Lovern v. Edwards

PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

MICHAEL LOVERN, SR.,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

MARK A. EDWARDS, Individually and

No. 98-2227

in his official capacity as

Superintendent of the Henrico

County Public Schools,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Richmond.

Richard L. Williams, Senior District Judge.

(CA-98-397-3)

Argued: June 11, 1999

Decided: August 31, 1999

Before WIDENER, NIEMEYER, and KING, Circuit Judges.

_________________________________________________________________

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge King wrote the opinion, in

which Judge Widener and Judge Niemeyer joined.

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COUNSEL

ARGUED: Daniel A. Carrell, CARRELL & RICE, Richmond, Vir-

ginia, for Appellant. William Gray Broaddus, MCGUIRE, WOODS,

BATTLE & BOOTHE, L.L.P., Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.

ON BRIEF: A. Eric Kauders, Jr., MCGUIRE, WOODS, BATTLE &

BOOTHE, L.L.P., Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.

OPINION

KING, Circuit Judge:

Appellant Michael Lovern sued appellee Mark A. Edwards, the

Superintendent of the Henrico County Public Schools

("Superintendent" or "Superintendent Edwards"), in the district court

for the Eastern District of Virginia, asserting subject matter jurisdic-

tion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343(a)(3). Lovern's com-

plaint alleged that Superintendent Edwards violated Lovern's

constitutional rights by prohibiting Lovern from entering the property

of the Henrico County Public Schools ("HCPS"), and Lovern sought

redress under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the form of injunctive relief and

damages. After conducting an evidentiary hearing, the district court

denied Lovern's motion for injunctive relief, declined to exercise

jurisdiction over Lovern's claims, and dismissed the case without

prejudice.

Lovern timely appealed to this court, and we possess jurisdiction

pursuant to 28 U.S.C § 1291.1 Because Lovern's claims fail to pass

muster under the substantiality doctrine, we affirm the district court's

dismissal.

I.

A.

Lovern is the non-custodial parent of three children who attend

Henrico County public schools near Richmond, Virginia. His former

wife, the custodial parent and the children's legal guardian, also lives

in the same area of Virginia. In February 1997, Lovern moved from

Texas to Virginia. Lovern acts as president of a private corporation,

Trial Management Associates, Inc., that specializes in "federal public

interest cases," and which, according to its letterhead, maintains

offices in Fort Worth, Texas; Richmond, Virginia; and Chicago, Illi-

_________________________________________________________________

1 Prior to oral argument, the Superintendent rescinded the ban on Lov-

ern's entry onto HCPS property, and Lovern withdrew his claim for

injunctive relief. Lovern's appeal is therefore limited to the dismissal of

his claim for damages.

2

nois. In this capacity, Lovern supervises a full-time staff attorney and

a number of volunteer attorneys.

Shortly after Lovern moved to Virginia, the basketball coach of his

son's junior varsity team at J. R. Tucker High School in Henrico

County was evicted from a game. Lovern promptly contacted Tuck-

er's principal about the coach's eviction, insisted that the principal

refuse to comply with the mandatory one-game suspension of the

coach, and sought to have the principal appeal the coach's eviction.

When his requests to the principal failed, Lovern immediately sought

intervention from higher authorities. He contacted Superintendent

Edwards' office, where the handling of his complaints consumed a

substantial amount of the employees' time.

On November 13, 1997, to Lovern's apparent disappointment, his

son was not selected by the basketball coach to play on Tucker's var-

sity basketball team. Lovern immediately phoned the coach, both at

work and at home, to complain about his son's exclusion. Lovern also

telephoned the Tucker principal's office a number of times to register

complaints concerning the coach's decision. Lovern then attended a

November 26, 1997 evening basketball practice at Tucker and, for

approximately 25 minutes, attempted to address the situation with the

coaches.

