Williams, Mario v. Rodriguez, Marcelo

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

____________

No. 06-4126

MARIO WILLIAMS,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

CHICAGO POLICE OFFICER MARCELO RODRIGUEZ,

UNKNOWN and UNNAMED CHICAGO POLICE OFFICER, and

CITY OF CHICAGO,

Defendants-Appellees.

____________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 06 C 0157—Samuel Der-Yeghiayan, Judge.

____________

ARGUED SEPTEMBER 28, 2007—DECIDED DECEMBER 6, 2007

____________

Before POSNER, FLAUM, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.

FLAUM, Circuit Judge. On February 15, 2005, Plaintiff

Mario Williams was driving on Lake Shore Drive in

Chicago, Illinois when his asthma allegedly flared up,

causing him to pull his vehicle over. Defendant Police

Officer Marcelo Rodriguez pulled up to Williams’s vehicle,

suspected Rodriguez had been drinking, and after ad-

ministering field sobriety tests, arrested Williams for

driving under the influence. When Williams was taken to

the police station and asked to take a breathalyzer test, he

informed Rodriguez that he had asthma, could not breathe,

and needed his medication. While in lockup, Williams

2 No. 06-4126

repeatedly requested his inhaler for four to five hours

before receiving it, and his requests for additional medica-

tion went unanswered. Charges were brought against

Williams for driving under the influence and obstructing

traffic, and Williams was found not guilty on all counts.

Williams subsequently filed the current lawsuit in the

Northern District of Illinois, which included false arrest

and deliberate indifference to medical needs claims

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as Illinois state

claims for denial of medical treatment and malicious

prosecution. The parties filed cross-motions for sum-

mary judgment which the district court granted for

defendants on all grounds. This appeal followed. For the

following reasons, we partially modify the district court’s

grant of summary judgment to an order to dismiss, and

as so modified, affirm.

I. Background

The facts in this section are presented in the light most

favorable to Plaintiff Mario Williams, the nonmoving

party on appeal, as is required for purposes of summary

judgment.

Early in the morning on February 15, 2005, Plaintiff

Mario Williams and his brother Mark were driving south-

bound on Lake Shore Drive in Chicago, Illinois after giving

a ride home to one of Mario’s friends. Mario Williams, who

was about to turn fifty, had been diagnosed in 1995 with

chronic asthma, which had flared up while at work on

February 14 before improving when he returned home.

While driving home with his brother however, Williams

did not feel well and the two decided to switch drivers.

At approximately 1:30 a.m., Williams pulled his vehicle

over and put his hazards on so he and his brother could

switch places. Williams stopped his vehicle in the far right

No. 06-4126 3

southbound driving lane on Lake Shore Drive between

Monroe Street and Jackson Boulevard, adjacent to Grant

Park in downtown Chicago. Traffic was light on the road

at that time. Defendant Marcelo Rodriguez, an on-duty

City of Chicago police officer, noticed Williams’s vehicle

at the traffic light at the intersection of Monroe Street

and Lake Shore Drive and then saw Williams stop the

vehicle in the far right lane. Shortly after Williams

stopped his vehicle, Rodriguez pulled behind Williams’s

truck. When Officer Rodriguez approached the vehicle, the

driver’s side window was already rolled down. According

to Rodriguez, he observed an odor of alcohol from Wil-

liams’s breath and noticed that Williams’s eyes were

bloodshot.1 Rodriguez asked Williams if he had been

drinking, to which Williams responded “no.” Williams

then informed Rodriguez that he intended to switch

seats with his brother because he “wasn’t feeling well.”

Officer Rodriguez then asked Williams to perform field

sobriety tests. On the finger-to-nose test, Williams suc-

cessfully completed the task, but swayed while doing so.

With respect to the one-leg stand test, Williams swayed

while balancing himself on one foot and did not maintain

his balance for the full thirty seconds the test contem-

plates. Finally, Williams took the walk-and-turn test, in

which he failed to touch his heel to his toe several times

and stepped off the line on a few occasions. After adminis-

tering the field sobriety tests, Officer Rodriguez placed

Williams under arrest for driving under the influence.

1

Williams disputes Officer Rodriguez’s contention that he

detected an odor of alcohol on Williams’s breath. The only

evidence Williams offers to support his argument is testimony

that he had not been drinking. The fact that Williams had not

had anything to drink however, does not call into dispute Officer

Rodriguez’s testimony as to what he smelled.

