Opinion

USF Red Star, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board

  • 230 F.3d 102
Court
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
Filed
Oct 18, 2000
Status
Published
Author
Wilkinson
On the bench
Wilkinson, Murnaghan, Herlong
Cited by
1 cases
Authority
More cited than 46.2%

The opinion

PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

USF RED STAR, INCORPORATED, 

Petitioner,

v.  No. 99-2600

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD,

Respondent.

CHAUFFEURS, TEAMSTERS AND HELPERS 

LOCAL 118, International

Brotherhood of Teamsters, AFL-

CIO,

Petitioner,  No. 99-2651

v.

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD,

Respondent.

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, 

Petitioner,

v.

USF RED STAR, INCORPORATED;

CHAUFFEURS, TEAMSTERS AND HELPERS  No. 99-1079

LOCAL 118, International

Brotherhood of Teamsters, AFL-

CIO,

Respondents.

On Petitions for Review and Cross-Application for

Enforcement of an Order of the National Labor Relations Board.

(3-CA-19698, 3-CA-19739, 3-CB-6734, 3-CB-6894)

2 USF RED STAR v. NLRB

Argued: June 6, 2000

Decided: October 18, 2000

Before WILKINSON, Chief Judge, MURNAGHAN,*

Circuit Judge, and Henry M. HERLONG, Jr.,

United States District Judge for the District of South Carolina,

sitting by designation.

Enforced by published opinion. Chief Judge Wilkinson wrote the

opinion, in which Judge Herlong joined.

COUNSEL

ARGUED: Paul M. Sansoucy, BOND, SCHOENECK & KING,

L.L.P., Syracuse, New York; Michael Thomas Harren, CHAMBER-

LAIN, D’AMANDA, OPPENHEIMER & GREENFIELD, Rochester,

New York, for USF Red Star, et al. Andrew J. Krafts, NATIONAL

LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Washington, D.C., for Board. ON

BRIEF: Subhash Viswanathan, BOND, SCHOENECK & KING,

L.L.P., Syracuse, New York, for USF Red Star, et al. Leonard R.

Page, General Counsel, Linda Sher, Associate General Counsel,

Aileen A. Armstrong, Deputy Associate General Counsel, Margaret

A. Gaines, Supervisory Attorney, NATIONAL LABOR RELA-

TIONS BOARD, Washington, D.C., for Board.

*Judge Murnaghan heard oral argument in this case but died prior to

the time the decision was filed. The decision is filed by a quorum of the

panel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 46(d).

USF RED STAR v. NLRB 3

OPINION

WILKINSON, Chief Judge:

This case involves a pact between officials of a union and a com-

pany to discharge an opponent of incumbent union officials in

exchange for the union’s agreement to modify the collective bargain-

ing agreement. The National Labor Relations Board found that the

National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq., pro-

hibits this practice. Since the Board’s decision was supported by sub-

stantial evidence and the actions of the union and the company

violated the fundamental principles of labor-management law, the

Board’s order shall be enforced.

I.

John Hayes was a member of Local 118, International Brotherhood

of Teamsters (the Union) in Rochester, New York. In December

1994, Hayes ran for union office on a ticket opposing Frank Posato

and John Cantwell. Although the Posato-Cantwell ticket prevailed,

the election was a bitter one. In January 1995, Hayes resumed work-

ing as an occasional or "casual" driver for the freight company USF

Red Star. His supervisor was terminal manager Wayne Zakofsky.

Between January and March 1995, Cantwell repeatedly ridiculed

Hayes to Zakofsky, referring to Hayes as a "scumbag." Cantwell also

expressed disdain for Hayes to Ron Morin, Red Star’s Director of

Field Services.

In March 1995, two other freight companies closed their Rochester

terminals. Zakofsky saw this as an opportunity for Red Star to modify

the costly "start-time" provisions of the current collective bargaining

agreement. These provisions guaranteed drivers a start time between

7 a.m. and 8:30 a.m.; drivers who started before 7 a.m. were paid

overtime and drivers who started after 8:30 a.m. were paid as if they

had started at 8:30 a.m. Ron Morin primarily handled the negotia-

tions, with oversight provided by Red Star Vice-President Roy Liller.

In early April, Morin informed Zakofsky that the Union wanted Red

Star to stop using Hayes as a driver. Zakofsky ignored this request

because he did not think Morin had the authority to issue such a direc-

tive.

