Scott, Perry v. Edinburg, Rodney L.

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

____________

No. 02-4085

PERRY L. SCOTT, SR., MICHELLE M. SCOTT,

PHILLIP H. SCOTT, JR., et al.,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

RODNEY L. EDINBURG and VILLAGE OF

GLENWOOD, a municipal corporation,

Defendants-Appellees.

____________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 99 C 4766—John A. Nordberg, Judge.

____________

ARGUED MAY 14, 2003—DECIDED OCTOBER 9, 2003

____________

Before POSNER, RIPPLE and MANION, Circuit Judges.

RIPPLE, Circuit Judge. Perry L. Scott, Sr. and other individ-

uals (collectively, “the plaintiffs”) brought this action on

behalf of the deceased Phillip Scott (“Mr. Scott”) in Illinois

state court. They claimed that Officer Rodney Edinburg

(“Officer Edinburg”) impermissibly had used deadly force

in attempting to arrest Mr. Scott. The defendants, Officer

Edinburg and his employer, the Village of Glenwood,

removed the case to federal court. The plaintiffs’ third

amended complaint alleged a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983

2 No. 02-4085

based on an allegation of an illegal seizure in violation of

the Fourth Amendment. The complaint also included an

1

Illinois state survival action and wrongful death claim.

Having determined that Officer Edinburg’s use of deadly

force was objectively reasonable, the district court granted

the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. For the

reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm the judgment of

the district court.

I

BACKGROUND

A. Facts

Rodney Edinburg was a police officer employed by the

Village of Glenwood. At 11:10 p.m. on May 17, 1999, Officer

Edinburg was off-duty and driving his personal car, a red

convertible Ford Mustang. He parked the vehicle, with the

top down, in a Marathon gas station on the South Side of

Chicago, left the keys in the ignition, exited the car in search

of something to eat, and approached J.J.’s hot dog stand

adjacent to the gas station. While at the hot dog stand,

Officer Edinburg learned that an individual had entered his

car and was trying to steal it. The perpetrator was Phillip

Scott. Officer Edinburg ran back to the car and stopped

1

The district court granted the defendants’ motion for summary

judgment, which sought summary judgment on both the § 1983

and pendent state law claims. See R.57 at 14. In this court, the

plaintiffs have not argued either in their initial or reply brief that

the grant of summary judgment on the state claims should be

reversed. Consequently, we address the only issue asserted on

appeal: whether summary judgment on the § 1983 claim was

appropriate.

No. 02-4085 3

between three to five feet from the rear bumper. Officer

Edinburg testified that he could not see Mr. Scott’s right

hand, which was either searching for something or perhaps

turning the ignition.

Officer Edinburg yelled “stop, stop,” “hey,” and “that’s

my car.” R.63, Ex.3 at 22. The car’s reverse lights then came

on, and it backed up toward him, so that Officer Edinburg

was forced to run backward to avoid being hit. Mr. Scott

was looking over his shoulder at Officer Edinburg as the

vehicle backed up. As he moved out of the way, Officer

Edinburg yelled “stop, police” and drew his revolver. Id.

at 23-24. Two to four seconds later, the car stopped backing

up and began to drive forward. The exact instant that the

first shot was fired is unclear, but the parties agree that Of-

ficer Edinburg fired the shot no earlier than the instant

when the car stopped moving backward and started to

move forward. Officer Edinburg testified that, after the first

shot was fired, the tires skidded and the car sped off.

Officer Edinburg stated that he noticed two individuals in

the direct path of the car and that people were moving,

ducking and running away as Mr. Scott drove through

the parking lot at a very high rate of speed. The plaintiffs,

however, introduced affidavits by two bystanders, stat-

ing that no one was in the car’s direct path and that no one

was forced to move out of the way. It is undisputed that

there were between twelve and fourteen patrons in the

gas station parking lot throughout the incident. While

the car was still in the parking lot, Officer Edinburg fired a

second shot. The vehicle then exited the parking lot, pro-

ceeding north on State Street. Officer Edinburg followed

on foot and fired at least six more shots. Shortly thereafter,

Mr. Scott died, and the car crashed. It is not clear which

gunshot killed Mr. Scott; but, the parties agree that the fa-

4 No. 02-4085

tal shot was one of the “first few shots fired by Officer

Edinburg, while he was on the gas station property.” R.58,

Ex.C at 2; see Appellant’s Br. at 3-4.