4 No. 06-4126

Officer Rodriguez took Williams to the police station for

processing. Williams’s property was inventoried, and

although another officer performed this task, Officer

Rodriguez saw Williams’s albuterol inhaler when Williams

emptied his pockets. After Williams had been at the

station over an hour and after Williams’s twenty minute

observation period, Rodriguez asked Williams to blow

into a breathalyzer. Williams then told Rodriguez that

he had asthma, needed his medication, and could not

breathe. The breathalyzer test was not administered.

Williams did not mention his medical condition at any

other time during processing to Officer Rodriguez or any of

the other four or five officers nearby. Additionally, Wil-

liams did not at any point request that he see a doctor.

Instead, Williams was trying to control his breathing by

minimizing the amount he was talking.

While Williams was being processed, his brother, Mark,

and wife, Shirley Ramsey Williams, came to the station

and met briefly with Officer Rodriguez. Williams’s wife

asked Officer Rodriguez if Williams had his asthma

inhaler, to which Rodriguez replied “yes.” Then, just to be

sure, Williams’s wife gave Officer Rodriguez an extra

albuterol inhaler and asked that it be given to Williams.

Officer Rodriguez responded that he would do so. This

however, did not occur. Officer Rodriguez did not give

Williams his inhaler and also ignored Williams when he

asked Rodriguez if his wife had brought his medicine.

After Officer Rodriguez completed his paperwork, he

took Williams to the lockup area, where he left Williams

with the lockup keeper, along with Williams’s paperwork

and property bag. This marked the end of Williams’s

contact with Officer Rodriguez during his detention.

While in lockup, Williams hollered for hours that he

needed his inhaler and knocked on the window and walls

of his cell. After approximately four to five hours, Williams

No. 06-4126 5

was told he would be given his inhaler. When the lockup

keeper gave the inhaler to Williams, he only let Williams

take a couple of puffs before placing the inhaler back

in the property bag. Williams then asked the lockup

keeper if he could call his wife so she could bring his

other asthma medication. Williams told him that if he

did not receive the proper medication for his asthma he

could die, and asked for his help. The lockup keeper

ignored Williams and did not respond to his requests.

During this period of time, Williams’s wife called the

police station at least eight times to check in on her

husband, and specifically asked about Williams’s medical

condition on the first two occasions. The woman Williams’s

wife spoke with replied that if Williams was having any

medical difficulties, he would let the lockup keeper know.

On February 16, 2005, Williams’s wife picked Williams

up after his release from the station. Williams did not

immediately seek medical treatment upon his release, but

did go to the hospital for his asthma on February 17 or 18.2

The incident on February 15, 2005 resulted in three

charges being brought against Williams: 1) driving under

the influence in violation of 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-

501(a) (2004); 2) obstruction of traffic in violation of 625

ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-1416 (2004); and 3) obstruction of

traffic in violation of the Municipal Code of Chicago § 9-40-

130 (1999). Following a bench trial in the Circuit Court of

Cook County, Williams was found not guilty on all three

counts on February 22, 2006.

2

Plaintiff ’s deposition, as well as his wife’s, indicate that

Williams went to the emergency room within a day or two of

his arrest due to asthma-related problems. The medical records

show however, and Plaintiff ’s counsel confirmed at oral argu-

ment, that Williams’s trip to the hospital was instead for pre-

scheduled care related to his asthma.

6 No. 06-4126

On January 11, 2006, Williams brought this action

against Officer Rodriguez, an unknown and unnamed

Chicago police officer, and the City of Chicago. The com-

plaint included two federal claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983: a false arrest claim against Officer Rodriguez

and a deliberate indifference to medical needs claim

against Officer Rodriguez and the unknown and unnamed

officer. Williams also brought two supplemental Illinois

state claims: a denial of medical treatment claim against

all defendants and a malicious prosecution claim against

Officer Rodriguez and the City of Chicago. Both parties

filed cross-motions for summary judgment, which the

district court granted for defendants in its entirety and

denied for Williams in its entirety. Williams appeals

the district court’s grant of summary judgment on all

counts.

