Lawson v. Shelby County

RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION

12 Lawson, et al. v. Shelby No. 98-6065 Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206

County, Tennessee, et al. ELECTRONIC CITATION: 2000 FED App. 0155P (6th Cir.)

File Name: 00a0155p.06

II.

Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

opinion because I would affirm the district court’s opinion by FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

finding that the statute of limitations barred this action. _________________

;



RANDY LAWSON and SHARON



LAWSON,



Plaintiffs-Appellants,



No. 98-6065



v. >







SHELBY COUNTY,



TENNESSEE, and its division

ELECTION COMMISSION, O.C. 

the SHELBY COUNTY



PLEASANT, JR., DAVID H. 





LILLARD, JR.,YVONNE B.



ACEY, RICHARD L. HOLDEN,



and MYRA STILES, in their



official capacity as members



of the Shelby County

Election Commission, and 





THE STATE OF TENNESSEE



and DON SUNDQUIST, in his



official capacity as Governor

Defendants-Appellees. 

of the State of Tennessee,

1

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Tennessee at Memphis.

No. 97-03034—Bernice B. Donald, District Judge.

1

2 Lawson, et al. v. Shelby No. 98-6065 No. 98-6065 Lawson, et al. v. Shelby 11

County, Tennessee, et al. County, Tennessee, et al.

Submitted: October 26, 1999 In Delaware State College v. Ricks, a junior faculty

member was notified that he had been denied tenure, but was

Decided and Filed: May 3, 2000 given a “terminal” contract that extended his employment for

one-year beyond the date his tenure was denied. The

Before: MARTIN, Chief Judge; SUHRHEINRICH and Supreme Court found that the cause of action for his denial of

SILER, Circuit Judges. tenure accrued on the date that he was given notice of the

denial, rather than on the date of his termination at the

_________________ conclusion of his “terminal” contract. The Court noted that

the “termination of employment at Delaware State is a

COUNSEL delayed, but inevitable consequence of the denial of tenure.”

Id. at 257-58 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court has also

ON BRIEF: Mark L. Pittman, PITTMAN & KELLY, held that for the purposes of computing the statute of

Memphis, Tennessee, for Appellants. William J. Marett, Jr., limitations period, the “proper focus is on the time of the . . .

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, Nashville, act, not the point at which the consequences of the act become

Tennessee, for Appellees. painful.” Chardon v. Fernandez, 454 U.S. at 8 (42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 employment termination case)(original emphasis).

MARTIN, C. J., delivered the opinion of the court, in

which SILER, J., joined. SUHRHEINRICH, J. (pp. 10-12), This notice-based test to determine when a cause of action

delivered a separate dissenting opinion. has accrued has also been applied in a variety of other civil

rights actions. See, e.g., Watts v. Graves, 720 F.2d 1416 (5th

_________________ Cir. 1983) (per curiam) ( 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights action

OPINION against local police alleging violation of Fourth Amendment

_________________ rights based on warrantless search); Eagleston v. Guido, 41

F.3d 865 (2d Cir. 1994) (42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights action

BOYCE F. MARTIN, JR., Chief Judge. Randy and Sharon against police alleging equal protection violation in police

Lawson appeal an order dismissing their amended complaint arrest policies relating to domestic violence complaints).

for failure to state a claim. The Lawsons claim that they were

denied the right to vote when they refused to disclose their Likewise, in this case, the Lawsons’ inability to vote on

social security numbers as a condition to exercising their right November 5, 1996, was a delayed, but inevitable consequence

to vote to the Shelby County Election Commission. of the denial of their registration application in October, 1996.

The alleged deprivation of their rights occurred, and the filing

On September 26, 1996, Randy and Sharon Lawson limitations period began to run, at the time their registration

attempted to register to vote in Shelby County by mail. application was denied, even though the effect of that denial

Instead of writing their social security number as required on did not occur until election day. Since the Lawsons were

the voter registration form, Randy and Sharon each wrote notified of that denial in October, 1996, more than one year

“See Public Law 93-579.” Public Law 93-579 is an prior to filing their complaint, their suit is time-barred.

amendment to the Freedom of Information/Privacy Act,

which states that neither the federal, state, nor local

governments may deny benefits because of an individual’s

10 Lawson, et al. v. Shelby No. 98-6065 No. 98-6065 Lawson, et al. v. Shelby 3

County, Tennessee, et al. County, Tennessee, et al.

