Estate Darlene Allen v. City of Rockford

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

____________

No. 02-1873

ESTATE OF DARLENE ALLEN,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

CITY OF ROCKFORD, a Municipal Corporation of

the State of Illinois, CHERYL TAYLOR and BRUCE

SCOTT, individually and in their official capacities

as police officers for the City of Rockford, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

____________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Illinois, Western Division.

No. 99 C 50324—Philip G. Reinhard, Judge.

____________

ARGUED JANUARY 24, 2003—DECIDED NOVEMBER 20, 2003

____________

Before RIPPLE, EVANS, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.

WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge. After she was placed under ar-

rest for driving under the influence of drugs, Darlene Allen

was driven to Rockford Memorial Hospital by a police officer

for the purpose of obtaining a urine sample. Allen refused

to provide a urine sample and to consent to a drug screen-

ing test requested by the emergency room doctor. After

deeming Allen not competent, the doctor, without the

2 No. 02-1873

assistance of the arresting officer, forcibly extracted blood

and urine samples from Allen. Allen sued the City of

Rockford and several police officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

for alleged due process violations stemming from the

unwanted medical treatment, and also filed various state

law claims against the City, the officers, and numerous

hospital personnel. The district court granted summary

judgment to the City and police officers on Allen’s § 1983

claims, denied Allen’s cross-motions for partial summary

judgment, and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdic-

tion over the state law claims. Allen appeals both the grant

of summary judgment in the officers’ favor and the denial

of partial summary judgment in her favor. Because Allen

has not established that the officers either breached a duty

of care or placed her in a dangerous situation by not

preventing her forced treatment, we affirm the district

court’s ruling.

I. BACKGROUND

On July 6, 1999, Rockford police officer Kevin Nordberg

received information that a car matching the description of

Darlene Allen’s had been traveling on the wrong side of the

road. Nordberg pulled over Allen in a parking lot for a local

tavern. He observed that Allen was shaking violently, and

had slurred speech and glassy eyes. Allen attributed her

behavior to prescription medication. After eliciting state-

ments from Allen about the condition of her car (the front

passenger’s side was damaged and the front bumper was

missing) and confirming those statements, Nordberg

believed that Allen had fled the scene of a property damage

accident,1 and placed her under arrest. He also suspected

that Allen was driving under the influence, and called

1

Other police officers found Allen’s front bumper and a fallen

tree at the location Allen described.

No. 02-1873 3

D.U.I. Task Force Officer Cheryl Taylor to the scene to help

assess Allen’s condition. Taylor observed the same abnor-

mal behavior that concerned Nordberg and also noticed that

Allen had difficulty walking unassisted. Allen admitted

taking a drug called Soma, which had been prescribed to

her sister, and was arrested for driving under the influence

of drugs.

Taylor drove Allen to Rockford Memorial Hospital, where

Allen refused to provide a urine sample in connection

with her alleged D.U.I. violation. Taylor told Dr. Arthur F.

Proust, the board-certified emergency room doctor, that

Allen had been driving northbound in a southbound lane

and had been in an accident. She also told him that Allen

had passed a Breathalyzer test. Dr. Proust observed that

Allen’s speech was slurred, that she was intermittently

sleepy and alert, and that she had borderline low blood

pressure. He also noticed that there were only seven pills

remaining in the bottle of Soma. (Dr. Proust claims that

if the Soma had been taken at the prescribed dosage, there

should have been sixteen pills left.) Allen was disoriented

with respect to the time of year, stating that it was January

instead of July. According to Dr. Proust, he became con-

cerned that Allen may have overdosed on the Soma, with

potentially fatal consequences, and may have ingested other

drugs as well that would have exacerbated the effects of the

Soma. Allen refused to consent to a drug screen. Upon

determining that Allen’s altered state rendered her incom-

petent to make decisions about her medical treatment, Dr.

Proust told Taylor that he planned to extract blood and

urine samples from Allen to determine the type and amount

of drugs she had ingested.2 Additionally,hospital staff told

2

Allen insists that Dr. Proust did not believe that an emergency

existed when he extracted the samples. The basis for Allen’s as-

sertion is unclear, as Dr. Proust’s deposition reflects that although

(continued...)

4 No. 02-1873

Taylor that they were concerned about potential liability if

they allowed Allen to leave the hospital and she overdosed.