On December 5, 1997, Tucker's principal wrote to Lovern to

explain and reemphasize to him that his children's mother had

requested that the school provide her with notice and opportunity to

be present at any of the school's discussions about her children.2 The

letter explained that, as a result, any such meetings had to be sched-

uled in advance.3 The principal's letter of December 5, 1997, also

_________________________________________________________________

2 At the July 14, 1998 evidentiary hearing, Lovern testified that

although he was under a court order to pay $600 per month for child sup-

port, he had made only two payments since February 1997.

3 The principal's December 5, 1997 letter to Lovern stated in pertinent

part:

The purpose of this letter is to reemphasize the process by

which you should bring your concerns regarding Tucker High

School to my attention. Through discussion with[the children's

3

informed Lovern that he should otherwise limit his entry onto school

property to events scheduled for and open to the public.4 Lovern felt

the principal's December 5 letter violated his constitutional rights. He

subsequently telephoned the principal, learned the name of the

employee who drafted the letter, and then phoned her, both at her

_________________________________________________________________

mother], she has requested us to inform and include her in all

discussions regarding your children. As the physical legal custo-

dian [sic] of the children, [their mother] has the authority to

make relevant educational decisions for your children, both of an

academic and extracurricular nature. We have shared this with

you on several occasions.

. . . [O]n Wednesday, November 26, 1997, you entered the

Tucker gymnasium . . . . The coaches were involved in getting

their basketball practice started and your interruption was inap-

propriate. As I have explained to you on several occasions, you

may bring your concerns regarding the children's education to

[their mother's] attention, and if necessary, all parties will meet

to discuss any issues.

You have made it clear to several Henrico County School staff

that you are taking legal action regarding concerns about Hen-

rico County Schools. . . .

Please be advised that any future contact with the school

should be arranged through [the children's mother] and me in

reference to your children or through the legal process for other

concerns. Under no circumstances are you to come on to Tucker

High School property during school hours without my express

consent and authorization except to attend scheduled activities

open to the public. Any violation of this direction on your part

will result in trespassing charges being filed against you. If you

have any questions regarding this letter, you may contact me

....

J.A. 77.

4 Lovern testified at the preliminary injunction hearing in the district

court, and admitted that he "was constantly being accused of threatening

people." J.A. 53. Lovern also acknowledged that, in an unrelated inci-

dent, he "physically went to [the Department of Motor Vehicles] and

requested an explanation . . . . The only thing[he] got was asked to leave

the building." J.A. 72-73.

4

office and at her home, complaining about the letter's contents. As a

result, the principal sent Lovern a follow-up letter on December 15,

1997, to explain that this established procedure was for the purpose

of maintaining an orderly school atmosphere, and was not intended

in any respect to limit Lovern's access to information about his chil-

dren's education.5

On December 10, 1997, Lovern attended a meeting of the Henrico

County Board of Supervisors and alleged to the Board that an investi-

gation performed by his business had discovered that HCPS officials

were misusing public funds. He asserted that HCPS's long history of

paying litigation costs of its board members and school officials was

illegal and corrupt.6 Lovern requested an official investigation, and

was referred to the HCPS Board.

The next week, on December 18, 1997, Lovern attended an HCPS

Board meeting, publicly raised the same "corruption" allegations, and

requested a private meeting with the Board members. By letter on

January 9, 1998, the HCPS Board referred Lovern to the HCPS

administration. Lovern then contacted Superintendent Edwards, and

also called a number of other HCPS officials, to talk about his corrup-

tion allegations against HCPS. On January 14, 1998, Superintendent

Edwards informed Lovern in writing that he was barred from HCPS's

property, due to his continuing "pattern of verbal abuse and threaten-

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5 The principal's December 15, 1997 follow-up letter to Lovern stated:

Please understand that while we encourage parents to take an

interest in their children's education, we have an obligation to

our staff and students to maintain an atmosphere of respect,

order, and professionalism in the school. This procedure is not

established for the purpose of limiting your access to information

about your children's education, but to initiate an orderly and

productive method of addressing concerns.

J.A. 78.

6 Contrary to Lovern's assertions, a school board in Virginia is autho-

rized to pay litigation costs of school officials and school board mem-

bers, if the costs arise from the exercise of their official duties. See Va.