_________________ refusal to disclose his social security number. The Shelby

County Election Commission notified the Lawsons before the

DISSENT October 5 registration deadline that their registration was

_________________ denied because they omitted their social security numbers.

SUHRHEINRICH, Circuit Judge, dissenting. I write The Lawsons attempted to vote in the November 5 general

separately to respectfully dissent from the majority’s opinion election, but were denied because they were not registered.

because I would find that this suit is barred by the one-year Randy and Sharon each presented to the election official at

statute of limitations. the poll, a letter, for signature, stating that he/she was being

denied the right to vote because his/her registration was

I. rejected for failure to disclose his/her social security number.

I agree with the majority that a one-year statute of On November 5, 1997, exactly one year after the election,

limitations applies to this case under Tennessee law. I also the Lawsons filed suit in federal court against Shelby County,

agree that federal law determines when a cause of action is the Shelby County Election Commission and the Chair of the

deemed to have accrued. However, I disagree with the Commission, Mr. O.C. Pleasant, Jr., “individually and in his

majority’s finding that the cause of action in this case accrued official capacity.” The Lawsons, seeking injunctive and

on election day, November 5, 1996. Instead, I agree with the declaratory relief, damages and attorney’s fees, claim that

district court and would find that the cause of action accrued they were denied the right to vote on November 5, 1996,

in October, 1996, when the plaintiffs were given official because they refused to disclose their social security numbers

notice that they were being denied the right to vote because of on their voter registration form. This, they allege, constituted

their failure to provide their social security numbers. a deprivation of their rights, privileges and immunities

secured by the Constitution of the United States under the

Generally, a civil rights cause of action accrues when the First and Fourteenth Amendments, Article IV § 1 of the

plaintiff knew or should have known of the injury. For Tennessee Constitution, and the Privacy Act of 1974. The

example, the Supreme Court held that a cause of action Lawsons then filed an Amended Complaint on February 27,

accrues at the time the plaintiff has notice of the 1998, naming all the remaining members of the election

discriminatory act for civil rights cases in the employment commission in their official, but not in their individual,

context. See Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250 capacities, the State of Tennessee, and Governor Sundquist in

(1980) (denial of tenure case filed under Title VII of the Civil his official capacity. In their second amended complaint, the

Rights Act of 1964 and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 accrued on date Lawsons assert a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

tenure was denied, not when employment terminated a year

later as a result of that denial); see also Janikowski v. Bendix After granting the Lawson’s permission to amend their

Corp., 823 F.2d 945, 947-48 (6th Cir. 1987) (Age complaint, the district court dismissed the Lawsons’ claims

Discrimination in Employment Act action accrued on date finding that they were barred by the Eleventh Amendment,

employee was notified of pending termination, not on the and assuming that the complaint was not barred by the

actual date of termination) (citing Chardon v. Fernandez, 454 Eleventh Amendment, the claims were barred by the one year

U.S. 6 (1981) (per curiam), and Delaware State College v. statute of limitations. The Lawsons filed a timely notice of

Ricks, 449 U.S. 250 (1980)). appeal to this Court on July 31, 1998.

4 Lawson, et al. v. Shelby No. 98-6065 No. 98-6065 Lawson, et al. v. Shelby 9

County, Tennessee, et al. County, Tennessee, et al.

This Court reviews de novo the district court’s dismissal for the cause of action accrued, thus satisfying the statute of

failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. limitations.

Cline v. Rogers, 87 F.3d 176, 179 (6th Cir. 1996).