II. Analysis

On appeal, we review a district court’s grant of sum-

mary judgment de novo. Whitman v. Nesic, 368 F.3d 931,

933 (7th Cir. 2004). In doing so, we “must construe all

facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party

and draw all reasonable and justifiable inferences in favor

of that party.” Conley v. Village of Bedford Park, 215 F.3d

703, 708 (7th Cir. 2000) (quoting Bellaver v. Quanex Corp.,

200 F.3d 485, 491-92 (7th Cir. 2000)). Summary judg-

ment is appropriate when the evidence “show[s] that

there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that

the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of

law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). With respect to Williams’s

claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, we will only address

whether defendants are protected by qualified immunity

if, as a threshold matter, we find that the facts, when

viewed in the light most favorable to Williams, establish

that Williams’s constitutional rights were violated. Russell

No. 06-4126 7

v. Harms, 397 F.3d 458, 462-63 (7th Cir. 2005) (citing

Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 150 L. Ed. 2d 272, 121

S. Ct. 2151 (2001)).

A. False Arrest

In order for Williams to prevail on his § 1983 false arrest

claim, he must show that probable cause for his arrest

was lacking. See Kelley v. Myler, 149 F.3d 641, 646 (7th

Cir. 1998) (“An essential predicate to any § 1983 claim

for unlawful arrest is the absence of probable cause.”).

If probable cause to arrest is found to exist, it “is an

absolute defense to any claim under Section 1983 against

police officers for wrongful arrest.” Mustafa v. City of

Chicago, 442 F.3d 544, 547 (7th Cir. 2006). Police officers

possess probable cause to arrest when “ ‘the facts and

circumstances within their knowledge and of which they

have reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient

to warrant a prudent person in believing that the sus-

pect had committed’ an offense.” Id. (quoting Kelley, 149

F.3d at 646). Probable cause is not evaluated by the

court based upon “the facts as an omniscient observer

would perceive them,” but instead is determined by the

facts “as they would have appeared to a reasonable person

in the position of the arresting officer.” Id. (quoting

Kelley, 149 F.3d at 646; citing Woods v. City of Chicago,

234 F.3d 979, 987 (7th Cir. 2000)).

In his appeal of this issue, Williams primarily focuses

upon whether Officer Rodriguez possessed probable cause

to arrest him for driving under the influence. Williams

contends that the district court failed to properly construe

the record in the light most favorable to him and ignored

the fact that he did not display many of the factors Officer

Rodriguez was trained to look for in determining whether

an individual is under the influence. The probable cause

analysis however, need not be limited solely to whether

8 No. 06-4126

probable cause existed to arrest Williams for driving under

the influence. Although Officer Rodriguez arrested Wil-

liams for driving under the influence, an officer’s “subjec-

tive reason for making the arrest need not be the criminal

offense as to which the known facts provide probable

cause.” Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 153 (2004). In

Devenpeck, the Supreme Court rejected “[t]he rule that

the offense establishing probable cause must be ‘closely

related’ to, and based on the same conduct as, the offense

identified by the arresting officer at the time of arrest.” Id.

Instead, the Fourth Amendment’s focus on reasonable-

ness dictates an objective analysis, whereby, “the fact

that the officer does not have the state of mind which is

hypothecated by the reasons which provide the legal

justification for the officer’s action does not invalidate the

action taken as long as the circumstances, viewed objec-

tively, justify that action.” Id. (quoting Whren v. United

States, 517 U.S. 806, 813, 135 L. Ed. 2d 89, 116 S. Ct. 1769

(1996)). Thus, the probable cause analysis in this case

need not be limited to whether Officer Rodriguez had

probable cause to arrest Williams for driving under the

influence or the obstruction of traffic violations for

which he was later charged. Instead, the issue is whether

a reasonable officer, with the same information known to

Officer Rodriguez at the time, would have had probable

cause to arrest Williams for any offense. See United States

v. Williams, 495 F.3d 810, 817-18 (7th Cir. 2007) (following

Devenpeck, finding that once the officers had probable

cause to arrest defendant, “it is irrelevant that their

investigation eventually found evidence of other crimes,

that he was originally charged with those other crimes, or

that the [sic] those crimes were charged based on an

investigation that dragged out longer than was war-

ranted by their original reasonable suspicion”); see also

Apodaca v. City of Albuquerque, 443 F.3d 1286 (10th Cir.

2006) (following Devenpeck, the plaintiff ’s wrongful arrest

No. 06-4126 9

claim failed since, although officers lacked probable cause

to arrest the plaintiff for the stated reason of violating a

restraining order, at the time of the arrest the officer

was aware that the plaintiff ’s vehicle was being operated

without insurance, a misdemeanor offense).

