Opinion

Francisco T. Garcia v. Office of Personnel Management

Court
Merit Systems Protection Board
Filed
Sep 14, 2015
Status
Unpublished
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 37.9%

The opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

FRANCISCO T. GARCIA, DOCKET NUMBER

Appellant, SF-0831-14-0567-I-1

v.

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL DATE: September 14, 2015

MANAGEMENT,

Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Rufus F. Nobles, I, Zambales, Philippines, for the appellant.

Karla W. Yeakle, Washington, D.C., for the agency.

BEFORE

Susan Tsui Grundmann, Chairman

Mark A. Robbins, Member

FINAL ORDER

¶1 The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which

affirmed the reconsideration decision of the Office of Personnel Management

(OPM) denying the appellant’s entitlement to a deferred annuity under the Civil

Service Retirement System (CSRS). Generally, we grant petitions such as this

1

A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add

significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,

but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not

required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a

precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board

as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).

2

one only when: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact;

the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation

or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the judge’s rulings

during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent

with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting

error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal

argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not

available when the record closed. See Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations,

section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this

appeal, and based on the following points and authorities, we conclude that the

petitioner has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the

petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review and AFFIRM

the initial decision, which is now the Board’s final decision. 5 C.F.R.

§ 1201.113(b).

BACKGROUND

¶2 The appellant is a former employee of the Department of the Navy (Navy)

in Subic Bay, Philippines. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 5 at 136-37. The Navy

appointed the appellant to a position in the excepted service in 1972 with a

not-to-exceed (NTE) date in January 1973. Id. The Navy extended his

appointment several times, with a break in service in April 1973, but terminated

him in May 1974. Id. at 124-35. The appellant was entitled to 2 months’ salary

as severance pay pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement. Id. at 124.

¶3 From June 1974 to July 1975, the appellant served in a series of

excepted-service NTE positions with brief breaks in service. Id. at 115-23. In

October 1975, the Navy appointed him to an excepted-service NTE position,

which it extended through a series of excepted-service NTE appointments until

February 1980. Id. at 96-114. Then, in February 1980, the Navy converted the

appellant to an excepted-service indefinite appointment. Id. at 94-95. He served

3

continuously under an excepted-service indefinite appointment until September

1992, when he resigned in lieu of involuntary action by reduction in force. Id. at

59-95. He received severance pay equivalent to 18 months’ salary following his

September 1992 resignation. Id. at 57-59.

¶4 In 2012, the appellant applied for a deferred annuity under CSRS. IAF, Tab

5 at 33-34. In an initial decision, OPM denied his application, finding that he

never served in a position subject to the Civil Service Retirement Act (CSRA).

Id. at 30. He requested reconsideration. Id. at 8-29. OPM issued a

reconsideration decision, again denying the appellant’s request. Id. at 5-7.

Specifically, OPM found that the appellant had not completed the minimum

5 years of creditable service required for entitlement to a CSRS annuity. Id. at 7.

OPM also found that the appellant’s service was excluded from coverage under

the CSRA because he had served in nonappropriated funds and personal contract

appointments. Id. Therefore, OPM determined that he did not have 1 year of

service subject to the CSRA within the 2 years immediately prior to his

retirement as was required for receipt of an annuity. Id.

¶5 The appellant filed this Board appeal challenging OPM’s reconsideration

decision. IAF, Tab 1. He did not request a hearing. Id. at 1. He asserted

entitlement to an annuity based upon his service that ended in September 1982,

arguing that the required deposit to receive credit for this service is constructively

waived and that, although he did not apply to OPM to make a deposit, he should

be able to make a deposit for his service from September 1982 until his

resignation in 1992. Id. at 2-4. Specifically, the appellant argued that, although

he has not made a deposit as to his service prior to October 1982, based upon his

interpretation of 5 U.S.C. §§ 8333, 8334(c), and 8339, and 5 C.F.R. § 831.303(a),

a deposit under the CSRS is presumed for the period prior to October 1, 1982.

IAF, Tab 1 at 16-27. The appellant further asserted that he satisfied the

requirement under the CSRA that he have 5 years of creditable service with

1 year of the last 2 years being in a position covered by CSRS because, at the end

4

of his constructive separation in September 1992, he had more than 8 years of

creditable service and the last 2 years and 3 months of that service had been under

an indefinite appointment. Id. at 27. The appellant also indicated that he is

asserting a claim of “harmful procedural error” and appeared to assert a

discrimination claim based upon his national origin. IAF, Tab 1 at 2, Tab 7 at 4.

OPM responded, asserting that the appellant’s Standard Form 50 (SF-50)

consistently listed his retirement coverage as “none” or “other,” and that his

temporary or indefinite appointments are specifically excluded from retirement

coverage. IAF, Tab 5 at 4. OPM also asserted that the appellant was not entitled

to make a deposit because he is not a current employee in a position subject to the

CSRA or a former employee who retained civil service retirement annuity rights

and did not have any covered service. Id.

