Montez v. United States

RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION

Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206 2 Montez v. United States No. 02-6303

ELECTRONIC CITATION: 2004 FED App. 0061P (6th Cir.)

File Name: 04a0061p.06 Lexington, Kentucky, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: T. Bruce

Simpson, Jr., ANGGELIS & GORDON, Lexington,

Kentucky, for Appellant. Thomas Lee Gentry, Mason Moore

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Kessinger, ASSISTANT UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS,

Lexington, Kentucky, for Appellee.

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

_________________ GILMAN, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which

NELSON, J., joined. ROGERS, J. (p. 13), delivered a

MARION MONTEZ , X separate concurring opinion.

Administratrix of the Estate of -

- _________________

Tracy Hearlson,

- No. 02-6303

Plaintiff-Appellant, - OPINION

> _________________

,

v. - RONALD LEE GILMAN, Circuit Judge. A corrections

- officer at the Federal Medical Center prison in Lexington,

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA , - Kentucky (FMC Lexington), found inmate Tracy Hearlson

Defendant-Appellee. - dead in a housing unit of the prison during the early morning

- hours of September 14, 1998. Hearlson had been beaten to

N death with a fire extinguisher. No alarm sounded, and prison

Appeal from the United States District Court officials were unaware of the assault until the corrections

for the Eastern District of Kentucky at Lexington. officer discovered Hearlson’s body. Two of Hearlson’s

No. 99-00348—Joseph M. Hood, District Judge. fellow inmates were subsequently convicted of his murder.

Marion Montez, who is both Hearlson’s mother and the

Argued: February 5, 2004 administratrix of his estate, brought suit against the United

States pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). Her

Decided and Filed: February 26, 2004 complaint alleged that the government was responsible for

Hearlson’s death because prison officials had negligently

Before: NELSON, GILMAN, and ROGERS, Circuit failed to adequately protect him. The district court granted

Judges. the government’s motion to dismiss on the ground that the

prison officials’ decisions regarding Hearlson’s safety fell

_________________ within the discretionary function exception to the FTCA. For

the reasons set forth below, we AFFIRM the judgment of the

COUNSEL district court.

ARGUED: T. Bruce Simpson, Jr., ANGGELIS &

GORDON, Lexington, Kentucky, for Appellant. Thomas Lee

Gentry, ASSISTANT UNITED STATES ATTORNEY,

1

No. 02-6303 Montez v. United States 3 4 Montez v. United States No. 02-6303

I. BACKGROUND specific, imminent threat to Hearlson. In fact, Hearlson had

concurred in the decision by prison officials to release him

Montez’s complaint alleges in pertinent part that back into Commonwealth South, a housing unit at FMC

Lexington designed for inmates with mental health problems

(1) Hearlson was an inmate at FMC Lexington who was or other special needs, approximately one month before the

killed on or about September 14, 1999; fatal assault.

(2) The prison warden, other officials, and employees of After Montez filed the complaint, the United States filed a

FMC Lexington were acting within the scope of their motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary

employment at all relevant times; judgment. The district court granted the motion, reasoning

that “the decision as to what level of protection within the

(3) Hearlson’s murder was the “direct and proximate result institution to be afforded Hearlson was a discretionary act by

of the negligence” of these persons; Bureau of Prisons officials not subject to the FTCA.” This

timely appeal followed.

(4) Because Hearlson was “in protective lock-up prior to

the attack, employees and officials of the Defendant knew or II. ANALYSIS

should have known that Tracy Hearlson was in imminent

danger of likely injury of substantial certainty and The only issue in this case is a purely legal one: Did the

consciously and knowingly failed to afford him reasonable district court properly grant the motion to dismiss on the basis

protection.” that the decisions of prison officials regarding Tracy

Hearlson’s safety fall within the discretionary function

(5) Prison officials placed Hearlson in a facility that they exception to the FTCA, thereby depriving the district court of

“knew or reasonably should have known was so inadequate subject matter jurisdiction? “This court reviews de novo a

that Tracy Hearlson could not be adequately protected from district court's grant of a motion to dismiss on the basis of

the risk of assaults by fellow prisoners.” subject-matter jurisdiction.” Pieper v. Am. Arbitration Ass’n,

Inc., 336 F.3d 458, 460 (6th Cir. 2003).

