The opinion
NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
File Name: 13a0797n.06
Case Nos. 11-2184/11-2282
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT FILED
Aug 28, 2013
ALL SEASONS CLIMATE CONTROL, ) DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk
INC., )
)
Petitioner/Cross-Respondent, ) ON APPEAL FROM THE
) NATIONAL LABOR
v. ) RELATIONS BOARD
)
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, )
)
Respondent/Cross-Petitioner. )
)
_______________________________________ )
BEFORE: BATCHELDER, Chief Judge; MERRITT and KETHLEDGE, Circuit Judges.
ALICE M. BATCHELDER, Chief Judge. All Seasons Climate Control, Inc. (“All
Seasons”) appeals from a decision and order of the National Labor Relations Board (“the Board”).
The Board adopted the findings and conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge that All Seasons
had engaged in unfair labor practices relating to the union that represented All Seasons’s employees.
On appeal, All Seasons argues that it did not engage in unfair labor practices, and it challenges the
portion of the Board’s order requiring All Seasons to bargain with the union for a minimum of
fifteen hours per week and to submit written bargaining progress reports every thirty days. For the
reasons we explain below, we ENFORCE the Board’s order.
I.
All Seasons is based in Norwalk, Ohio and installs HVAC systems in connection with the
construction industry. In 2005, after an organizing drive by Sheet Metal Workers International
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Association, Local Union No. 33 of Northern Ohio, AFL-CIO (“the union”), a majority of All
Seasons’s employees voted in favor of union representation. Before the election, one of the
employees, James Marino, had talked with All Seasons’s owner, Bob Stang, and had asked Stang
the company’s stance regarding the union. Stang replied that “he was not going to allow the Union
in his company.”
The union was officially certified in January 2006, but All Seasons refused to bargain with
or furnish information to the union. In response to a subsequent complaint, All Seasons contended
that the certification was invalid and denied that the information requested was necessary and
relevant. The Board rejected these arguments, and the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
enforced the Board’s decision and order. All Seasons subsequently met for various bargaining
sessions with union representatives between August 2007 and August 2008. On September 17,
2008, All Seasons withdrew its recognition of the union based on a petition signed by most of All
Seasons’s employees.
A new complaint was issued, and a trial was conducted before an Administrative Law Judge
(“the ALJ”). At trial, Marino testified that during the years following the initial union election, he
had gone periodically into Stang’s office and asked what All Seasons was doing about the union.
According to Marino, in February 2008, Stang called him on his company cell phone while he was
out on a job site. Stang told Marino that he needed Marino to do him a favor and call David Farkas,
All Seasons’s attorney. Marino called Farkas a few minutes later, and he testified that Farkas told
him that he was a valued employee and that “they needed [him] to do something for them about
circulating a Petition to call for another vote to vote the Union out.” When Marino said he would
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do it, Farkas started telling Marino what the petition should say. Marino testified that Farkas was
talking too quickly for him to take complete notes, and that he was able merely to “scribble[] some
things down.” Marino further testified that Farkas told him not to have the other employees sign the
petition until May or June. Finally, at the end of the conversation, Marino said that Farkas told him,
“[R]emember, we didn’t have this conversation, and don’t call me from a cell phone again.”
In July 2008, Marino drafted and circulated a petition to decertify the union. However, he
was unable to decipher his notes from his February conversation with Farkas, so he drafted the
language of the petition as best as he could. Marino testified that when he took this original petition
to Stang, Stang told him that the wording of the petition was problematic and suggested generally
what type of wording would be better. Marino asked for the petition back and said, “[W]ell, I guess
I’ll have to get another one then.” Stang replied in the affirmative.
In August 2008, Marino circulated a second petition. Marino testified that when he took this
petition to Stang and asked for the address for where to send it, Stang asked to see the petition, took
it, and said he would take care of it. All Seasons subsequently withdrew recognition from the union
based on this second petition and declined to bargain any further with the union or to provide the
union with any further information.
In his decision, the ALJ found the testimony of Marino to be credible and concluded that All
Seasons had engaged in unfair labor practices in violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the National
Labor Relations Act. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), (5). Specifically, the ALJ concluded that All
Seasons:
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(a) [s]olicited and encouraged an employee to circulate two petitions for the purpose
of decertification of the Union and/or revoking the Union’s majority status, and
assisted him in those efforts[;]
(b) [w]ithdrew recognition of the Union and refused to engage in further bargaining
based on the second such petition[; and]
(c) [f]ailed and refused to provide the Union with all of the information it requested
that was necessary and relevant to the performance of its duties as representative of
unit employees; more specifically, current employees with their contract [sic]
information and their wages and fringe benefits.
