Harris v. Stovall

RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION

Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206

ELECTRONIC CITATION: 2000 FED App. 0169P (6th Cir.)

File Name: 00a0169p.06

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

_________________

;



DONALD HARRIS,



Petitioner-Appellant,





No. 98-2308

v.



>

CLARICE STOVALL, 

Respondent-Appellee. 

1

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Michigan at Detroit.

No. 97-76301—Arthur J. Tarnow, District Judge.

Argued: May 3, 2000

Decided and Filed: May 18, 2000

Before: SUHRHEINRICH and COLE,* Circuit Judges;

QUIST, District Judge.

_________________

COUNSEL

ARGUED: James Sterling Lawrence, Detroit, Michigan, for

Appellant. Vincent J. Leone, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY

GENERAL, HABEAS CORPUS DIVISION, Lansing,

*

The Honorable Gordon J. Quist, United States District Judge for the

Western District of Michigan, sitting by designation.

1

2 Harris v. Stovall No. 98-2308

Michigan, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: James Sterling

Lawrence, Detroit, Michigan, for Appellant. Vincent J.

Leone, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL,

HABEAS CORPUS DIVISION, Lansing, Michigan, for

Appellee.

_________________

OPINION

_________________

GORDON J. QUIST, District Judge. This appeal of the

denial of a habeas corpus application requires us to apply the

provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty

Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996)

(“AEDPA”). Donald Harris, a Michigan state prisoner

serving a mandatory life term for first-degree felony-murder,

appeals from an order of the district court denying his

application for habeas relief filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254. The victim was John Anthony, who was killed at

gunpoint while working in his store in Detroit. Harris did not

commit the crime alone. Two others, Stanley West and

Frederick Wilkes, were tried together and convicted of the

murder. Harris was tried later. In this appeal, Harris contends

that he was denied due process of law when, as an indigent

defendant, he was denied free transcripts of the earlier trial of

West and Wilkes. Harris claims that the transcripts were

necessary for effective impeachment of the state’s witnesses,

which would support his theory of innocence. The district

court held that petitioner had adequate alternatives to the

transcripts because copies of the preliminary examination

transcripts from the prior trial had been filed. The district

court also found that any error was harmless. The underlying

habeas action was filed in early 1997, and the standards under

the AEDPA apply. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336,

117 S. Ct. 2059, 2067 (1997); Harpster v. Ohio, 128 F.3d

322, 326 (6th Cir. 1997). Although the district court

incorrectly applied the standards under the AEDPA, we

affirm the result it reached.

No. 98-2308 Harris v. Stovall 3

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

This court applies de novo review to the decision of the

district court in a habeas corpus proceeding. See, e.g.,

Harpster, 128 F.3d at 326; West v. Seabold, 73 F.3d 81, 84

(6th Cir. 1996). Federal habeas review of the state court’s

decision is governed by the standards established by the

AEDPA. See Harpster, 128 F.3d at 326. Under the AEDPA,

an application for writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person

who is incarcerated pursuant to a state conviction cannot be

granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the

merits in state court unless the adjudication: “(1) resulted in

a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined

by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in

a decision that was based upon an unreasonable determination

of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State

court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

On April 18, 2000, the Supreme Court issued a decision in

Williams v. Taylor, 120 S. Ct. 1495 (2000), setting forth the

standard of review that a federal habeas court must apply

under § 2254(d). The Court held that a decision of the state

court is “contrary to” clearly established federal law “if the

state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by

this Court on a questio n of law or if the state court decides a

case differently than this Court has on a set of materially

indistinguishable facts.” Id. at 1523. The Court further held

that an “unreasonable application” occurs when “the state

court identifies the correct legal principle from this Court’s

decision but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of

the prisoner’s case.” Id. A federal habeas court may not find

a state adjudication to be “unreasonable” “simply because that

court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant

state-court decision applied clearly established federal law

erroneously or incorrectly.” Id. at 1522.

In this case, the district court referred to our holding in

Harpster, which simply noted the differing interpretations of

§ 2254(d) developing in our sister circuits, but found that the

4 Harris v. Stovall No. 98-2308 No. 98-2308 Harris v. Stovall 9

standard under § 2254(d) had not been met. See Harpster, codefendants for purposes of impeaching witnesses.2 Such

128 F.3d at 326-27. Subsequently, in Nevers v. Killinger, 169 a rule would impose a new obligation on the state government

F.3d 352 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 2340 (1999), we under factual circumstances beyond that recognized by the

found it appropriate to rely on the Fifth Circuit’s “debatable Supreme Court. Consequently, we conclude that Supreme

among reasonable jurists” standard in Drinkard v. Johnson, Court precedent existing at the time of petitioner’s trial did

97 F.3d 751 (5th Cir. 1996), combined with the First Circuit’s not dictate or compel a rule that a defendant is entitled to a

standard of “so offensive to existing precedent, so devoid of free copy of a transcript of his codefendants’ previous trial for

record support, or so arbitrary, as to indicate that it is outside impeachment of witnesses. Although a petitioner’s case need

the universe of plausible, credible outcomes,” set forth in not be factually identical to the facts in the case before the

