Amadio, Thomas v. Ford Motor Company

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 99-3728

Thomas Amadio,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

Ford Motor Company,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 98 C 7810--George W. Lindberg, Judge.

Argued September 6, 2000--Decided February 1, 2001

Before Cudahy, Coffey, and Ripple, Circuit Judges.

Cudahy, Circuit Judge. Thomas Amadio was an

hourly employee on the assembly line at Ford

Motor Company’s Chicago Assembly Plant from June

9, 1986, to March 8, 1995, the date of his

termination by Ford Motor Company (Ford). In the

three years prior to his termination, Amadio

suffered from a variety of ailments that led him

to take a total of approximately 70 weeks of sick

leave. Because Amadio allegedly failed to fully

comply with Ford’s sick leave policy, Ford

terminated Amadio’s employment. Following his

termination, Amadio filed this suit against Ford

under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA),

42 U.S.C. sec.sec. 12101-12213, claiming that

Ford discriminated against him because of his

disability or, in the alternative, because it

regarded him as having a disability. The district

court granted summary judgment in favor of Ford.

We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Facts

In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we

set forth the facts in a light most favorable to

the non-moving party (here, Amadio), drawing all

reasonable inferences in its favor. See Anderson

v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986).

1.

Amadio started at Ford’s assembly plant on June

9, 1986, working, as he would until his

termination, on the assembly line. Amadio began

his career as an assembler, but later graduated

to the general utility position in the chassis

division, a position that qualified Amadio to be

assigned to any duty on the assembly line

involving the production of the car chassis.

Amadio was a member of the International Union

of the United Automobile Workers of America

(UAW), Local 551, as well as of the international

union. The UAW was the certified collective

bargaining representative for all hourly

employees at the assembly plant, and a collective

bargaining agreement (CBA) between Ford and the

UAW governed the terms and conditions of Amadio’s

employment.

The CBA specifically provides for employee sick

or medical leaves. A medical leave under the CBA

is requested from, and granted by, the medical

staff employed at the assembly plant. Generally,

Ford’s medical staff does not conduct an

independent examination of the employee, but

instead decides the propriety of a medical leave

based solely upon documents submitted by the

employee in support of the request. Ford Form

5166, "Medical Leave Authorization for Hourly

Employees," is generally used by employees in

submitting a required physician’s statement and

an anticipated return to work date.

Under the CBA, an employee who does not report

to work after the expiration of his medical leave

is mailed what is known as a "five-day quit"

letter. This letter requires the employee to

report to work or, if unable to do so, to report

to the company medical section, or mail in a form

completed by the employee’s doctor or phone the

assembly plant with an expected return date. If

an employee fails to respond adequately to a

five-day quit letter, the employee may be

terminated.

2.

Amadio appears to have gained an intimate

familiarity with the CBA’s sick leave provisions

in the last three years of his employment.

Indeed, the record indicates that Amadio took 23

medical leaves, and was absent for no less than

70 weeks during this time period. In addition,

Amadio was also subject to several disciplinary

lay-offs during this time period, apparently for

failure to adequately comply with Ford’s sick

leave procedures.

During Amadio’s last three years of employment

with Ford, he suffered from several ailments,

including illnesses (such as an upper respiratory

infection, a cold and similar afflictions), an

occupational back injury, hepatitis B, Brown’s

Syndrome,/1 high blood pressure, a liver

disorder and a urinary tract infection. While

Amadio’s liver disorder and urinary tract

infection were apparently the result of his

hepatitis, the remaining ailments appear to have

been unrelated to one another.

Amadio’s ailments resulted in several extended

absences from work. For example, Amadio was on

continuous medical leave from May 9, 1994 to

October 28, 1994. Amadio was again on leave from

November 2, 1994 to November 21, 1994. And, of

most importance to this case, Amadio was once

again on leave from December 2, 1994 to the date

of his termination on March 8, 1995.

Amadio’s last extended absence from work began

with the diagnosis of Brown’s Syndrome in

November 1994. While being treated for Brown’s

Syndrome, Amadio was diagnosed with hepatitis B.