The ALJ ordered All Seasons to cease and desist from these types of actions as well as to take certain
affirmative actions. Among the affirmative actions the ALJ ordered was a requirement that, unless
the union agreed otherwise, All Seasons must hold bargaining sessions with the union for a
minimum of fifteen hours per week and submit progress reports every fifteen days.
The Board affirmed the ALJ’s decision with minor modifications. As relevant here, the
Board affirmed the ALJ’s finding that Marino was a credible witness, but it modified the affirmative
bargaining remedy slightly to require submission of progress reports every thirty days, instead of
every fifteen days.
All Seasons filed in this Court a petition for review of the Board’s decision, and the Board
filed an application for enforcement of its order.
II.
A. Substantial Evidence Supports the Board’s Findings.
“It is well established that we review the Board’s factual determinations as well as the
Board’s application of law to a particular set of facts under a substantial evidence standard.”
Painting Co. v. NLRB, 298 F.3d 492, 499 (6th Cir. 2002); see 29 U.S.C. § 160(e), (f) (providing that
the Board’s factual findings shall be conclusive “if supported by substantial evidence on the record
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considered as a whole”). Although this standard requires more than “a mere scintilla of evidence,”
we will not disturb the Board’s findings if they are “supported by such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Painting Co., 298 F.3d at 499
(internal quotation marks omitted). “Also, under this standard, we defer to the Board’s reasonable
inferences and credibility determinations, even if we would conclude differently under de novo
review.” Id. “The Board’s choice between two equally plausible and reasonable inferences from
the facts cannot be overturned on appellate review, even though a contrary decision may have been
reached through de novo review of the case.” Exum v. NLRB, 546 F.3d 719, 724 (6th Cir. 2008)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
All Seasons acknowledges in its brief that the decision of the Board “rises or falls upon [the]
finding that All Seasons unlawfully solicited and encouraged an employee to circulate two
decertification petitions.” “The law is clear that an employer may not solicit its employees to
circulate or sign decertification petitions . . . .” Armored Transp., Inc., 339 N.L.R.B. 374, 377
(2003). “Other than to provide general information about the [decertification] process on the
employees’ unsolicited inquiry, an employer has no legitimate role in that activity, either to instigate
or to facilitate it.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Compare Texaco, Inc. v. NLRB, 722 F.2d
1226, 1236 (5th Cir. 1984) (recognizing that an employer’s actions were unlawful when the
employer, inter alia, “initiated and stimulated the activity that led to the employees’ withdrawal from
the Union,” even though the employer had previously learned of employee dissatisfaction), with
NLRB v. Kit Mfg. Co., 335 F.2d 166, 168 (9th Cir. 1964) (holding that an employer’s conduct was
lawful where the employer merely failed to oppose “action taken by an employee entirely on his own
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initiative with knowledge that company permission was withheld and taken in accordance with the
wishes not of the company but of himself and certain of his fellow employees”). Here, the testimony
of Marino provides substantial evidence supporting the conclusion that All Seasons unlawfully
solicited Marino to circulate the decertification petitions.
Although Marino had gone periodically on his own volition to Stang’s office and asked what
All Seasons was doing about the union, Marino did not initiate a decertification petition until the
company approached him and asked him to do so. Stang called Marino in February 2008 and said
he needed Marino to do him a favor and call Farkas. When Marino called Farkas a few minutes
later, Farkas told him, as Marino testified, that “they needed [him] to do something for them about
circulating a Petition to call for another vote to vote the Union out.” Marino responded that he
would do it, and Farkas then proceeded to explain what the petition should say. Farkas also told
Marino not to have the other employees sign the petition until May or June. At the end of the
conversation, Marino testified, Farkas told him, “[R]emember, we didn’t have this conversation, and
don’t call me from a cell phone again.”
Thus, according to Marino’s testimony, which the ALJ found credible,1 Stang and Farkas
solicited the circulation of the decertification petitions. The company requested that Marino draft
and circulate a decertification petition, and Marino complied. Marino’s testimony provides
1
Although All Seasons challenges Marino’s credibility, we note that “[i]t is not this Court’s function to resolve
questions of fact and credibility when there is conflict in the testimony. This Court ordinarily will not disturb credibility
evaluations because the ALJ was in the superior position of observing the witness’ demeanor.” V & S ProGalv, Inc. v.