Taylor told Dr. Proust that Allen had refused to consent

to any testing relating to her alleged D.U.I. violation.

Taylor then apprised her supervisor, Sergeant Bruce Scott,

of the situation. Neither Taylor nor Scott have any medical

training beyond CPR and basic first aid. Scott told Taylor

that the hospital was acting of its own accord, and that it

was up to the doctor to act as he thought necessary to pre-

vent Allen from having a potentially life-threatening drug

overdose. Taylor then informed the hospital that she would

have no role in Allen’s medical treatment. With the assist-

ance of hospital staff, Dr. Proust then forcibly extracted the

blood and urine samples from Allen.3 There were no police

officers in the room at that time. Tests revealed that Allen

had taken other drugs in addition to Soma, such as

benzodiazepines, marijuana, and opiates. (Allen acknowl-

edged in her deposition that she was taking Soma, Vicodin,

Prozac, and Activan as of July 5, 1999, the day before her

arrest.) Allen was given counteracting agents designed to

prevent drug overdoses4 and was released back into police

custody.

2

(...continued)

he felt that there was no immediate need to provide Allen with

drugs to counteract a potential overdose, there was an immediate

need to test Allen to determine what she had taken. In any event,

this factual dispute is not relevant to the claims at issue here,

which revolve around whether the officers, not Dr. Proust, were

under the impression that an emergency existed. At oral argu-

ment, Allen conceded that no statement was ever made to the

officers that there was not an immediate need to intervene.

3

Two security guards filed battery claims against Allen alleging

that she attacked them during the drug screen.

4

Dr. Proust could not remember whether Allen received the

counteracting drugs before or after the samples were extracted.

No. 02-1873 5

Allen filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit against the City of

Rockford, Taylor, and Scott5 alleging Fourteenth Amend-

ment due process violations stemming from Taylor and

Scott’s failure to prevent the hospital staff from extract-

ing the samples. Allen also filed various state law claims,

including battery, intentional infliction of emotional dis-

tress, and malicious prosecution, against Rockford Health

Systems, Inc. d/b/a Rockford Memorial Hospital, Dr. Proust,

other hospital personnel, the City, and the officers. The de-

fendants sought summary judgment on all claims, while

Allen filed various cross-motions for partial summary

judgment.

In a well-reasoned opinion, the district court granted

summary judgment to the City and the police officers on

Allen’s § 1983 claims, denied Allen’s partial summary

judgment motion on those claims, declined to exercise sup-

plemental jurisdiction over the state law claims, and denied

as moot all parties’ summary judgment motions on the state

law claims. Allen appeals the grant of summary judgment

in favor of the police officers in their individual capacities,

but does not appear to challenge the grant of summary

judgment to the City. She also contests the denial of her

motion for partial summary judgment.6

II. ANALYSIS

Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no gen-

uine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled

to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex

5

Taylor and Scott were sued in both their official and individual

capacities.

6

Allen died during the course of briefing the summary judgment

motions. Jim Moriarty, as Special Administrator of the Estate of

Darlene Allen, was substituted as the named plaintiff.

6 No. 02-1873

Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). We review grants

of summary judgment de novo, viewing all facts in the light

most favorable to the non-moving party. Rizzo v. Sheahan,

266 F.3d 705, 711 (7th Cir. 2001). However, our analysis is

complicated by the fact that Taylor and Scott have raised

the defense of qualified immunity. Allen bears the burden

of defeating this defense. See Sparing v. Vill. of Olympia

Fields, 266 F.3d 684, 688 (7th Cir. 2001). Thus, we assess

whether, viewing all of the facts in Allen’s favor, the officers

violated one of Allen’s constitutional rights. See Saucier v.

Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). Even if this requirement is

satisfied, in order to prevail Allen must also show that the

constitutional right was clearly established such that a

reasonable officer would have understood that she was

violating that right. Id. at 201-02.

A. The § 1983 Claim

The Supreme Court made clear in DeShaney v.

Winnebago County Department of Social Services, 489

U.S. 189 (1989) that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due

Process Clause does not impose a general, affirmative obli-

gation upon the state to protect its citizens against the

deprivation of life, liberty, and property by private actors.

Id. at 195. However, the courts have acknowledged that this

rule is subject to two narrow exceptions.

