Conley, Joseph M. v. Village Bedford Park

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 99-2659

JOSEPH M. CONLEY,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

VILLAGE OF BEDFORD PARK,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern

Division.

No. 98 C 7183--Suzanne B. Conlon, Judge.

ARGUED JANUARY 14, 2000--DECIDED May 31, 2000

Before FLAUM, EASTERBROOK and RIPPLE,

Circuit Judges.

RIPPLE, Circuit Judge. Joseph Conley

brought this action pursuant to the

Vocational Rehabilitation Act of 1973

(the "Rehabilitation Act"), 29 U.S.C.

sec. 701 et seq., and the Americans with

Disabilities Act of 1990 (the "ADA"), 42

U.S.C. sec. 12101 et seq. He claimed that

his employer, the Village of Bedford Park

(the "Village"), had discriminated

against him on the basis of his

disability; Mr. Conley is a recovering

alcoholic. The district court granted

summary judgment for the Village. For the

reasons set forth in the following

opinion, we affirm the judgment of the

district court.

I

BACKGROUND

A. Facts/1

Mr. Conley worked as a Maintenance

Worker for the Village of Bedford Park.

He was assigned to the Water Department

from October 1989, until his transfer to

the Department of Public Works in October

1997. For the first four and one-half

years of his employment, Mr. Conley was

chronically tardy and absent from work

without permission. In response, the

Water Department imposed various forms of

progressive discipline, including verbal

warnings, written warnings, and, finally,

suspension. Believing that alcoholism was

the root of Mr. Conley’s work problems,

Water Department management requested

that Mr. Conley submit to a substance

abuse evaluation. As a result of that

evaluation, Mr. Conley was required to

attend an alcohol rehabilitation program

in late February and early March of 1994.

As the completion of his program drew

near, Mr. Conley contacted his

supervisor, James Gifford. The exact

nature of the conversations between Mr.

Conley and Gifford are disputed.

According to Mr. Conley, however, he

contacted Gifford on March 1, 1994, and

told Gifford that he (Mr. Conley) would

be released from the program on March 3;

Gifford responded: "Mike, I don’t have

time for this s_ _ t now. Call me when

you get your paperwork," and hung up.

R.7, Ex.3 at 63. On March 3, the day Mr.

Conley was released, he called the Water

Department at 4:15 p.m. and again asked

for Gifford. Mr. Conley was told that

Gifford had left for the day; Mr. Conley

left a message.

At 9:00 a.m. the following day, Mr.

Conley again called Gifford to obtain

instructions for his return to work.

Gifford told him that he should have

called earlier or, at least, have

reported for work at the usual start

time; Gifford then told Mr. Conley that

he would have to call Mr. Conley back.

After speaking with the Village’s

attorney and others, Gifford returned Mr.

Conley’s call and told Mr. Conley that he

should come to the Water Department later

that day. When Mr. Conley arrived, he was

informed by Gifford that he was being

suspended for nine days without pay

because he had failed to come directly to

work after his treatment and because he

had missed four days of his treatment.

During the course of the meeting, Gifford

also told Mr. Conley that he "would be

relentless" toward Mr. Conley and that

Mr. Conley "should probably find another

job." Id. at 70.

Mr. Conley returned to work after his

nine-day suspension. Although his

absenteeism and punctuality improved

markedly, Mr. Conley’s work performance

declined in Gifford’s eyes. Specifically,

Mr. Conley failed to report pump problems

to the central office on several

occasions.

According to Mr. Conley, his diagnosis

and treatment for alcoholism marked the

beginning of various types of

discrimination by the Village. For

instance, after his return from

treatment, Mr. Conley was assigned to

paint the pump house for several months

by himself. During this time, he was not

allowed to drive department vehicles.

These actions, according to Mr. Conley,

made him feel isolated from other

employees.

Mr. Conley also points to other examples

of allegedly discriminatory actions that

occurred after his treatment. Mr. Conley

believes that the Village unjustifiably

denied him opportunities to work overtime

and, in August 1996, promoted a less

senior maintenance worker instead of him.

The injustice Mr. Conley perceived as an

employee in the Water Department led him

to file a charge of discrimination with

the Illinois Department of Human Rights

on March 20, 1997, three years after his

suspension. In his charge, Mr. Conley

alleged that he had been subjected to

"different terms and conditions" of

employment since March of 1994. R.7,

Ex.14. Specifically, he complained of

three actions by the Water Department.

