Knowlin, Lee v. Thompson, Pat

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 97-3463

Lee Knowlin,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

Pat Thompson and Ed Michalek,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Wisconsin.

No. 96-C-5--Charles N. Clevert, Judge.

Submitted November 30, 1999/*--Decided March 23, 2000

Before Harlington Wood, Jr., Flaum, and Evans, Circuit

Judges.

Flaum, Circuit Judge. Lee Knowlin, a Wisconsin

prisoner proceeding pro se, filed suit under 42

U.S.C. sec. 1983 seeking compensatory and

punitive damages against Arkansas law enforcement

officers for alleged violations of the Arkansas

Uniform Criminal Extradition Act ("UCEA"). The

district court dismissed Knowlin’s complaint

without prejudice as barred by Heck v. Humphrey,

512 U.S. 477 (1994). For the reasons stated

below, we affirm.

Background

In reviewing the district court’s dismissal, we

accept the allegations in the plaintiff’s

complaint as true and draw all reasonable

inferences in favor of the plaintiff. See

Hernandez v. Joliet Police Dep’t, 197 F.3d 256,

262 (7th Cir. 1999). In February 1992, the State

of Wisconsin released Knowlin on parole. After

violating the conditions of his parole, Knowlin

left Wisconsin. In February 1994, Knowlin was

arrested in Sherwood, Arkansas, for traffic

violations. Shortly after Knowlin’s arrest in

Arkansas, authorities there received a request

from the State of Wisconsin to hold him pending

a formal extradition request. Knowlin appeared

before an Arkansas judge on a detainer warrant on

February 15, 1994, and he informed the court that

he would not waive formal extradition procedures.

On February 28, 1994, the governor of Wisconsin

submitted a request for Knowlin’s extradition to

the Arkansas governor. On March 10, 1994, the

Arkansas governor issued a certificate of

delivery, authorizing Knowlin’s transfer to

Wisconsin under the terms of the UCEA. Under the

Arkansas UCEA, before Knowlin was surrendered to

Wisconsin authorities, he was to be informed of

the demand for his surrender, the charges against

him, and his right to an attorney. See Ark. Code

Ann. sec. 16-94-210. If Knowlin chose to test the

legality of the proposed extradition, he was to

be taken before a judge and allowed a reasonable

amount of time to apply for a writ of habeas

corpus, a proceeding in which the court could

establish Knowlin’s identity and verify the

facial validity of the extradition papers. See

id. Knowlin, following through with his election

to oppose extradition, filed a pro se motion on

March 14, 1994, requesting that his extradition

proceedings be moved from the Sherwood Municipal

Court to the Arkansas Circuit Court, where he

could seek a habeas writ. On March 15, an

Arkansas judge transferred Knowlin’s pending

extradition proceedings to the state’s circuit

court, but before a hearing could be held on his

habeas application, the defendants, Sherwood law

enforcement officers Pat Thompson and Ed

Michalek,/1 delivered him to Wisconsin agents.

After a parole revocation hearing, the State of

Wisconsin revoked Knowlin’s parole and imprisoned

him. See Wisconsin ex rel. Knowlin v. Schwarz,

No. 95-2504, 1996 WL 266005, at *1 (Wis. Ct. App.

May 21, 1996).

Knowlin subsequently filed suit in the district

court under sec. 1983 against Thompson and

Michalek for surrendering him to Wisconsin

authorities without first permitting him to

pursue a habeas corpus action in an Arkansas

court to contest his extradition. Knowlin alleged

that his surrender prior to the disposition of

his habeas corpus action violated his federal

rights under the Fourteenth Amendment and the

UCEA.

The defendants moved to dismiss under Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing that

Knowlin failed to state a claim upon which relief

could be granted and, alternatively, that they

were entitled to qualified immunity. Knowlin,

citing our decision in McBride v. Soos, 594 F.2d

610, 613 (7th Cir. 1979) (holding that a

complaint "which charges abuse of the extradition

power by noncompliance with applicable law states

a cause of action [under sec. 1983]"), argued

that he indeed stated a proper claim. The

district court rejected both proffered defenses.