4 USF RED STAR v. NLRB

On April 28, two key events occurred. First, that morning Hayes

had a preventable accident while driving a Red Star truck. There was

no damage to customer property and the damage to the truck cost Red

Star $15 to repair. Second, Morin and Zakofsky met with Posato and

Cantwell to discuss the start-time provision. At the close of the meet-

ing, Posato told Morin: "Ron, you know what I want. If you want to

negotiate this type of contract, you know what I want." Posato and

Morin then met privately for about ten minutes, after which Morin

told Zakofsky that "Jack Hayes is gone." When Zakofsky indicated

that he did not want to participate in the plot to terminate Hayes,

Morin explained that if "we want to get . . . [the] type of negotiations

that we want approved, Jack Hayes is gone."

Zakofsky issued Hayes a written warning for the accident but did

not enter it into the company’s computer. Although Red Star some-

times fired occasional drivers for having preventable accidents,

Zakofsky believed that terminal managers had the discretion to over-

look minor accidents of this type.1 He also thought that if the accident

was entered into the corporate computer, it would be used as a pretext

to terminate Hayes. In the following weeks, both Morin and Liller

instructed Zakofsky to phase out Hayes on account of the Union

negotiations. Morin specifically told Zakofsky that "we’re going to

get more out of the negotiations, but in turn the Union wants Jack

Hayes gone." On both June 6 and 7, Liller insisted that Zakofsky fire

Hayes. During the second conversation Zakofsky agreed to terminate

Hayes because Liller threatened to do it himself if Zakofsky did not.

After Zakofsky fired Hayes, Liller terminated Zakofsky, ostensibly

for failing to report Hayes’ accident.

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Raymond Green ruled that Red

Star violated 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) and (1) by discharging Hayes for

engaging in protected union activity, and violated 29 U.S.C.

§ 158(a)(1) by discharging Zakofsky for refusing to fire Hayes. The

ALJ also found that the Union had violated § 158(b)(1)(A) and (b)(2)

for causing Hayes to be discharged for engaging in protected union

1

Red Star’s purported practice of firing drivers who have even one pre-

ventable accident is limited to occasional or "casual" drivers. Red Star

does not terminate permanent or "preferred" drivers solely because of a

preventable accident.

USF RED STAR v. NLRB 5

activity. The National Labor Relations Board affirmed this decision,

and ordered Red Star and the Union to stop their unfair labor prac-

tices. The Board also ordered Red Star to reinstate Hayes and Zakof-

sky with back-pay. Finally, the Board required the Union to notify

Red Star that it agreed to Hayes’ reinstatement. Red Star and the

Union both appeal.

II.

A.

This court enforces Board orders whenever substantial evidence

exists to support the Board’s factual findings. See Universal Camera

Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 491 (1951); Sam’s Club v. NLRB, 173

F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 1999). In a case such as this where there are both

legitimate and illegitimate reasons advanced for challenged conduct,

the court must determine if the Board properly applied the burden

shifting test approved by the Supreme Court in NLRB v. Transp.

Mgmt. Corp., 462 U.S. 393, 403 (1983), overruled on other grounds

by Director, OWCP v. Greenwich Collieries, 512 U.S. 267, (1994)

(adopting the test set forth in Wright Line, 251 NLRB 1083 (1980),

enforced, 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981)).

Under the Wright Line test, the Board must first find substantial

evidence that the employee’s protected activity was "a motivating fac-

tor" in the employer’s decision to take adverse action against the

employee. See Wright Line, 662 F.2d at 906. The employer then bears

the burden of proving that the discharge would have occurred even in

the absence of the protected activity. See id.; see also NLRB v. Nueva

Eng’g Inc., 761 F.2d 961, 968-69 (4th Cir. 1985). If the Board

believes the employer’s stated lawful reasons are non-existent or pre-

textual, the defense fails. See Transp. Mgmt. Corp., 462 U.S. at 398;

see also Nueva Eng’g Inc., 761 F.2d at 968-69.

B.

A company violates 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) if it discharges an

employee for engaging in protected union activity. See Transp. Mgmt.

Corp., 462 U.S. at 398. A company violates 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) if

6 USF RED STAR v. NLRB

it discharges an employee for refusing to engage in activity that

would otherwise be unlawful under the NLRA. See id. Although

supervisors are not explicitly covered by the NLRA, § 158(a)(1) is

violated if a supervisor’s discharge results from his refusal to commit

an unfair labor practice. See ARA Leisure Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 782

F.2d 456, 459 n.3 (4th Cir. 1986); Parker-Robb Chevrolet, Inc., 262

NLRB 402, 404 (1982), enforced sub nom, Automobile Salesmen’s

Union Local 1095 v. NLRB, 711 F.2d 383 (D.C. Cir. 1983). "[I]f

employers are allowed to force supervisors to engage in unfair labor

practices, this necessarily results in direct interference with the

affected rank-and-file employees in the exercise of their [protected]

rights." Gerry’s Cash Markets, Inc. v. NLRB, 602 F.2d 1021, 1023

(1st Cir. 1979).