First, Mr. Conley stated he had been

given the "worst job assignments (mainly

painting)" and that this made him feel

"isolated from the other employees." Id.

Second, Mr. Conley cited the Water

Department’s failure to offer him

overtime "as recent as March 7, 1997," as

further evidence of discrimination. Id.

Finally, Mr. Conley charged that the

Water Department failed to promote him to

a higher class of maintenance worker

around August 20, 1996. Mr. Conley

attributed his poor treatment to his

disability; he stated: "I believe I have

been discriminated against because of my

disability, in violation of the Americans

With Disabilities Act of 1990, as

amended, in that I was not treated badly

until after I was diagnosed [with my]

disability." Id. While his charge was

pending, Mr. Conley requested, and was

granted, a transfer to the Department of

Public Works.

B. District Court Proceedings

After receiving his right-to-sue letter

from the EEOC, Mr. Conley brought this

action in the district court for

violations of both the ADA and

Rehabilitation Act. In his complaint, Mr.

Conley averred that, after the disclosure

of his alcoholism in March 1994, his

supervisors no longer considered him "a

competent or valued member of the agency,

unjustifiably criticized his work, and

pursued adverse personnel actions against

[him], all because of his alcoholism

condition." R.1, para.14. He also stated,

as in his EEOC charge, that he "was

denied promotion, given menial

assignments below his former level, and

otherwise mistreated." Id., para.15.

Finally, Mr. Conley alleged that the

Village, "through [its] management team,

intentionally created a hostile work

environment for [him] after his

disclosure of his handicap, on account of

his handicap." Id., para.17.

The Village denied the material

allegations of the complaint. It also set

forth an affirmative defense that Mr.

Conley’s complaint was outside the scope

of the charge of discrimination because

the charge did not name alcoholism

specifically as Mr. Conley’s disability.

Shortly thereafter, the Village moved

for summary judgment on the ground that

Mr. Conley was not disabled within the

meaning of the statutes. According to the

Village, he was not disabled because he

was, at all times, able "to sit, stand,

lift, reach, hear, speak, breathe, learn,

walk, work, [and] care for himself." R.5

at 11. Furthermore, it did not perceive

Mr. Conley as disabled because he

possessed all of the abilities listed

above. The Village also took issue with

Mr. Conley’s claims that he had suffered

adverse employment actions as a result of

his alcoholism. The Village claimed that

there was "no evidence that the Village

of Bedford Park discriminated against Mr.

Conley because he was an alcoholic." Id.

at 12. Any failure to promote Mr. Conley,

the Village argued, was based on job

performance. As well, his assignments and

opportunities for overtime had not

changed since his treatment. Finally, the

Village reiterated its affirmative

defense that the EEOC charge was

deficient because it lacked specifics

concerning Mr. Conley’s disability. The

Village maintained that this deficiency

resulted in an absolute bar to Mr.

Conley’s claims because the date for

filing a new charge had passed./2

Mr. Conley filed a response to the

motion for summary judgment. In his

response, Mr. Conley set forth examples

of the ways that the Village had

discriminated against him, namely, his

suspension, his supervisor’s statement

that he would be "relentless" toward Mr.

Conley, the lack of opportunities for him

to work overtime, his job assignments,

and the fact that he was not promoted.

R.13 at 6-7. Mr. Conley also refuted the

Village’s argument that his claims were

time-barred; he said the Village became

aware of the nature of the alleged

disability discrimination early in the

EEOC’s investigation.

The district court was persuaded by the

Village’s arguments and entered summary

judgment on its behalf. In its opinion,

the court first reiterated the elements

of Mr. Conley’s cause of action: "(1) he

is a disabled person under the statute;

(2) he is qualified to perform the

essential functions of his job with or

without reasonable accommodation and (3)

he has suffered an adverse employment

action because of his disability." R.18

at 4 (citations omitted). Because Mr.

Conley had produced evidence that

"Bedford Park viewed his alcoholism as

impairing his job performance," the court

concluded that his alcoholism qualified

as a disability. Id. at 5. The court then

determined that "Conley has failed to

carry his burden of proving that his

alcoholism did not affect his job and

that he was performing at the same

standard as other employees." Id. at 6.

