Opinion

Terrance Drew v. Michael Milka

  • 555 F. App'x 574
Court
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
Filed
Feb 18, 2014
Status
Unpublished
Author
Merritt
On the bench
Merritt, Moore, Clay
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 39.5%

The opinion

FILED

Feb 18, 2014

DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION

File Name: 14a0135n.06

No. 13-2129

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

TERRANCE DREW, )

)

Plaintiff-Appellee, )

)

v. )

)

MICHAEL MILKA, ) ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED

) STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

Defendant-Appellant. ) EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

BEFORE: MERRITT, MOORE and CLAY. Circuit Judges.

MERRITT, Circuit Judge. In this interlocutory appeal by the defendant, police officer

Milka, who arrested plaintiff Drew and caused his police dog to bite him during the process, the

question is whether the defendant officer is entitled to “qualified immunity.” The district court

described the case as follows and ruled as follows on the issue of qualified immunity:

Plaintiff’s testimony — viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff —

suggests that he did not resist the officers’ attempt to take him into custody.

According to his testimony, he was simply standing still with his daughter when

police officers ran up, struck him in the head, and tackled him to the ground. Despite

his protests that he was not resisting arrest and his claim that he “willingly”

cooperated with officers’ order that he place his hands behind his back, the arresting

officers twisted his arms and ordered a dog bite. A reasonable jury could accept

Plaintiff’s account as true despite Defendant’s contrary testimony, and under these

facts Defendant used excessive force in ordering the dog bite, irrespective of its

timing.

....

No. 13-2129

Drew v. Milka

It is clear that ordering a dog bite on a compliant arrestee violates a clearly

established constitutional right. As the Sixth Circuit stated in Wysong, “[t]he same

cases holding the police may not use force on a subdued, non-resisting subject hold

that the right to be free from physical force when one is not resisting the police is a

clearly established right.” 260 Fed. App’x at 848 (citing Smoak v. Hall, 460 F.3d

768, 784 (6th Cir. 2006) and Champion v. Outlook Nashville, Inc., 380 F.3d 8983.,

902 (6th Cir. 2004)). Just as the government has no law enforcement interest in

ordering a dog bite on someone who is neither resisting arrest nor trying to flee, there

is a clearly established constitutional right to be free from dog bites when one is

neither resisting arrest nor attempting to flee. Accepting Plaintiff’s facts for

purposes of this motion, it is therefore clear that Defendant violated Plaintiff’s

clearly established constitutional rights. Therefore, the qualified immunity doctrine

does not prevent Plaintiff from proceeding on his excessive-force claim.

After reviewing the record and briefs in the case, we agree with the district court that there

is a material dispute of facts that must be decided at trial on the question of how the arrest occurred

and whether the plaintiff resisted arrest and whether there was any justification for the dog bites.

Therefore, we affirm the district court’s refusal to grant summary judgment in favor of defendant.

-2-

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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