technically remains

an employee of the Department of Corrections.” The

district court concluded that Dargis was entitled to a

hearing before imposition of this deprivation, and the

Sheriff’s Office was directed to conduct a hearing

within thirty days of the judgment pursuant to 55 ILCS

5/3-7012. Summary judgment was entered in favor of

the Sheriff’s Office on Dargis’s remaining federal claims,

and the remaining state claims were dismissed without

prejudice when the district court declined to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction over them. Dargis filed a

motion to alter or amend the judgment, asserting that

the district court had overlooked evidence relevant to

his ADA claims. Dargis also claimed that the district

court was required to proceed to trial to determine the

damages he suffered as a result of the due process vio-

lation. This motion was denied on April 27, 2005.

Dargis raises four issues in his appeal. First, Dargis

argues that there existed genuine issues of material fact

which should have prevented the district court from

entering summary judgment against him on his ADA

claims. Second, although judgment was entered in his

8 No. 05-2575

favor on his due process claims, Dargis argues that the

district court erred by directing the Sheriff’s Office to

hold a hearing instead of proceeding to trial on his

claim for damages, attorney’s fees and other appropriate

relief. Third, Dargis asserts that the district court abused

its discretion in dismissing his state law claims. Finally,

Dargis claims that the district court erred when it

denied his motion to alter or amend the judgment against

him. The Sheriff’s Office maintains that no error was

committed by the district court.

II.

A. ADA Claim

We review a district court’s grant of summary judg-

ment de novo, and draw all inferences in favor of the

nonmoving party. Breneisen v. Motorola, Inc., 512 F.3d 972,

977 (7th Cir. 2008). Though given the benefit of this well-

known standard, “[t]o survive summary judgment, the

nonmoving party must make a sufficient showing of

evidence for each essential element of its case on which

it bears the burden at trial.” Kampmier v. Emeritus Corp.,

472 F.3d 930, 936 (7th Cir. 2007) (citing Celotex Corp. v.

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986)). Dargis claims that by

failing to accommodate him after his stroke, the Sheriff’s

Office violated the ADA’s mandate that it not “discrimi-

nate against a qualified individual with a disability be-

cause of the disability.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). To make

out a prima facie case of disability discrimination, Dargis

must establish that (1) he suffers from a disability as

defined in the ADA, (2) he is qualified to perform the

essential functions of the job in question, with or without

reasonable accommodation, and (3) he has suffered an

No. 05-2575 9

adverse employment action as a result of his disability.

Jackson v. City of Chicago, 414 F.3d 806, 810 (7th Cir. 2005).

The Sheriff’s Office asserts that Dargis cannot establish

the second element of this test, namely, that he is quali-

fied to perform the essential functions of a correctional

officer, whether reasonably accommodated or not.

There are two requirements Dargis must meet to

show that, though disabled, he is qualified to perform

the essential functions of a correctional officer. He must

(1) “satisfy ‘the requisite skill, experience, education and

other job-related requirements of the employment posi-

tion [he] holds or desires,’ ” and (2) “establish that he

‘can perform the essential functions of such position’ with

or without accommodation.” Ross v. Ind. State Teacher’s

Ass’n Ins. Trust, 159 F.3d 1001, 1013 (7th Cir. 1998) (quoting

29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m)). There is no dispute that Dargis

satisfies the first requirement—after receiving a degree

in criminal justice in 1981, he served admirably as a

correctional officer for almost twenty years before his

stroke. The Sheriff’s Office argues, however, that Dargis

can no longer perform the essential functions of a cor-

rectional officer. Indeed, Dargis admitted during his

deposition that he cannot stand watch over the inmates,

break up fights, inspect cells, escort inmates when they

are out of their cells, or search for escaped inmates. Not-

withstanding these inabilities, Dargis asserts that he

can still perform the essential functions of a correctional

officer if he is assigned to a position requiring no

inmate contact, including the prison’s entrances and

exits, tower, control center, records department, com-

puter room, or firing range.