In support of its statement, the district

court pointed to Mr. Conley’s

acknowledgment of his less than stellar

attendance record and of his admission

that "his lack of promotion was the

result of not performing on a par with

other maintenance workers." Id. The court

then addressed Mr. Conley’s other

allegations of discrimination, that he

was not allowed to drive a Village

vehicle and that he was assigned to paint

the pump room for an extended period of

time. It stated:

Refusing Conley a city-owned vehicle in

which to drive to work hardly constitutes

discrimination when Conley had previously

appeared for work with alcohol on his

breath. See Gifford Dep. at 154-56.

Conley’s assignment to paint the pump

room was a normal aspect of his job;

other maintenance workers had been

required to paint parts of the pump

station. See Orlos Dep. at 12-13.

Id. at 6-7. Because Mr. Conley had failed

to show that the Village discriminated

against him on the basis of his

alcoholism, the court entered judgment on

behalf of the Village.

II

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

We review de novo the district court’s

grant of summary judgment to the

defendants. See Silk v. City of Chicago,

194 F.3d 788, 798 (7th Cir. 1999). In

evaluating the district court’s decision,

we "must construe all facts in the light

most favorable to the non-moving party

and draw all reasonable and justifiable

inferences in favor of that party."

Bellaver v. Quanex Corp., 200 F.3d 485,

491-92 (7th Cir. 2000). Summary judgment

is proper if the record shows "that there

is no genuine issue as to any material

fact and that the moving party is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law."

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see Celotex Corp.

v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).

However, the nonmoving party, here Mr.

Conley, was required to set forth

"specific facts showing that there is a

genuine issue for trial," Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(e), and to produce more than a

scintilla of evidence in support of his

position, see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,

Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986). In fact,

Mr. Conley must have presented evidence

from "which the jury could reasonably

find for" him. Id. With these standards

in mind, we turn to Mr. Conley’s first

claim./3

B. Suspension

Mr. Conley first argues that the Village

discriminated against him by suspending

him for his failure to report for work on

time immediately following his treatment.

In order to state a claim for

discriminatory suspension, Mr. Conley

must establish that he is disabled as

defined under the ADA and that he

suffered an adverse employment action as

a result of his disability. See Silk, 194

F.3d at 798 n.6. The district court

concluded, and the Village does not

contest on appeal, that alcoholism is a

disability as defined by the ADA.

Furthermore, there is no dispute that a

suspension constitutes an adverse

employment action. See, e.g., id. at 800;

Biolchini v. General Elec. Co., 167 F.3d

1151, 1154 (7th Cir. 1999) ("It is

undisputed that Biolchini . . . suffered

an adverse employment action in the form

of a one week suspension . . . ."). We

turn, therefore, to whether Mr. Conley

has proffered some evidence of an illicit

motive for the adverse action, that is,

some causal link between his alcoholism

and his suspension.

We have stated previously that a

plaintiff may show a causal link in two

ways: either by (1) putting forward

"direct evidence of illegal motive linked

to the challenged employment decision,"

or (2) establishing illegal motive

indirectly through the three-step model

of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411

U.S. 792 (1973). Chambers v. American

Trans Air, Inc., 17 F.3d 998, 1003 (7th

Cir. 1994). Different kinds and

combinations of evidence can demonstrate

a discriminatory intent such as

"suspicious timing, ambiguous statements,

oral or written, behavior toward or

comments directed at other employees in

the protected group, and other bits and

pieces from which an inference of

discriminatory intent might be drawn."

Troupe v. May Dep’t Stores Co., 20 F.3d

734, 735 (7th Cir. 1994).

Here, if we accept Mr. Conley’s version

of events as true, there is evidence from

which an inference of discriminatory

intent might be drawn with respect to the

suspension. Both during and after his

release from treatment, Mr. Conley took

steps to determine exactly what he must

do to return to work. However, Gifford

never responded to Mr. Conley’s requests.

When Mr. Conley finally reached Gifford

on March 4, Gifford immediately chastised

Mr. Conley for failing to show up for

work at the usual hour and did not give

Mr. Conley further instructions at that

time. Instead, Gifford summoned Mr.