Shortly thereafter, he was further diagnosed with

liver disease and a urinary tract infection. In

order to tend to this last round of ailments,

Amadio properly secured a medical leave, which he

began on December 2, 1994. This leave expired on

February 26, 1995. Because Amadio had still not

returned to work on February 28, 1995, Louis

Lafayette, a human resource representative in the

labor relations department at the assembly plant,

mailed a five-day quit letter (February 28

Letter) to Amadio. This letter required Amadio to

respond on or before March 7, 1995, by reporting

either to work or to the assembly plant’s medical

section for an evaluation. The letter further

required Amadio to bring "satisfactory medical

evidence" covering his entire period of absence.

On March 6, Amadio chose to report to the

medical section, where he discussed his medical

status with a clerk and a nurse. During his

visit, Amadio provided Ford’s medical staff with

a Ford Form 5166, documenting his absence from

February 27, 1995, to March 6, 1995, but failing

to document his absence prior to February 27,

1995, as requested by the February 28 Letter.

Amadio indicated that he had an upcoming

appointment with a specialist regarding his

urinary tract infection and that he would bring

additional medical leave paperwork after this

appointment. Amadio alleges that Ford’s medical

personnel responded by telling him "no problem,

when you get your information from the specialist

come back and see us."

3.

Lafayette terminated Amadio’s employment on

March 8, 1995, allegedly because Amadio failed to

adequately document his entire medical leave when

he visited the assembly plant’s medical section

on March 6, as required by his February 28

Letter. Consistent with assembly plant custom,

Lafayette sent a memorandum to assembly plant

personnel, informing them of Amadio’s termination

and instructing them that Amadio was to be

referred to the assembly plant’s labor relations

department before going to work or having further

contact with assembly plant medical personnel.

Later in the day on March 8, and subsequent to

Lafayette’s termination of Amadio, Richard

Jordan, another human resources representative at

the assembly plant, mailed a second five-day quit

letter (March 8 Letter) to Amadio. This letter

indicated that Amadio’s medical leave expired on

March 5, and not on February 26, as stated in the

February 28 Letter. The March 8 Letter gave

Amadio until March 15 to return to work./2

Amadio attempted to return to the assembly

plant medical section on March 9, 1995. He had

seen a medical specialist and was hoping to

submit a Ford Form 5166 that indicated an

expected return to work date of March 17, 1995.

However, upon Amadio’s arrival at the medical

section, the medical personnel refused to accept

Amadio’s new Ford Form 5166. Instead, as

instructed by Lafayette’s memorandum, they

referred Amadio to the assembly plant labor

relations department, which informed Amadio of

his termination.

Following an unsuccessful appeal of his

discharge through the CBA’s grievance procedure,

Amadio filed this action against Ford. In this

action, Amadio alleges for the first time that

Ford discriminated against him in violation of

the ADA because Ford knew that he had a

disability or regarded him as having a

disability.

B. District Court Proceedings

The district court issued a one-page order

granting summary judgment in favor of Ford,

finding that Amadio was not a "qualified

individual with a disability" under the ADA. The

district court expressed doubt that Amadio had a

"disability" as defined by the ADA because it

believed that Amadio’s medical conditions were

temporary. The district court also determined

that Amadio was unable to perform all of the

essential functions of his job because he was

unable to come to work on a regular basis. He had

missed approximately 70 weeks of work during the

preceding three years. In addition, the court

found that Ford was not required to continue

granting medical leaves as a reasonable

accommodation of Amadio’s inability to appear for

work. Accordingly, the court held that Amadio was

unable to prove a prima facie case of disability

discrimination under the ADA. Lastly, the court

stated that, even if Amadio had been able to

establish a prima facie case under the ADA, Ford

had articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory

reason for Amadio’s termination--that Amadio

failed to adequately document his absence as

required by the February 28 Letter.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

We review de novo the district court’s

disposition of this case on summary judgment. See

Cengr v. Fusibound Piping Sys., Inc., 135 F.3d

445, 450 (7th Cir. 1998). In so doing, we bear in

mind that summary judgment is only proper when

the "pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together

with the affidavits, if any, show that there is

no genuine issue as to any material fact and that

the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a

matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see also

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23

(1986). We, of course, view the record in a light

most favorable to the non-moving party. See

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,

255 (1986).