In Miller v. Illinois Department of Corrections, 107 F.3d 483

(7th Cir. 1997), we considered whether a correctional

10 No. 05-2575

officer with the Illinois Department of Corrections re-

mained able to perform the essential functions of a cor-

rectional officer after she went blind. Like Dargis, the

appellant in Miller conceded that she was unable to

perform the majority of functions normally associated

with being a correctional officer, but argued that she

could continue in the position if given the assignment of

either switchboard operator or armory officer.5 We held,

however, that “if an employer has a legitimate reason

for specifying multiple duties for a particular job classi-

fication, duties the occupant of the position is expected

to rotate through, a disabled employee will not be quali-

fied for the position unless he can perform enough of

these duties to enable a judgment that he can perform its

essential duties.” Id. at 485 (emphasis in original). The

reason for this is clear—“to be able to respond to unex-

pected surges in the demand for particular abilities.” Id.

The prison has to be able to call upon its full staff

of correctional officers for help in putting down a

prison riot, and therefore each officer must have

experience in the positions, such as searching and

escorting inmates, that provide the necessary training

and experience for responding effectively to a riot,

as well as the capability for such response.

Id. Obviously a prison riot is an extreme threat. But there

are many other duties that include disciplining pris-

oners, inspections, intervening in disputes, and dealing

with routine but sometimes tense situations that cannot

be subtracted from the performance expectations of a

5

An “armory officer” is “in charge of issuing guns to correc-

tional officers as needed.” Miller, 107 F.3d at 485.

No. 05-2575 11

correctional officer. This necessary ability to respond to

emergencies was the exact reason provided by Lyles

for why Cook County correctional officers must be able

to rotate through all positions. Like the Illinois Depart-

ment of Corrections in Miller, it is the position of the

Sheriff’s Office that the ability to rotate through all posi-

tions, including the majority of them that involve

inmate contact, is a prerequisite for someone being quali-

fied to perform the essential functions of a correctional

officer. Additionally, Dargis did not request placement

in another position in the Sheriff’s Office, but rather

sought accommodation in order to retain his position as

a correctional officer. Because the Sheriff’s Office need

not “manufacture a job that will enable the disabled

worker to work despite his disability,” Hansen v. Hender-

son, 233 F.3d 521, 523 (7th Cir. 2000), Dargis’s inability to

rotate through the various positions of a correctional

officer means that he cannot perform the essential func-

tions of that job. Carving out a job that included very

few of the duties all other correctional officers were

expected to perform would have the effect of creating

a new position for an employee who would not be other-

wise qualified.

Dargis argues that there is a genuine issue of material

fact regarding the existence of a requirement that correc-

tional officers be able to rotate through all positions

because he is aware of officers who were placed in posi-

tions in order to avoid inmate contact. During his dep-

osition, Dargis stated that he supervised an officer named

Barbara Siejka, and was directed by his supervisors to

assign her to a position without inmate contact because

she had a cardiovascular illness. Dargis was aware of

another officer with the last name Bablicock who was

12 No. 05-2575

assigned to positions not involving inmate contact be-

cause she was in the habit of starting arguments with

inmates. Finally, Dargis knew of an officer named Emil

Jones who was assigned to the firing range after he suf-

fered a stroke and returned to work with a cane.

If it is true that the Sheriff’s Office regularly assigned

officers with Dargis’s restrictions to permanent positions

where they were guaranteed no inmate contact, that

fact might undercut the legitimacy of its assertion that

all officers need to be able to rotate through the full

gamut of correctional officer positions. However, these

statements by Dargis are insufficient to create a genuine

issue of material fact on that point. Dargis set forth no

evidence tending to establish that any of these officers

needed to avoid all inmate contact at all times, as in his

own case. The closest call might be with Siejka, however

Dargis could not recall if her medical or other paper-

work required such an absolute accommodation.6

Dargis’s statements tell us very little about the other

officers’ conditions, the reasons for their assignment, or

the completeness of their isolation from inmates. Addi-

tionally, Dargis is silent regarding the extent to which, if

6

Additionally, Dargis stated during his deposition that

Siejka, who was normally assigned to the lobby, would have

been required to carry a weapon in that assignment. This

requirement shows that the Sheriff’s Office anticipated the

possibility, however minimal, that even a correctional officer

assigned to a specific position in order to avoid inmate con-

tact might be involved in an altercation. It also reveals the

difficulty, if not the impossibility, of attempting to accom-

modate someone with Dargis’s limitations in the position of

a correctional officer.