Specifically, “when the State takes a person into its

custody and holds him there against his will, the Constitu-

tion imposes upon [the State] a corresponding duty to

assume some responsibility for [the person’s] safety and

general well-being,” in light of the special relationship be-

tween the state and that individual. Id. at 199-200; see also

Kitzman-Kelly v. Warner, 203 F.3d 454, 458 (7th Cir. 2000)

(explaining that the special relationship arises “from the

limitations that the state has imposed upon [an individual]

No. 02-1873 7

through a restraint on his personal liberty”); Collignon v.

Milwaukee County, 163 F.3d 982, 987 (7th Cir. 1998)

(stating that “[w]hen a state actor . . . deprives a person of

his ability to care for himself by incarcerating him, detain-

ing him, or involuntarily committing him, it assumes an

obligation to provide some minimum level of well-being and

safety”). The state’s failure to meet this duty of care

constitutes a violation of the Due Process Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 200. Addi-

tionally, the state may be held liable for due process vio-

lations if it places an individual in a position of danger that

she would not otherwise have faced. See Monfils v. Taylor,

165 F.3d 511, 516 (7th Cir. 1998); Collignon, 163 F.3d at

987; Estate of Stevens v. City of Green Bay, 105 F.3d 1169,

1174 (7th Cir. 1997). Allen contends that because she was

subjected to forced medical treatment while she was a pre-

trial detainee, Taylor and Scott are liable for due process

violations under both the “special relationship” and “state-

created danger” exceptions.

1. The “Special Relationship” Exception

The officers contend that no special relationship was es-

tablished because Allen was neither incarcerated nor

institutionalized when she received the forced treatment.

Although in Estate of Stevens v. City of Green Bay, 105 F.3d

1169 (7th Cir. 1997), we questioned whether the “special

relationship” exception applies to simple criminal arrests,

in that case we were analyzing whether a special relation-

ship arises merely because “a person rid[es] in the back seat

of an unlocked police car for a few minutes.” Id. at 1175. We

have since made clear that DeShaney’s exceptions apply to

pretrial detainees, see Tesch v. County of Green Lake, 157

F.3d 465, 472-73 (7th Cir. 1998); see also Collins v. City of

Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 127-28 (1992) (explaining

that the Due Process Clause “requires that conditions of

confinement satisfy certain minimum standards for pretrial

8 No. 02-1873

detainees, for people in mental institutions, for convicted

felons, and for persons under arrest”) (citations omitted),

and the officers themselves asserted that Allen was a

pretrial detainee. See Estate of Allen v. City of Rockford, No.

99 C 50324, 2002 WL 426117, at *4 (N.D.Ill. Mar. 15, 2002)

(“All parties (and the court) agree Allen should be consid-

ered a pretrial detainee while she was at the Hospital. . . .”).

We therefore agree with Allen that she was entitled to a

certain level of care and safety.

However, the facts do not support Allen’s contention that

the officers were aware of a substantial risk of injury

to Allen in the form of a battery (i.e., the forced medical

treatment), failed to prevent this known danger, and

therefore failed to meet their duty of care. Rather, the

evidence suggests that it is precisely because the officers

did not intervene with the medical treatment that the offi-

cers met their obligations to Allen.

Taylor and Scott were met with the following scenario:

Allen had slurred speech, glassy eyes, and mobility prob-

lems, but had passed a Breathalyzer test. A licensed emer-

gency care physician had stated that Allen was not com-

petent to make decisions regarding her health, and might

suffer a potentially life-threatening drug overdose if a drug

screen was not conducted. We need not consider whether

Dr. Proust’s assessment of Allen’s competency or lack

thereof was correct.7 The crux of the matter is that the

officers,who had no training beyond CPR and first aid, quite

7

Allen contends that the district court decided that she was in-

competent despite her assertions to the contrary, in violation of

summary judgment standards. She does not point to any language

in the district court’s opinion to support her claims, nor have we

found any. The district court simply addressed the issue of

whether it was proper for the officers to defer to the physician’s

determination of incompetence, and we adopt the same approach

on appeal.

No. 02-1873 9

reasonably chose not to question a licensed physician’s

determinations that treatment was necessary and that

Allen was not competent to decide otherwise. Cf. Brownell

v. Figel, 950 F.2d 1285, 1291 (7th Cir. 1991) (explaining

that it would be “unrealistic” to expect police officers to

second-guess a physician’s medical diagnosis). Indeed, had

Taylor and Scott prevented the treatment and Allen had

suffered negative health consequences as a result, they

would have left themselves open to charges of due process

violations for failure to provide appropriate medical care to

a pretrial detainee. See Chapman v. Keltner, 241 F.3d 842,

845-46 (7th Cir. 2001).