Code § 22.1-82.

5

ing behavior towards school officials, including staff and School

Board members."7

B.

Lovern reacted to the Edwards Letter by threatening to publicly

expose "corruption" by HCPS's officials and threatening to initiate

legal action against a variety of public entities and officials. On

March 9, 1998, Lovern sent a letter jointly addressed to Henrico

County Officials, the County Attorney, and the Henrico County

School Board, among others. In this letter, he complained that:

Mr. Edwards [sic] letter is nothing more than an attempt

to shut me up in a public setting (school board meeting,

sporting event, etc..) [sic], where other parents will hear

about [the corrupt school / county officials'] indiscretions

and incorrigible behavior.

....

If you do not [totally rescind your threats of trespass by

4:00 p.m. today] I will immediately forward a legal demand

letter for monetary damages. If those demands are not met

I will file suit in federal court ASAP seeking injunctive

relief and monetary damages including punitives in the

amount of Twenty Five Million Dollars ($25,000,000.00).

_________________________________________________________________

7 Superintendent Edwards' hand-delivered letter of January 14, 1998

(the "Edwards Letter") stated:

The purpose of this letter is to inform you that as of this date

you may no longer enter the premises of any Henrico County

School Board property. This includes all school buildings, as

well as Glen Echo and the Central Office. The reason for this is

your continued pattern of verbal abuse and threatening behavior

towards school officials, including staff and School Board mem-

bers. If you do enter upon any school board property, trespassing

charges will be filed pursuant to Va. Code §18.2-119 and §18.2-

128.

J.A. 108.

6

J.A. 109-113 (emphasis in original). The letter's list of courtesy cop-

ies included the Department of Justice's "Civil Rights Division, Crim-

inal Section."

Two days later, on March 11, 1998, Lovern sent a purported "de-

mand letter" to the County Attorney. This letter named various public

entities and nine individuals as potential defendants in his lawsuit.

The proposed defendants included the local police chief, who had

apparently informed Lovern that the police would enforce the coun-

ty's trespass laws against him. In this letter, Lovern also accused

Superintendent Edwards and unnamed county officials of several

criminal acts, and complained that:

There has been a cover-up of illegal activity.

. . . I now provide you with this demand letter. You have

until noon Friday, March 13, 1998 to settle the claims. . . .

You can contact me with any offer you wish to make as

I am lead counsel on this case. No initial offers will be

made by me as I will not negotiate against myself.

J.A. 114-16 (emphasis added).8

Two weeks later, on March 25, 1998, having already named the

Henrico County Board of Supervisors as potential defendants in the

"demand letter" for his purported lawsuit, Lovern wrote to the Board

of Supervisors on business letterhead of Trial Management Asso-

ciates, Inc., to propose that he assist their investigation of his "corrup-

tion" allegations:

I wish that the Board had taken me seriously in December

as this is going to be a great embarrassment to the county.

If you would like my help on this matter I will consider

_________________________________________________________________

8 Lovern is not a licensed attorney. However, as pointed out above, he

testified that his work involves supervising attorneys who conduct "pub-

lic interest" litigation.

7

such depending on your request, and its effect on the [sic]

my other claims. I hope you do the right thing before the

County's integrity is completely destroyed.

J.A. 117-18.

Simultaneously, in a March 25, 1998 letter to Superintendent

Edwards, Lovern accused Edwards of "using [Lovern's] children in

[Edwards'] incorrigible web of deceit and corruption." The letter also

informed Edwards that:

Your decision [excluding me from the school's property]

is another overt act in furtherance of your conspiracy,

actionable in Federal Court. I will amend my law suit again.

For you to call yourself an educator is unbelievable. I

hope your children never find out the kind of person you

really are. I can assure you Mr. Edwards that because you

have intentionally inflicted pain on my children, who are

innocent pawns in your devious game of public corruption,

I will spend the rest of my life using the legal system to

make you accountable, using civil litigation to take from

you every penny you have ever earned.

