Shipman, Karen Y. v. Hamilton, Eric

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

____________

No. 07-2098

KAREN Y. SHIPMAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

ERIC HAMILTON,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Illinois.

No. 06 C 242—Michael J. Reagan, Judge.

____________

ARGUED DECEMBER 4, 2007—DECIDED APRIL 1, 2008

____________

Before RIPPLE, MANION, and WOOD, Circuit Judges.

MANION, Circuit Judge. Karen Shipman filed suit pursu-

ant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Deputy Eric Hamilton of the

Randolph County Sheriff’s Department. In her complaint,

Shipman asserted that Hamilton had violated her rights

under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments when he

arrested her while she was on duty as a nurse at the Sparta

Community Hospital (the “hospital”) in Sparta, Illinois.

Hamilton filed a motion for summary judgment. In that

motion, he argued that he had probable cause to arrest

Shipman. In the alternative, Hamilton asserted that he was

2 No. 07-2098

entitled to qualified immunity. The district court denied

Hamilton’s motion, and he filed this interlocutory appeal.

We affirm.

I.

We begin by setting forth the facts as the district court

found them, that is, in the light most favorable to Shipman.

See Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 319-20 (1995). On the night

of April 28, 2005, Shipman, a registered nurse, was on duty

at the medical-surgical floor of the hospital. While Shipman

had worked a few shifts in the hospital’s emergency room,

that night was Shipman’s first night on duty on the

medical-surgical floor.

Around midnight, Hamilton and Deputy Rod Queen

entered the hospital to serve an emergency order of

protection1 on Roscoe Handsbury, a 60-year-old patient at

the hospital who was in an “ICU-like” environment. At the

time the officers arrived, Shipman was the highest-ranking

nurse, and the only registered nurse, on the floor. The

officers announced that they had papers to serve

Handsbury and asked to speak to Handsbury’s nurse. In

response, Shipman told the officers that she was

Handsbury’s nurse.

What happened next is disputed. While Hamilton

testified at his deposition that Shipman would not give the

officers Handsbury’s location, Shipman testified at her

deposition that she pointed out to the officers the room

where Handsbury was located. (Shipman’s testimony is

1

The record does not disclose why the officers had to serve the

emergency order of protection on Handsbury.

No. 07-2098 3

confirmed by Queen, who testified at his deposition that

Shipman told them where Handsbury was and that they

could see Handsbury through the window in his room.)

According to Shipman, after she gave the officers

Handsbury’s location, Hamilton inquired about

Handsbury’s condition. Shipman responded that, although

she was not sure of his exact condition, she thought she

needed to call the doctor because the report on Handsbury

stated that he had been extremely upset and crying

throughout the day. Shipman then told the officers that,

given his condition, she thought they should wait for the

doctor to be present before serving Handsbury. Shipman

was concerned about a stroke or other potential medical

complication if the officers woke up Handsbury in the

middle of the night to serve him. She also feared violating

her obligations under the Health Insurance Portability and

Accounting Act if she let the officers into Handsbury’s

room.

At that point, Hamilton suggested that Shipman call her

supervisors. Shipman first called the on-call doctor, Dr.

Elvira Salarda. Salarda told Shipman that Handsbury was

not going anywhere and that the officers should come back

in the morning when she was present. Salarda also sug-

gested that Shipman call her supervisor Kathy Lehr. At her

deposition, Shipman testified that, while she was on the

phone with the doctor, Hamilton started to become aggra-

vated. After getting off the phone with Salarda, Shipman

called Lehr and explained to her what Salarda had said.

Shipman then gave the phone to Hamilton (who, Shipman

testified, was at this point “very aggravated”). Lehr told

Hamilton that he ought to return to the hospital at 8:00 a.m.

the next morning so he could serve Handsbury while a

doctor was present.

