Columbus Independent School District v. Five Oaks Achievement Center

Affirmed and Opinion filed April 21, 2005

Affirmed and Opinion filed April 21, 2005.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

_______________

NO. 14-04-00129-CV

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COLUMBUS INDEPENDENT

SCHOOL DISTRICT, Appellant

V.

FIVE OAKS

ACHIEVEMENT CENTER, Appellee

____________________________________________________________________

On Appeal from the County Court at Law

Austin County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 03CV3724

____________________________________________________________________

O P I N I O N

In

this accelerated interlocutory appeal, [1]

Columbus Independent School District ( A CISD @ ) appeals the denial of its plea to

the jurisdiction on the grounds that: (1) Texas Education Code section 11.151

does not provide a waiver of its immunity from suit; (2) a school district

cannot waive such immunity by conduct; and (3) Five Oaks Achievement Center ( A Five Oaks @ ) did not adequately exhaust its

administrative remedies before filing suit. We affirm.

Background

Five Oaks sued CISD to collect payments allegedly due on a contract

to provide special education services.

CISD filed a plea to the jurisdiction, claiming immunity from suit and

failure to exhaust administrative remedies, which the trial court denied.

Immunity from Suit

Governmental

immunity provides immunity from suit to subdivisions of a state, including

school districts. Harris County v.

Sykes , 136 S.W.3d 635, 638 (Tex. 2004).

When a governmental unit contracts with a private party, it thereby

waives immunity from liability, but not immunity from suit. Catalina Dev., Inc. v. County of El Paso ,

121 S.W.3d 704, 705 (Tex. 2003). As

applicable to this case, [2]

immunity from suit can be waived only by a constitutional provision or

legislative enactment that is expressed in clear and unambiguous language. Wichita Falls Hosp. v. Taylor , 106

S.W.3d 692 , 695 B 96 (Tex. 2003). A

party suing a governmental entity must establish the State = s waiver of immunity from suit. Tex. Dep = t of Transp. v. Jones , 8 S.W.3d 636, 638 (Tex. 1999). A trial court = s ruling on a plea to the

jurisdiction based on immunity from suit is reviewed de novo . Tex. Natural Res. Conservation Comm = n v. IT-Davy , 74 S.W.3d 849, 855 (Tex. 2002).

The

statute upon which Five Oaks relies to provide a waiver of CISD = s immunity from suit is section

11.151 of the Texas Education Code (“section 11.151”):

The trustees of an independent school district

constitute a body corporate and in the name of the district may acquire and

hold real and personal property, sue and be sued , and receive bequests

and donations or other moneys or funds coming legally into their hands.

Tex. Educ. Code Ann. ' 11.151 (Vernon Supp. 2004-05)

(emphasis added). In Missouri Pacific ,

the Texas Supreme Court (the A Court @ ) held that a statute similarly authorizing navigation

districts to A sue and be sued @ was a A general consent for [the] District to

be sued in the courts of Texas in the same manner as other defendants @ and that the District was therefore

a A political subdivision that is always

subject to suit by virtue of a general statute . . . . @

Mo. Pac. R.R. Co. v. Brownsville Navigation Dist. , 453 S.W.2d

812 , 813 B 14 (Tex. 1970). Based on this conclusion, the Court reversed

the decisions of the lower courts that had granted the district = s plea to the jurisdiction based on

immunity from suit. Id . at 814.

Thereafter,

the Legislature added section 311.034 to the Government Code, providing, A In order to preserve the legislature = s interest in managing state fiscal

matters through the appropriations process, a statute shall not be construed as

a waiver of sovereign immunity unless the waiver is effected by clear and

unambiguous language. @ Tex. Gov = t Code Ann. ' 311.034 (Vernon Supp. 2004). However, rather than effecting a change in

the law, this provision merely ratified the standard that the Court had

previously recognized to be well-established since at least 1942. [3] In addition, the Court has since acknowledged

that A sue and be sued @ language at least arguably shows

intent to waive immunity from suits (against counties), [4]

and that A we have little difficulty recognizing

the Legislature = s intent to waive immunity from suit when a statute provides

that a state entity may be sued or [5]

that > sovereign immunity to suit is waived. = @ Wichita Falls State Hosp. , 106 S.W.3d at

696-97 (emphasis added). Based on these

considerations, and particularly that the Court has not since overturned or

limited its holding in Missouri Pacific , we are not at liberty to depart

from its holding that A sue and be sued @ language, such as in section 11.151,

is a clear and unambiguous waiver of immunity from suit. Therefore, we overrule CISD = s first issue and need not address

its second issue, challenging any finding of waiver of immunity by conduct.

Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

CISD = s third issue contends that the trial

court lacked jurisdiction because Five Oaks failed to exhaust its

administrative remedies before filing suit on its claims. As authority for this position, CISD relies

on section 7.057 of the Texas Education Code (the A Code @ ), which provides, with exceptions

not applicable here, that A a person may appeal in writing to the commissioner if the

person is aggrieved by: (1) the school laws of this state; or (2) actions or

decisions of any school district board of trustees that violate: (A) the school

laws of this state . . . . @ Tex. Educ. Code Ann. ' 7.057(a)(1), (2)(A) (Vernon Supp.

2004-05). For this purpose, A school laws of this state @ means Titles 1 and 2 of the Code and

rules adopted thereunder. Id . ' 7.057(f)(2).

District

courts have general subject matter jurisdiction over disputes absent a showing

to the contrary, such as that Texas law vests exclusive jurisdiction over a

matter in an administrative agency. In

re Entergy Corp. , 142 S.W.3d 316, 322 (Tex. 2004). A state agency, such as the Texas Education

Agency (the A TEA @ ), has exclusive jurisdiction where

the Legislature has provided a pervasive regulatory scheme that is intended to

be the exclusive means of remedying the problem to which the regulation is

addressed. Id .

The

predecessor statute to the Code provided, among other things, that A [t]he State Superintendent shall be

charged with the administration of the school laws . . . . He shall hear and determine all appeals from

the rulings and decisions of subordinate school officers . . . . @ [6]

Based on this provision, civil courts were held to have no jurisdiction

over matters relating to the administration of school laws until resort was

first made to school authorities. See,

e.g., Warren v. Sanger Indep. Sch. Dist. , 116 Tex. 183 , 288 S.W. 159, 160

(1926). However, even then, such

exclusive jurisdiction applied only to matters placed under the supervision of

school authorities. Id . Thus, a

suit against a school district for breach of contract to buy school equipment

was not a matter of administration of school laws that required exhausting

administrative remedies before filing suit in district court. Spring Branch Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Metalab

Equip. Co. , 381 S.W.2d 48, 48 (Tex. 1964).

The

current version of the Code no longer contains a provision charging the

Commissioner (the A Commissioner @ ) of the TEA (or other state official) with the

administration of school laws, but does provide, as did its predecessors, that

persons aggrieved by school laws of the State or decisions of school boards

pertaining to those laws may appeal to

the Commissioner. See Tex. Educ. Code Ann. ' 7.057(a). [7] Therefore, to whatever extent any exclusive

jurisdiction remains with the Commissioner or TEA under the current Code, it

does not extend beyond issues governed by the school laws of the State, as set

forth in the Titles 1 and 2 of the Code.

In this case, because the pleadings of the parties purport to state no

such issues, we see no basis to conclude that this lawsuit falls within any

exclusive jurisdiction of the TEA.

Accordingly, CISD = s third issue is overruled, and the judgment of the trial

court is affirmed.

/s/ Richard H. Edelman

Justice

Judgment rendered

and Opinion filed April 21, 2005.

Panel consists of

Justices Yates, Edelman, and Guzman.

[1] See

Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann.

' 51.014(8) (Vernon Supp. 2004) (allowing interlocutory

appeal of an order denying a plea to the jurisdiction); Tex. R. App. P. 28.1 (providing that appeals allowed from

interlocutory orders are to be accelerated).

[2] Although

not applicable to this case, immunity from suit can also be waived by a

governmental entity affirmatively asserting claims in a lawsuit. See Reata Constr. Corp. v. City of Dallas ,

__ S.W.3d __, __ (Tex. 2004).

[3] See

Wichita Falls State Hosp. , 106 S.W.3d at 696 ; Duhart v. State , 610

S.W.2d 740, 742 (Tex. 1980) (“It is a well-established rule that for the

Legislature to waive the State’s sovereign immunity, it must do so by clear and

unambiguous language. Texas Prison

Board v. Cabeen , 159 S.W.2d 523 (Tex. Civ. App. C Beaumont 1942, writ ref = d).”)

[4] Travis

County v. Pelzel & Assocs., Inc. , 77 S.W.3d 246, 249-50 (Tex. 2002).

[5] Because

of this disjunctive, we find no basis to conclude that express waivers are only

those specifically referring to a waiver of immunity.

[6] Act of

June 8, 1949, 51st Leg., R.S., ch. 334, 1949 Tex. Gen. Laws 644 , repealed by

Act of Sept. 1, 1969, 61st Leg., R.S., ch. 889, ' 2, 1969

Tex. Gen. Laws 3024 .

[7] The

Code further provides that the TEA A shall

conduct hearings involving state school law at the direction and under the

supervision of the commissioner. @ Tex

Educ. Code Ann. ' 7.021(a)(3)(Vernon Supp. 2004-05).