A union violates 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A) by restraining an

employee from engaging in protected union activity and violates 29

U.S.C. § 158(b)(2) for causing or attempting to cause an employee to

be discharged for engaging in protected union activity. These provi-

sions make it illegal for unions to act in a manner that is contrary to

the interests of its members. For example, a union cannot, consistent

with § 158(b)(1)(A) and (b)(2), put the personal gain of incumbent

union officers in front of the interests of the union membership.

III.

A.

Red Star claims it did not violate § 158(a)(3) because it fired Hayes

due to his accident, not because of the Union’s demands. Red Star

concedes that the first part of the Wright Line test is satisfied because

the animosity generated by Hayes’ failed election bid was a motivat-

ing factor in his firing. Red Star disputes, however, the Board’s deci-

sion to reject its affirmative defense. The Board concluded that Red

Star did not have a uniform policy of discharging occasional drivers

who have preventable accidents and that this reason was pretextual.

We agree. Although Red Star introduced evidence that some occa-

sional drivers had been fired for having preventable accidents, it

failed to prove these terminations were the result of a uniform policy.

First, Red Star failed to produce any records of still-employed drivers

USF RED STAR v. NLRB 7

whose files could have been examined for the presence or absence of

preventable accidents. Instead, Red Star only produced records of ter-

minated occasional drivers. Even these records often listed an acci-

dent as just one of many reasons for termination.

Second, Zakofsky testified that he and other Terminal Managers

had discretion to overlook minor accidents by occasional drivers. The

ALJ found Zakofsy’s testimony quite credible on this point and

"[a]bsent extraordinary circumstances, we will not disturb a fact-

finder’s credibility determinations." Columbus-America Discovery

Group v. Atlantic Mutual Ins. Co., 56 F.3d 556, 567 (4th Cir. 1995).

This evidence, plus the Board’s findings that Hayes’ accident cost

Red Star only $15 and that occasional drivers were in short supply,

supports the conclusion that Red Star would not have fired Hayes

over the accident alone.

Red Star’s reliance on Transcon Lines, 259 NLRB 1424 (1982),

and Rock-Tenn Co., 319 NLRB 1139 (1995), enforced, 101 F.3d 1441

(D.C. Cir. 1996), is misplaced. In those cases, there was "no direct

evidence of exceptions to the accident reporting and rule enforcement

procedures." Transcon Lines, 259 NLRB at 1432. Here, there was

direct evidence of exceptions in the form of Zakofsky’s credited testi-

mony. Synergy Gas Corporation v. NLRB, 19 F.3d 649, 653 (D.C.

Cir. 1994), is also inapposite because in that case the employer used

accident records to prove the existence of a non-discretionary dis-

charge policy. This is exactly the sort of evidence that Red Star failed

to produce. Thus, since Red Star failed to establish its affirmative

defense, the Board was correct in concluding that Hayes was termi-

nated in response to the Union’s demands.

B.

Red Star claims that firing Zakofsky did not violate 29 U.S.C.

§ 158(a)(1) because he was fired for concealing Hayes’ accident, not

for refusing to terminate Hayes. We disagree. There is substantial evi-

dence that Red Star terminated Zakofsky for his refusal to phase out

Hayes. First, given that the Union leadership was unlawfully pressur-

ing Red Star to dispatch its opponent Hayes, Zakofsky believed that

reporting the accident would provide a pretextual basis for Hayes’

discharge. His desire not to participate in an unlawful conspiracy was

8 USF RED STAR v. NLRB

protected and could not serve as a valid basis for his termination. See

ARA Leisure Serv., 782 F.2d at 459 n.3 (citing Parker-Robb, 262

NLRB at 402-03).

Second, Zakofsky had worked for Red Star for eleven years and

had received the "service terminal of the year" award in 1993 and

1994. Vice-President Liller described Zakofsky as being a "very, very

diligent" employee. Red Star presented no evidence of other impro-

prieties by Zakofsky. Zakofsky’s employment record, combined with

the fact that the accident he failed to report cost $15 to repair, sup-

ports the Board’s conclusion that Red Star violated 28 U.S.C.