B. District Court Proceedings

Relying on the testimony that Mr. Scott tried to run

Officer Edinburg down with the Mustang and the uncontra-

dicted testimony that there were twelve to fourteen by-

standers in the gas station parking lot, the district court

concluded that the use of deadly force was justified under

Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985). See R.69 at 6 & 16. The

plaintiffs argued that Mr. Scott did not try intentionally to

run into Officer Edinburg and that Mr. Scott did not pose a

danger to bystanders in the parking lot. See id. at 8. The

district court noted that the plaintiffs did not introduce

contradictory forensic evidence; rather, they attempted to

challenge Officer Edinburg’s story by arguing that his tes-

timony is internally contradictory, inconsistent with prior

statements, and contradicted by eyewitness testimony. See

id. Nevertheless, the court concluded that these challenges

to Officer Edinburg’s testimony did not create a dispute

over a material fact. See id. at 16.

II

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

We review the district court’s grant of the motion for

summary judgment de novo. See Adams v. Wal-Mart Stores,

Inc., 324 F.3d 935, 938 (7th Cir. 2003); Rauen v. United States

Tobacco Mfg. Ltd. P’ship, 319 F.3d 891, 895 (7th Cir. 2003).

Summary judgment is appropriate only “if the pleadings,

No. 02-4085 5

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions

on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no

genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving

party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(c); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322

(1986). In evaluating whether a genuine issue of material

fact exists, all evidence and inferences must be viewed in

the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986);

Balderston v. Fairbanks Morse Engine Div. of Coltec Indus., 328

F.3d 309, 320 (7th Cir. 2003). However, “the nonmoving

party must set forth specific facts, more than mere conclu-

sions and allegations, sufficient to raise a genuine issue for

trial; ‘the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute

between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly

supported motion for summary judgment . . . .’ ” Balderston,

328 F.3d at 320 (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-48 (em-

phasis in Anderson)); see Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-24.

B. Fourth Amendment Analysis

The plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim is based on an alleged vio-

lation of Mr. Scott’s Fourth Amendment right to be free

from unreasonable seizures. A police officer’s use of deadly

force constitutes a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth

Amendment, and therefore it must be reasonable. See

Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7 (1985); Muhammed v. City of

Chicago, 316 F.3d 680, 683 (7th Cir. 2002). In Tennessee v.

Garner, the Supreme Court outlined the principles for eval-

uating whether the use of deadly force is reasonable under

the Fourth Amendment:

Where the officer has probable cause to believe that

the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm, ei-

ther to the officer or to others, it is not constitutionally

6 No. 02-4085

unreasonable to prevent escape by using deadly force.

Thus, if the suspect threatens the officer with a weapon

or there is probable cause to believe that he has commit-

ted a crime involving the infliction or threatened in-

fliction of serious physical harm, deadly force may be

used if necessary to prevent escape, and if, where feasi-

ble, some warning has been given.

Garner, 471 U.S. at 11-12; see Bell v. Irwin, 321 F.3d 637, 639

(7th Cir. 2003). The fact-specific nature of whether an officer

used excessive force depends on the totality of the cir-

cumstances surrounding the encounter. See Estate of Phillips

2

v. City of Milwaukee, 123 F.3d 586, 592 (7th Cir. 1997).

The issue of whether an intentional use of deadly force by

a police officer is permissible under the Fourth Amendment

requires an objective reasonableness inquiry. See Graham v.

Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 399 (1989). The officer’s subjective

belief or motivations are irrelevant. See id. at 397 (“[E]vil

intentions will not make a Fourth Amendment violation out

of an objectively reasonable use of force; nor will . . . good

intentions make an objectively unreasonable use of force

constitutional.”). The “particular use of force must be

judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the

scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Id. at

396; see Bell, 321 F.3d at 639; Estate of Phillips, 123 F.3d at 592.

“[T]he question is whether the officers’ actions are ‘objec-

tively reasonable’ in light of the facts and circumstances

confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent

or motivation.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 397; see Estate of Phillips,

2

We have held that, if the suspect threatens the officer with a

weapon, the risk of serious physical harm to the officer or others

has been established. See Bell v. Irwin, 321 F.3d 637, 639 (7th Cir.