Conley for a meeting later that afternoon

and informed him that he was suspended

for nine days without pay because he had

failed to report to work on time. Gifford

also told Mr. Conley that he "would be

relentless" toward Mr. Conley and that

Mr. Conley "should probably find another

job." R.7, Ex.3 at 70. The combination of

Gifford’s reluctance to give Mr. Conley

instructions for his return to work, of

the timing of the suspension--occurring

the day Mr. Conley returned to work after

his treatment--and of Gifford’s

statements during the suspension meeting,

is sufficient evidence from which a jury

could find that Mr. Conley’s alcoholism

resulted in his suspension./4

Nevertheless, we may affirm a grant of

summary judgment "’on a ground other than

that relied upon by the district court

below, so long as the alternative basis

finds adequate support in the record.’"

E.E.O.C. v. North Knox Sch. Corp., 154

F.3d 744, 746 (7th Cir. 1998) (quoting

Bombard v. Fort Wayne Newspapers, Inc.,

92 F.3d 560, 562 (7th Cir. 1996)). The

suspension was a discrete act resulting

in a discrete injury to Mr. Conley. He

was not permitted to work for nine days

and lost his income for those nine days.

However, even given Mr. Conley’s obvious

loss, he failed to file a charge with the

EEOC, or equivalent state agency, within

the requisite 300-day time period.

Consequently, any claim based on the

suspension alone is untimely.

Moreover, even if timeliness were not a

bar, Mr. Conley failed to raise the

allegedly discriminatory suspension

either in his EEOC charge or in his

complaint; the suspension was mentioned

for the first time in Mr. Conley’s

response to the Village’s motion for

summary judgment. "A plaintiff may pursue

a claim not explicitly included in an

EEOC complaint only if her allegations

fall within the scope of the charges

contained in the EEOC complaint." Cheek

v. Peabody Coal Co., 97 F.3d 200, 202

(7th Cir. 1996) (citing Harper v. Godfrey

Co., 45 F.3d 143, 147-48 (7th Cir.

1995)). To determine whether the

allegations in the complaint fall within

the scope of the earlier EEOC charge, we

must look at whether the allegations are

"’like or reasonably related to’" those

contained in the charge. Id. (quoting

Harper, 45 F.3d at 148).

We do not believe that the allegations

of discriminatory suspension contained in

the response to the motion for summary

judgment are "like or reasonably related

to" those actions contained in the EEOC

charge. The EEOC charge sets forth other

alleged discriminatory employment

actions--unpleasant job assignments, lack

of overtime and failure to promote; it

does not mention the suspension. The

suspension is a discrete action, taken at

a definite time, in response to Mr.

Conley’s alleged failure to report for

work in a timely manner. Although all of

these actions implicate conduct by

Gifford, they are not related in any

other way. "Not having raised the claim

or even its seeds before the EEOC,

[Conley] was not entitled to bring it in

[his] action." Id. at 203. Consequently,

we conclude that the district court did

not err in granting summary judgment to

the Village on the suspension claim./5

C. Failure to Promote

Mr. Conley also maintains that the

Village discriminated against him on the

basis of his disability because it

promoted a less senior maintenance

worker, and passed him over for

promotion. The district court held that

Mr. Conley admitted that "his lack of

promotion was the result of not

performing on par with other maintenance

workers." R.18 at 6. We agree.

To survive summary judgment, Mr. Conley

had to come forward with indirect or

direct evidence to link his lack of

promotion with his disability. The

indirect method requires a plaintiff to

demonstrate that (1) he was disabled

within the meaning of the ADA; (2) he

applied for and was qualified for the

position sought; (3) he was rejected for

the position; and (4) those who were

promoted had similar or lesser

qualifications for the job. See Ghosh v.

Indiana Dep’t of Envtl. Mgmt., 192 F.3d

1087, 1091 (7th Cir. 1999) (setting forth

elements for a failure to promote claim

under Title VII). Mr. Conley has failed

to come forth with any evidence of his

qualifications for this position. At the

same time, he appears to admit that Paul

Miraldi, the maintenance worker who was

promoted, was qualified for the job. See

R.14 at 3./6

Furthermore, Mr. Conley has not come

forward with any direct evidence of

discrimination with respect to this

claim. Although Gifford’s alleged

statement that he would be "relentless"

toward Mr. Conley may be sufficient to

establish a link between Mr. Conley’s

suspension and his condition as an

alcoholic, it is not sufficient to link

Mr. Conley’s lack of promotion with his

disability. "To rise to the level of

direct evidence of discrimination, this

Court has stated that ’isolated comments

must be contemporaneous with the [adverse

action] or causally related to

the[applicable] decision-making process.’"