No. 05-2575 13

at all, these other officers shared Dargis’s other medical

requirements, such as avoiding most physical activity

other than sitting, avoiding lifting, kneeling, stooping,

or running, and staying in a temperature-controlled

environment. Finally, even if the Sheriff’s Office did

assign some officers to positions where they were able to

avoid inmate contact completely, Dargis’s testimony does

not show that such a position was available when he

sought reinstatement, and that the Sheriff’s Office over-

looked Dargis for it. Hansen, 233 F.3d at 523 (noting that

a “worker cannot demand that his employer give him a

job for which there is no vacancy without shifting the

worker who has that job to another job in order to create

a vacancy for the disabled worker.”).

Dargis further argues that the district court erred in

granting judgment against him on his ADA claims be-

cause there was no evidence suggesting that the Sheriff’s

Office engaged in the legally required interactive process

to determine whether his disability could be accommo-

dated. See E.E.O.C. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 417 F.3d 789, 797

(7th Cir. 2005) (noting that “the ADA requires that em-

ployer and employee engage in an interactive process to

determine a reasonable accommodation”) (quotation

omitted). “When . . . the disabled worker has communi-

cated his disability to his employer and asked for an

accommodation so that he can continue working, the

employer has the burden of exploring with the worker

the possibility of a reasonable accommodation.” Hansen,

233 F.3d at 523.

For certain, Dargis communicated his disability to the

Sheriff’s Office, thereby triggering its duty to engage

Dargis in the process of exploring possible avenues of

accommodation. However, while Dargis claims the Sher-

14 No. 05-2575

iff’s Office failed to engage in the process, such failure

“cannot give rise to a claim for relief . . . if the employer

can show that no reasonable accommodation was possi-

ble.” Sears, Roebuck & Co., 417 F.3d at 805 (quotation

omitted). Unfortunately, Dargis’s disabilities—generally,

that he could engage in very limited physical activity

and have no inmate contact—were severe enough to

bring the interactive process to a prompt end once

they were made known. As set forth above, the Sheriff’s

Office showed through the statement of Lyles that cor-

rectional officers need to be able to rotate through all

positions for reasons of safety and inmate control. This

statement is supported by our prior decision in Miller,

107 F.3d at 485. The Sheriff’s Office being able to make

the required showing that no reasonable accommodation

was possible, there was no further interactive process

necessary. Its failure to engage in such interaction pro-

vides no basis for disturbing the district court’s judgment.

In sum, we conclude that Dargis failed to meet his

burden of establishing a prima facie case under the ADA

because he was unable to show that he could perform

the essential functions of a correctional officer. Dargis’s

knowledge of other officers who may have been assigned

in order to avoid inmate contact does not create a gen-

uine issue of material fact about the legitimacy of the

Sheriff’s Office’s requirement that officers be able to

rotate through all positions. Furthermore, because disa-

bilities like Dargis’s could not be reasonably accommo-

dated, there was no need to engage in an interactive

process regarding accommodation. Accordingly, we

conclude that the district court committed no error

in entering summary judgment in favor of the Sheriff’s

Office on Dargis’s ADA claims.

No. 05-2575 15

B. Due Process Claim

Dargis next argues that after finding that his procedural

due process rights, as protected by both the United

States and Illinois Constitutions, were violated, the dis-

trict court ordered the wrong remedy by merely di-

recting the Sheriff’s Office to hold a Merit Board hearing

pursuant to 55 ILCS 5/3-7012. Dargis claims that the

appropriate course would have been for the district court

to proceed to trial on his claim for damages, attorney’s

fees, and other appropriate relief. Thus, the only due

process question before us is whether, after finding a

violation, the district court’s order for a hearing was the

proper remedy. The Sheriff’s Office states in its brief

that while it does not agree that Dargis was unlawfully

deprived of a property interest, it is assuming for argu-

ment’s sake that such a violation occurred, and thus

argues only that the district court’s choice of remedies

was correct.

