R.M. Collazo v. Mount Airy 1, LLC

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Ruben M. Collazo, :

Appellant :

: No. 175 C.D. 2015

v. : Submitted: July 17, 2015

:

Mount Airy #1, LLC :

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION

PER CURIAM FILED: September 10, 2015

Ruben M. Collazo (Collazo), representing himself, appeals from the

order of the Monroe County Court of Common Pleas (trial court)1 sustaining the

preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer, filed by Mount Airy #1, LLC

(Mt. Airy), and dismissing Collazo’s declaratory judgment claims. Collazo asserts

his exclusion from the Mt. Airy casino violates his constitutional rights to due

process and free speech and is impermissible under the Pennsylvania Race Horse

Development and Gaming Act (Gaming Act), 4 Pa. C.S. §§1101-1904.

Specifically, he argues Section 1515 of the Gaming Act, 4 Pa. C.S. §1515, limits a

licensee’s common law property rights to exclude patrons from its casino. The

trial court determined Collazo could not prevail on his constitutional claims because

Mt. Airy is not a state actor, noting he did not sue the Pennsylvania Gaming Control

Board (Board) as to its regulation of Mt. Airy. Upon review, we affirm.

1

The Honorable Arthur L. Zulick presided.

I. Background

Collazo filed a series of complaints, to which Mt. Airy filed

preliminary objections. In the second amended complaint, consisting of one count

seeking declaratory judgment, Collazo averred Mt. Airy had no right to exclude

him from its casino. He also argued generally that licensees under the Gaming Act

do not have the same common law rights of other property owners to exclude

persons from their licensed facilities. To the extent the Gaming Act allows

licensees to exercise that common law right shared by other property owners,

Collazo contends it is invalid. The relevant underlying facts, as pled, follow.

Collazo maintains an anti-gambling website described as an “internet

faith-based gambling addiction forum” (Website). Certified Record (C.R.), Item

No. 22, Second Am. Compl. at ¶8. The Website address is: http://mtairy-

poconoscoalitionofpremiumplayers.com. Id.

In December 2010, Collazo received a telephone call from an

individual purportedly from Mt. Airy security notifying him that he would no

longer be permitted on the premises of the casino. Id. at ¶10. Collazo contacted

counsel for Mt. Airy (Counsel), who investigated his claim and reviewed his

Website. Counsel advised Collazo he was not permitted on the premises of the

casino, such that he would be arrested for criminal trespass if he entered the

premises. Purportedly, Counsel added that Collazo should know better as someone

of “Italian origin.” Id. at ¶16. Collazo characterized Counsel’s statement as a

“threat.” Id. at ¶¶17, 19. Shortly thereafter, Collazo received a letter from Lianne

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Asbury, Director of Security at Mt. Airy. She notified Collazo that because he was

warned to avoid the premises, he would be arrested for criminal trespass if he

returned.

In addition to the instant case, Collazo filed a complaint with the

Board seeking redress for his exclusion from the Mt. Airy casino. Pursuant to

Board regulations and Section 1514 of the Gaming Act, 4 Pa. C.S. §1514, the

Board may place individuals on an excluded patron list. Collazo advised the Board

he never engaged in an incident warranting exclusion. He alleged Mt. Airy did not

comport with the Gaming Act or its regulations governing exclusion of patrons.

The Board responded, stating Mt. Airy did not violate the Gaming Act. It also

advised that Mt. Airy may exclude an individual pursuant to Section 1515 of the

Gaming Act.

In his second amended complaint, Collazo challenged Mt. Airy’s

exclusion of him from its casino as a violation of his due process right to a hearing

to disprove the allegations underlying his exclusion. He also asserted the Website

is an improper basis for exclusion. Specifically, he stated:

The issue presented in the instant proceeding is not limited to

[Collazo] but challenges the ability of a licensed gaming

facility from barring any individual from their [sic] facility

without benefit of due process, or for any reason totally apart

from the provisions set forth in the [Gaming Act], the State

and U.S. Constitution and the provisions that established the

[Board] and the [r]egulations (Title 58 [of the Pennsylvania

Administrative Code]) that govern the licensure of a facility

within Pennsylvania.