NLRB, 168 F.3d 270, 276 77 (6th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted). Indeed, we will accept the Board’s credibility
determinations “unless they have no rational basis.” Fluor Daniel, Inc. v. NLRB, 332 F.3d 961, 967 (6th Cir. 2003)
(internal quotation marks omitted). Despite All Seasons’s arguments, we see no justification in this case to disturb the
ALJ’s finding, affirmed by the Board, that Marino was a credible witness.
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substantial evidence supporting the Board’s conclusion that All Seasons unlawfully solicited Marino
to circulate the decertification petitions.
Because All Seasons was unlawfully involved in the decertification process, the
decertification petitions were tainted and therefore do not justify All Seasons’s withdrawal of
recognition from the union. See V & S ProGalv, Inc. v. NLRB, 168 F.3d 270, 281 (6th Cir. 1999)
(“[B]ecause ProGalv interfered with its employees’ rights to be represented by the Union, the
petition was tainted and ProGalv therefore cannot in fact rely upon the petition as the basis of Union
decertification.”); Columbia Portland Cement Co. v. NLRB, 979 F.2d 460, 464 (6th Cir. 1992)
(“[A]n employer cannot lawfully withdraw recognition from a union if it has committed as yet
unremedied unfair labor practices that reasonably tended to contribute to employee disaffection from
the union.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Because All Seasons unlawfully withdrew
recognition of the union, it is unnecessary for us to address the remainder of All Seasons’s
arguments, except its challenge to the affirmative bargaining order.2
B. All Seasons Failed To Preserve an Objection to the Bargaining Requirement.
All Seasons argues that the Board erred in ordering fifteen hours of bargaining per week and
the submission of progress reports every thirty days. Despite the fact that the validity of an
affirmative bargaining order with a specific minimum weekly hour requirement would apparently
be an issue of first impression for this Court, we do not reach that issue, because All Seasons failed
to preserve it properly before the Board.
2
W e do note that although All Seasons argues the Board erred in finding that All Seasons failed to bargain in
good faith, the Board found it unnecessary to rule on the allegation of bad faith bargaining, stating in a footnote that the
finding of such a violation “would not materially affect the remedy” in this case.
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“No objection that has not been urged before the Board, its member, agent, or agency, shall
be considered by the court, unless the failure or neglect to urge such objection shall be excused
because of extraordinary circumstances.” 29 U.S.C. § 160(e). A party’s failure to present an
objection to the Board renders this Court without jurisdiction to consider the issue. See Woelke &
Romero Framing, Inc. v. NLRB, 456 U.S. 645, 665-66 (1982).
In footnote 2 of its decision, the Board stated that All Seasons had “excepted generally to the
‘ALJ’s remedies,’ but it did not except specifically to the judge’s grant of an affirmative bargaining
order to remedy [All Seasons’s] unlawful withdrawal of recognition. Therefore, we find it
unnecessary to provide a specific justification for that remedy.”
All Seasons argues that the Board misunderstood its exception to the “ALJ’s remedies,”
pointing to the fact that the exception specifically referred to the “ALJ’s Decision, page 31, line 10
through page 32, line 12.” All Seasons contends that this citation to page and line numbers was
sufficiently specific to constitute an appropriate objection. The problem with this argument is that
the page and line numbers referenced encompass the entire order at the end of the ALJ’s decision,
which included more than simply the particular remedy requiring minimum weekly bargaining hours.
While it might have constituted a sufficiently specific objection had All Seasons separately
referenced the precise page and line numbers containing only the requirement of minimum weekly
bargaining hours, a simple, broad reference to the entire order was not sufficiently specific to
preserve the particular challenge All Seasons seeks to make. See NLRB v. Watson-Rummell Elec.
Co., 815 F.2d 29, 31 (6th Cir. 1987) (“The specificity required for a claim to escape the ban imposed
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by [29 U.S.C. § 160(e)] is that which will ‘apprise the Board of an intention to bring up the
question.’” (quoting May Dep’t Stores Co. v. NLRB, 326 U.S. 376, 387 n.5 (1945))).
We do not believe there are extraordinary circumstances in this case that excuse All
Seasons’s failure to object specifically to the fifteen-hour-per-week bargaining requirement. See 29
U.S.C. § 160(e). Accordingly, we express no opinion regarding the legitimacy of that portion of the
Board’s order.
III.
For the foregoing reasons, we ENFORCE the Board’s order.
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