B. ADA Claim

The ADA states that "[n]o covered entity shall

discriminate against a qualified individual with

a disability because of the disability of such

individual in regard to . . . discharge of

employees . . . ." 42 U.S.C. sec. 12112(a). When,

as here, there is no direct evidence of

discrimination, a plaintiff must instead attempt

to prove a prima facie case under the familiar

scheme of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411

U.S. 792 (1973). See DeLuca v. Winer Indus., 53

F.3d 793, 797 (7th Cir. 1995).

A prima facie case under the ADA is established

when a plaintiff proves that: (1) he belongs to

the protected group; (2) he performed his job

satisfactorily; (3) he was subjected to an

adverse employment action; and (4) similarly

situated employees received more favorable

treatment. See DeLuca, 53 F.3d at 797. If the

plaintiff fails to prove any of these elements,

his claim fails. See id. However, if the

plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the

burden shifts to the defendant to articulate a

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the

defendant’s employment action. See id. If the

defendant clears this hurdle, the burden once

again shifts to the plaintiff to show that the

defendant’s offered reason is merely pretextual.

See id.

Here, there is no need to reach the later

inquiries of the McDonnell Douglas analysis

because Amadio has failed to prove even the first

element of a prima facie case--that he is a

member of the protected group. For the purpose of

showing that he is a member of the ADA’s

protected group, a plaintiff must establish that

he is "an individual with a disability who, with

or without reasonable accommodation, can perform

the essential functions of the employment

position that such individual holds or desires."

42 U.S.C. sec. 12111(8). Stated another way, to

prove membership in the ADA’s protected class, a

plaintiff must establish up to three elements:

(1) a disability; (2) the ability to perform the

essential functions of the employment position;

and (3) if unable to perform the essential

functions without accommodation, the existence of

a reasonable accommodation that would allow

performance of the position’s essential

functions. Amadio fails to establish even one of

these three elements, and he thus fails to prove

any part of the first requirement of a prima

facie ADA claim.

1.

We first address Amadio’s claim that he has a

"disability" as that term is employed by the ADA.

The ADA defines "disability" to include: "(A) a

physical or mental impairment that substantially

limits one or more of the major life activities

of such individual; (B) a record of such an

impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such

an impairment." 42 U.S.C. sec. 12102(2); see also

29 C.F.R. sec. 1630.2(g). Amadio concedes that he

does not meet the first two definitions of a

disability but vigorously contends that he

satisfies the third definition--that Ford

regarded him as having an impairment that

substantially limits one or more of his major

life activities.

The purpose of the "regarded as" definition of

a "disability" is to "cover individuals ’rejected

from a job because of the ’myths, fears and

stereotypes’ associated with disabilities.’"

Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471,

489-90 (1999) (quoting 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, App.

sec. 1630.2(l)). An individual may prove a

"regarded as" claim by showing that either "(1)

a covered entity mistakenly believes that a

person has a physical impairment that

substantially limits one or more major life

activities, or (2) a covered entity mistakenly

believes that an actual, nonlimiting impairment

substantially limits one or more major life

activities." Sutton, 527 U.S. at 489; see also 29

C.F.R. sec. 1630.2(l).

It is important to note that, in order to

establish a "regarded as" claim, it is not enough

for a plaintiff to show that the employer knew of

the plaintiff’s impairment. See Davidson v.

Midelfort Clinic, Ltd., 133 F.3d 499, 510 (7th

Cir. 1998). The plaintiff must also show that the

employer believed that one or more of the

plaintiff’s major life activities were

substantially limited by the plaintiff’s

impairment. See id.; see also 29 C.F.R. sec.

1630.2(l). Such major life activities include,

for example, "caring for oneself, performing

manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking,

breathing, learning, and working." Sinkler v.

Midwest Prop. Mgmt. Ltd. Partnership, 209 F.3d

678, 683-84 (7th Cir. 2000) (citing 29 C.F.R.

sec. 1630.2(i)). The plaintiff must select the

major life activities that he will attempt to

prove the employer regarded as being

substantially limited by his impairment. See

Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 637-38 (1998);

Sinkler, 209 F.3d at 683.