Thus, we remand the case to the district court to order such

The Lawsons contend that the district court erred in relief as will allow the Lawsons to vote and such other relief

dismissing their suit for failure to state a claim upon which as appropriate.

relief can be granted because Eleventh Amendment immunity

does not apply to suits brought by a private citizen seeking

injunctive or declaratory relief against a state official. The

full text of the Eleventh Amendment provides: “The judicial

power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to

any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against

one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by

Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” As originally

drafted, the suits to which the Amendment referred were only

those suits brought against a state by out-of-state or foreign

citizens. But, in 1890, the Supreme Court held that in-state as

well as out-of-state citizens were barred by the Eleventh

Amendment from suing a state. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S.

1 (1890). Under current law, the Amendment is a bar to

federal court jurisdiction whenever any private citizen

attempts to sue a state.

There are, however, three qualified exceptions to Eleventh

Amendment immunity, only two of which are addressed by

the district court in this case. First, a state may waive the

protection of the Amendment by consenting to the suit.

Consent may occur in a number of ways. A state may

expressly waive immunity from suit for money damages in

court. Thiokol Corp. V. Mich. Dep’t of Treasury, 987 F.2d

376 (6th Cir. 1993). Consent may also take the form of a

voluntary appearance and defense on the merits in federal

court. Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436 (1883). Furthermore,

consent may result when the state agrees to administer a

federal-state program that imposes certain federal standards

8 Lawson, et al. v. Shelby No. 98-6065 No. 98-6065 Lawson, et al. v. Shelby 5

County, Tennessee, et al. County, Tennessee, et al.

election day for failing to be registered. The denial of the upon the state.1 In this case, the district court correctly

right to vote, they contend, occurred at the moment they were asserted that no consent had been given by the defendant to

denied the opportunity to vote on election day. Defendants, satisfy this first exception to the Eleventh Amendment bar.

however, dispute this contention, arguing instead that the Thus, the exception does not apply here.

Lawsons were denied the right to vote when they received

notice that their registration application was not successful on The second exception to the Eleventh Amendment bar is

October 1, 1996, which is more than a year before the that Congress, under certain provisions of the Constitution,

complaint was filed. The district court agreed with may abrogate the sovereign immunity of the states through

Defendants on this issue and therefore dismissed the case. statute. For a Congressional abrogation of state sovereign

immunity to be valid, two conditions must be satisfied. First,

We reverse the district courts decision on this issue for two Congress must state clearly that it intends a statute to abrogate

reasons. First, the issue at hand in this case is the state sovereign immunity. Seminole Tribe of Florida v.

fundamental right to vote not the right to register to vote. The Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 55 (1996).2 Second, a determination

U.S. Constitution protects an individual’s right to vote during must be made as to whether3Congress has acted “pursuant to

an election, not the right to register to vote prior to an a valid exercise of power.” Id. Thus, the mere fact that a

election. statute was passed is not enough to show that Congress

intended to nullify state sovereign immunity. Defendants

Second, the district court cites a number of wrongful correctly assert in their brief that Congress never expressly

employment termination cases in its opinion to show that abrogated state sovereign immunity under the Privacy Act.

employees brought actions against their respective employers Thus, the Lawsons cannot escape the Eleventh Amendment

outside of the limitations periods as measured from the dates bar against their Privacy Act claim under the second

on which they were notified that they had been terminated. exception. But Defendants also note that the Lawsons may be

Chardon v. Fernandez, 454 U.S. 6 (1981); In re Rin, 782 F.2d able to circumvent a state sovereign immunity defense under

603 (6th Cir. 1986). The court concludes that the “act” is a third exception to the Eleventh Amendment bar.

what is important, not the point at which the consequences of

the act become painful. These cases, however, do not apply

to the Lawson’s situation. The Lawsons were not denied the

right to vote when they were notified that their registrations

had been rejected, they were denied the right to vote when 1

they presented themselves at the appropriate polling place and Thus far, consent to suit on this basis has never been found. See

were denied access to the voting booth. The rejection letters Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985).

merely served as notice to the Lawsons that they were not 2

registered, and in order to become registered, they needed to The Supreme Court has found no clear statement of intent to

abrogate under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Quern v. Jordan,

provide their social security numbers. This could have been 440 U.S. 332 (1979).

done up until the time they presented themselves at the polls

on election day. Therefore, the harm to the Lawsons occurred 3

Congress may abrogate state sovereign immunity under the

on November 5, 1996 (election day) when they presented Fourteenth Amendment. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976). The

themselves at their polling station and were refused the right Supreme Court has suggested that Congress may also abrogate state

to vote. The complaint was then filed within one year after sovereign immunity under the Fifteenth Amendment. City of Rome v.