O’Brien v. Dubois, 145 F.3d 16 (1st Cir. 1998). See Nevers, Supreme Court, a better analog than as presented in this case

169 F.3d at 361-62. Later, we reaffirmed this approach in is necessary. Thus, the result of the decision of the Michigan

Maurino v. Johnson, No. 98-1332, ___ F.3d ___, 2000 WL Court of Appeals to affirm petitioner’s conviction was not an

432804, at *5 (6th Cir. Apr. 24, 2000). However, the unreasonable application of clearly established federal law as

Supreme Court in Williams found that the Fourth Circuit’s determined by the Supreme Court because the Supreme Court

test—that a state court’s application of federal law was precedent on the rule sought by petitioner was not clearly

“unreasonable” only if the court had applied federal law in a established.

manner that reasonable jurists would all agree was

unreasonable—was erroneously subjective, as the inquiry III. CONCLUSION

should be objective. The Court expressly disavowed the Fifth

Circuit’s “reasonable jurist” standard set forth in Drinkard. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court

In light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Williams, we find is AFFIRMED.

that Nevers and Maurino no longer correctly state the law on

the issue of the appropriate standard under 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d). We must therefore rely solely on the Supreme

Court’s decision in Williams for the appropriate standard

under § 2254(d).

II. ANALYSIS

A. Lack of a state court decision articulating its

reasoning

In this case, there appears to be no state court decision to

evaluate under § 2254(d). The issue concerning provision of

a free transcript was raised on appeal to the Michigan Court

of Appeals, which summarily issued an Order Granting [the

Prosecutor’s] Motion to Affirm on February 2, 1978. The

Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal on February 2

We note that even if the Supreme Court had stated the rule sought

7, 1979. Thus, the issue is how to apply § 2254(d) when there by petitioner in a decision issued after petitioner’s trial, petitioner could

is no state court decision articulating its reasons. not rely upon it. The rule must have been “as of the time of the relevant

state court decision.” Williams, 120 S. Ct. at 1523.

8 Harris v. Stovall No. 98-2308 No. 98-2308 Harris v. Stovall 5

needed); Long v. District Court of Iowa, 385 U.S. 192, 87 S. Other circuit courts have concluded that where the state

Ct. 362 (1966)(per curiam)(transcript of habeas proceedings court has not articulated its reasoning, federal courts are

needed for appeal); Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487, 83 obligated to conduct an independent review of the record and

S. Ct. 774 (1963) (transcript needed for appeal); Eskridge v. applicable law to determine whether the state court decision

Washington State Bd. of Prison Terms and Paroles, 357 U.S. is contrary to federal law, unreasonably applies clearly

214, 78 S. Ct. 1061 (1958)(per curiam)(trial transcript needed established law, or is based on an unreasonable determination

for an appeal); Griffin, 351 U.S. 12, 76 S. Ct. 585 (trial of the facts in light of the evidence presented. See Aycox v.

transcript needed for an appeal). Lytle, 196 F.3d 1174, 1177-78 (10th Cir. 1999) (“we must

uphold the state court’s summary decision unless our

Moreover, the statement in Britt that the state must provide independent review of the record and pertinent federal law

an indigent defendant with the basic tools for an effective persuades us that its result contravenes or unreasonably

defense was unquestionably broad. The Britt Court itself applies clearly established federal law, or is based on an

recognized that "the outer limits of that principle are not unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the

clear." Britt, 404 U.S. at 227, 92 S. Ct. at 433. Obviously, evidence presented”); Schaff v. Snyder, 190 F.3d 513, 523

the basic tools needed for an effective defense are not (7th Cir. 1999); Delgado v. Lewis, 181 F.3d 1087, 1091 n.3

contained in any list, and the Supreme Court has only begun (9th Cir.1999), vacated on other grounds, 120 S. Ct. 1002

to delineate what the basic tools might be. For example, in (2000); accord Gordon v. Kelly, No. 98-1905, 2000 WL

Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 US. 68, 105 S. Ct. 1087 (1985), the 145144, at *12 (6th Cir. Feb. 1, 2000). That independent

Court considered “whether, and under what conditions, the review, however, is not a full, de novo review of the claims,

participation of a psychiatrist is important enough to but remains deferential because the court cannot grant relief

preparation of a defense to require the State to provide an unless the state court’s result is not in keeping with the

indigent defendant with access to competent psychiatric strictures of the AEDPA.1 In this appeal, we find that the

assistance in preparing the defense.” Id. at 77, 105 S. Ct. at result reached by the Michigan Court of Appeals in its

1093. The Court specifically mentioned that the language in summary denial of petitioner’s claim was not inimical to the

Britt regarding providing an indigent defendant the “basic AEDPA.

tools of an adequate defense or appeal,” was only the

beginning of the inquiry. Id. Then, in Caldwell v. B. “Clearly established federal law as determined by the

Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 105 S. Ct. 2633 (1985), the Court Supreme Court of the United States”

considered whether and when an indigent defendant is

entitled to nonpsychiatric expert assistance. See id. at 323 The district court, applying Britt v. North Carolina, 404

n.1, 105 S. Ct. at 2637 n.1. Thus, the Supreme Court has not U.S. 226, 92 S. Ct. 431 (1971), found that petitioner would be

completely answered the question of what basic tools are entitled to a transcript from another defendant’s trial if the

necessary for an adequate defense.