In this case, Amadio has alleged that Ford

regarded his hepatitis as limiting only his major

life activity of working. However, before we can

decide whether Ford regarded Amadio’s hepatitis

as limiting his ability to work, we must first

take a detour to decide what facts may inform our

analysis of Amadio’s "regarded as" claim. Perhaps

the best evidence that exists to support Amadio’s

claim resides in the affidavit that he submitted

in response to Ford’s motion for summary

judgment. In his affidavit, Amadio alleged that

in February 1995 he told Lafayette, "I’m blind in

one eye, I just learned that I have hepatitis B

so come on, give me a break and quit riding me

about the medical leaves." Amadio further alleged

that Lafayette replied by saying that he had

"heard hepatitis B was contagious and maybe

[Amadio] should not come around the Plant."

Amadio’s affidavit statements directly

contradict the testimony he gave at an earlier

deposition, during which he was asked, "Was there

any point in time when you told a Ford employee,

a management person, that you were handicapped or

disabled?" To this question, Amadio simply

responded, "No." Further, at his deposition

Amadio was asked at length about conversations he

had with Lafayette, and not once did Amadio

disclose the conversation he alleged in his

affidavit. He even answered in the negative after

being asked, "Just for the sake of completeness

can you remember at all any other difficult

conversations with Lou Lafayette other than

anything you’ve testified to so far?"

Amadio responds to the contradictions in his

testimony by arguing that Ford should have asked

more specific questions at his deposition. It is,

however, difficult to imagine how Ford could have

been more specific. At the very least, being told

that one’s ailment is contagious and that one is

no longer welcome around the plant certainly

seems to qualify as a "difficult conversation."

Amadio should have mentioned it as such during

his deposition, especially given his detailed

recollection of other conversations with

Lafayette. For example, Amadio was asked the

following questions during his deposition:

Then I believe you said that Lou Lafayette gave

you a hard time and said things along the lines

of you need to show up to work; is that a fair

characterization of your testimony? [affirmative

response omitted] . . . Can you tell me as

specifically as you can exactly what he said in

that regard?

In response, Amadio remembered that sometime

between January 27, 1995 and February 3, 1995,

Lafayette told him "to get your ass back to work

or you’re going to get your ass fired."

It is by now well-settled that a party may not

attempt to survive a motion for summary judgment

by manufacturing a factual dispute through the

submission of an affidavit that contradicts prior

deposition testimony. Consequently, "[w]here a

deposition and affidavit are in conflict, the

affidavit is to be disregarded unless it is

demonstrable that the statement in the deposition

was mistaken, perhaps because the question was

phrased in a confusing manner or because a lapse

of memory is in the circumstances a plausible

explanation for the discrepancy." Russell v.

Acme-Evans Co., 51 F.3d 64, 67-68 (7th Cir. 1995)

(citing Slowiak v. Land O’Lakes, Inc., 987 F.2d

1293, 1297 (7th Cir. 1993)). As already noted,

Amadio provided no acceptable explanation for his

failure to describe Lafayette’s alleged

statements during his deposition. As such,

because Amadio’s affidavit directly contradicts

his prior deposition testimony, the affidavit is

inadmissible, and we will only consider Amadio’s

deposition testimony. See Piscione v. Ernst &

Young, L.L.P., 171 F.3d 527, 532-33 (7th Cir.

1999); Slowiak, 987 F.2d at 1295.

Amadio rightly points out that Lafayette’s

testimony is seemingly contradictory as well. In

Lafayette’s affidavit in support of Ford’s motion

for summary judgment, Lafayette maintained that,

at the time of his decision to terminate Amadio

he did not know that Amadio had been suffering

from blindness in his left eye, had hepatitis or

had any other infection. On the other hand,

Lafayette testified at his deposition that he was

of the "opinion" that he was aware of Amadio’s

medical information prior to terminating Amadio.

Just as a non-moving party may not use a

contradictory affidavit to manufacture a factual

dispute for the purpose of surviving summary

judgment, a moving party may not rely on a

contradictory affidavit to negate the existence

of a factual dispute for the purpose of winning

summary judgment. As a result, and because we

view the record in a light most favorable to

Amadio, we assume that Lafayette was aware of

Amadio’s hepatitis at the time Lafayette

terminated Amadio’s employment.