(6) The officials “were required to use ordinary care in

determining whether a federal prisoner should be kept in a Analysis of this issue starts with the fundamental principle

particular facility and in determining where within that that the United States government may not be sued without its

particular facility the prisoner should be kept, and the consent. United States v. Orleans, 425 U.S. 807, 814 (1976)

Governmental functions performed in these areas are not (observing that “the United States can be sued only to the

‘discretionary functions’ with[] respect to which the United extent that it has waived its immunity”). Pursuant to the

States is immune from Tort Liability.” FTCA, the United States has consented, subject to certain

exceptions, to suit for damages for personal injuries caused by

Hearlson was beaten to death with a fire extinguisher in an the negligence of government employees acting within the

unsupervised area of FMC Lexington where inmates watch course and scope of their employment. See 28 U.S.C.

television. No prison official was aware of the assault. But §§ 1346(b), 2671-2680.

the prison was aware of Hearlson’s prior altercations with

other inmates, and had previously put Hearlson in protective

lock-up. No official, however, had knowledge of any

No. 02-6303 Montez v. United States 5 6 Montez v. United States No. 02-6303

A significant limitation on the scope of the FTCA’s waiver contends that both a statute (18 U.S.C. § 4042(a)) and a

of sovereign immunity is the discretionary function exception, federal regulation (28 C.F.R. § 541.10) mandated a course of

28 U.S.C. § 2680(a), which provides that the United States conduct for prison officials to follow in making decisions

has not consented to suit where the claim is “based upon the regarding Hearlson’s safety.

exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform

a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal The statute provides in pertinent part as follows:

agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not the

discretion involved be abused.” Because the United States The Bureau of Prisons, under the direction of the

has not waived its sovereign immunity with respect to Attorney General, shall—

discretionary functions, courts lack subject matter jurisdiction (1) have charge of the management and

over acts falling within the discretionary function exception. regulation of all Federal penal and correctional

Rosebush v. United States, 119 F.3d 438, 440 (6th Cir. 1997). institutions;

(2) provide suitable quarters and provide for the

The United States Supreme Court has formulated a two-part safekeeping, care, and subsistence of all persons

test to determine whether a governmental act falls within the charged with or convicted of offenses against

exception. First, a court must ask whether the act involves the United States, or held as witnesses or

“an element of judgment or choice.” United States v. otherwise;

Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 322 (1991) (quotation marks omitted) (3) provide for the protection, instruction, and

(holding that federal regulators’ supervision of a savings and discipline of all persons charged with or

loan association’s day-to-day operations was within the convicted of offenses against the United States.

discretionary function exception). If the answer to that

question is “yes,” then the court must ask “whether that 18 U.S.C. § 4042(a) (emphasis added).

judgment is of the kind that the discretionary function

exception was designed to shield.” Id. at 322-23 (quotation The statute imposes a mandatory duty upon the Bureau of

marks omitted). Each of these elements is discussed in turn Prisons (BOP) through the use of the word “shall.” Calderon

below. v. United States, 123 F.3d 947, 950 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding

that § 4042(a) “sets forth a mandatory duty of care”). But the

A. Did the prison officials’ decisions regarding duty imposed by § 4042(a) is of a general nature, broadly

Hearlson’s safety involve an element of requiring that the BOP “provide for the safekeeping” and

judgment or choice? “provide for the protection” of federal inmates. BOP officials

are given no guidance, and thus have discretion, in deciding

The Supreme Court has stated that “the discretionary how to accomplish these objectives.

function exception will not apply when a federal statute,

regulation, or policy specifically prescribes a course of action The two other circuits that have previously considered this

for an employee to follow.” Berkovitz v. United States, 486 issue have both decided that § 4042(a) does not specifically

U.S. 531, 536 (1988) (holding that the discretionary function prescribe a course of action for prison officials to follow. See

exception did not apply where the complaint alleged that the Cohen v. United States, 151 F.3d 1338, 1342 (11th Cir. 1998)

FDA failed to follow a prescribed course of conduct when (“[E]ven if § 4042 imposes on the BOP a general duty of care

approving a polio vaccine). In the present case, Montez to safeguard prisoners, the BOP retains sufficient discretion

No. 02-6303 Montez v. United States 7 8 Montez v. United States No. 02-6303

in the means it may use to fulfill that duty to trigger the In addition to the regulation cited by Montez, the United

discretionary function exception.”); Calderon, 123 F.3d at States cites two additional regulations that govern the actions

950 (“While it is true that this statute sets forth a mandatory of prison officials. One states that an inmate “may” be

duty of care, it does not, however, direct the manner by which removed from the general population for safety reasons.

the BOP must fulfill this duty. The statute sets forth no 28 C.F.R. § 541.22(a). Another provides that BOP staff “may

particular conduct the BOP personnel should engage in or consider . . . as protection cases” inmates who are in danger.