Both the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution

of the United States, and Article One, Section Two of

the Illinois Constitution provide that a person shall not

be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due pro-

cess of law. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; Ill. Const. of 1970,

art. I, § 2. For an employee to have a constitutionally

protected property interest in continued employment,

that interest must be “created and defined by an inde-

pendent source, such as state law or a contract.” Miyler

v. Village of East Galesburg, 512 F.3d 896, 898 (7th Cir. 2008).

Here, Illinois law provided that “no . . . county correc-

tions officer . . . shall be removed, demoted or sus-

pended except for cause, upon written charges filed

with the [Merit] Board by the Sheriff and a hearing

before the Board thereon upon not less than 10 days’

16 No. 05-2575

notice at a place to be designated by the chairman thereof.”

55 ILCS 5/3-7012. At this hearing, the officer would be

“afforded full opportunity to be heard in his or her

own defense and to produce proof in his or her defense.”

Id. The district court found that while Dargis was never

terminated, the decision to stop paying him implicated

a concrete benefit of the type that creates a property

interest that may not be taken away absent the process

set forth above. See Barrows v. Wiley, 478 F.3d 776, 780 (7th

Cir. 2007) (distinguishing between mere acquisitional

opportunities which do not implicate the Constitution,

and vested benefits protected by nondiscretionary rules

of which someone may not be deprived without due

process). Although the district court concluded that

Dargis was entitled to the hearing, it expressly stated that

it had not considered the merits of Dargis’s placement on

“zero pay status,” or his remedies under state law.

We conclude that the district court acted appropriately

in directing the Sheriff’s Office to conduct a hearing in-

stead of proceeding to trial on damages. “Procedural due

process rules are meant to protect persons not from the

deprivation, but from the mistaken or unjustified deprivation

of life, liberty, or property.” Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247,

259 (1978) (emphasis added). For this reason, where a

plaintiff would have suffered the same fate had the re-

quired hearing been held, he is not entitled to recover

damages caused by the suspension. Id. at 260 (agreeing

with the court of appeals that to award damages for

injuries caused by a justified suspension imposed with-

out a hearing would amount to a windfall rather than

compensation). If the placement of Dargis on involuntary

unpaid leave was justified based on his physical con-

dition, then awarding him the damages sought would

result in the type of windfall discussed in Carey. Addition-

No. 05-2575 17

ally, based on its findings regarding Dargis’s ADA claims,

if the district court was the entity to consider whether

Dargis’s leave was justified, it would be placed in the

incongruous position of considering whether to award

compensation to Dargis in the form of lost wages for a

job it had found him unable to perform. There is nothing

in the record, however, indicating that Merit Board hear-

ings are governed by the same standards as a federal

ADA claim. Accordingly, we conclude that the district

court correctly decided that the Merit Board could better

determine whether Dargis’s placement on involuntary

unpaid leave was justified.

Furthermore, in declining to consider the merits of

Dargis’s placement on “zero pay status,” the district

court did not foreclose Dargis’s opportunities for mon-

etary relief. We have previously noted that an officer in

Dargis’s position can obtain back pay to which he is

entitled by petitioning the Merit Board, initiating an

action of mandamus, or, unless the applicable statute of

limitations has run, filing suit under the Illinois wage

payment statute. Ellis v. Sheahan, 412 F.3d 754, 756-57

(7th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted). Taking all of these

considerations together, we conclude that the district court

committed no error in directing the Sheriff’s Office to

conduct a hearing on Dargis’s placement on “zero pay

status” rather than proceeding to a damages trial itself.