Illinois law provides that it is an offense to stop or park

a vehicle “upon the roadway when it is practicable to

stop, park or so leave such vehicle off the roadway.” 625

ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-1301(a) (2004). This statute does

not apply to business or residential districts and is ap-

plicable regardless of whether the vehicle is attended or

unattended. Id.; see People v. Glisson, 835 N.E.2d 162, 173

(Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (“we read the language that the

statute is applicable only ‘outside a business or residence

district’ to mean the statute is applicable to areas other

than business or residential districts”). Officer Rodriguez

in this case observed Williams’s vehicle stopped in the

far right lane of southbound Lake Shore Drive with its

hazard lights on. Despite this however, Williams claims

that no probable cause existed to find him in violation of

this statute.

Williams first contends that it was not “practicable” for

him to stop elsewhere since this was a medical emergency.

Even if Williams was in fact suffering from a severe

medical emergency however, this would not have been

apparent to a reasonable officer on the scene. All Williams

told Officer Rodriguez was that he was not “feeling well,”

and he did not display any physical symptoms indicat-

ing that it was necessary to stop the vehicle on Lake

Shore Drive. Furthermore, if Williams needed to stop the

vehicle, he did not need to do so on Lake Shore Drive,

which is part of Highway 41. Williams stopped his vehicle

between two cross-streets and could have turned off on one

of these roads and found an appropriate place to switch

drivers.

10 No. 06-4126

Williams next argues that no probable cause existed to

find he had violated 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-1301(a)

because there were still multiple unobstructed lanes

available for other vehicles to go around him. The statute’s

text states that “but in every event an unobstructed

width of the highway opposite a standing vehicle shall

be left for the free passage of other vehicles.” 625 ILL.

COMP. STAT. 5/11-1301(a). The Appellate Court of Illinois

has determined that this language “does not mean that

drivers can pull over anywhere they please as long as

there is a second lane of traffic.” Glisson, 835 N.E.2d at

173. Instead, the court determined that “it means that a

driver for whom it is not practicable to pull off the road

onto a shoulder has to pull as far to the side of the road as

possible in order to allow the passage of other vehicles

around his or her vehicle.” Id. This clause therefore, did

not permit Williams to stop the vehicle where he did so

long as he did not obstruct all lanes of traffic. Further-

more, even if Lake Shore Drive did not have a shoulder

for Williams to pull off on, as discussed above, given the

number of cross-streets in the area, a reasonable officer

would have reason to believe that it was practicable for

Williams to stop his car to switch drivers somewhere

other than on Highway 41.

Williams’s final argument is that no probable cause

existed to arrest him under this statute because he was

“disabled.” Illinois law provides that 625 ILL. COMP. STAT.

5/11-1301(a) “shall not apply to the driver of any vehicle

which is disabled in such manner and to such extent

that it is impossible to avoid stopping and temporarily

leaving the vehicle in such position.” 625 ILL. COMP. STAT.

5/11-1301(c). This section clearly exempts a “vehicle

which is disabled,” not a disabled driver of a vehicle as

Williams argues. See id. (emphasis added). This argu-

ment therefore is unavailing.

No. 06-4126 11

Having found that a reasonable officer on the scene

would have probable cause to believe Williams had vio-

lated 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-1301(a), the only remain-

ing issue is whether this was an offense for which Williams

could be arrested. The Supreme Court has made clear that

“[i]f an officer has probable cause to believe that an

individual has committed even a very minor criminal

offense in his presence, he may, without violating the

Fourth Amendment, arrest the offender.” Atwater v. City

of Largo Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354, 121 S. Ct. 1536, 149 L.

Ed. 2d 549 (2001) (affirming the custodial arrest of a

woman when probable cause existed that she had violated

a Texas statute requiring the wearing of seatbelts);

Chortek v. City of Milwaukee, 356 F.3d 740, 745 (7th Cir.

2004) (“Arrest for a minor, non-jailable offense does not

violate the Fourth Amendment.”). Therefore, because the

facts known to Officer Rodriguez, when viewed objectively,

would have provided a reasonable officer with probable

cause to believe Williams had violated 625 ILL. COMP.