Allen’s next argument is that the officers did not

provide the appropriate standard of care because they failed

to protect her liberty interest in preventing unwanted

treatment. We do not quibble with her assertion that the

Supreme Court in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department

of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990) found a “constitutionally

protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical

treatment.” Id. at 278; see also Washington v. Harper, 494

U.S. 210, 221 (1990) (finding a “significant liberty interest

in avoiding the unwanted administration of antipsychotic

drugs”).

However, Allen’s contention appears to rest on the hy-

pothesis that she has a constitutional right to state pro-

tection from unwanted medical treatment after a physician

has determined that treatment is required and found her

incompetent to make decisions about her medical treat-

ment. Cruzan does not address Allen’s circumstances.

Rather, the Cruzan Court stated that “[t]he principle that

a competent person has a constitutionally protected liberty

interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment may be

inferred from our prior decisions,” id. at 278, but “[a]n

incompetent person is not able to make an informed and

voluntary choice to exercise a hypothetical right to refuse

10 No. 02-1873

treatment or any other right.” Id. at 280. Conspicuously

absent from the Cruzan opinion is any language suggesting

that state actors who are not physicians must prevent

unwanted medical treatment notwithstanding a doctor’s

determination that the person refusing treatment is

incompetent.

Undaunted, Allen points to Sheik-Abdi v. McClellan, 37

F.3d 1240 (7th Cir. 1994), for the proposition that § 1983

liability attaches to Taylor and Scott. Sheik-Abdi, however,

is irrelevant to our analysis. In that case, after pointing out

that the plaintiff did not allege that he received any medical

treatment, we stated the following:

Accordingly, even if the rationales of Cruzan v.

Director of Missouri Health Department, 497 U.S.

261, 110 S.Ct. 2841, 111 L.Ed.2d 224 (1990) (stating

that a competent person has a liberty interest

under the Due Process Clause in refusing unwanted

medical treatment that must be balanced against

relevant state interests and assuming, for purposes

of that case, that the Constitution would grant a

competent person a protected right to refuse lifesav-

ing hydration and nutrition), and Washington v.

Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 110 S.Ct. 1028, 108 L.Ed.2d

178 (1990) (establishing a right to a due process

hearing before an inmate can be administered

psychotropic drugs), could be extended to the

circumstances presented here, the fact that no

forced treatment is alleged to have actually taken

place frees Akers from any potential § 1983 liabil-

ity.

Id. at 1248-49. This quotation makes clear that in Sheik-

Abdi, we merely discussed hypotheticals; we neither held

that Cruzan applied to Sheik-Abdi’s circumstances nor

paved the way for Cruzan’s application to the instant case.

We therefore see no support for Allen’s contention that the

No. 02-1873 11

officers’ inaction can be characterized as a constitutional

violation under the “special relationship” exception, and

find that the district court properly granted summary

judgment to the officers on that issue.8

2. The “State-Created Danger” Exception

Allen’s assertion that her situation falls within

DeShaney’s “state-created danger” exception is similarly

without merit. Allen admits that there can be no suggestion

that “the police action of removing her from the road was

unwise or form[s] the basis for liability.” Indeed, it would be

difficult to argue otherwise, as Allen had just been in a

traffic accident and was seen driving in the direction of

oncoming traffic. However, Allen contends that by taking

8

Citing the Health Care Surrogate Act, 755 ILL. COMP. STAT.

40/1 et seq. (“the Act”) and various cases, Allen also contends that

she has a liberty interest in refusing unwanted treatment under

Illinois law. See Thielman v. Leean, 282 F.3d 478, 480 (7th Cir.

2002) (“Liberty interests can arise from two sources: The Federal

Constitution or state law.”). But even assuming that Illinois rec-

ognizes such an interest, this interest is generally analyzed with

a presumption that the individual is competent to refuse treat-

ment, and thus appears to be no broader than the liberty interest

found in Cruzan. See, e.g., Prairie v. Univ. of Chicago Hosps., 698

N.E.2d 611, 619 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998); In re Baby Boy Doe, 632

N.E.2d 326, 330 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994). Moreover, Allen’s reliance

on the Act, which requires a health care provider to find a sur-

rogate decision-maker in certain cases, is misplaced. The Illinois

courts have not suggested that police officers, as opposed to phys-

icians or other hospital staff, must determine whether the Act is

relevant to a particular patient. See, e.g., Ficke v. Egangelical

Health Sys., 674 N.E.2d 888, 893 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996). Finally,

Allen herself argues that a surrogate would not be necessary in an

emergency, and we have already noted that she has not put forth

persuasive evidence that the officers did not believe that an

emergency existed. We therefore fail to see how Allen can make

out a constitutional violation based on state law.