In addition your actions today give me the necessary evi-

dence to go forward with a criminal complaint . . . punish-

able up to ten years in prison. You should be ashamed of

yourself.

J.A. 79-80.

Thereafter, on March 30, 1998, Lovern sent another letter on the

letterhead of Trial Management Associates, Inc., with attachments, to

the principals of two high schools with upcoming baseball games

scheduled against Tucker High. In this letter, Lovern again accused

both the School Board and school administrators of criminal and civil

violations of the law. He informed the principals that unless they

demanded in writing that Superintendent Edwards rescind the

Edwards Letter, they would also become defendants in Lovern's law-

suit. Lovern threatened:

8

I hope you choose to be on the side of the law. Please don't

let corrupt County Officials drag you down and tarnish the

good name of your schools. . . .

. . . This is a serious matter with severe consequences. Be

smart and I will not take advantage of you.

J.A. 83. Lovern enclosed a draft complaint with this correspondence.

This draft complaint had blank spaces reserved for twenty-five defen-

dants. It identified as defendants, among others, an FBI agent and an

Assistant United States Attorney in Richmond, as well as Henrico

County police officials, who Lovern asserted had refused to protect

his rights. J.A. 82-106. According to Lovern, "[a]nother overt act in

furtherance of the conspiracy" was committed when the FBI agent

and the Assistant United States Attorney refused his requests for fed-

eral intervention. J.A. 98-99. On June 10, 1998, Lovern wrote to Vir-

ginia's Secretary of Education, also on business letterhead, and

complained that the HCPS Board voted to adopt the Edwards Letter.

Lovern said that he had "no intention of dealing with the School

Board anywhere except in Federal Court," and threatened to have

Edwards' "Superintendent's license" taken from him. J.A. 119.

C.

On June 26, 1998, Lovern filed his complaint against Superinten-

dent Edwards in this action, alleging that the Superintendent's con-

duct violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the First and the Fourteenth

Amendments of the Constitution, through deprivation of Lovern's

constitutional rights of free speech, "right of petition," and "parental

rights." The complaint also asserted that Superintendent Edwards had

conspired to violate Lovern's constitutional rights. See 42 U.S.C.

§ 1985.

After the July 14, 1998 evidentiary hearing on Lovern's motion for

a preliminary injunction, the district court denied Lovern's request for

injunctive relief, ruling that Lovern could not show either irreparable

harm or the likelihood of prevailing on the merits of his claims.9 The

_________________________________________________________________

9 The court also found that Lovern completely lacked credibility in that

there was "compelling" evidence that Lovern was "really trying to

9

court then dismissed the complaint against Superintendent Edwards

without prejudice.

II.

A.

We review de novo the district court's determination of its subject

matter jurisdiction. See, e.g., Folio v. City of Clarksburg, W. Va., 134

F.3d 1211, 1214 (4th Cir. 1998). As we have recognized, a federal

court is obliged to dismiss a case whenever it appears the court lacks

subject matter jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3); Goldsmith v.

Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 845 F.2d 61, 64 (4th Cir. 1988).

Indeed, the absence of jurisdiction may be raised at any time during

the case, and may be based on the court's review of the evidence. See,

e.g., Gibbs v. Buck, 307 U.S. 66, 72 (1939). Determining the question

of subject matter jurisdiction at the outset of the litigation is often the

most efficient procedure. Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 119 S. Ct.

1563, 1572 (1999).

A district court may address its lack of subject matter jurisdiction

in two ways. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1); Adams v. Bain, 697 F.2d 1213,

1219 (4th Cir. 1982). The court may find insufficient allegations in

the pleadings, viewing the alleged facts in the light most favorable to

the plaintiff, similar to an evaluation pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Id.