3

Second Am. Compl. at ¶30. Collazo then set forth the grounds for placing a patron

on an exclusion list, including reference to Board regulation 58 Pa. Code §511a.4.

Collazo alleged Mt. Airy personnel improperly excluded him from the

casino for various reasons. He asserted his exclusion is unconstitutional because it

is based on his Italian origin, and it violates his freedom of speech. He also

averred Mt. Airy wrongfully caused his arrest for defiant trespass. Collazo

included allegations regarding his arrest for criminal trespass by state police,

“under color of law.” Id. at ¶39.

In response, Mt. Airy filed preliminary objections, asserting Collazo’s

second amended complaint is legally insufficient under Pa. R.C.P. No. 1028(a)(4).

Mt. Airy also alleged Collazo failed to join the Board as a necessary party in

accordance with Pa. R.C.P. No. 1028(a)(5).

The parties filed briefs, and the trial court heard argument on the

preliminary objections. The trial court subsequently issued an order sustaining Mt.

Airy’s preliminary objection in the nature of a demurrer, dismissing the action.

In its opinion accompanying the order, the trial court noted Collazo

attempted to enter Mt. Airy since his exclusion, resulting in two criminal

proceedings, one of which resulted in a conviction for defiant trespass. The trial

court explained that Collazo’s allegations as to Mt. Airy’s non-compliance with

Section 1514 of the Gaming Act (relating to Board placement of a patron on an

excluded patron list) do not apply to a claim regarding proper construction of

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Section 1515 of the Gaming Act, (relating to licensees’ rights to exclude patrons).

Notably, Collazo did not contend the Board placed him on a list resulting in his

exclusion from all casinos. As a result, Collazo had no right to due process and the

notice provided prior to placement on the excluded patron list as set forth in

Section 1514.

Further, the trial court rejected the alleged violations of Collazo’s

constitutional rights to free speech and procedural due process because Mt. Airy is

not a state actor. To the extent Collazo asserted his exclusion was discriminatory

based on his Italian heritage, the trial court also reasoned Collazo did not plead

sufficient facts to allege a violation of Section 5 of the Pennsylvania Human

Relations Act (PHRA)2 regarding non-discrimination in public accommodations.

Ultimately, the trial court dismissed Collazo’s second amended

complaint, concluding it failed to state a cognizable legal claim. Having dismissed

the action, the trial court found Mt. Airy’s preliminary objection for failure to join

a necessary party moot. Collazo appealed.

II. Discussion

On appeal,3 Collazo argues the trial court erred in construing the

Gaming Act to permit his exclusion. Specifically, he claims Section 1515 of the

2

Act of October 27, 1955, P.L. 744, as amended, 43 P.S. §955.

3

On an appeal from a trial court's order sustaining preliminary objections and dismissing

the complaint, we review whether the trial court committed an error of law or an abuse of

discretion. Podolak v. Tobyhanna Twp. Bd. of Supervisors, 37 A.3d 1283 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012).

5

Gaming Act does not permit his exclusion from Mt. Airy’s casino because he is not

a repeat offender, and he was not convicted of a misdemeanor or felony committed

on the premises.4 Collazo contends Mt. Airy, as a licensee, may not exercise

common law rights as a property owner because the Gaming Act limits its

authority to exclude patrons.

A. Legal Standard for Preliminary Objections

When considering preliminary objections, we must consider as true all

well-pled material facts set forth in the complaint and all reasonable inferences that

may be drawn from those facts. R.H.S. v. Allegheny Cnty. Dep’t of Human

Servs., 936 A.2d 1218 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007). However, we need not accept legal

conclusions. Petsinger v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., Office of Vocational Rehab.,

988 A.2d 748 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010). Preliminary objections in the nature of a

demurrer should be sustained only where the pleadings are clearly insufficient to

establish a right to relief; any doubt must be resolved in favor of overruling the

demurrer. Mazur v. Trinity Area Sch. Dist., 961 A.2d 96 (Pa. 2008); R.H.S.