Thus, after excluding the contradictory

affidavits, and viewing the remaining facts in

the light most favorable to Amadio, we are left

with the following facts against which to examine

Amadio’s claim that Ford regarded him as

disabled: (1) Amadio never told a Ford employee

that he was handicapped or disabled; (2) Amadio

never had a difficult conversation concerning his

hepatitis with Lafayette; and (3) Lafayette knew

of Amadio’s hepatitis before he terminated

Amadio’s employment.

On these facts, no reasonable jury could find

that Ford regarded Amadio as having a disability

that substantially impaired his ability to work.

There is no evidence that Amadio ever discussed

the reasons for his medical leaves with the labor

relations department at the assembly plant, or

with Lafayette in particular. Even though we

assume, for purposes of reviewing a grant of

summary judgment, that Lafayette did know of

Amadio’s hepatitis at the time Lafayette

terminated Amadio’s employment, this knowledge is

insufficient, in itself, to show that Lafayette

regarded Amadio as substantially limited in the

life activity of working. To divine from the

known facts the conclusion that Lafayette

terminated Amadio’s employment out of a fear of

Amadio’s hepatitis would require us not to draw

a reasonable inference in Amadio’s favor, as we

are required to do in reviewing an order of

summary judgment, but to engage in speculation.

It is well-settled that speculation may not be

used to manufacture a genuine issue of fact. See

Gorbitz v. Corvilla, Inc., 196 F.3d 879, 882 (7th

Cir. 1999); Patterson v. Chicago Assoc. for

Retarded Citizens, 150 F.3d 719, 724 (7th Cir.

1998). Accordingly, Amadio has failed to show

that Ford regarded him as being disabled.

2.

Even if Amadio had been able to prove that Ford

regarded him as having a disability, Amadio would

still need to establish that, with or without

reasonable accommodation, he could perform the

essential functions of his employment position.

See Deane v. Pocono Med. Ctr., 142 F.3d 138, 140

(3d Cir. 1998); see also 42 U.S.C. sec. 12111(8);

29 C.F.R. sec. 1630.2(m).

We first recognized work attendance as an

essential requirement of employment in Vande

Zande v. Wis. Dep’t of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 544

(7th Cir. 1995) (attendance required of clerical

worker position). Since Vande Zande, the list of

occupations in Seventh Circuit cases requiring

attendance as an essential function has grown to

include, in addition to clerical worker, the

positions of teacher, Nowak v. St. Rita High

Sch., 142 F.3d 999 (7th Cir. 1998), account

representative, Corder v. Lucent Tech., Inc., 162

F.3d 924 (7th Cir. 1998), production employee,

Waggoner v. Olin Corp., 169 F.3d 481 (7th Cir.

1999), and plant equipment repairman, Jovanovic

v. In-Sink-Erator Div. of Emerson Elec. Co., 201

F.3d 894 (7th Cir. 2000). While we will not say

that attendance is an essential function of every

employment position, Amadio’s position on the

assembly line at Ford’s assembly plant can easily

be added to the "attendance required" list.

Indeed, the requirement that an employee be in

attendance is "especially true in factory

positions . . . where the work must be done on

the employer’s premises; maintenance and

production functions cannot be performed if the

employee is not at work." Jovanovic, 201 F.3d at

900.

It is clear that Amadio’s record of attendance

does not meet even the minimum requirements of

his position. Amadio took 23 medical leaves

during his last three years of employment

(totaling approximately eighteen months of

absence) and was disciplined several times in

connection with his absenteeism. We have

consistently found that plaintiffs who have

attendance records similar to or substantially

better than Amadio’s do not qualify for

protection under the ADA. See Jovanovic, 201 F.3d

at 900 (employee missing twenty-four days in past

twelve months not qualified); Waggoner, 169 F.3d

at 485 (employee missing 5 months of work, and

showing up late or not at all for forty days in

a fourteen-month period, not qualified); Corder,

162 F.3d at 928 (employee missing eighteen months

of work not qualified); Nowak, 142 F.3d at 1003-

04 (employee missing eighteen months of work not

qualified). Similarly, Amadio’s lengthy absences

from a job that requires regular attendance lead

us to conclude that Amadio could not perform all

essential functions of his employment position.

