Opinion

Roberto Delgado v. Department of Veterans Affairs

Court
Merit Systems Protection Board
Filed
Sep 22, 2015
Status
Unpublished
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 39.5%

The opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

ROBERTO DELGADO, DOCKET NUMBER

Appellant, PH-0752-15-0272-I-1

v.

DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS DATE: September 22, 2015

AFFAIRS,

Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Roberto Delgado, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, pro se.

Tierney Stanley, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, for the agency.

BEFORE

Susan Tsui Grundmann, Chairman

Mark A. Robbins, Member

FINAL ORDER

¶1 The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which

dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Generally, we grant petitions such

as this one only when: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material

fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or

1

A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add

significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,

but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not

required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a

precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board

as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).

2

regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the

administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial

decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of

discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and

material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due

diligence, was not available when the record closed. See Title 5 of the Code of

Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully

considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not

established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review.

Therefore, we DENY the petition for review and AFFIRM the initial decision,

which is now the Board’s final decision. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113(b).

¶2 The agency terminated the appellant from the excepted service position of

Biomedical Equipment Support Specialist during his trial period for inadequate

performance. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 6 at 48. The appellant appealed the

agency’s action. IAF, Tab 1. The administrative judge found that the appellant

was not an employee with Board appeal rights because he was serving a trial

period in the excepted service. IAF, Tab 8, Initial Decision (ID).

¶3 In his petition for review, the appellant asserts that he was notified of his

excepted appointment on March 5, 2014, and that he had therefore completed his

1-year trial period by the date of his termination, March 20, 2015. He also

reiterates the assertion that he was terminated in retaliation for his

whistleblowing, disclosing gross mismanagement, gross expenditures, and abuse

of power. Petition for Review File, Tab 1.

¶4 The Board's jurisdiction is limited to those matters over which it has been

given jurisdiction by law, rule or regulation. Maddox v. Merit Systems Protection

Board, 759 F.2d 9, 10 (Fed. Cir. 1985). Only an “employee,” as defined under

5 U.S.C. chapter 75, subchapter II, can appeal to the Board from an adverse

action such as a removal. Barrand v. Department of Veterans Affairs,

112 M.S.P.R. 210, ¶ 13, review dismissed, 370 F. App'x 85 (Fed. Cir. 2009); see

3

5 U.S.C. §§ 7511(a)(1), 7512(1), 7513(d). A nonpreference-eligible individual in

the excepted service is an employee if: (1) he is not serving a probationary or

trial period under an initial appointment pending conversion to the competitive

service; or (2) he has completed 2 years of current continuous service in the same

or similar positions in an Executive agency under other than a temporary

appointment limited to 2 years or less. 5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1)(C)(i)-(ii).

¶5 Here it is undisputed that the appellant was not preference eligible.

IAF, Tab 1. Further, the record reflects that he was serving a trial period, and

that he had served in his position for less than 1 year. Although the appellant

may have accepted the position by March 5, 2014, he was appointed to the

position effective April 6, 2014. IAF, Tab 6 at 12. He was terminated less than 1

year later, effective March 20, 2015. Id. at 48. Thus, the administrative judge

properly found that the appellant was not an employee and the Board does not

have jurisdiction over his appeal. ID at 4; see Barrand, 112 M.S.P.R. 210, ¶ 13.

¶6 Even though the Board lacks jurisdiction to review the termination as an

otherwise appealable action, the appellant may request review of such an agency

action in an individual right of action (IRA) appeal under the Whistleblower

Protection Act. See Becker v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 107 M.S.P.R. 327,

¶ 5 (2007); 5 U.S.C. § 1221. The Board has jurisdiction over an IRA appeal if the

appellant has exhausted his administrative remedies before the Office of Special

Counsel (OSC) and makes nonfrivolous allegations that: (1) he engaged in

whistleblowing activity by making a protected disclosure, and (2) the disclosure

was a contributing factor in the agency’s decision to take or fail to take a

personnel action. Yunus v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 242 F.3d 1367, 1371

(Fed. Cir. 2001).

¶7 Here, the administrative judge informed the appellant of his burden to prove

jurisdiction over his allegation that he was removed in retaliation for

whistleblowing as an IRA appeal. IAF, Tab 3. The appellant has failed to meet

his jurisdictional burden because he has not shown that he filed a complaint with

4

OSC, and therefore has not shown that he exhausted his administrative remedies.

See Garrison v. Department of Defense, 101 M.S.P.R. 229, ¶ 6 (2006). Thus, the

administrative judge properly found that this appeal is not an IRA appeal within

the Board’s jurisdiction. ID at 4.

¶8 Accordingly, we affirm the initial decision dismissing the appeal for lack of

jurisdiction.

NOTICE TO THE APPELLANT REGARDING

YOUR FURTHER REVIEW RIGHTS 2

You have the right to request review of this final decision by the United

States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.

The court must receive your request for review no later than 60 calendar

days after the date of this order. See 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(A) (as rev. eff. Dec.

27, 2012). If you choose to file, be very careful to file on time. The court has

held that normally it does not have the authority to waive this statutory deadline

and that filings that do not comply with the deadline must be dismissed. See

Pinat v. Office of Personnel Management, 931 F.2d 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1991).

If you want to request review of the Board’s decision concerning your

claims of prohibited personnel practices under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8),

(b)(9)(A)(i), (b)(9)(B), (b)(9)(C), or (b)(9)(D), but you do not want to challenge

the Board’s disposition of any other claims of prohibited personnel practices, you

may request review of this final decision by the United States Court of Appeals

for the Federal Circuit or any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction. The

court of appeals must receive your petition for review within 60 days after the

date of this order. See 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(B) (as rev. eff. Dec. 27, 2012). If

you choose to file, be very careful to file on time. You may choose to request

2

The administrative judge afforded the appellant mixed-case review rights. ID at 8-10.

However, in the absence of Board jurisdiction, this is not a mixed-case appeal. We

have provided the appellant the proper review rights here. See, e.g., Calixto v.

Department of Defense, 120 M.S.P.R. 557 (2014).

5

review of the Board’s decision in the United States Court of Appeals for the

Federal Circuit or any other court of appeals of competent jurisdiction, but not

both. Once you choose to seek review in one court of appeals, you may be

precluded from seeking review in any other court.

If you need further information about your right to appeal this decision to

court, you should refer to the federal law that gives you this right. It is found in

Title 5 of the United States Code, section 7703 (5 U.S.C. § 7703) (as rev. eff.

Dec. 27, 2012). You may read this law as well as other sections of the United

States Code, at our website, http://www.mspb.gov/appeals/uscode/htm.

Additional information about the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal

Circuit is available at the court's website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular

relevance is the court's "Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants," which is

contained within the court's Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, and 11. Additional

information about other courts of appeals can be found at their respective

websites, which can be accessed through

http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.

If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for your appeal to

the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at

http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation

for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit.

6

The Merit Systems Protection Board neither endorses the services provided by

any attorney nor warrants that any attorney will accept representation in a given

case.

FOR THE BOARD: ______________________________

William D. Spencer

Clerk of the Board

Washington, D.C.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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