2003).

No. 02-4085 7

123 F.3d at 592. Moreover, the reasonableness calculation

“must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are

often forced to make split-second judgments— in circum-

stances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolv-

ing—about the amount of force that is necessary in

a particular situation.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396-97. Conse-

quently, “ ‘when an officer believes that a suspect’s actions

[place] him, his partner, or those in the immediate vicinity

in imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury, the

officer can reasonably exercise the use of deadly force.’ ”

Muhammed, 316 F.3d at 683 (quoting Sherrod v. Berry, 856

F.2d 802, 805 (7th Cir. 1988) (en banc) and omitting empha-

sis).

Officer Edinburg presents two rationales to justify his use

3

of deadly force. First, he contends that Mr. Scott committed

a forcible felony by trying to run over him with the Mus-

tang, a deadly weapon, which made it reasonable for him to

protect himself by using deadly force. Second, Officer

Edinburg argues that it was objectively reasonable to use

deadly force to protect the other patrons in the gas station

parking lot. Assuming that either of these two propositions

is true, then the use of deadly force would have been

permissible under Tennessee v. Garner.

1. Threat to Officer Edinburg

Officer Edinburg contends that Mr. Scott threatened him

with a deadly weapon by trying to back over him with the

3

The defendants argue in the alternative that Officer Edinburg

is entitled to qualified immunity and that we may affirm on this

ground although it was not relied on by the district court. Nev-

ertheless, in this case, we need not consider the second prong of

the Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001), qualified immunity analy-

sis because we find no constitutional violation.

8 No. 02-4085

Mustang. He submits that this action justified his use of

deadly force to protect himself. The plaintiffs argue, how-

ever, that there is a genuine issue of material fact concerning

this matter that precludes summary judgment. We agree.

It is clear that, when an individual threatens a police of-

ficer with a deadly weapon, the officer is permitted to use

deadly force in self-defense if the use is consistent with the

principles set forth in Tennessee v. Garner. See Garner, 471

U.S. at 11-12; Muhammed, 316 F.3d at 683. Moreover, an

automobile may be used as a deadly weapon. See Smith v.

Freland, 954 F.2d 343, 347 (6th Cir. 1992). However, in Ellis

v. Wynalda, 999 F.2d 243 (7th Cir. 1993), we noted that, even

“[w]hen an officer faces a situation in which he could justi-

fiably shoot, he does not retain the right to shoot at any time

thereafter with impunity.” Id. at 247. In Ellis, we reversed a

grant of summary judgment in a police officer’s favor when

he shot an unarmed burglar in the back after the suspect

threw a bag at the officer and fled. We concluded that the

threat to the officer had ceased once the suspect had thrown

the bag and fled and that the legality of the use of deadly

force ended with the expiration of the threat. See id. Thus,

the timing of Officer Edinburg’s first shot is critical. It is

undisputed that every shot after the first one was fired

while the car was moving away from Officer Edinburg, see

4

R.65, Ex.C at 43, but the timing of the first shot is unclear.

4

We note that Officer Edinburg fired approximately six addi-

tional shots after Mr. Scott had exited the gas station parking lot

and was driving north on State Street. See R.65, Ex.C at 41.

Nevertheless, the propriety of these shots is not in issue because

the parties do not dispute that the gunshot that killed Mr. Scott

was one of the “first few shots fired by Officer Edinburg, while

(continued...)

No. 02-4085 9

Officer Edinburg’s own deposition testimony is the only

evidence in the record directly addressing the instant that

the first shot was fired.

In their response to the defendants’ Local Rule 56.1 State-

ment of Uncontested Facts, the plaintiffs agreed with the

defendants that “at the point where the vehicle stopped

moving towards Defendant Edinburg and began moving

away from Edinburg, he fired his weapon at Scott.” R.63

at ¶ 16; R.58 at ¶ 16. However, in his deposition testimony,

Officer Edinburg initially stated that the car was in the

process of backing up and stopping when he fired the first

shot. See R.63, Ex.3 at 26 (“The brake lights came on after I

backed up, yelled stop police at which time I fired a shot.”).