Primarily, Collazo seeks a declaration that Mt. Airy’s exclusion of

him from its casino is invalid because the grounds for his exclusion are not listed in

the Gaming Act. He also seeks a declaration that the comments contained on the

4

In his statement of the questions involved, Collazo also challenges the prosecution of

criminal trespass charges, asserting the trial court did not “give binding effect to [his] presumption

of innocence,” and contending he is a victim of malicious prosecution. Appellant’s Br. at 6. As

these claims were not set forth in his declaratory judgment complaint, we do not address them.

Moreover, Collazo cannot utilize the declaratory judgment process to collaterally attack his arrest

or prosecution for criminal trespass. See Guarrasi v. Scott, 25 A.3d 394 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011).

6

Website constitute expressions of protected free speech. Based on the facts pled,

we consider whether Collazo states a claim for which relief may be granted.

B. Declaratory Relief

The Declaratory Judgments Act (DJA), 42 Pa. C.S. §§7531-7541, is

properly invoked to “settle and to afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity with

respect to rights, status, and other legal relations, and is to be liberally construed

and administered.” 42 Pa. C.S. §7541(a); Se. Pa. Transp. Auth. v. City of Phila., 20

A.3d 558 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011). Pursuant to Section 7532 of the DJA, a court may

“declare rights, status and other legal relations” between parties. 42 Pa. C.S. §7532.

To sustain a declaratory judgment action, a plaintiff must demonstrate

an actual controversy indicating imminent and inevitable litigation and a direct,

substantial, and present interest. Buehl v. Beard, 54 A.3d 412 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012).

A declaratory judgment action is an inappropriate mechanism to determine rights

in anticipation of events that may never occur. McClellan v. Pa. State Police, 619

A.2d 799 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1992) (threat of future police activity is not proper basis for

declaratory relief).

The purpose of the DJA is “remedial.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 7541(a). A

“remedial law” provides a “means to enforce rights or redress injuries.” BLACK’S

LAW DICTIONARY 1319 (8th ed. 1999). As to the remedy, the DJA states:

Any person interested under a deed, will, written contract, or

other writings constituting a contract, or whose rights, status,

or other legal relations are affected by a statute, municipal

ordinance, contract, or franchise, may have determined any

question of construction or validity arising under the

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instrument, statute, ordinance, contract, or franchise, and

obtain a declaration of rights, status, or other legal relations

thereunder.

42 Pa.C.S. §7533 (emphasis added). Thus, the DJA is an appropriate vehicle to

resolve matters of statutory construction.

1. Statutory Construction

a. Section 1515-Discretionary Exclusion

The Gaming Act preserves the common law rights of property owners

in Section 1515, entitled “Repeat offenders excludable from licensed gaming

facilities.” The provision provides:

A licensed gaming entity may exclude or eject from its

licensed facility any person who is known to it to have been

convicted of a misdemeanor or felony committed in or on the

premises of any licensed facility. Nothing in this section or in

any other law of this Commonwealth shall limit the right of a

licensed gaming entity to exercise its common law right to

exclude or eject permanently from its licensed facility any

person who disrupts the operations of its premises, threatens

the security of its premises or its occupants or is disorderly or

intoxicated.

4 Pa. C.S. §1515 (emphasis added). The Gaming Act thus permits licensees to

exercise their common law rights to exclude persons from their licensed facilities.

“[I]ncluded in the bundle of rights constituting ‘property’ is the right

to exclude other persons ….” Petition of Borough of Boyertown, 466 A.2d 239,

245-46 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1983) (citing Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV

Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982)). This right includes the right to remove persons by

force if necessary. Yoder v. Yoder, 86 A. 523 (Pa. 1913).

8

b. Section 1514-Mandatory Exclusion

In part, Collazo contends casinos are not entitled to the same common

law property rights as other property owners because they are subject to the

excluded patron list criteria established in Section 1514 of the Gaming Act and

Board regulation 58 Pa. Code §511a.3. Section 1514 of the Gaming Act, entitled

“Regulation requiring exclusion or ejection of certain persons,” provides, in

pertinent part:

(a) General rule. The [B]oard shall by regulation provide for

the establishment of a list of persons who are to be excluded

or ejected from any licensed facility. The provisions shall

define the standards for exclusion and shall include standards

relating to persons who are career or professional offenders as

defined by regulations of the [B]oard or whose presence in a

licensed facility would, in the opinion of the [B]oard, be

inimical to the interest of the Commonwealth or of licensed

gaming therein, or both.