avoid while attempting to fulfill their duty to protect 28 C.F.R. § 541.23(a). The use of the word “may” in these

inmates.”). We believe that Cohen and Calderon are regulations, rather than “shall,” demonstrates that their

persuasive on this point, and we therefore adopt their implementation is left to the discretion of BOP officials. See

conclusion. Dykstra v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 140 F.3d 791, 796 (8th

Cir. 1998) (holding that “the use of the term ‘may’ in the

But Montez also contends that BOP officials lack discretion regulations imports discretion”); see also Dorris v. Absher,

because of federal regulation 28 C.F.R. § 541.10, which 179 F.3d 420, 429 (6th Cir. 1999) (“The use of the term

provides in pertinent part as follows: ‘may’ in a statute is generally construed as permissive rather

than as mandatory.”). Because these regulations contain no

(b) The following general principles shall apply in every mandatory language, we agree with Dykstra’s conclusion that

disciplinary action taken: they do not impose a mandatory, nondiscretionary duty upon

... BOP officials.

(2) Staff shall take disciplinary action at such times and

to the degree necessary to regulate an inmate's behavior In sum, the relevant statute and regulations allowed BOP

within Bureau rules and institution guidelines and to officials to exercise judgment when making decisions

promote a safe and orderly institution environment. regarding Hearlson’s safety. Under the Supreme Court’s two-

factor approach, we must next consider “whether that

(Emphasis added.) judgment is of the kind that the discretionary function

exception was designed to shield.” Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 322-

This regulation, much like 18 U.S.C. § 4042(a), sets forth 23 (quotation marks omitted).

the general objectives of “regulat[ing] inmate behavior” and

“promot[ing] a safe and orderly institution environment,” but B. Were the prison officials’ decisions regarding

does not mandate any specific course of action on the part of Hearlson’s safety of the kind that the

BOP officials. Moreover, the phrases “at such times” and “to discretionary function exception was meant to

the degree necessary” clearly allow prison officials discretion shield?

to decide when disciplinary action is necessary.

Where the relevant governmental policy allows discretion,

In Calderon, the Seventh Circuit held that § 541.10 creates the Supreme Court has explicitly stated what a plaintiff must

no mandatory, nondiscretionary duty on the part of BOP do to survive a motion to dismiss:

officials. 123 F.3d at 949. Calderon’s conclusion is

consistent with the language of the regulation, and we When established governmental policy, as expressed or

likewise conclude that § 541.10 does not prescribe a specific implied by statute, regulation, or agency guidelines,

course of action that BOP officials must follow. allows a Government agent to exercise discretion, it must

No. 02-6303 Montez v. United States 9 10 Montez v. United States No. 02-6303

be presumed that the agent’s acts are grounded in policy affirmed the district court’s decision to grant the BOP’s

when exercising that discretion. For a complaint to motion to dismiss.

survive a motion to dismiss, it must allege facts which

would support a finding that the challenged actions are As a general principle, a complaint that alleges the

not the kind of conduct that can be said to be grounded in existence of a specific and immediate threat against an inmate

the policy of the regulatory regime. The focus of the is more likely to survive a motion to dismiss than a complaint

inquiry is not on the agent’s subjective intent in that either alleges a nonspecific threat or provides only

exercising the discretion conferred by statute or conclusory statements regarding the existence of a threat.

regulation, but on the nature of the actions taken and on This follows from the fact that decisions by prison officials to

whether they are susceptible to policy analysis. ignore specific and immediate threats against inmates are less

likely to be the type of decision that can be said to be

Id. at 324-25. In the present case, therefore, we must decide grounded in the underlying policy of the BOP, which requires

whether Montez’s complaint alleges facts sufficient to rebut prison officials to provide for the safekeeping and protection

the presumption that the decisions by the prison officials of inmates. See 18 U.S.C. § 4042(a). In light of this general

regarding Hearlson’s safety were “of the kind that the principle, we regard Dykstra as a close case because the

discretionary function exception was designed to shield.” prison officials apparently knew that Dykstra was at a higher

Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 322-23 (quotation marks omitted) (the risk of sexual assault and that the inmate who eventually

Gaubert presumption). attacked Dykstra had been staring at him. 140 F.3d at 795.