STAT. 5/11-1301(a), it was within his authority, without

violating the Fourth Amendment, to arrest Williams for

that violation. Due to the objective nature of the probable

cause analysis, it is of no consequence that Officer Rodri-

guez’s subjective reason for making the arrest was driving

under the influence rather than a violation of 625 ILL.

COMP. STAT. 5/11-1301(a). Therefore, the district court

properly granted summary judgment for Defendant

Rodriguez on this count.

B. Deliberate Indifference to Medical Needs

Williams complaint included a claim pursuant to § 1983

that Officer Rodriguez and an unknown and unnamed

officer had violated his Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth

Amendment rights by denying him treatment for his

asthma. At summary judgment, Williams limited his

12 No. 06-4126

claim to one of deliberate indifference to medical needs

pursuant to the standard applied under the Eighth

Amendment. Although the Eighth Amendment only applies

to convicted prisoners, this court has previously stated

that the same standard applies to pretrial detainees under

the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause. See

Cavalieri v. Shepard, 321 F.3d 616, 620 (7th Cir. 2003)

(“The Eighth Amendment does not apply to pretrial

detainees, but as a pretrial detainee, [Plaintiff] was

entitled to at least the same protection against deliberate

indifference to his basic needs as is available to convicted

prisoners under the Eighth Amendment.”); see also

Jackson v. Ill. Medi-Car, Inc., 300 F.3d 760, 764 (7th Cir.

2002) (“when considering a pretrial detainee’s claim of

inadequate medical care, we frequently turn to the analo-

gous standards of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence”).

Under this standard, “plaintiff has the burden of showing

that (1) the harm to the plaintiff was objectively serious;

and (2) that the official was deliberately indifferent to

[his] health or safety.” Cavalieri, 321 F.3d at 620. Defen-

dants do not address the second element of this stan-

dard in their brief and instead solely argue that Williams’s

harm was not objectively serious.

A medical condition is deemed to be objectively serious

if it is “one that has been diagnosed by a physician as

mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a

lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a

doctor’s attention.” Henderon v. Sheahan, 196 F.3d 839,

846 (7th Cir. 1999) (quoting Gutierrez v. Peters, 111 F.3d

1364, 1374 (7th Cir. 1997)). This court has found that

“asthma can be, and frequently is, a serious medical

condition, depending on the severity of the attacks.” Board

v. Farnham, 394 F.3d 469, 484 (7th Cir. 2005); see Garvin

v. Armstrong, 236 F.3d 896, 898 (7th Cir. 2001) (“Asthma,

depending upon its degree, can be a serious medical

condition.”). Defendants’ claim for summary judgment

No. 06-4126 13

therefore, depends upon whether Williams was suffering

from a sufficiently severe asthma attack the night he

was arrested. In Farnham, we found that the plaintiff ’s

asthma constituted a severe medical condition for pur-

poses of surviving summary judgment when there was

testimony that the air quality in jail caused the plaintiff to

be taken to the emergency room on two occasions, forced

him to begin using a breathing machine, and that when

deprived of his asthma medication, the plaintiff would

sometimes go into an attack that would leave him, as he

described it, “almost frickin’ dead” in the morning. Farn-

ham, 394 F.3d at 484-85. Here, although Williams has

been diagnosed with chronic asthma and it has been severe

enough at times to require trips to the emergency room,

according to Williams’s medical records, his night under

arrest did not necessitate an immediate, independent

trip to the emergency room. Furthermore, our inquiry

into the severity of Williams’s asthma attack is limited to

his time in processing, since Williams has failed to name

a proper defendant for the period of his detention spent

in lockup.

Williams brought this deliberate indifference claim

against Officer Rodriguez and an unknown and unnamed

Chicago police officer. In his complaint, Williams stated

that he would seek leave to amend his complaint once

he learned the identify of this unknown and unnamed

defendant. Discovery was Williams’s opportunity to

identify this defendant, and he failed to do so before

discovery closed on August 18, 2006. Due to Williams’s

failure to identify this defendant and the lack of any

record that this individual was served with process, the

district court’s grant of summary judgment for this

unknown and unnamed defendant is modified to dis-

miss this defendant from the case.