C. State Law Claims

Dargis next challenges the district court’s decision not

to exercise jurisdiction over his remaining state law

claims, dismissing them instead without prejudice. In

addition to Dargis’s state due process claim, on which the

district court ruled in his favor, Dargis stated claims for

18 No. 05-2575

violation of the Illinois Human Rights Act, 745 ILCS 5/2-

102, respondeat superior against the Sheriff and Sheriff’s

Office, violation of the Illinois Governmental Employees

Tort Immunity Act, 745 ILCS 10/9-102, wrongful con-

structive discharge, breach of a collective bargaining

agreement, violation of the Cook County Human Rights

Ordinance, No. 93-0-13, and conspiracy to violate the

Illinois Human Rights Act and the Cook County Human

Rights Ordinance. A district court has the discretion not

to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over pendent state

law claims when it dismisses the claims over which it

has original jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), and we

review that decision for abuse of discretion. Williams

Electronics Games, Inc. v. Garrity, 479 F.3d 904, 906 (7th

Cir. 2007). We have held that the district courts

should exercise this discretion to relinquish jurisdiction

over state law claims that remain after the dismissal of

federal claims unless any of the following three circum-

stances exists: (1) the state law claims may not be re-filed

because a statute of limitations has expired, (2) substantial

judicial resources have been expended on the state

claims, or (3) it is clearly apparent how the state claims

are to be decided. Williams v. Rodriguez, 509 F.3d 392,

404 (7th Cir. 2007).

Dargis does not argue that any of these three excep-

tions is present here, and we find no evidence of them

in the record. Rather, Dargis first argues that by dis-

missing his state law claims without prejudice, the dis-

trict court “relegat[ed] a desperate plaintiff to his ad-

versary and nemesis and to the notoriously backlogged

Cook County judicial system.” However, the equal dig-

nity of the state and federal courts, even to adjudicate

federal claims, is a well-established principle of our

legal system. See Giles v. NYLCare Health Plans, Inc., 172

No. 05-2575 19

F.3d 332, 339 (5th Cir. 1999) (citing Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S.

455, 458 (1990)). And regarding state claims, state courts

can provide a better forum when the issue being consid-

ered is a state actor’s compliance with state law. Mid-Am.

Waste Sys., Inc. v. City of Gary, 49 F.3d 286, 291 (7th Cir.

1995). Accordingly, this argument provides Dargis no

basis for relief.

Dargis next argues that dismissal of his state claims was

inappropriate because all of his federal claims were not

dismissed—judgment was actually entered in his favor

on his federal due process claim. However, we see no

problem with the district court’s action because actual

dismissal of all federal claims is not required for a district

court to exercise the discretion afforded it regarding

supplemental jurisdiction. Section 1367 itself allows

dismissal of state law claims when they raise novel or

complex questions of state law, or where they predom-

inate over the federal claims, with no reference in either

instance to dismissal of federal claims. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1367(c)(1) and (2). Moreover, “[t]he rationale of the

supplemental jurisdiction is economy in litigation,”

Williams Electronics Games, 479 F.3d at 906, and we see

no reason that a district court must entertain Dargis’s

seven state law claims, on which no other judicial re-

sources have been expended, simply because it disposed

of a federal due process claim in his favor. Accordingly,

we conclude that the district court did not abuse its

discretion in declining to exercise supplemental juris-

diction over Dargis’s state law claims.

D. Motion to Alter or Amend

Finally, Dargis asserts that the district court erred in

denying his motion to alter or amend the judgment

20 No. 05-2575

entered against him. A review of this motion, however,

reveals that the only grounds for relief it sets forth are

identical to the first two issues we have considered on

appeal. Because the district court did not commit error

in its disposition of Dargis’s ADA claims, nor in directing

the Sheriff’s Office to conduct a hearing instead of pro-

ceeding to trial, there was no basis for granting Dargis’s

motion. The district court therefore committed no error

in denying it.

III.

Because Dargis was unable to establish that he was

qualified to perform the essential functions of the cor-

rectional officer position, he did not make out a prima

facie case of discrimination under the ADA, and the dis-

trict court did not err in entering judgment for the

Sheriff’s Office on those claims. Additionally, because

the Merit Board was better suited to consider the justi-

fication for Dargis’s placement on leave, and because

those proceedings afforded Dargis an opportunity for

monetary relief, the district court did not err in directing

the Sheriff’s Office to conduct a hearing before the Merit

Board rather than proceeding to trial itself. Finally, we

conclude that the district court did not abuse its discre-

tion in declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction

over Dargis’s state law claims, and that there was no

basis for granting Dargis’s motion to alter or amend the

judgment. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court’s

disposition of Dargis’s claims.

USCA-02-C-0072—5-16-08