On the next page, Officer Edinburg was asked if the car had

stopped when he fired the first shot, and he responded

“no.” See R.63, Ex.3 at 27. Four pages later, the following

exchange occurred: “Q. At the time you fired the first shot,

was the vehicle backing up, standing still or moving away

from you? A. Moving away from me.” R.65, Ex.C at 31. The

discrepancy in Officer Edinburg’s testimony is significant.

If the fatal shot was fired while Mr. Scott was driving

away, then the argument that Officer Edinburg was com-

pelled to fire in order to protect himself would be signifi-

cantly weakened. Accordingly, there is a genuine issue of

material fact as to the timing of the first shot, which pre-

cludes a grant of summary judgment based on Garner’s

justification for self-defense.

4

(...continued)

he was on the gas station property.” R.58, Ex.C at 2; see Appel-

lant’s Br. at 3-4 (agreeing that “it is believed that the first or

second shot . . . was ultimately responsible for [Mr. Scott’s]

death . . .”).

10 No. 02-4085

2. Threat to Bystanders

Officer Edinburg also maintains that his use of deadly

force did not violate the Fourth Amendment because, as Mr.

Scott drove through the parking lot of the Marathon gas

station, there were between twelve to fourteen patrons in

the vicinity of the vehicle’s path whose safety Officer

Edinburg believed was at risk; these people were “forced to

run and duck out of the path of the vehicle.” R.58 at ¶¶ 7-18.

Although we have determined that a genuine issue of

material fact exists as to the timing of Officer Edinburg’s

firing of the first shot, Mr. Scott’s attempt to run over Officer

Edinburg is relevant in considering the reasonableness of

Officer Edinburg’s perception that the bystanders were in

danger. In Ellis, we explained “[i]f Ellis had threatened the

officer with a weapon and then run off with the weapon, a

reasonable officer . . . could believe that Ellis created a

danger to the community.” Ellis, 999 F.2d at 247. Officer

Edinburg knew that Mr. Scott already had committed a

forcible felony and had attempted to run him down in order

to escape or at least had acted recklessly with respect to that

5

possibility. Moreover, Officer Edinburg knew that Mr. Scott

was escaping at a high rate of speed through a parking lot

with twelve to fourteen bystanders and demonstrating little

concern for anyone’s safety. These facts support Officer

Edinburg’s argument that the use of deadly force was

permissible to protect third parties in danger. See Sherrod v.

Berry, 856 F.2d 802, 805 (7th Cir. 1988) (en banc) (“ ‘[W]hen

5

Under Illinois law, Mr. Scott’s action of trying to steal Officer

Edinburg’s Mustang constitutes the forcible felony of burglary.

See 720 ILCS 5/19-1; People v. Buckner, 561 N.E.2d 335, 342 (Ill.

App. Ct. 1990). Additionally, Mr. Scott committed a second forci-

ble felony by attempting to run over Officer Edinburg with the

car. See 720 ILCS 5/2-8.

No. 02-4085 11

an officer believes that a suspect’s actions [place] him, his partner,

or those in the immediate vicinity in imminent danger of death or

serious bodily injury, the officer can reasonably exercise the use of

deadly force.’ ” (emphasis in original)); see also Muhammed,

316 F.3d at 683 (quoting Sherrod); Ford v. Childers, 855 F.2d

1271, 1275 (7th Cir. 1988) (en banc) (finding no Fourth

Amendment violation when officer fired at a suspect

“because he reasonably believed that the suspect had

committed a felony involving the threat of deadly force, was

armed with a deadly weapon, and was likely to pose a

danger of serious harm to others if not immediately appre-

hended”); Freland, 954 F.2d at 347 (affirming summary

judgment even though officer was not in immediate per-

sonal danger when he fired his weapon because he could

reasonably believe that the suspect posed a serious and

immediate danger to the public and fellow officers).

The plaintiffs contend that the district court’s grant of

summary judgment was inappropriate because there exists

a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether there was

a threat to any bystanders. They rely on the identically

worded affidavits of eyewitnesses Moses Dean, Jr. and

Gregory Woolridge for the proposition that no one was ac-

tually in the direct path of Mr. Scott as he drove through the

parking lot and that no bystander was forced to flee the car.