4 No. 07-2098

Meanwhile, after handing the phone to Hamilton,

Shipman—believing matters would be taken care of—

returned to her nursing duties. As soon as Hamilton got off

the phone, however, he approached Shipman, who was

preparing an IV, told her she had blocked his service of

process by calling the doctor, stated that he was going to

arrest her, and demanded her name. According to

Shipman, she did not respond to Hamilton because she was

“stunned.”2 Hamilton then grabbed Shipman by the arms,

cuffed her, and forced her down the hallway, out of the

hospital. The charges filed against Shipman list “obstruct-

ing service of process” in violation of 720 ILCS 5/31-3

and “obstructing a peace officer” in violation of 720

ILCS 5/31-1 as the grounds for the arrest.3

On March 24, 2006, Shipman filed this § 1983 action

against Hamilton. She alleged that Hamilton violated her

rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments by

arresting her without probable cause. Hamilton moved for

summary judgment. He argued that he had probable cause

to arrest Shipman. In the alternative, he asserted that he

was entitled to qualified immunity. The district court

denied the motion on both grounds, and Hamilton appeals.

II.

The only question before us on this appeal is whether,

taking the facts as the district court presented them, the

2

Shipman also testified that she was wearing a name badge

displaying her name, title, and picture.

3

We assume that these charges were later dismissed, though

the record contains no reference to their dismissal.

No. 07-2098 5

district court erred in finding that Hamilton was not

entitled to qualified immunity for his arrest of Shipman.

We have jurisdiction to consider this purely legal question.

Via v. Lagrand, 469 F.3d 618, 623 n.2 (7th Cir. 2006) (citing

Johnson, 515 U.S. at 317); see also Sallenger v. Oakes, 473 F.3d

731, 738 (7th Cir. 2007) (“Recognizing the urgency of

denials of qualified immunity, [a denial of] summary

judgment on these grounds is deemed a ‘final judgment’

under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and is immediately appealable.”).

We review a district court’s denial of summary judgment

on qualified immunity grounds de novo. Washington v.

Haupert, 481 F.3d 543, 546 (7th Cir. 2007).

Qualified immunity shields governmental actors per-

forming discretionary functions from suit “insofar as their

conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would

have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).

Whether an officer is entitled to qualified immunity in any

particular case is a two-step inquiry. Saucier v. Katz, 533

U.S. 194, 201 (2001). First, taking the facts in the light most

favorable to the plaintiff, we must consider whether the

officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right. Id. If no

constitutional right would have been violated were the

plaintiff’s allegations established, our inquiry is at an end

and summary judgment should be entered in favor of the

officer. Id. “On the other hand, if a violation could be made

out on a favorable view of the parties’ submissions, the

next, sequential step is to ask whether the right was clearly

established.” Id. “[F]or a constitutional right to be clearly

established, its contours must be sufficiently clear that a

reasonable official would understand that what he is doing

violates that right”; in other words, “in the light of preexist-

ing law the unlawfulness must be apparent.” White v. City

6 No. 07-2098

of Markham, 310 F.3d 989, 993 (7th Cir. 2002) (internal

quotations omitted). “If the right was clearly established,

the officer is not entitled to qualified immunity.” Washing-

ton, 481 F.3d at 547 (emphasis in original).

In this case, the constitutional right Shipman alleges that

Hamilton violated when he arrested her without a warrant

was her right to be free from an unreasonable seizure

under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. “The

Fourth Amendment permits warrantless arrests only if the

arresting officer has probable cause to believe that a crime

has been committed.” Id. (citing Thompson v. Wagner, 319

F.3d 931, 934 (7th Cir. 2003)). Probable cause exists where

an officer reasonably believes, in light of the facts and

circumstances known to the officer at the time of the arrest,

that the suspect had committed or was committing an

offense. Payne v. Pauley, 337 F.3d 767, 776 (7th Cir. 2003).

“The test is an objective one and evaluates whether proba-

ble cause existed on the facts as they appeared to a reason-

able police officer, even if the reasonable belief of that

officer is ultimately found to be incorrect.” Id. (citing Kelley

v. Myler, 149 F.3d 641, 646 (7th Cir. 1998)). According to the

charges filed against Shipman, Hamilton arrested Shipman

for obstructing service of process in violation of 720 ILCS

5/31-3 and obstructing a peace officer in violation of 720

ILCS 5/31-1. The question, then, is whether Hamilton had

probable cause to arrest Shipman for either of those

offenses.

We can immediately rule out probable cause for an arrest

of Shipman for obstruction of a peace officer. Under Illinois

law, the offense of obstructing a police officer requires

some sort of physical resistance on the part of the suspect.