12 No. 02-1873

her to the hospital and “abandoning” her to unwanted

treatment, the police “placed her in danger from an immi-

nent battery which the police knew was about to occur.”

Although we acknowledged in Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d

616, 618 (7th Cir. 1982) that the state’s placement of an

individual in harm’s way can result in actionable constitu-

tional claims, cases in which we have either found or

suggested that liability attaches under the “state-created

danger” exception are rare and often egregious. For exam-

ple, in Monfils v. Taylor, 165 F.3d 511 (7th Cir. 1998), we

upheld a jury verdict against a police officer who allowed an

informant’s tape to be released despite his knowledge that

the tape’s release would result in heightened danger to the

informant, who was ultimately killed. Id. at 520. In Reed v.

Gardner, 986 F.2d 1122 (7th Cir. 1993), which involved

death and serious injury due to a car crash, we stated that

“[p]olice officers who remove sober drivers and leave behind

drunk passengers with keys may be said to create a danger

or at least render others on the road more vulnerable.” Id.

at 1125. Additionally, in White v. Rochford, 592 F.2d 381

(7th Cir. 1979), a pre-DeShaney case, we required a trial

when officers, after arresting the children’s uncle, left three

children in an abandoned car on the side of the road such

that the children had to cross eight lanes of traffic and

brave the elements in search of a phone, resulting in the

week-long hospitalization of a five-year-old child. Id. at 382.

Here, the officers attempted to minimize danger by al-

lowing a licensed physician to exercise his judgment rather

than substituting their own judgment. We are unwilling to

place the officers’ actions in this case on the same footing as

Monfils, Reed, and White, and decline to find a due process

violation under these circumstances.9

9

Allen’s brief does not appear to challenge the district court’s

grant of summary judgment to the City and the officers in their

(continued...)

No. 02-1873 13

B. The Denial of Partial Summary Judgment

Finally, Allen argues that the district court improperly

denied her motion for partial summary judgment based on

the Health Care Surrogate Act, 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 40/1

et seq. Although Allen does not articulate which denial she

is appealing (the district court denied both her partial sum-

mary judgment motion on her federal claims and her partial

summary judgment motion on her state law claims), we

assume that she is contesting the district court’s denial of

partial summary judgment on her state law claims as moot.

We need not address the defendants’ substantive arguments

that summary judgment is unwarranted. We have already

ruled that the district court properly denied summary

judgment on Allen’s federal claims, and we therefore find no

fault with its decision to deny the state law-based motions

as moot and dismiss the state law claims. Moreover, Allen’s

argument on appeal is waived, as it consists of a page-long

citation to the Act, followed by three unilluminating

sentences. See Tyler v. Runyon, 70 F.3d 458, 464-65 (7th

Cir. 1995).

9

(...continued)

official capacity. However, assuming that Allen intended her

vague and sporadic references to departmental policy to be con-

strued as an appeal of this issue, we consider the argument

waived in light of her failure to discuss any of the requirements

for municipal liability set forth in Monell v. Department of Social

Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). See Tyler v. Runyon, 70 F.3d 458,

464-65 (7th Cir. 1995). In any event, the fact that Taylor and Scott

are not liable on the underlying substantive claim provides an

obvious basis for not holding the City liable. See Treece v.

Hochstetler, 213 F.3d 360, 364 (7th Cir. 2000).

14 No. 02-1873

III. CONCLUSION

We in no way mean to make light of any discomfort or

outrage Allen may have felt during the involuntary treat-

ment, nor do we suggest that a police officer can never be

held liable for failing to prevent medical personnel from

treating a patient against her will. However, the specific

circumstances at issue here simply do not give rise to a

constitutional violation. We therefore AFFIRM the judgment

of the district court.

A true Copy:

Teste:

________________________________

Clerk of the United States Court of

Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

USCA-02-C-0072—11-20-03