The affidavits state: “While the vehicle proceeded through

the Marathon gas station parking lot, at no time were there

any people in the direct path of the vehicle’s travel.” R.63,

Ex.5 at ¶ 7; R.63, Ex.6 at ¶ 7. They also state, “While the

vehicle proceeded through the Marathon gas station

parking lot, no people ran or were forced to flee from the

vehicle’s path to avoid being struck by the car.” R.63, Ex.5

at ¶ 9; R.63, Ex.6 at ¶ 9. Finally, the plaintiffs invite us to

consider statements in the affidavits from Dean and

Woolridge that assert, “While the vehicle proceeded

12 No. 02-4085

through the Marathon gas station parking lot, at no time

were there any people who were in danger of being struck

6

by the vehicle.” R.63, Ex.5 at ¶ 8; R.63, Ex.6 at ¶ 8.

The affidavits clearly create a disputed fact as to whether

people were in the direct path of the car and whether they

were forced to run and duck out of its way. Nevertheless,

this conflict does not preclude summary judgment because

the threatened individuals need not have been placed in the

direct path of the threat. Deadly force may be exercised if

6

Officer Edinburg contends that the statements in paragraph 8

are not admissible and therefore do not preclude summary judg-

ment. In Reese v. Anderson, 926 F.2d 494, 499 (5th Cir. 1991), the

Fifth Circuit rejected similar statements in an affidavit in support

of a motion opposing summary judgment. The affidavit consid-

ered the shooting of a suspect who was surrounded by police. It

stated, “ ‘Mr. Crawford did not pose a threat to Officer Ander-

son’s life or to any of the other officers surrounding the car.’ ” Id.

The court reasoned:

The second sentence quoted is not factual at all. It is simply

an opinion—indeed, an opinion on the ultimate issue in this

case. As such, it is a textbook example of conclusoriness.

What is needed in an affidavit of this sort are facts, reasons,

observations, and explanations—in a word, evidence—not

sweeping conclusions. Instead [the plaintiff] has given us

what amounts to merely a general denial. Such may suffice

in the courts of Carroll’s Wonderland, but our rules are more

exacting.

See id. (emphasis in original) (citations omitted). Paragraph 8 of

Dean’s and Woolridge’s affidavits presents a similar conclusion

on an ultimate issue that is not well supported by facts in the affi-

davit, such as the positions of other bystanders, their own posi-

tions, or the speed and path of the vehicle. Therefore, this portion

of the affidavits cannot be used to create an issue of material fact.

No. 02-4085 13

the suspect’s actions place the officer, “his partner, or those

in the immediate vicinity in imminent danger of death or

serious bodily injury.” Muhammed, 316 F.3d at 683 (citing

Sherrod, 856 F.2d at 805) (emphasis added). Moreover, as we

have noted, at the time Officer Edinburg fired the fatal

shots, there were between twelve and fourteen patrons in

the gas station parking lot, Mr. Scott had committed a

forcible felony by stealing Officer Edinburg’s car, and Mr.

Scott had placed Officer Edinburg in danger. The affidavits

do not dispute these facts; therefore, they do not reject the

basis for our conclusion that it was objectively reasonable

for Officer Edinburg to perceive that the bystanders in the

Marathon gas station parking lot were at risk of injury from

Mr. Scott.

Additionally, the plaintiffs argue that the report of their

expert, James Marsh, creates a genuine issue of material fact.

The report concludes that Officer Edinburg’s actions were

“based on faulty perception, poor judgment, were untimely,

were without verbal warning, were excessive, and were

unjustified.” R.63, Ex.7 at 11. However, Marsh’s report was

introduced into the record without any supporting affidavit

verifying its authenticity and is therefore inadmissible and

cannot be considered for purposes of summary judgment.

See Haywood v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 323 F.3d 524, 533 (7th Cir.

2003) (stating that evidence relied upon to defeat a motion

for summary judgment must be evidence of a type admissi-

7

ble at trial); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Fed. R. Evid. 901(a).

7

See Smith v. City of Chicago, 242 F.3d 737, 741 (7th Cir. 2001) (“In

granting summary judgment, a ‘court may consider any material

that would be admissible or usable at trial,’ including properly

authenticated and admissible documents or exhibits.” (citations

(continued...)