Kennedy v. Schoenberg, Fisher & Newman,

Ltd., 140 F.3d 716, 723 (quoting Geier v.

Medtronic Inc., 99 F.3d 238, 242 (7th

Cir. 1996)), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 870

(1998). However, Gifford’s statements

were made in March 1994, more than two

years before the allegedly discriminatory

failure to promote occurred; these

statements are too distant temporally to

provide support for Mr. Conley’s

promotion claim. Here again, Mr. Conley’s

admissions help defeat his claims. Mr.

Conley admitted that "Gifford never

denied [him] a promotion because he was

an alcoholic." R.6 at 7; R.14 at 3.

Consequently, because Gifford’s statement

was not contemporaneous with the

promotion decision, and because Mr.

Conley admitted that his alcoholism was

not a motivating factor in Gifford’s

decision-making process, the district

court properly entered summary judgment

for the Village with respect to this

claim.

D. Lack of Overtime

Mr. Conley argues that the district

court erred in granting summary judgment

to the Village on his overtime claim. Mr.

Conley fails to come forward with any

evidence to substantiate his allegations.

He does not set forth any specific times

that the Village gave others overtime

opportunities, but denied the same to

him. As well, he does not proffer any

evidence to show that, on par, he did not

receive the same number of overtime

opportunities as others. Mr. Conley

merely makes the unsupported allegation

that he was denied overtime on the basis

of his alcoholism. Such a statement is

wholly inadequate to make out a prima

facie case of discrimination. See Jones

v. Merchants Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 42

F.3d 1054, 1057 (7th Cir. 1994) ("’Self-

serving assertions without factual

support in the record will not defeat a

motion for summary judgment.’" (quoting

McDonnell v. Cournia, 990 F.2d 963, 969

(7th Cir. 1993))). Consequently, summary

judgment for the Village was appropriate.

E. Painting/Driving the Village Truck

Mr. Conley also maintains that the

Village furthered its course of

discrimination by requiring him to paint

the pump room for an extended period of

time and by denying him use of a Village

vehicle. We do not believe that these

actions, standing alone, rise to the

level of an ADA violation.

"While adverse employment actions extend

beyond readily quantifiable losses, not

everything that makes an employee unhappy

is an actionable adverse action." Smart

v. Ball State Univ., 89 F.3d 437, 441

(7th Cir. 1996). "[A] materially adverse

change in employment conditions must be

more disruptive than a mere inconvenience

or an alteration of job

responsibilities[.]" Johnson v. City of

Fort Wayne, 91 F.3d 922, 932 (7th Cir.

1996). In this case, Mr. Conley complains

of being assigned to paint the pump room

for several months and attributes the

motivation for this assignment to his

alcoholism because other workers were not

assigned to paint for such a long period

of time. However, the record belies Mr.

Conley’s assertions. Mr. Orlos, also a

maintenance worker, stated that he had

spent "a whole summer painting fire

hydrants" and had spent a year painting

one pump room. R.14, Ex.2 at 13.

Furthermore, Mr. Conley admitted in his

deposition that, prior to his treatment,

when there was painting to be done, it

was assigned to him. See R.7, Ex.3 at 86.

Mr. Conley has not shown that his

assignment to paint the pump room was

more than "a mere inconvenience or an

alteration in job responsibilities";

indeed, the assignment seems to be well

within the scope of normal activities for

a Village maintenance worker.

Consequently, Mr. Conley’s painting

assignment did not constitute an adverse

action under the ADA.

Mr. Conley also suggests that denying

him the use of a Village vehicle isolated

him from his co-workers and, therefore,

violated the ADA. We cannot agree.

According to the record, Mr. Conley was

denied the use of a Village vehicle while

painting the pump room. The Village’s

reason for its action was that the

vehicles were needed for those who would

be answering emergency calls. Mr. Conley

does not dispute this rationale.

