Arnold v. Cockrell

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 02-40615

Summary Calendar

JOSEPH K. ARNOLD,

Petitioner - Appellant,

versus

JANIE COCKRELL, DIRECTOR, TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE,

INSTITUTIONAL DIVISION,

Respondent - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

For the Eastern District of Texas

October 2, 2002

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, SMITH, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Joseph K. Arnold, Texas state prisoner # 284250, appeals the

district court’s denial of habeas corpus relief. We affirm.

I. Facts and Procedural History

Arnold was convicted by a jury in 1978 of aggravated kidnapping,

and subsequently sentenced to life in prison. Arnold filed a state

postconviction application in 2001, arguing that he was entitled to

release to mandatory supervision on the basis that his combined

calendar time and good-time credits exceeded the statutory time

necessary for the granting of such release. The Court of Criminal

Appeals denied this petition in January 2002. Arnold filed the

instant § 2254 petition in February 2002, at which time he had served

23 calendar years and had accumulated 43 years of good-time credit,

for a total of 66 years of credit. He asserts that the mandatory

supervision law in effect for prisoners sentenced in 1978 requires

that inmates who have accumulated more than 60 years of total time

must be released to mandatory supervision.

The district court denied Arnold’s petition, stating that the

statute could not be applied to prisoners who had received a life

sentence. However, the district court granted Arnold a certificate

of appealability because of a conflict among district courts in the

treatment of this issue. This is a matter of first impression for

this court.

II. Analysis

Federal habeas relief is available only if a prisoner “has been

deprived of some right secured to him or her by the United States

Constitution or by the laws of the United States.”1 In Malchi, we

concluded that Texas’s mandatory supervision law in place prior to

September 1, 1996 created a “constitutional expectancy of early

1

Malchi v. Thaler, 211 F.3d 953, 957 (5th Cir. 2000)(quoting

Orellana v. Kyle, 65 F.3d 29, 31 (5th Cir. 1995)).

2

release.”2 Therefore, it must be determined if Arnold is eligible for

mandatory supervision release. If he is not, Arnold does not have a

constitutional claim for which relief can be granted.

The statute at issue at the time Arnold was sentenced reads: “A

prisoner who is not on parole, except a person under sentence of

death, shall be released to mandatory supervision by order of the

Board when the calendar time he has served plus any accrued good

conduct time equal the maximum term to which he was sentenced.”3 The

statute does not state how the maximum time for a life sentence is

determined.

The district court concluded that although theoretically

eligible for release, “the reality of the matter is that [Arnold]

will never be factually eligible to be released” because “his

calendar time combined with his good conduct time will never reach a

life sentence.”4 Other courts have reached the same conclusion.5

However, at least one district court reached a different result.6

2

Id. at 957-58.

3

Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.12 § 15(c)(Vernon 1977).

4

Arnold v. Director, TDCJ-ID, No. 02-CV-93 (E.D. Tex. Mar.4,

2002)(Mag. report and recommendations, accepted by order of Apr. 3,

2002).

5

See, e.g., Barnes v. Cockrell, 2002 WL 1878548 (N.D. Tex. Aug.

12, 2002); Brown v. Cockrell, 2002 WL 638584 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 17,

2002); Morris v. Cockrell, 2002 WL 66798 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 11, 2002);

Derry v. Johnson, 2001 WL 1029520 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 27, 2001).

6

Govan v. Johnson, No. 1-97-247-C (N.D. Tex. July 28,

1998)(unpublished).

3

We need not resolve this issue ourselves, because the Court of

Criminal Appeals of Texas has addressed this issue in a recent

opinion. It concluded that “a life-sentenced inmate is not eligible

for release to mandatory supervision”7 under the 1981 version of the

statute at issue. The court concluded that neither the 1981 statute

nor the current statute permitted release for prisoners sentenced for

life. The court reasoned: “Under a literal reading of this law, it

is mathematically impossible to determine a mandatory supervision

release date on a life sentence because the calendar time served plus

any accrued good conduct time will never add up to life.”8 The same

conclusion clearly applies to the 1977 version of the law, which is

at issue here, because the relevant language is the same as the 1981

version.

As we have stated, “[i]t is not our function as a federal

appellate court in a habeas proceeding to review a state's

interpretation of its own law”, and “we defer to the state courts'

interpretation” of its statute.9 In Seaton v. Procunier, we stated:

"We will take the word of the highest court on criminal matters of

Texas as to the interpretation of its law, and we do not sit to

review that state's interpretation of its own law."10

7

Ex parte Franks, 71 S.W.3d 327 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001).

8

Id. at 328.

9

Weeks v. Scott, 55 F.3d 1059, 1063 (5th Cir. 1995)(citations

omitted).

10

750 F.2d 366, 368 (5th Cir. 1985).

4

We must therefore conclude that Arnold is not eligible for

release under the Texas mandatory supervision statute. Because he is

not eligible for release, Arnold does not have a constitutionally

protected interest, and his petition for habeas corpus relief must be

denied. AFFIRMED.

5