14 No. 02-4085

Moreover, even if the report were admissible, it would not

create a genuine issue of material fact. The report’s analysis

of Officer Edinburg’s use of deadly force concludes that he

should have used the least amount of force possible under

the circumstances if there were lesser alternatives available

to secure the same result. See R.63, Ex.7 at 8. We have

rejected that position and stated, “[w]e do not believe that

the Fourth Amendment requires the use of the least or even

a less deadly alternative so long as the use of deadly force

is reasonable under Garner v. Tennessee and Graham v.

Connor . . . .” Plakas v. Drinski, 19 F.3d 1143, 1149 (7th Cir.

1994); see also Pena v. Leombruni, 200 F.3d 1031, 1033 (7th Cir.

1999) (commenting that, although the application of mea-

sures to render a person harmless without killing or wound-

ing him may be desirable, in a case in which the individual

presented a serious threat of bodily harm, failure to adopt

lesser measures would be no more than negligence, which

is not actionable under § 1983); Forrett v. Richardson, 112

F.3d 416, 420 (9th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by

Chroma Lighting v. GTE Prods. Corp., 127 F.3d 1136 (9th Cir.

1997) (citing Plakas for the proposition that the Fourth

Amendment does not require exhaustion of every alterna-

7

(...continued)

and quotations omitted)); Woods v. City of Chicago, 234 F.3d 979,

988 (7th Cir. 2000) (noting that court may consider “properly au-

thenticated and admissible documents or exhibits” in evaluating

a motion for summary judgment); 10A Charles Alan Wright et al.,

Federal Practice & Procedure § 2722, at 379-80 & 382-84 (1998)

(“Rule 56(e) requires that sworn or certified copies of all papers

referred to in an affidavit must be attached to or served with that

affidavit. . . . To be admissible, documents must be authenticated

by and attached to an affidavit that meets the requirements of

Rule 56(e) and the affiant must be a person through whom the

exhibits could be admitted into evidence.”).

No. 02-4085 15

tive before using justifiable deadly force); 3 Wayne R.

LaFave, Search & Seizure § 5.1, n.161.2 (2003) (citing Plakas

for the proposition that the “Fourth Amendment does not

require police to exhaust every alternative before using

deadly force”).

Finally, Mr. Scott argues that the testimony of William

Cranston, one of Officer Edinburg’s instructors, precludes

summary judgment. Cranston testified that shooting into a

moving vehicle and the use of deadly force against a non-

dangerous fleeing felon is a violation of police procedures.

See R.65 at ¶¶ 4-6. However, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 protects

plaintiffs from constitutional violations, not violations of

state laws or, in this case, departmental regulations and

police practices. See Pasiewicz v. Lake County Forest Preserve

Dist., 270 F.3d 520, 526 (7th Cir. 2001); Soller v. Moore, 84

F.3d 964, 969 (7th Cir. 1996) (rejecting evidence of police

department policies as irrelevant in the Fourth Amendment

reasonableness analysis); Ford, 855 F.2d at 1272-73 (uphold-

ing a district court’s denial of a new trial after granting a

directed verdict for defendant police officer even though

plaintiffs introduced evidence of violations of police prac-

tices and police manual policies); Freland, 954 F.2d at 348

(adopting the approach of Ford v. Childers, limiting inquiry

to whether the defendant violated Garner, not local police

rules and practices).

The only issue before us is whether Officer Edinburg’s use

of force to effect an arrest was a reasonable seizure consis-

tent with the Fourth Amendment. We emphasize that we

are not called upon to determine whether Officer Edinburg’s

conduct was either good police practice or a violation of

Illinois law. See Bell, 321 F.3d at 641 (“To say that police

officers have acted within the bounds that the Constitution

sets is not necessarily to say that they have acted wisely.”).

Our inquiry is simply whether the record contains sufficient

evidence on summary judgment to determine whether

16 No. 02-4085

Officer Edinburg’s conduct was reasonable under the

Fourth Amendment. We conclude that it does.

Conclusion

The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

AFFIRMED

A true Copy:

Teste:

_____________________________

Clerk of the United States Court of

Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

USCA-02-C-0072—10-9-03