Payne, 337 F.3d at 776 (“It is well settled under Illinois

law . . . that the resistance [720 ILCS 5/31-1 requires] must

No. 07-2098 7

be physical . . . .”). Here, taking the facts as we have them,

Shipman did not physically resist Hamilton.

That leaves the offense of obstructing service of process

as the only ground upon which Hamilton can justify his

arrest of Shipman. Obstructing service of process is defined

as “knowingly resist[ing] or obstruct[ing] the authorized

service or execution of any civil or criminal process or

order of any court.” 720 ILCS 5/31-3. In arguing that he

had probable cause to arrest Shipman for obstructing

service of process—or at least could have reasonably

believed under existing law that he had probable cause to

do so—Hamilton places great emphasis on his view that

Illinois law is less than clear on what constitutes obstruct-

ing service of process under 720 ILCS 5/31-3. According to

Hamilton, the offense of obstructing service of process,

unlike the offense of obstructing a peace officer, does not

require an act of physical resistance. Rather, Hamilton

argues that a reasonable police officer could believe that

the offense of obstructing service of process could be

committed simply by any action or inaction that might

impede, hinder, or delay the performance of the officer’s

duties.

In support of his interpretation of Illinois law, Hamilton

relies on Silverman v. Ballantine, 694 F.2d 1091 (7th Cir.

1982), and People v. Meister, 682 N.E.2d 306 (Ill. Ct. App.

1997). In Silverman, this court held that a decedent had

obstructed service of process when he, in no uncertain

terms, informed officers that they were not going to seize

his computer equipment, retreated from a reception area to

his inner office, and continued to refuse the officers access

to the equipment after they unlocked the door of the

reception area and entered his office. 694 F.2d at 1092-

93, 1095. This court noted that “[a]lthough obstructing

8 No. 07-2098

service or execution of process under [720 ILCS 5/31-3]

cannot be premised on ‘mere argument’ with a police

officer, it may be premised on a physical act which . . . may

impede, hinder, interrupt, prevent or delay the perfor-

mance of the officer’s duties.” Id. at 1095 (citing People v.

Raby, 240 N.E.2d 595 (Ill. 1968)) (internal quotation omit-

ted). In Meister, the defendant called the police who were

seeking to serve a subpoena on his wife and gave false

information about his wife’s whereabouts. 682 N.E.2d at

309. Noting that the intentional, “self-initiated provision of

false information” to the police could pose a greater

obstruction on many occasions than any physical act, the

court in Meister held that a physical act was not required to

obstruct service of process under 720 ILCS 5/31-3. Id. at

309-10 (“We believe too much emphasis is often placed

upon the Raby . . . language [requiring a ‘physical act’].”).

The court then found that the defendant’s false information

created an obstacle that may have “impede[d], hinder[ed],

interrupt[ed], prevent[ed] or delay[ed] the performance of

the officer’s duties” and therefore constituted obstructing

service of process. Id. at 310.

We need not determine whether Hamilton is correct in

asserting that Silverman and Meister take the offense of

obstructing service of process beyond a physical-resistance

requirement. Even if it is unclear as to whether Illinois law

requires physical resistance to arrest a person for obstruct-

ing service of process, no reasonable police officer encoun-

tering the facts as the district court has set them forth in

this case could have believed that he had grounds to arrest

Shipman for obstructing service of process. At no point

before her arrest did Shipman take any action, physical or

otherwise, to hinder the officers’ ability to serve

Handsbury. Indeed, Shipman affirmatively assisted

No. 07-2098 9

Hamilton. When Hamilton asked Shipman where

Handsbury was, Shipman pointed him to Handsbury’s

exact location. From where he was standing, Hamilton

could see Handsbury through the window in Handsbury’s

room. At any point after he obtained Handsbury’s location

from Shipman, Hamilton could have walked into

Handsbury’s room and served him; yet Hamilton never

did.

Nevertheless, Hamilton presents several theories of how

he could have reasonably believed Shipman’s actions

constituted the offense of obstructing service of process as

he defines it. First, Hamilton contends Shipman obstructed

his service of Handsbury by advising the officers that,

given Handsbury’s tenuous condition, they might want to

wait until a doctor was present before serving Handsbury.