(b) Categories to be defined. The [B]oard shall promulgate

definitions establishing those categories of persons who shall

be excluded or ejected pursuant to this section, including

cheats and persons whose privileges for licensure,

certification, permit or registration have been revoked.

4 Pa. C.S. §1514 (emphasis added). Section 1514 also provides for written notice

and a hearing prior to placing a person on an exclusion list. The Board defined

such categories of persons who shall be placed on an excluded list as follows:

(1) A career or professional offender whose presence in a

licensed facility would, in the opinion of the Board, be

inimical to the interest of the Commonwealth or of licensed

gaming therein, or both.

(2) An individual with a known relationship or connection

with a career or professional offender whose presence in a

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licensed facility would be inimical to the interest of the

Commonwealth or of licensed gaming therein, or both.

(3) A person who has been convicted of a criminal offense

under the laws of any state, or of the United States, which is

punishable by more than 1 year in prison, or who has been

convicted of any crime or offense involving moral turpitude,

and whose presence in a licensed facility would be inimical to

the interest of the Commonwealth or of licensed gaming

therein, or both.

(4) A person whose presence in a licensed facility would be

inimical to the interest of the Commonwealth or of licensed

gaming therein [….]

58 Pa. Code §511a.3.

c. Comparison

Section 1514 mandates exclusion from any licensed facility of any

patron placed on the Board’s list. The provision offers another means of barring a

patron that applies to all licensees as opposed to one particular licensee (Mt. Airy).

Licensees are thus required to exclude or eject any patrons who are on the

excluded patrons list from their facility under this provision. By contrast, Section

1515 permits licensees to exercise discretion as to removal of patrons who are not

on the excluded patrons list by preserving their common law property rights.

We agree with the trial court that Section 1514 does not limit the

rights of licensees.5 Whereas Section 1514 of the Gaming Act and 58 Pa. Code

5

The second amended complaint is not a model of clarity, as Collazo cites Section 1514

of the Gaming Act throughout the pleading and in his uncounseled brief in various contexts. In

the event Collazo intended to challenge the criteria for placement on an excluded patron list

under Section 1514, or other Board action, declaratory relief would not be appropriate because

(Footnote continued on next page…)

10

§511a.3 set forth criteria for mandatory exclusion from a licensed facility, such

criteria are not exhaustive as to discretionary exclusion under Section 1515.

Accordingly, we reject Collazo’s argument that Section 1514 limits a licensee’s

grounds for discretionary exclusion under Section 1515.

Section 1515 expressly allows a licensee to exclude patrons “who

[are] known to have been convicted of a misdemeanor or felony in or on the

premises of any licensed facility.” 4 Pa. C.S. §1515 (emphasis added). Also,

regardless of a past conviction based on conduct at some licensed facility, Section

1515 allows a licensee to exclude a person based on his or her present or past conduct

at its premises, when that person is: (1) disruptive; (2) threatening; (3) disorderly; or

(4) intoxicated. Nowhere does Section 1515 state that these are the only grounds

for exclusion.

Collazo asserts the title of Section 1515, “Repeat offenders

excludable from licensed gaming facilities,” requires more than one incident of the

offensive conduct. We disagree. The language of a heading does not govern a

provision’s content. 1 Pa. C.S. §1924 (“headings prefixed to titles, parts, articles,

chapters, sections, and other divisions of a statute shall not be considered to control

…”). Instead, it offers a tool for construing a provision’s meaning. Id. The

language in the title of Section 1515 generally refers to the first sentence of the

provision, which sets forth a licensee’s ability to exclude from its facility someone

(continued…)

he would need to first exhaust his administrative remedies. Bayada Nurses, Inc. v. Dep’t of

Labor & Indus., 8 A.3d 866 (Pa. 2010).

11

previously convicted of a felony or misdemeanor offense committed at any

licensed facility. The title also generally refers to the second sentence of Section

1515, which preserves a licensee’s common law right to exclude a person based on

past conduct at its premises, even if that conduct was not criminal in nature or did

not result in a conviction. Thus, a licensee need not suffer repeat offenses.