Furthermore, Mr. Conley does not explain

how failing to give him a vehicle

prevented him from carrying out his

duties or isolated him from his co-

employees. Consequently, we cannot say

that denying Mr. Conley use of a vehicle,

of itself, violated the ADA./7

F. Hostile Work Environment

Finally, Mr. Conley rather obliquely

argues that, although any one of these

actions might not violate the ADA, the

sum total of actions by the Village rises

to the level of a statutory violation. In

essence, Mr. Conley claims that the

Village created a hostile work

environment for him as a result of his

disability, see R.1, para.17, although he

never uses those terms in his appellate

brief.

This court has not yet resolved the

issue whether the ADA encompasses a cause

of action for hostile work environment.

"Thus far, we have assumed the existence

of such claims, without expressly

deciding whether they are proper, because

resolution of that issue has not been

necessary." Vollmert v. Wisconsin Dep’t

of Transp., 197 F.3d 293, 297 (7th Cir.

1999); see also Silk, 194 F.3d at 803-04.

We have followed this course because the

actions alleged in the cases before us

have not been "significant enough to rise

to the level of a hostile environment

were that type of claim available."

Vollmert, 197 F.3d at 297. This case is

no different.

In order for harassment to approach the

level of a hostile work environment, it

must be "so severe or pervasive as to

alter the conditions of [the victim’s]

employment and create an abusive working

environment." Faragher v. City of Boca

Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 786 (1998)

(citations and quotation marks omitted).

Here the actions allegedly taken against

Mr. Conley are neither severe nor

pervasive and certainly cannot be

characterized as "abusive."

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the

judgment of the district court.

AFFIRMED

/1 Because the district court granted summary judg-

ment to the Village, we take the facts alleged by

Mr. Conley to be true. See Adusumilli v. City of

Chicago, 164 F.3d 353, 357 (7th Cir. 1998) (cit-

ing Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S.

742 (1998)), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 450 (1999).

/2 The Village filed its motion for summary judgment

on April 15, 1999, more than 300 days after the

last act of discrimination allegedly took place.

/3 In Erickson v. Board of Governors of State Col-

leges and Universities, 207 F.3d 945 (7th Cir.

2000), and Stevens v. Illinois Department of

Transportation, No. 98-3350, 2000 WL 365947 (7th

Cir. Apr. 11, 2000), we applied the framework of

Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, 120 S. Ct. 631

(2000), to an ADA case. In Erickson, the court

held that the ADA did not "’enforce’ the Four-

teenth Amendment," and therefore, like the Age

Discrimination in Employment Act, did not validly

abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity. 207 F.3d at

252. The Eleventh Amendment, however, applies

only to the states, and not to municipalities.

See Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v.

Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280 (1977) ("The bar of the

Eleventh Amendment to suit in federal courts

extends to States and state officials in appro-

priate circumstances, but does not extend to

counties and similar municipal corporations."

(citations omitted)). It is clear that, under the

Illinois Municipal Code, the Village of Bedford

Park is considered a municipality, and not an arm

of the state. See 65 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/1-1-

2(1) (West 1996) ("’Municipal’ or ’municipality’

means city, village, or incorporated town in the

State of Illinois, . . . ."). Consequently, the

Village may be sued in federal court for alleged

violations of the ADA.

/4 We note that the Village disputes that Gifford

ever made these statements. However, summary

judgment is not the appropriate stage to resolve

issues of fact.

/5 Similarly, Mr. Conley’s Rehabilitation Act claims

are untimely. We previously have held that Illin-

ois’ two-year statute of limitations for personal

injury actions applies to actions brought under

the Rehabilitation Act. See Cheeney v. Highland

Community College, 15 F.3d 79, 81-82 (7th Cir.

1994). Because Mr. Conley’s complaint was filed

on November 10, 1998, more than four years after

the allegedly discriminatory suspension took

place, his suspension claim cannot be sustained

under the Rehabilitation Act either.

/6 In the Village’s 12M(3) Statement, setting forth

facts to which there was not a genuine issue, the

Village stated:

38. Paul Miraldi was promoted to Maintenance

Worker II based on his job performance even

though he had less seniority than Mr. Conley.

(Transcript of the Deposition of James Gifford,

page 148, lines 7-10, Exhibit 2).

R.6 at 7. Mr. Conley admitted that this assertion

was true. See R.14 at 3.

/7 Because we hold that the Village’s denial of the

use of a vehicle was unrelated to Mr. Conley’s

disability, we do not reach the issue whether the

Village might otherwise be justified in denying

the use of a public vehicle to a recovering

alcoholic without violating the ADA.