§ 158(a)(1) by terminating Zakofsky for failing to join the plot to oust

Hayes. Of course, company policies designed to encourage the report-

ing and sanctioning of even minor accidents are altogether legitimate.

See Paramount Mining Corp. v. NLRB, 631 F.2d 346, 348 (4th Cir.

1980) (NLRA does not interfere with an employer’s right to establish

standards for selecting and discharging employees). However, the

NLRA does prevent an employer from seizing upon a trivial $15 acci-

dent to force the opponent of incumbent union officers off the job.

C.

The Union claims it violated neither 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A) nor

§ 158(b)(2) during its negotiations with Red Star. Instead, the Union

claims that it agreed to modify the start-time provision in order to pre-

vent the closure of Red Star’s Rochester terminal. According to the

Union, the recent closure of two other Rochester terminals gave Red

Star so much leverage that the Union was in no position to make any

demands, not even for Hayes’ termination. We disagree. The evidence

shows that the Union leadership used whatever bargaining power it

had to expel an election opponent, rather than to protect the interests

of its membership. This self-serving behavior by the Union’s officers

is at odds both with the purpose of a labor union and with the laws

that govern union behavior.

The Board had substantial evidence of Posato and Cantwell’s ani-

mus towards Hayes. The record reflects that Cantwell referred to

Hayes as a "scumbag" and later told Ron Morin that Hayes was a

"troublemaker." The Board also had substantial evidence that Posato

and Cantwell used the start-time negotiations to oust Hayes. The latter

USF RED STAR v. NLRB 9

evidence came in the form of Postato’s "you know what I want" state-

ment to Morin, Morin’s subsequent "Jack Hayes is gone" statement

to Zakofsky after the April 28 meeting, and Liller and Morin’s calls

to Zakofsky concerning the need to phase out Hayes.2 The Union

claims Posato’s statement to Morin was a reference to the Union’s

desire to extend the routes for Rochester drivers. It is undisputed,

however, that this proposed route change was one that Red Star also

wanted. Even if the Union’s explanation of Posato’s statement were

true, that does not undermine the evidence of animus towards Hayes.

Indeed, even Red Star concedes that improper union pressure played

a role in Hayes’ termination.3

2

There is no merit to the Union’s claim that Liller and Morin’s state-

ments constituted inadmissible hearsay and thus were erroneously relied

upon by the Board. Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E) provides that

"a statement by a coconspirator of a party during the course and in fur-

therance of the conspiracy" is "not hearsay." Here, the statements relied

upon by the Board were made by the Union and Red Star management,

each a coconspirator, and were in furtherance of the conspiracy to termi-

nate Hayes. See Groves-Granite, 229 NLRB 57, 66 n.44 (1977) (consid-

ering the co-conspirator exception but declining to apply it because the

statements did not satisfy the "in furtherance of" requirement); see also

World of Sleep, Inc. v. La-Z-Boy Chair Co., 756 F.2d 1467, 1474 (10th

Cir. 1985) (co-conspirator exception applies in both civil and criminal

cases).

3

The Union’s remaining arguments also lack merit. The Board

declined to apply the Wright Line burden-shifting test because that test

only applies when there are both legitimate and illegitimate reasons for

the challenged conduct. Since the Union never claimed it had a lawful

reason to seek Hayes’ termination, Wright Line was never triggered. The

Union claims that since Red Star did not violate 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3)

(making it unlawful to discharge an employee for engaging in protected

union activity), it could not have violated 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(2) (making

it unlawful for a union to cause or attempt to cause an employee to be

discharged for engaging in protected union activity). This claim is

equally without merit. The predicate assumption is erroneous and a find-

ing of a § 158(a)(3) violation is not a prerequisite for finding a

§ 158(b)(2) violation. See, e.g., Iron Workers Local 377 (M.S.B., Inc.),

299 NLRB 680, 683-84 n.7 (1990).

10 USF RED STAR v. NLRB

IV.

Neither Red Star nor the Union had the right under the NLRA to

penalize Hayes for his participation in a union election. It may suit the

aims of incumbent union officers to oust past and future election

opponents. It may suit a company to agree to terminate such individu-

als in order to secure an advantageous collective bargaining conces-

sion. The NLRA, however, does not allow union officers to ensconce

themselves at the expense of those they represent. And it does not

permit management to collude in such misconduct. Sanctioning this

course would undermine union democracy and allow purely personal

aims to tarnish the collective bargaining process. Since the Board had

substantial evidence to support its decision, its order is

ENFORCED.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.