Alternatively, after an evidentiary hearing, the court may weigh the

evidence in determining whether the facts support the jurisdictional

allegations. Id. Where the court conducts an evidentiary hearing and

engages in fact-finding to determine the jurisdictional question, a

problem may arise if the jurisdictional facts are intertwined with the

merits of the dispute; if this occurs, ordinarily the entire dispute is

appropriately resolved by a proceeding on the merits. Id. However,

there are circumstances where, as here, the court has conducted an

evidentiary hearing, the jurisdictional facts are related to the merits of

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advance the interests of his company . . . as opposed to his concern about

the welfare of his children." J.A. 74. The district court opined that "this

case is a monument to what ought not to be in a federal court," and found

that Lovern "engag[ed] in tactics to try to intimidate everybody to force

them to do his bidding." J.A. 74-75.

10

the case, and the district court may yet find the substantiality doctrine

to preclude the exercise of subject matter jurisdiction.

It is elementary that the burden is on the party asserting jurisdiction

to demonstrate that jurisdiction does, in fact, exist. Thomson v.

Gaskill, 315 U.S. 442, 446 (1942); Goldsmith , 845 F.2d at 63-64. The

mere assertion of a federal claim is not sufficient to obtain jurisdiction

under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343(a)(3). Davis v. Pak, 856 F.2d 648,

650 (4th Cir. 1988) (dismissing § 1983 claims for lack of subject mat-

ter jurisdiction because the federal claims were insubstantial and were

pretextual state claims). As we recognized in Davis, "Federal jurisdic-

tion requires that a party assert a substantial federal claim." Id. (citing

Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536 (1974)) (emphasis added). In

Davis, we confirmed that where a claim is obviously without merit,

Hagans precludes a federal district court from exercising its

jurisdiction.10 Id. at 651.

The Hagans doctrine of substantiality is especially important where

a wholly frivolous federal claim serves as a pretext to allow a state-

law issue, the real focus of the claim, to be litigated in the federal sys-

tem. Id. As we warned in Davis, federal courts must guard against the

litigant who frames a pretextual federal issue solely for the purpose

of having a state-law claim adjudicated in the federal system; Article

III of the Constitution forbids this practice. Id.; see also Fleet Bank,

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10 In our Davis decision, Judge Hall endorsed the continuing viability

of the substantiality doctrine, as follows:

[In Hagans, the Supreme] Court noted:

Over the years, this court has repeatedly held that the federal

courts are without power to entertain claims otherwise

within their jurisdiction if they are "so attenuated and insub-

stantial as to be absolutely devoid of merit, wholly insub-

stantial, obviously frivolous, plainly insubstantial, or no

longer open to discussion." (citations omitted).

While emphasizing that this insubstantiality threshold is a diffi-

cult one to meet, the Court concluded that the substantiality doc-

trine "remains the federal rule and needs no reexamination here"

(citation omitted).

Davis, 856 F.2d at 650-61.

11

Nat'l Ass'n v. Burke, 160 F.3d 883, 892 (2d Cir. 1998) (concluding

that an attenuated federal claim presents no substantial federal ques-

tion over what is primarily a state-law claim, in which state adminis-

trative bodies have the primary right to take evidence and make

findings of fact). Put simply, the Constitution does not contemplate

the federal judiciary deciding issues of state law among non-diverse

litigants.11 Davis, 856 F.2d at 652.

B.

Our disposition of Lovern's appeal is controlled by our decision in

Davis. Applying the Davis principles to this case, Lovern's claims are

bottomed on alleged violations of his First Amendment speech and

Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process rights. These pur-

ported violations flow from the decision of Superintendent Edwards,

set forth in the Edwards Letter, to bar Lovern's entry onto school

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11 As the district court emphasized, Lovern had recourse to appropriate

state process to remedy any grievance arising from a school board's

action against him. Virginia law provides for state court review of

actions of a school board, and requires the state court to sustain such

actions unless the board exceeded its authority, acted arbitrarily or capri-

ciously, or abused its discretion. See Va. Code § 22.1-87.

Lovern, however, argues that the available statutory processes are

inapplicable here for two reasons: (1) the statute requires the

complained-of school board action to arise from a formal meeting of the

board, which did not occur here; and (2) in any event, the Edwards Letter

was never acted on by the HCPS Board. Both of these arguments are spe-

cious.