Officer Rodriguez then, is the only proper defendant

for Williams’s deliberate indifference claim. Therefore, the

14 No. 06-4126

analysis for this claim is limited to determining whether

Williams’s asthma was objectively serious during the

period of time he was with Officer Rodriguez. Williams

concedes that there was no evidence he had a serious

medical need at the scene of his arrest. Instead, the sole

question is whether Williams’s asthma was objectively

serious during processing. The evidence does not reflect

that Williams was suffering from a sufficiently severe

asthma attack at that time. Williams’s first mention of

his asthmatic condition occurred when Officer Rodriguez

asked him to take a breathalyzer test. It was at this

point that Williams told Officer Rodriguez that he had

asthma, “needed [his] medication,” and “can’t breathe.”

These statements, when arising in the context of a re-

quest for Williams to take a breathalyzer test, are insuffi-

cient by themselves to show that Williams was suffer-

ing from a serious asthma attack. At no other point

during processing did Williams affirmatively request his

inhaler or any medical attention from Officer Rodriguez

or any of the other officers present. Williams responds to

this, stating that his silence during processing was due to

his focus on trying to control his breathing. While Wil-

liams’s explanation for his silence is evidence that he

was suffering from asthmatic symptoms, this also indi-

cates that during processing, Williams’s asthma was not

so severe that he was unable to control his breathing

without immediate medical assistance. In addition, aside

from Williams’s attempt to control his breathing, there

is no evidence in the record showing that Williams was

exhibiting physical symptoms reflective of an asthma

attack while in processing. Furthermore, although Wil-

liams’s wife and brother put Officer Rodriguez on addi-

tional notice of Williams’s asthma when they gave Officer

Rodriguez Williams’s inhaler, there is no evidence that

they told Officer Rodriguez that Williams was in im-

mediate need of his inhaler due to a current asthma

No. 06-4126 15

attack. Thus, the facts, when viewed in the light most

favorable to Williams, fail to show that his asthma was

sufficiently severe during processing to be considered

objectively serious for purposes of his deliberate indif-

ference claim against Officer Rodriguez.

Although Williams’s deliberate indifference claim fails

under the Fourteenth Amendment analysis, it is worth

noting that while this suit was before the district court,

this court recognized in Lopez v. City of Chicago that

the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process protections

only apply to a pretrial detainee’s confinement condi-

tions after he has received a judicial determination of

probable cause. Lopez v. City of Chicago, 464 F.3d 711, 719

(7th Cir. 2006). Claims regarding conditions of confine-

ment for pretrial detainees such as Williams, who have not

yet had a judicial determination of probable cause (a

Gerstein hearing), are instead governed by the Fourth

Amendment and its objectively unreasonable standard.

Id. The Lopez decision came out nearly two months be-

fore the district court granted defendants’ summary

judgment motion in this case, and Williams has waived

any Fourth Amendment claim by failing to amend or

supplement his motion for summary judgment or raise

the issue on appeal.

Without offering any opinion as to whether Williams’s

deliberate indifference claim would have been successful

under a Fourth Amendment analysis, we do note that the

deliberate indifference standard under the Eighth and

Fourteenth Amendments requires a higher showing on a

plaintiff ’s part than is necessary to prove an officer’s

conduct was “objectively unreasonable under the circum-

stances.” Id. at 720. What is “objectively unreasonable” in

the context of a medical needs case has been further

clarified by this court in Sides v. City of Champaign, 496

F.3d 820 (7th Cir. 2007). In that case, the plaintiff was

ordered out of his vehicle by police and made to stand

16 No. 06-4126

against the fender of his car, which was hot, on a ninety

degree day for approximately one hour. Id. at 823. This

led the plaintiff to complain to the officers of dizziness,

dehydration, and soreness, but the officers did not permit

the plaintiff to move. Id. The reasoning underlying this

court’s determination that the officers did not violate

the plaintiff ’s Fourth Amendment rights implicitly identi-

fied four factors that are relevant for ascertaining wheth-

er a defendant’s conduct was objectively unreasonable. See

id. at 827-28. The first is that the officer be given notice

of the arrestee’s medical need, whether by word as oc-

curred in Sides, or through observation of the arrestee’s

physical symptoms. Id. at 823, 828. Second, the court in

Sides considered the seriousness of the medical need, in

that case noting that the plaintiff ’s complaints were not

accompanied by any physical symptoms. Id. at 828. The

severity of the medical condition under this standard

need not, on its own, rise to the level of objective serious-

ness required under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amend-

ment. Instead, the Fourth Amendment’s reasonable-

ness analysis operates on a sliding scale, balancing the

seriousness of the medical need with the third factor—the

scope of the requested treatment. In Sides for ex-

ample, the court noted that the plaintiff was partially

responsible for his lengthy detention outdoors, since he

insisted that the officers not charge him at all, rather than

requesting that the officers take him to the station house

or write him a citation immediately. Id. Finally, police

interests also factor into the reasonableness determina-

tion. This factor is wide-ranging in scope and can include

administrative, penological, or investigatory concerns.