3.

When a disabled employee cannot perform the

essential functions of a job, the court must

consider whether any reasonable accommodation by

the employer would help the employee to perform

those functions. See Cochrum v. Old Ben Coal Co.,

102 F.3d 908, 911 (7th Cir. 1996); see also 42

U.S.C. sec. 12112(b)(5)(A). The ADA states that

"reasonable accommodation" may include "job

restructuring, part-time or modified work

schedules, reassignment to a vacant position,

acquisition or modification of equipment or

devices, appropriate adjustment or modifications

of examinations, training materials or policies,

the provision of qualified readers or

interpreters, and other similar accommodations

for individuals with disabilities." 42 U.S.C.

sec. 12111(9)(B). However, if an accommodation

"would impose an undue hardship" on the operation

of the employer’s business, the accommodation

need not be made. 42 U.S.C. sec. 12112(b)(5)(A).

The facts relevant to a determination of whether

a medical leave is a reasonable accommodation are

the facts available to the decision-maker at the

time of the employment decision. See Bay v.

Cassens Transp. Co., 212 F.3d 969, 974 (7th Cir.

2000); Nowak, 142 F.3d at 1003.

When an employee is unable to perform the

essential function of attending his employment,

few, if any, reasonable accommodations exist. In

fact, if an employee cannot regularly attend

work, the only imaginable accommodation is an

open-ended schedule that allows the employee to

come and go as he pleases. This is especially

true of employees like Amadio who seemingly take

advantage of a company’s apparently generous

leave policy to show up for only a few days at a

time between absences that occasionally stretch

over several months. We are thus led here to the

same conclusion we reached in Jovanovic: "We

would be hard-pressed to imagine a manufacturing

facility that could operate effectively when its

employees are essentially permitted to set their

own work hours, and we thus reject such a

schedule as an unreasonable accommodation under

the circumstances of this case." 201 F.3d at 899

n.9.

Amadio attempts to distinguish his case by

arguing that his poor attendance record is not

indicative of his ability to work at the time he

was fired. Amadio maintains that he eventually

would have been able to work had Ford reasonably

accommodated him with the one week of additional

medical leave he requested as necessary to return

to full health. Amadio bases this argument on his

appearance at the assembly plant medical section

on March 9, 1995, the day after he was

terminated, with a doctor’s note giving his

expected date of return to work as March 17,

1995.

Undoubtedly, a short, one-week medical leave

constitutes a reasonable accommodation in many

circumstances. Here, however, we have already

determined that Amadio is unable to regularly

attend his job. Thus, in order to claim that a

continued absence from his job would have been a

reasonable accommodation, Amadio must do more

than merely allege that he would have been able

to return to work on a full-time basis if only he

had been given one more week of leave. In

Amadio’s case, Ford had every reason to believe

that giving Amadio additional leave would be an

ineffectual gesture. Amadio’s record of

attendance clearly indicated that, even if he had

returned to work in one week, he was not likely

to remain for very long before a new ailment

afflicted him. Amadio took 23 medical leaves, and

was absent for more than 70 weeks during the last

three years of his employment. In addition,

during his employment at Ford, Amadio was

disciplined on several occasions for absenteeism,

including a 30-day layoff for insufficient

documentation of a medical leave, a one-week

layoff relating to a previous medical leave, and

a number of three-day and one-day layoffs. In

light of these facts, the extension of Amadio’s

already lengthy leave by one more week would have

been a futile concession, not a reasonable

accommodation./3 Indeed, while we have not

considered this fact in rendering our decision,

we note that Ford’s suspicions were ultimately

realized; in spite of Amadio’s contention that he

merely needed one week before being able to

return to work, he did not in fact find a new job

until over one year had elapsed because his

hepatitis remained actively symptomatic.