As to the first, the plain language of the Virginia statute provides that

a parent may complain of any "action of the school board"; there is no

basis to infer a statutory limitation only to school board actions that are

taken at formal meetings, and Lovern provides no authority to support

that such an inference is proper. See Va. Code § 22.1-87.

Further, Lovern's contention that there was no HCPS Board action in

this case flatly contradicts the record, since he acknowledged in his June

10, 1998 letter that the HCPS Board had adopted the Edwards Letter.

Moreover, Lovern admitted that he chose not to seek a hearing on the

matter from the HCPS Board and thus that he elected not to pursue his

available state remedies.

12

property because of Lovern's "continued pattern of verbal abuse and

threatening behavior towards school officials." 12

School officials have the authority to control students and school

personnel on school property, and also have the authority and respon-

sibility for assuring that parents and third parties conduct themselves

appropriately while on school property. See, e.g., Carey v. Brown,

447 U.S. 455, 470-71 (1980) (the Constitution does not leave state

officials powerless to protect the public from threatening conduct that

disturbs the tranquility of schools); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 582-

83 (1975) (a school official's determination of the existence of an

ongoing threat of disruption of the academic process can justify

immediately removing a person from school property). While the spe-

cific contours of the authority and responsibility of school officials

are defined by state law, such officials should never be intimidated

into compromising the safety of those who utilize school property. Cf.

Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968) (public education is

by and large committed to the control of state and local authorities);

Bystrom v. Fridley High Sch., Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 14, 822 F.2d 747,

751 (8th Cir. 1987) (in determining the invalidity of a First Amend-

ment violation claim, the "restraint [applies] only on [high school]

property. The difference is decisive.").

Here, HCPS did not seek to affect Lovern's conduct except on

HCPS property. As to Lovern's conduct on the school's property,

HCPS initially advised Lovern of the proper process if he desired to

discuss his children's schooling and other matters relating to HCPS.

Lovern was provided ample opportunity to air his"corruption" allega-

tions, both to the school board and in numerous discussions with

school officials. Under the circumstances, the school administration

concluded that Lovern's conduct constituted a "continuing pattern of

verbal abuse and threatening behavior towards school officials," and

requested that Lovern not enter HCPS property.13 The right to com-

municate is not limitless. Carey, 447 U.S. at 470.

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12 Counsel notified this court in March 1999, during the pendency of

this appeal, that the Superintendent has rescinded the prohibition, subject

to the condition that Lovern, "while on School property, conform his

conduct and behavior to the standard expected of all patrons and visi-

tors."

13 Although Lovern asserts that the Edwards Letter was intended to pre-

vent him from publicly exposing corrupt school officials and thereby vio-

13

We are simply unable to conclude, on this record, that Lovern's

constitutional rights were "directly and sharply" implicated by

HCPS's prohibition against him. See Epperson, 393 U.S. at 104; see

also, e.g., Bystrom, 822 F.2d at 750-51 (secondary school's speech

restraint that applies only on school property and was implemented to

assure that school resources were devoted primarily to education, and

to preserve "some trace of calm" on the property, was not unconstitu-

tional).

Lovern's claims against Superintendent Edwards in this case are

plainly insubstantial and entirely frivolous. His assertions that school

administrators must provide him with boundless access to school

property are "obviously without merit." See Davis, 856 F.2d at 650.

As the district court noted, "this case is a monument to what ought

not to be in a federal court." In these circumstances, application of the

substantiality doctrine to dismiss this case is particularly appropriate.

III.

Pursuant to the foregoing, we conclude that the district court lacked

subject matter jurisdiction. We therefore affirm the judgment of the

district court in dismissing this case.

AFFIRMED

_________________________________________________________________

lated his rights, he does not dispute that his conduct towards school

personnel was perceived as verbally abusive and threatening. Lovern also

does not dispute that the school officials did permit him to air his con-

cerns about school "corruption" numerous times while he was on school

property, and that after he received the Edwards Letter, he continued to

be free to speak and publicize his complaints about school officials' "cor-

ruption," so long as he was not on school property.

14