holding that sex-based discrimination is -2- actionable under 42 U.S.C. 1983 as a violation of the equal protection clause
How later courts described this case
- holding that sex-based discrimination is -2- actionable under 42 U.S.C. 1983 as a violation of the equal protection clause
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
USCA1 Opinion
December 4, 1995 [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
____________________
No. 95-1726
SUSAN HAYES,
Plaintiff, Appellee,
v.
STATE OF RHODE ISLAND DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS
REGULATION,
Defendant, Appellee.
__________
MAURICE A. PARADIS,
Defendant, Appellant.
____________________
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
[Hon. Raymond J. Pettine, Senior U.S. District Judge] __________________________
____________________
Before
Torruella, Chief Judge, ___________
Selya and Cyr, Circuit Judges. ______________
____________________
Steven E. Snow, Thomas R. Noel and Partridge, Snow & Hahn on _______________ _______________ ________________________
brief for appellant.
Amato A. DeLuca, Miriam Weizenbaum and Mandell, DeLuca & _________________ ___________________ ____________________
Schwartz, Ltd. on brief for appellee, Susan Hayes. ______________
____________________
____________________
Per Curiam. Defendant-appellant Maurice C. Paradis __________
has filed this interlocutory appeal from the district court's
denial of his motion for summary judgment on the issue of
qualified immunity that would shield him from damages in this
sex discrimination suit. Plaintiff-appellee Susan Hayes
argues that under Johnson v. Jones, ___ U.S. ___, 115 S. Ct. _______ _____
2151 (1995), this court lacks appellate jurisdiction.
Paradis has raised two issues on appeal. The first
issue is a purely legal one: whether in 1991, when the
challenged conduct occurred, there was a clearly established
right under the fourteenth amendment's equal protection
clause to be free from sex discrimination in the workplace.
Under Johnson, "a district court's pretrial rejection of a _______
proffered qualified immunity defense remains immediately
appealable as a collateral order to the extent that it turns
on a pure issue of law . . . ." Stella v. Kelley, No. 95- ______ ______
1223, slip op. at 10 (1st Cir. Aug. 23, 1995). Exercising
this jurisdiction, we summarily affirm the district court's _________ ______
purely legal determination that, at the time of the
challenged conduct, there existed a clearly established right
under the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause to
be free from sex discrimination in the workplace. See ___
Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881 , 884-85 _______ __________________________
(1st Cir. 1988) (holding that sex-based discrimination is
-2-
actionable under 42 U.S.C. 1983 as a violation of the equal
protection clause).
Paradis' second argument on appeal is as follows:
even if there was a clearly established constitutional right
to be free from sex discrimination in the workplace, "[i]t
cannot be said that Paradis' action was objectively
unreasonable given the extraordinary circumstances
confronting him." Although cloaked as a purely legal issue,
this argument is actually fact-based. The objective
reasonableness of Paradis' conduct (under clearly established
law) will necessarily turn on an issue of fact: whether the
conduct was motivated by sex-based animus. See Poe v. ___ ___
Haydon, 853 F.2d 418, 431 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 ______ ____________
U.S. 1007 (1989). Under Johnson, "a district court's _______
pretrial rejection of a qualified immunity defense is not
immediately appealable to the extent that it turns on . . .
an issue of fact . . . ." Stella, supra, at 6-7. Therefore, ______ _____
we lack jurisdiction to consider the second issue raised by
this appeal.
Affirmed in part, dismissed in part, and remanded ___________________________________________________
for further proceedings. Costs to appellee. _______________________ _________________
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