Collazo construes Section 1515 as a provision that sets forth a finite

list of grounds for excluding patrons from licensed facilities. We disagree with his

premise. The second sentence of Section 1515 demonstrates the intent to confirm

a licensee’s common law rights of ejection or exclusion. Thus, in addition to the

circumstances expressed in the first sentence of Section 1515, a licensee may also

exclude a person from its otherwise public facility based on his or her conduct,

consistent with the common law. We reject Collazo’s arguments to the contrary.

Mt. Airy is authorized by Section 1515 to exclude him based on his

conduct at its premises. Here, there is no dispute that Collazo’s Website portrays

Mt. Airy in a negative light. Also, there is no disagreement that Collazo left

business cards containing information about the Website at the Mt. Airy casino.

Collazo acknowledges responsibility for the Website. Mt. Airy advised Collazo it

was excluding him from its premises because it deemed his placement of the

business cards in its casino disruptive. Discretionary exclusion by a licensee based

on disruptive conduct at its licensed facilities is clearly authorized by Section 1515.

In short, the only limitations Section 1515 recognizes as to Mt. Airy’s

discretion to exclude patrons it deems disruptive or disorderly are those based in

12

the common law. Collazo does not direct our attention to any such common law

limitations. Thus, the trial court did not err in construing Section 1515 of the

Gaming Act to permit Mt. Airy to exercise its discretion to exclude Collazo based

on the facts pled.

2. Constitutional Claims6

To state a claim for a constitutional violation, such as a deprivation of

procedural due process or of freedom of speech, the complainant must allege state

action. W. Pa. Socialist Workers 1982 Campaign v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 485

A.2d 1 (Pa. Super. 1984). This Court recognized, “[t]he action of the private racing

association, albeit a licensed corporation … in ejecting a patron is not state action.”

Staino v. Pa. State Horse Racing Comm’n, 512 A.2d 75, 77 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1986).

Significantly, Collazo does not allege any state action aside from the

action of the Pennsylvania State Police (PSP) to arrest him for trespass. In his

uncounseled brief, Collazo attempts to remedy this omission, stating “[the]

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania is a 55 percent majority shareholder in gambling

venues.” Appellant’s Br. at 12. However, our review of a trial court’s

determination on preliminary objections is limited to the contents of the complaint

and any attachments thereto. Thomas v. Corbett, 90 A.3d 789 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014).

Thus, we cannot consider this allegation. Id.

6

Section 1904 of the Gaming Act provides that our Supreme Court has “exclusive

jurisdiction to hear any challenge to or render a declaratory judgment concerning the constitutionality

of [the Gaming Act].” 4 Pa. C.S. §1904; Pa. State Troopers Ass’n v. Pa. Gaming Control Bd., 920

A.2d 173, 176 n.8 (Pa. 2007). From our review of the second amended complaint, Collazo does

not challenge the constitutionality of the Gaming Act itself. Rather, he contends Mt. Airy’s act of

excluding him from the casino violated his constitutional rights to due process and free speech, and

undermined the statutory due process afforded by Section 1514 of the Gaming Act.

13

Nevertheless, that Mt. Airy is a licensee subject to Board regulation

does not render it a state actor. Staino. Collazo cites no authority for the

proposition that issuance of a license or permit to a private business entity, such as

a bar, casino, mine or landfill, suffices to show government action.

Aside from lack of state action, we consider the legal sufficiency of

Collazo’s allegations that Mt. Airy’s exclusion violated his constitutional rights to

due process and to free speech.

a. Due Process

The threshold inquiry in any due process analysis is whether there

exists any identifiable property or liberty interest at issue. Phila. Entm’t & Dev.

Partners, L.P. v. Pa. Gaming Control Bd., 34 A.3d 261 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011) (en

banc). “[W]ithout such an interest, due process is not applicable.” Id. at 276

(citations omitted).

Once an interest is found within the zone of protected interests, the

issue becomes what type of a process is due. Lopez v. Dep’t of Corr., __ A.3d __

(Pa. Cmwlth., No. 546 M.D. 2013, filed June 26, 2015). A person only has a right

to a due process hearing when the following two-prong test is met: (1) the

challenged action has caused that party an injury in fact, economic or otherwise;

and, (2) the interest asserted by the plaintiff is within the zones of interests sought

to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question.