This advice was given only after Hamilton initiated a

conversation with Shipman about Handsbury’s condition.

Moreover, it was only advice; Shipman did not order the

officers to wait for a doctor. Nor did Shipman threaten to

refuse the officers entry into Handsbury’s room if they did

not wait. Thus, Shipman’s suggestion that the officers wait

for a doctor could not possibly have impeded or delayed

Hamilton’s service of Handsbury because Hamilton was

free to ignore her suggestion, walk into Handsbury’s room,

and serve him. But, again, for whatever reason, Hamilton

chose not to do so.

Second, Hamilton faults Shipman for not giving him

permission to enter Handsbury’s room. He asserts that a

reasonable officer could have believed that express permis-

sion was necessary before entering Handsbury’s room.

Consequently, Hamilton argues that Shipman’s failure to

give him express authority to serve the order could reason-

ably be construed as obstruction. The facts as they are

10 No. 07-2098

presented to us, however, indicate that the authority was

not Shipman’s to give. Although Shipman was the only

registered nurse on duty on the medical-surgical floor, this

was her first night on that floor. She did not appear to

believe that she had the authority to allow the officers to

enter (in the middle of the night) an “ICU-like” room of an

older patient in poor condition, since she recommended

that the officers wait for a doctor. Hamilton apparently did

not believe that Shipman had the authority either, since it

was at his suggestion that Shipman called her supervisors.

Because neither Shipman nor Hamilton believed that

Shipman had the authority to give Hamilton permission to

enter Handsbury’s room, a reasonable officer could not

have believed that Shipman was impeding or hindering his

ability to serve Handsbury by not giving him permission to

enter the room.

Next, Hamilton asserts that Shipman’s handing him the

phone (to talk to her supervisor), then walking away to

resume her hospital duties, obstructed him. But as previ-

ously discussed, that assertion fails. At the point Shipman

resumed her duties, she had (1) shown Hamilton where

Handsbury was; (2) expressed concern about Handsbury’s

condition, his possible negative medical reaction when

confronted by the officers delivering the notice, and the

limits to her own authority under the law as well as the

rules and procedures of the hospital; (3) called

Handsbury’s treating physician, who advised delaying

service until she arrived in the morning and told Shipman,

in the meantime, to contact her supervisor about hospital

procedure; (4) contacted her supervisor who advised

waiting until morning for service; and (5) handed the

phone to Hamilton to talk directly to the supervisor (the

presumed decisionmaker). Even if a reasonable officer

No. 07-2098 11

would not have served Handsbury, despite knowing his

location, because he could have believed that he needed

express authority to enter Handsbury’s room, it should

have been clear to such an officer at the time Shipman

returned to her duties that the authority to enter

Handsbury’s room was not Shipman’s to give. Conse-

quently, Shipman could not have posed any impediment

to serving Handsbury because her involvement was at an

end. She could do no more to help the officers; her failure

to do more cannot constitute obstruction.

Finally, Hamilton contends that Shipman’s failure to give

her name upon request constituted obstruction. Like the

others, this theory does not survive scrutiny because

Hamilton had already informed Shipman that she was

under arrest before he asked her for her name. Thus,

because Hamilton had already arrested her, Shipman’s

failure to give Hamilton her name cannot add anything to

the analysis as to whether Hamilton had probable cause to

make the arrest in the first place. Payne, 337 F.3d at 776

(probable cause must be based on the facts and circum-

stances known to the officer at the time of the arrest).

In sum, the district court did not err in denying Hamil-

ton’s motion for summary judgment based on qualified

immunity. Under these facts, a reasonable officer would

not have believed that he had grounds to arrest Shipman,

the only registered nurse on duty that night.

III.

The district court did not err in denying Hamilton’s

motion for summary judgment based on qualified immu-

nity. Under the facts as they are presented to us, no

reasonable officer could have believed that he had proba-

12 No. 07-2098

ble cause to arrest Shipman for obstructing service of

process after she affirmatively assisted the officers by

pointing out the location of Handsbury, the person to be

served. In addition, Shipman’s failure to give Hamilton

express authority to enter Handsbury’s room did not

constitute obstruction because neither she nor Hamilton

believed the authority was hers to give. We AFFIRM.

USCA-02-C-0072—4-1-08