Amadio makes one last attempt to show that an

extended leave would have been a reasonable

accommodation by arguing that Ford was bound by

its obligations under the CBA, which explicitly

provided for medical leaves. However, the fact

that Ford generously granted extended leaves to

its employees--in rare cases, up to two years--

does not necessarily bind Ford to repeatedly

grant successive leaves to Amadio, especially

since Amadio had a history of abusing his medical

leave status. Usually, an employee on medical

leave will be absent for a determinate period of

time. In such a circumstance, an employer can

hire temporary help or otherwise plan to

compensate for the employee’s absence on the

production line. However, with a chronically

absent employee like Amadio, the employer never

knows when the employee’s medical leave will

really terminate since the employee is likely to

request yet another leave shortly after returning

to work following the previous leave. This

pattern of behavior prevents the employer from

ever being able to adequately compensate for the

missing employee’s frequent, yet unpredictable

absences.

While an employer should show patience when an

employee first falls sick, if an employer "bends

over backwards to accommodate a disabled worker

. . . it must not be punished for its generosity

by being deemed to have conceded the

reasonableness of so far-reaching an

accommodation." Vande Zande, 44 F.3d at 545; see

also Duckett v. Dunlop Tire Corp., 120 F.3d 1222,

1225 (11th Cir. 1997) (An employer is not

necessarily required to apply its own established

business policy as a reasonable accommodation.);

Myers v. Hose, 50 F.3d 278, 284 (4th Cir. 1994)

("A particular accommodation is not necessarily

reasonable, and thus federally mandated, simply

because the [employer] elects to establish it as

a matter of policy."). As noted, Ford was more

than generous when it granted Amadio the numerous

and extended leaves he has received; Ford was

under no duty to continue to do so indefinitely,

given that Amadio showed no promise of ever

committing himself to his work.

III. CONCLUSION

Because Amadio fails to establish even the

first element of a prima facie case under the

ADA, we need not address the parties’ dispute

regarding the validity of Ford’s stated reason

for releasing Amadio. See Celotex Corp. v.

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) ("[A] complete

failure of proof concerning an essential element

of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders

all other facts immaterial."). For the foregoing

reasons, the district court’s entry of summary

judgment in favor of Ford Motor Company is

Affirmed.

/1 Brown’s Syndrome is an inflammation of the muscle

tissue that controls the eye. In Amadio’s case,

this disease led to blindness in Amadio’s left

eye lasting from November 1994 through January

1995.

/2 The parties dispute the meaning of this second

five-day quit letter. Amadio maintains that this

second letter proves that his medical leave had

been extended until at least March 5 and that,

therefore, Lafayette had prematurely terminated

Amadio because of his disability. Amadio further

supports his argument by alleging that Lafayette

told him to stay away from the assembly plant

because Lafayette understood hepatitis to be

contagious. On the other hand, Ford ascribes no

meaning to the March 8 Letter, arguing that the

letter was an oversight. The dispute is

immaterial, however, because it is relevant only

to a determination of Ford’s motive for

terminating Amadio. We need not consider Ford’s

motive because we find that Amadio was not a

"qualified individual with a disability" under

the ADA. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.

317, 323 (1986) ("[A] complete failure of proof

concerning an essential element of the nonmoving

party’s case necessarily renders all other facts

immaterial.").

/3 In addition, we observe that Amadio would lose on

his reasonable accommodation claim at a trial.

"An employee has the initial duty to inform the

employer of a disability before ADA liability may

be triggered for failure to provide

accommodations--a duty dictated by common sense

lest a disabled employee keep his disability a

secret and sue later for failure to accommodate."

Beck v. Univ. of Wis. Bd. of Regents, 75 F.3d

1130, 1134 (7th Cir. 1996). As determined above,

there is no admissible evidence that Ford knew of

Amadio’s alleged disability, or even regarded him

as having one, at the time he was fired.

Accordingly, Ford cannot be held liable for

failing to accommodate Amadio.

Amadio would also likely lose on his reasonable

accommodation claim because he did not make his

request for a reasonable accommodation until

after he was terminated. As announced in Webster

v. Methodist Occupational Health Ctrs., Inc.,

"[a]n employee cannot refuse reasonable

accommodations during the interactive process the

[ADA] contemplates, and then after dismissal

suggest something different and claim that the

employer still has a duty to consider further

accommodations," 141 F.3d 1236, 1238 (7th Cir.

1998). Similarly, an employee cannot wait until

after dismissal to inform an employer of his

disability and request an accommodation for the

first time, as Amadio attempted to do here.