Muscarella v. Com., 87 A.3d 966 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014) (en banc).

14

Here, Collazo claims a vague right to due process before the Mt. Airy

casino may exclude him. However, he fails to identify any common law right to

force the Mt. Airy casino to admit him to its privately-owned facility over its

objection. Indeed, this Court previously determined the Board’s exercise of

discretion not to institute an enforcement action against Mt. Airy did not “affect

Collazo’s ‘personal or property rights, privileges immunities, duties, liabilities or

obligations.’” Collazo v. Pa. Gaming Control Bd. (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 1083 C.D.

2011, filed February 23, 2012) (per curiam) (unreported), slip op. at 6 (citing 2 Pa.

C.S. §101; 58 Pa. Code §491a.2). Accordingly, Collazo does not state a sufficient

interest that is protectable by due process under the constitution.

Further, there is no statutory authority entitling Collazo due process

prior to being barred from Mt. Airy’s casino under Section 1515. In contrast to

Section 1514, Section 1515 does not require licensees to provide prior notice or a

hearing to exclude a patron.

Having failed to identify either an interest protected at common law or

a statutory provision of certain process, Collazo cannot state a claim for violation of

constitutional protection of due process.

b. Free Speech

Likewise, Collazo’s free speech and freedom of expression claims

fail. Collazo refers to the “constitution” as affording him a right of free speech and

15

of free expression.7 The free speech provision of the First Amendment of the U.S.

Constitution,8 applicable to the states by way of the Fourteenth Amendment, does

not prevent a privately-owned and operated business from banning certain activity

on its premises. W. Pa. Socialist Workers 1982 Campaign; see also W. Pa.

Socialist Workers v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 515 A.2d 1331 (Pa. 1986) (plurality

opinion).

Here, the alleged free speech activity is the placement of business

cards referring to his Website throughout the Mt. Airy casino. However, Mt. Airy

deemed this activity disruptive, and it is permitted to ban disruptive activity at its

facility. Id.

7

The rights to association and free speech are guaranteed by Article I, Sections 7 and 20

of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Article I, Section 7 provides:

[T]he printing press shall be free to every person who may undertake to

examine the proceedings of the Legislature or any branch of government,

and no law shall ever be made to restrain the rights thereof. The free

communication of thought and opinions is one of the invaluable rights of

man, and every citizen may freely speak, write and print on any subject,

being responsible for the abuse of that liberty.

PA. CONST. art. I, §7. Article I, Section 20 provides: “The citizens have a right in a peaceable

manner to assemble together for their common good, and to apply to those invested with the

powers of government for redress of grievances or other proper purposes, by petition, address or

remonstrate.” Id. at art. I, §20.

8

The First Amendment states: “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment

of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the

press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a

redress of grievances.” U.S. CONST. amend. I.

16

c. Discrimination/Equal Protection

The second amended complaint contains no allegations that Mt. Airy

excluded him from the premises of the casino based on his Italian heritage, or on

some other improper criterion. The only relevant averment in the complaint

alleges that Counsel reprimanded Collazo for maintaining the Website when he is

someone of “Italian origin.” See C.R., Item No. 22, Second Am. Compl. at ¶16.

Thus, the pleading does not fairly comprise a discrimination or equal protection

claim. In addition, we agree with the trial court that Collazo did not allege

sufficient facts to plead a violation of the PHRA, 43 P.S. §955, prohibiting

unlawful discriminatory practices in public accommodations.

Further, Collazo did not brief a discrimination claim, so any such

claim is waived. See Pa. R.A.P. 2119.

Because Collazo fails to state a claim for violation of his

constitutional rights, the trial court properly dismissed his constitutional claims.

III. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s order.

17

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Ruben M. Collazo, :

Appellant :

: No. 175 C.D. 2015

v. :

:

Mount Airy #1, LLC :

PER CURIAM

ORDER

AND NOW, this 10th day of September, 2015, the order of the Court

of Common Pleas of Monroe County is AFFIRMED.