¶6 The administrative judge issued an initial decision affirming OPM’s

reconsideration decision. IAF, Tab 11, Initial Decision (ID). Specifically, he

found that the appellant failed to prove entitlement to a deferred retirement

annuity because the CSRA excluded his excepted service, temporary

appointments, and subsequent excepted-service indefinite appointment from its

coverage. ID at 9-10. The administrative judge also noted that the appellant’s

receipt of a lump sum payment under a different retirement system, the Filipino

Employment Personnel Instructions (FEPI), indicated that he was covered under

another retirement system and thus was not covered under the CSRA. ID at

12-13. Additionally, the administrative judge found that, to the extent that the

appellant asserted that he was entitled to make a deposit or to receive a reduced

annuity based upon his decision not to make a deposit, these rights would only be

available to someone who, unlike the appellant, is covered by the CSRA.

ID at 13. Lastly, the administrative judge found that OPM could not have

committed harmful procedural error because, even if true, none of the appellant’s

asserted errors would have affected the outcome of his retirement application and

5

subsequent appeal, and that his claim of discrimination was misplaced because

these retirement matters do not involve any discretion by OPM. ID at 15-16.

¶7 The appellant has petitioned for review. Petition for Review (PFR) File,

Tab 1. On review, he reasserts many of the same arguments from below. 2 Id.

OPM has responded in opposition to the appellant’s petition. PFR File, Tab 4.

DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW

¶8 In appeals from OPM reconsideration decisions involving CSRA retirement

benefits, the appellant has the burden of proving entitlement to benefits by

preponderant evidence. 3 5 C.F.R. § 1201.56(b)(2)(ii). To qualify for a civil

service retirement annuity, a Government employee ordinarily must complete at

least 5 years of creditable service and at least 1 of the 2 years before separation

must be in “covered service.” 5 U.S.C. § 8333(a)-(b). Almost all Federal service

is creditable service. Noveloso v. Office of Personnel

Management, 45 M.S.P.R. 321, 323 (1990), aff’d, 925 F.2d 1478 (Fed. Cir. 1991)

(Table). On the other hand, covered service includes only appointments subject

to the CSRA for which employees must deposit part of their pay into the Civil

Service Retirement and Disability Fund (Fund). Anahaw v. Office of Personnel

Management, 85 M.S.P.R. 646, ¶ 4 (2000).

¶9 The appellant claims entitlement to an annuity based upon his service in a

series of NTE, excepted-service appointments and in an indefinite

excepted-service appointment ending prior to October 1, 1982. PFR File, Tab 1

at 11; see IAF, Tab 5 at 95-136. These appointments do not constitute covered

2

We do not consider the evidence that the appellant has presented for the first time on

review, including an OPM information sheet and a court pleading, because he has not

shown that, despite his due diligence, it was unavailable when the record closed below.

5 C.F.R. § 1201.115(d); see PFR File, Tab 1 at 12-17. Even if we did consider this

evidence, however, it would not affect our disposition of the appeal.

3

A preponderance of the evidence is that degree of relevant evidence that a reasonable

person, considering the record as a whole, would accept as sufficient to find that a

contested fact is more likely to be true than untrue. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.4(q).

6

service because nonpermanent and indefinite appointments are excluded from

coverage under the CSRA. De Jesus v. Office of Personnel

Management, 63 M.S.P.R. 586, 589-94 (1994), aff’d, 62 F.3d 1431 (Fed. Cir.

1995) (Table), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1138 (1996). Because the appellant did not

have covered service under the CSRA, he is not entitled to an annuity for his

service prior to October 1, 1982. See 5 U.S.C. § 8333(b). Additionally, to the

extent that the appellant asserts that he is entitled to an annuity based upon his

service beginning in October 1982, he is not entitled to an annuity based upon

this service because he was in an excepted-service, indefinite appointment, which

is excluded from coverage under the CSRA. See De Jesus, 63 M.S.P.R. at 590-

94.

¶10 We note the appellant’s assertion that his status as a full-time employee

rendered his service covered under the CSRA. See, e.g., IAF, Tab 1 at 19.

However, service as a full-time employee does not impact CSRA coverage absent

a showing that the schedule affected the temporary, term, or indefinite character

of an appointment, or that an individual made contributions to the Fund. See

Noveloso, 45 M.S.P.R. at 325. The appellant has made no such showing and has

not asserted that he contributed to the Fund; thus, his full-time status does not

change the fact that his service was not covered by the CSRA. Additionally, the

appellant’s SF-50s support our finding that he is not covered by the CSRA

because they designate his retirement as either “none” or “other.” 4 IAF, Tab 5 at

59-133. The Board has held that the reference to “other” or “none” in an

appellant’s SF-50s means that the individual was not employed in covered

service. Espiritu v. Office of Personnel Management, 114 M.S.P.R. 192, ¶ 8

(2010), aff’d, 431 F. App’x 897 (Fed. Cir. 2011).