Sides reflected the latter of these interests, with the

court emphasizing the importance of an on-site investiga-

tion and noting that the officers did not prolong the

plaintiff ’s detention once this investigation was completed.

Id. Again, we offer no opinion as to whether defendants’

No. 06-4126 17

conduct violated Williams’s Fourth Amendment rights

under this multi-factor analysis, but for the reasons

discussed above, Williams has failed to meet the higher

burden of showing that Officer Rodriguez was deliberately

indifferent to an objectively serious medical condition.

C. Supplemental State Claims

Having disposed of Williams’s federal claims, we are left

only with his supplemental state claims of malicious

prosecution and willful and wanton denial of medical care.

As a general matter, when all federal claims have been

dismissed prior to trial, the federal court should relinquish

jurisdiction over the remaining pendant state claims.

Wright v. Associated Ins. Cos., 29 F.3d 1244, 1252 (7th Cir.

1994); Williams Electronics Games, Inc. v. Garrity, 479

F.3d 904, 906-07 (7th Cir. 2007). This rule however, is

subject to three recognized exceptions: when the refilling

of the state claims is barred by the statute of limitations;

where substantial judicial resources have already been

expended on the state claims; and when it is clearly

apparent how the state claim is to be decided. Wright,

29 F.3d at 1251-52; Williams Electronics Games, 479 F.3d

at 906-07. Although discovery in this case has been

completed and thus judicial resources have already been

expended to some degree, our reasoning with respect to

Williams’s federal § 1983 claims did not reach issues

fully dispositive of Williams’s pendant state claims. See

Wright, 29 F.3d at 1251 (“If the district court, in deciding

a federal claim, decides an issue dispositive of a pendent

claim, there is no use leaving the latter to the state

court.”).

With respect to Williams’s malicious prosecution claim,

it is well-established that the existence of probable cause

is a complete defense to such a claim. Logan v. Caterpillar,

Inc., 246 F.3d 912, 926 (7th Cir. 2001) (citing Cervantes v.

18 No. 06-4126

Jones, 188 F.3d 805, 810-11 (7th Cir. 1999)); Mustafa v.

City of Chicago, 442 F.3d 544, 547 (7th Cir. 2006). Unlike

the district court however, we have disposed of Williams’s

false arrest claim without needing to address whether

probable cause existed to arrest Williams for the offenses

for which he was prosecuted. See Bombard v. Fort Wayne

Newspapers, Inc., 92 F.3d 560, 562 (7th Cir. 1996) (“In

deciding an appeal, we may affirm the district court’s

grant of summary judgment on a ground other than that

relied upon by the district court below, so long as the

alternative basis finds adequate support in the record.”).

Because we have not determined whether Officer Rodri-

guez lacked probable cause to arrest Williams for driving

under the influence or obstruction of traffic, an essential

element of an Illinois malicious prosecution claim, see

Reynolds v. Menard, Inc., 850 N.E.2d 831, 837 (Ill. App. Ct.

2006), we modify the district court’s grant of summary

judgment for defendants on this claim to a dismissal

for lack of jurisdiction.

Williams has also brought a state claim against all

defendants for failure to provide him with medical care.

Illinois’s Local Governmental and Governmental Em-

ployees Tort Immunity Act provides that as a general

matter, “[n]either a local public entity nor a public em-

ployee is liable for injury proximately caused by the failure

of the employee to furnish or obtain medical care for a

prisoner in his custody . . .” 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. 10/4-105

(2004). This immunity however, does “not apply where

the employee, acting within the scope of his employment,

knows from his observation of conditions that the

prisoner is in need of immediate medical care and,

through willful and wanton conduct, fails to take reason-

able action to summon medical care.” Id. This court has

held that the “willful and wanton [standard] is ‘remark-

ably similar’ to the deliberate indifference standard.”

Chapman v. Keltner, 241 F.3d 842, 847 (7th Cir. 2001)

No. 06-4126 19

(citing Payne for Hicks v. Churchich, 161 F.3d 1030, 1041

n.13 (7th Cir. 1998)).