United States, 446 U.S. 156 (1980).

6 Lawson, et al. v. Shelby No. 98-6065 No. 98-6065 Lawson, et al. v. Shelby 7

County, Tennessee, et al. County, Tennessee, et al.

Under the third exception, a federal court may enjoin a because the Lawsons’ requests for declaratory relief and

“state official” from violating federal law. Ex parte Young, attorneys’ fees are ancillary to their request for prospective

209 U.S. 123 (1908). The idea behind this exception is that injunctive relief, such relief would also fall under the Young

a suit against a state officer is not a suit against the state when exception.

the remedy sought is an injunction against an illegal action,

for an officer is not acting on behalf of the state when he acts Finally, subdivisions of the state, such as counties and

illegally. In effect, the illegal act strips the state officer of his municipalities, are not protected by the Eleventh Amendment.

character as an agent of the state for the purposes of the Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529 (1890). The

Eleventh Amendment. Injunctive relief is available under the Eleventh Amendment limits the jurisdiction only as to suits

Young exception only against state officers — not the state against a state.4 Id., at 530. Even though a county is

itself — who violate federal law. Pennhurst State School & territorially a part of the state, it is also a corporation created

Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984). Relief ancillary by it, and is therefore only a part of the state “in that remote

to injunctive relief, such as attorneys’ fees is also permitted. sense in which any city, town or other municipal corporation

Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978). However, retroactive may be said to be a part of the state.” Id. In this case, the

relief, such as money damages, is not permitted because such Lawsons filed suit against Shelby County and the Shelby

relief would require the “payment of funds from the state County Election Commission. These entities are not

treasury.” Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974). protected by the Eleventh Amendment under Luning.

Therefore, the Lawsons’ claims against these entities should

In this case, because the Young exception is limited to the not have been dismissed on Eleventh Amendment grounds.

award of prospective nonmonetary relief, any claim for

retroactive relief or damages is barred under the Eleventh In regard to the district court’s dismissal of the Lawson’s

Amendment. Id. In addition, the Lawsons’ claims against the case based on an expired statute of limitations, the Lawsons

State of Tennessee are barred by the Eleventh Amendment, argue that the court’s decision should be reversed because the

because the Amendment prohibits suits against a “state” in complaint was filed within the required time period. The

federal court whether for injunctive, declaratory or monetary statute of limitations for federal civil rights claims is the

relief. appropriate state statute of limitations. Wilson v. Garcia, 471

U.S. 261 (1985). Tennessee law requires that actions brought

However, the Lawsons’ claims for prospective injunctive under the federal civil rights statutes shall be commenced

and declaratory relief against the individual state and county within one year after the cause of action accrues. Tenn. Code

officials should not be dismissed. Under the fiction of Ex Ann. § 28-3-104(a)(3). Federal law ordinarily determines

parte Young, these officials may be stripped of their character when a cause of action is deemed to have accrued. Sevier v.

as agents of the state when they violate federal law. The Turner, 742 F.2d 262, 272 (6th Cir. 1984).

Lawsons allege that Governor Sundquist, the Chairman of the

Shelby County Election Commission and the remaining The Lawsons filed their complaint on November 5, 1997,

members of the Commission engaged in conduct that violated exactly one year after they were turned away from the polls on

federal law when they denied the Lawsons the right to vote

for failing to disclose their social security numbers. Thus,

4

their request for prospective injunctive relief against these Suits may be brought by private citizens against counties and

officials is permitted under the Young exception. Moreover, municipalities under section 1983. Monell v. Department of Social

Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).