4

One of the appellant’s SF-50s designated his retirement as “FS.” IAF, Tab 5 at 95.

We agree with the administrative judge that this designation appeared to refer to the

Foreign Service Retirement and Disability System. See ID at 3-4 n.2. The appellant,

though, has not asserted that this designation supports his entitlement to retirement

benefits under that system. Therefore, we need not address this apparent error.

7

¶11 Furthermore, we agree with the administrative judge that, because the

record supports a finding that the appellant was covered by FEPI and a collective

bargaining agreement, he is excluded from coverage under the CSRA. ID at

12-13. Specifically, the appellant’s SF-50 from May 1974 indicates that he

received a severance payment pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement and

his SF-50 from September 1992 indicates that he received a second severance

payment. IAF, Tab 5 at 59, 124. The receipt of these severance payments under

another retirement system, designated as “other” on the appellant’s SF-50s,

excludes him from coverage under the CSRA. 5 U.S.C. § 8331(1)(L)(ii); see

Vergara v. Office of Personnel Management, 104 M.S.P.R. 616, ¶ 2 n.2 (2007).

¶12 Even though the appellant did not serve in covered positions so as to entitle

him to an annuity under CSRS, he appears to assert that he should be considered

eligible for an annuity because a deposit was constructively made on his behalf

pursuant to 5 C.F.R. § 831.303(a). PFR File, Tab 1 at 7-11. Section 831.303(a)

is contained in subpart C of part 831, which addresses whether service is

creditable. Section 831.303(a) describes how to calculate an annuity that includes

credit for years of service performed prior to October 1, 1982, of an otherwise

entitled individual for periods of service for which retirement deductions have not

been taken; nowhere does it provide for service credit to individuals that have no

covered service. There is thus no support in the regulation for the appellant’s

assertion that he is deemed to have made a deposit qualifying him for an annuity

where he is otherwise ineligible for an annuity due to his lack of covered service.

¶13 Finally, the appellant asserted below that he should be able to make a

deposit for his service from the end of September 1982 until September 1992.

IAF, Tab 1 at 4. To the extent that he previously asserted in his request for

reconsideration that he should have been able to make a deposit, id. at 18, OPM

did not address this issue, IAF, Tab 5 at 5-7. Although, ordinarily, the Board has

jurisdiction over retirement issues only once OPM has issued a reconsideration

decision regarding those issues, Kilpatrick v. Office of Personnel

8

Management, 94 M.S.P.R. 609, ¶ 8 (2003), where, as here, OPM failed to

adjudicate an issue that was before it, we may consider the nonadjudicated claims

and issues and may remand the case to OPM for a full review of the matter, Ott v.

Office of Personnel Management, 120 M.S.P.R. 453, ¶ 4 (2013). Because the

appellant made clear that his goal in making a deposit was to receive a CSRS

annuity and OPM addressed the issue of his entitlement to a CSRS annuity, we

need not remand the appeal. Instead, we find that the appellant is not entitled to

make a deposit because he did not have any covered

service. 5 5 U.S.C. §§ 8331(1), 8334(c); see Muyco v. Office of Personnel

Management, 114 M.S.P.R. 694, ¶¶ 12-13 (2010).

NOTICE TO THE APPELLANT REGARDING

YOUR FURTHER REVIEW RIGHTS

You have the right to request review of this final decision by the United

States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. You must submit your request to

the court at the following address:

United States Court of Appeals

for the Federal Circuit

717 Madison Place, N.W.

Washington, DC 20439

The court must receive your request for review no later than 60 calendar

days after the date of this order. See 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(A) (as rev. eff. Dec.

27, 2012). If you choose to file, be very careful to file on time. The court has

held that normally it does not have the authority to waive this statutory deadline

and that filings that do not comply with the deadline must be dismissed. See

Pinat v. Office of Personnel Management, 931 F.2d 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1991).

5

As described above, the administrative judge found that the appellant failed to meet

his burden concerning his harmful procedural error and discrimination claims. ID at

15-16. We see no reason to disturb these findings. Jordan v. Office of Personnel

Management, 108 M.S.P.R. 119, ¶ 9 (2008); 5 C.F.R. § 1201.4(r).

9

If you need further information about your right to appeal this decision to

court, you should refer to the federal law that gives you this right. It is found in

Title 5 of the United States Code, section 7703 (5 U.S.C. § 7703) (as rev. eff.

Dec. 27, 2012). You may read this law as well as other sections of the United

States Code, at our website, http://www.mspb.gov/appeals/uscode.htm.

Additional information is available at the court’s

website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular relevance is the court’s “Guide

for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is contained within the

court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, and 11.

If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to the

United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website

at http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono

representation for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal

Circuit. The Merit Systems Protection Board neither endorses the services

provided by any attorney nor warrants that any attorney will accept representation

in a given case.

FOR THE BOARD: ______________________________

William D. Spencer

Clerk of the Board

Washington, D.C.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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