With respect to Williams’s claim under 745 ILL. COMP.

STAT. 10/4-105 against Officer Rodriguez, our decision

on Williams’s federal deliberate indifference claim is

dispositive of this issue. Although Officer Rodriguez did

not argue whether he was subjectively deliberately indif-

ferent to Williams’s medical need, and thus similarly, does

not apparently contest whether he subjectively acted

willfully and wantonly, our reasoning that Williams’s

medical condition was not objectively serious similarly

reflects that Officer Rodriguez did not know that Williams

was in immediate need of medical care. As discussed

above, Williams’s statement that he had asthma, couldn’t

breathe, and needed his medication was made in response

to Officer Rodriguez’s request that Williams take a

breathalyzer test, and thus does not, in context, reflect

that Williams needed immediate medical care. Further-

more, Williams never requested at any other time that

Officer Rodriguez provide him with his inhaler or take him

to a hospital. In addition, although Williams’s wife gave

Officer Rodriguez Williams’s inhaler, she never conveyed

that Williams needed his inhaler because he was currently

suffering from asthmatic symptoms. In fact, there is no

evidence in the record indicating that Williams, aside

from his efforts to minimize his talking to control his

breathing, was exhibiting any physical symptoms of an

asthma attack during processing. We therefore conclude

that Officer Rodriguez did not know that Williams was

in need of immediate medical care and thus affirm the

district court’s grant of summary judgment as it relates

to Officer Rodriguez on this claim.

The City of Chicago’s liability under this section is

premised on its vicarious liability for the actions of its

employees. 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. 10/4-105. Therefore,

because we have affirmed the district court’s grant of

20 No. 06-4126

summary judgment on this claim for Officer Rodriguez,

we similarly affirm summary judgment for the City of

Chicago as it relates to its vicarious liability for Officer

Rodriguez’s conduct. The same however, does not apply

to the City of Chicago’s vicarious liability for the unnamed

and unknown defendant or other City employees. First,

for the same reasons we dismissed Williams’s deliberate

indifference claims against the unnamed and unknown

defendant, the district court’s grant of summary judg-

ment is similarly modified to dismiss this defendant on

this state law claim. Dismissing this unnamed defendant

from the suit however, does not necessarily absolve the

City of Chicago of liability for that employee’s actions.

Indeed, the City of Chicago conceded this in its brief to

this court. Under Illinois law, “it is sufficient for recovery

against a public entity to prove that an identified employee

would be liable even though that employee is not named a

defendant in the action.” Gordon v. Degelmann, 29 F.3d

295, 299 (7th Cir. 1994) (quoting McCottrell v. Chicago,

481 N.E.2d 1058, 1060 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985)). In Gordon, this

court surmised that an unnamed officer assisting in an

arrest was sufficiently identified for purposes of holding

the municipality liable for his actions, before determining

that this officer’s actions were not willful or wanton. Id.

For the same reason, our determination that the unnamed

defendant is not himself a properly named defendant

in this suit does not negate the City’s potential liability

for his conduct. Because we have not addressed the merits

of Williams’s deliberate indifference claim as it relates

to his time in lockup, we decline to make this determina-

tion with respect to Williams’s pendant state claim. We

therefore modify the grant of summary judgment for the

City of Chicago on this claim to a dismissal for lack of

jurisdiction for all but the City’s vicarious liability for

Officer Rodriguez’s conduct, which we affirm as a ruling

on summary judgment.

No. 06-4126 21

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the grant of

summary judgment in favor of Defendant Officer Rodri-

guez on all claims but that for malicious prosecution,

which we MODIFY to a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction. We

also MODIFY the grant of summary judgment in favor of

the unknown and unnamed Defendant on all counts to a

dismissal of that party from this lawsuit. With respect to

the City of Chicago, we MODIFY the grant of summary

judgment in its favor on both state law claims to a dis-

missal for lack of jurisdiction, with the exception of the

district court’s grant of summary judgment for the City

for its vicarious liability for Officer Rodriguez under 745

ILL. COMP. STAT. 10/4-105, which we AFFIRM. As so modi-

fied, this judgment is affirmed.

A true Copy:

Teste:

________________________________

Clerk of the United States Court of

Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

USCA-02-C-0072—12-6-07