Instead, the court concluded sua sponte that

Knowlin’s claim was barred by Heck v. Humphrey,

512 U.S. 477 (1994), and its progeny.

Accordingly, the district court dismissed

Knowlin’s complaint without prejudice.

Discussion

In the district court, Knowlin asserted that,

when the defendants delivered him to Wisconsin

authorities while his Arkansas habeas corpus

action remained pending, they violated his rights

under the Fourteenth Amendment and the UCEA. On

appeal, Knowlin has abandoned his Fourteenth

Amendment argument, and we therefore consider

only Knowlin’s allegation that the defendants

violated the UCEA. We conclude, like the district

court, that Knowlin’s sec. 1983 claim is barred

by Heck.

Heck involved a sec. 1983 claim arising out of

alleged unlawful acts by state prosecutors and

police officers that had led to the plaintiff’s

arrest, and ultimately his conviction. In

analyzing whether Heck’s claim was cognizable

under sec. 1983, the Court analogized to the

common-law cause of action for malicious

prosecution, one element of which is the

termination of the prior criminal proceeding in

favor of the accused. The Supreme Court upheld

the dismissal of the suit, and it stated that if

a "judgment in favor of the plaintiff would

necessarily imply the invalidity of his

conviction or sentence . . . the [sec. 1983]

complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff

can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence

has already been invalidated." Id. at 487. This

rule stems not from exhaustion principles, but

from "the hoary principle that civil tort actions

are not appropriate vehicles for challenging the

validity of outstanding criminal judgments . . .

." Id. at 486.

The tort of malicious prosecution provides the

closest analogy again in this case, and thus

Knowlin cannot prevail in his claim based on the

denial of an opportunity to test the facial

validity of the extradition demand through habeas

proceedings absent a showing that he was not, in

fact, extraditable through proper procedures. It

is irrelevant that Knowlin, in his complaint,

alleges only that the defendants denied him a

procedure guaranteed by federal law; he does not

allege that he was innocent of the charges in the

demanding state or was otherwise not

extraditable. In Edwards v. Balisok, the Supreme

Court rejected the proposition that a claim

challenging only a procedural defect, not a

defective result, is always cognizable under sec.

1983 after Heck. 117 S.Ct. 1584, 1587-88 (1997).

Rather, Heck requires an inquiry into the nature

of the allegations and whether the entire claim

for damages would, if proven, necessarily imply

the invalidity of the conviction or sentence. Id.

at 1588.

In Antonelli v. Foster, 104 F.3d 899 (7th Cir.

1997), the plaintiff sought damages under sec.

1983, alleging that his detention pursuant to a

parole violator warrant was invalid because he

was not given a copy of the application for the

warrant. We held that the suit was barred by Heck

because the plaintiff had not proven that his

detention had been invalidated: "A suit for

damages for confinement pursuant to a warrant

would also be a suit for malicious prosecution,

. . . which can succeed only if the prosecution

fails, that is, only if the confinement is held

to be unlawful in the proper forum." Id. at 900

(citations omitted). So too, here, to establish

a sec. 1983 claim for monetary relief, including

a showing of damages, Knowlin will have to prove

that he suffered some deprivation of liberty

greater than that which he would have suffered

through extradition in full compliance with the

UCEA. That showing, in turn, would necessarily

imply the invalidity of his Wisconsin parole

revocation, which Heck instructs cannot be shown

through a sec. 1983 suit. Heck therefore bars the

instant suit.

Conclusion

For the reasons stated herein, the decision of

the district court is AFFIRMED.

/* After an examination of the briefs and the

record, we have concluded that oral argument is

unnecessary. Thus, the appeal is submitted on the

briefs and the record. See Fed. R. App. P.

34(a)(2).

/1 Knowlin also sued Sherwood police officer Leonard

Carver, but voluntarily dismissed the suit

against Carver because he was unable to effect

service against this third defendant. Although

Knowlin also alleged official capacity claims

against the defendants, he conceded in the

district court that he could not state such a

claim.