Petitioner has not cited any Supreme Court authority 1

extending the principles of Britt to an indigent defendant’s It would be error for a federal court to “remand” an action to the

request for free copies of transcripts from a prior trial of his state appellate courts for the issuance of fuller findings to facilitate review

under AEDPA or for a federal court to order any state court to issue fuller

findings. Where a state court decides a constitutional issue by form order

or without extended discussion, a habeas court should then focus on the

result of the state court’s decision, applying the standard articulated

above.

6 Harris v. Stovall No. 98-2308 No. 98-2308 Harris v. Stovall 7

transcript were “necessary for discovery or impeachment whether the relief requested would constitute a new rule, the

purposes and there were no available alternatives to fulfill question becomes “‘whether a state court considering [the

those functions.” The district court also relied on other lower petitioner’s] claim at the time his conviction became final

court decisions, including our decision in Riggins v. Rees, 74 would have felt compelled by existing precedent to conclude

F.3d 732 (6th Cir. 1996). We find that the district court that the rule [he] seeks was required by the Constitution.’”

erroneously applied the AEDPA to the decision of the Caspari v. Bohlen, 510 U.S. 383, 390, 114 S. Ct. 948, 953

Michigan Court of Appeals through a misinterpretation of the (1994)(quoting Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 488, 110 S. Ct.

meaning of “clearly established federal law as determined by 1257, 1260 (1990)). Thus, applying Teague principles,

the Supreme Court of the United States” under § 2254(d) in “clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme

two critical ways. Court of the United States” means that the rule sought by

petitioner must have been dictated or compelled by Britt. We

First, the AEDPA expressly limits the source of law to find that it was not.

cases decided by the United States Supreme Court. 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d). The Williams Court found that a federal court Petitioner seeks a rule compelling the state to provide an

must find a violation of law “clearly established” by holdings indigent defendant with free copies of trial transcripts of his

of the Supreme Court, as opposed to its dicta, as of the time codefendants’ previous trial so that he can impeach the

of the relevant state court decision. See Williams, 120 S. Ct. prosecution’s witnesses. In Britt, the Supreme Court

at 1523. We have stated that this provision marks a considered whether an indigent petitioner was entitled to a

“significant change” and prevents the district court from free transcript of his own previous trial, which had ended in

looking to lower federal court decisions in determining a mistrial because the jury was deadlocked. The Court relied

whether the state court decision is contrary to, or an on Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 76 S. Ct. 585 (1956), which

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. held that as a matter of equal protection, the state must

Herbert v. Billy, 160 F.3d 1131, 1135 (6th Cir. 1998). We “provide indigent prisoners with the basic tools of an

reemphasize that point here. It was error for the district court adequate defense or appeal, when those tools are available for

to rely on authority other than that of the Supreme Court of a price to other prisoners.” Britt, 404 U.S. at 227, 92 S. Ct. at

the United States in its analysis under § 2254(d). 433.

Second, the district court failed to appropriately apply Britt concerned a petitioner who requested a transcript of

“clearly established law” as determined by the Supreme Court his own prior trial which resulted in a deadlocked jury. In

when it applied the rule in Britt to petitioner’s case. The contrast, petitioner seeks transcripts from a previous trial of

Williams Court stated that “[w]hatever would qualify as an his codefendants. The decisions relied upon by the Britt

‘old rule’ under Teague will constitute ‘clearly established Court itself address situations where the petitioner needed a

Federal law, as determined by [this] Court.’” Williams, 120 transcript of proceedings in which he was directly involved.

S. Ct. at 1499 (citation omitted). Under Teague, “a case See Williams v. Oklahoma City, 395 U.S. 458, 89 S. Ct. 1818

announces a new rule when it breaks new ground or imposes (1969)(per curiam)(transcript of trial proceeding needed for

a new obligation on the States or the Federal Government.” the petitioner’s appeal); Gardner v. California, 393 U.S. 367,

Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 301, 109 S. Ct. 1060, 1070 89 S. Ct. 580 (1969) (transcript of state habeas proceedings

(1989). “To put it differently, a case announces a new rule if needed to bring appeal); Roberts v. LaVallee, 389 U.S. 40, 88

the result was not dictated by precedent existing at the time S. Ct. 194 (1967)(per curiam)(transcript of petitioner’s

the defendant’s conviction became final.” Id. In determining preliminary hearing where state’s witnesses testimony was