Two other circuits have acknowledged the Gaubert We have been unable to find any post-Gaubert case that

presumption in affirming the grant of motions to dismiss in illustrates a situation where an injured prisoner’s complaint is

cases brought by injured prisoners. In Calderon, the Seventh unquestionably adequate to survive a motion to dismiss, but

Circuit affirmed the grant of a motion to dismiss because the one useful factual situation comes from the Supreme Court’s

plaintiff inmate had failed to allege in his complaint facts that decision in United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150, 152 (1963),

“would support a finding that the BOP’s [decision] not to take where a prison guard stood by while an inmate was chased

disciplinary action against [the inmate who later attacked the and severely beaten by 12 other inmates. Although the Muniz

plaintiff] was based on grounds other than considerations of Court did not decide whether the discretionary function

public policy.” 123 F.3d at 950. Similarly, the Eighth Circuit exception applied, a complaint alleging the facts set forth in

in Dykstra held that the discretionary function exception Muniz would be adequate, in our opinion, to survive a motion

barred a suit against the BOP by an inmate who was sexually to dismiss because a guard’s conscious decision not to protect

assaulted by another inmate. Dykstra claimed that certain an inmate from a specific and immediate attack cannot “be

prison officials were negligent in not informing him that his said to be grounded in the policy of the regulatory regime.”

youthful appearance placed him at a higher risk of sexual Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 325.

assault and for not taking action after Dykstra informed a

guard that another inmate had been staring at him. 140 F.3d In the present case, only three allegations in the complaint

at 795. But Dykstra’s complaint was found deficient because directly focus on the basis for prison officials’ decisions

it failed to allege facts establishing that prison officials’ regarding Hearlson’s safety. The complaint first alleges that

decisions regarding these issues were not based on policy because Hearlson was “in protective lock-up prior to the

considerations. Id. at 796. The Eighth Circuit therefore attack, employees and officials of the Defendant knew or

No. 02-6303 Montez v. United States 11 12 Montez v. United States No. 02-6303

should have known that Tracy Hearlson was in imminent were of the type that can be said to be grounded in BOP

danger of likely injury of substantial certainty and policy.

consciously and knowingly failed to afford him reasonable

protection.” But the sentence provides insufficient support In conclusion, the relevant statute and regulations do not

for its conclusory allegations. The sole fact Hearlson was “in prescribe a mandatory course of conduct for prison officials

protective lock-up prior to the attack” does not demonstrate to follow when making decisions regarding inmates’ safety.

the existence of a specific and immediate threat against Montez’s complaint, moreover, fails to rebut the Gaubert

Hearlson that was still present after he was released from presumption that the decisions by prison officials regarding

protective lock-up a month earlier. That Hearlson had his safety were based upon BOP policy. We therefore

previously been in protective lock-up is simply insufficient to conclude that the discretionary function exception shields the

rebut the presumption that the prison officials’ decisions United States from liability in this case, and that the district

regarding Hearlson’s safety at the time of his death were of court properly granted the government’s motion to dismiss for

the type that can be said to be grounded in BOP policy. lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

The complaint next alleges that the prison officials placed III. CONCLUSION

Hearlson in a facility that they “knew or reasonably should

have known was so inadequate that Tracy Hearlson could not For all of the reasons set forth above, we AFFIRM the

be adequately protected from the risk of assaults by fellow judgment of the district court.

prisoners.” This allegation, however, simply alleges that the

BOP officials were negligent in making a decision—to place

Hearlson in the Commonwealth South housing area—without

addressing the nature of that decision, and therefore does not

satisfy Gaubert’s requirement that a complaint “must allege

facts which would support a finding that the challenged

actions are not the kind of conduct that can be said to be

grounded in the policy of the regulatory regime.” Gaubert,

499 U.S. at 324-25.

Finally, the complaint alleges that the prison officials “were

required to use ordinary care in determining whether a federal

prisoner should be kept in a particular facility and in

determining where within that particular facility the prisoner

should be kept, and the Governmental functions performed in

these areas are not ‘discretionary functions’ with[] respect to

which the United States is immune from Tort Liability.” This

is nothing more than a bare assertion that the discretionary

function exception does not apply, and it clearly does not

satisfy Gaubert’s requirement of a factual assertion sufficient

to rebut the presumption that the prison officials’ decisions

No. 02-6303 Montez v. United States 13

____________________

CONCURRENCE

____________________

ROGERS, Circuit Judge, concurring. I concur in the

majority’s judgment and almost totally in its reasoning. My

one reservation concerns the first complaint allegation

discussed by the majority: that because of Hearlson's previous

stint in protective custody, BOP officials knew or should have

known that Hearlson was in danger and failed to provide him

reasonable protection. With respect, the issue for

discretionary function exception purposes is not whether there

is sufficient support for the allegation, nor is the issue the

specificity or immediacy of the threat. Instead, the relevant

question is whether the ongoing determination of where

Hearlson would be placed was the type of agency decision-

making that takes broad agency policies into account. In

short, the relevant inquiry is the nature of the decision-making

process, not the nature of the threat. I agree, however, that

there is nothing about this allegation that rebuts the

presumption that the prison officials’ decisions regarding

Hearlson’s safety were the type of decision that is grounded

in policy.