Opinion

Eulalio Huerta v. State

Court
Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin)
Filed
Dec 18, 1997
Status
Published
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 35.8%

The opinion

TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03-97-00066-CR

Eulalio Huerta, Appellant

v.

The State of Texas, Appellee

FROM THE COUNTY COURT AT LAW NO. 7 OF TRAVIS COUNTY

NO. 452,026, HONORABLE FRED A. MOORE, JUDGE PRESIDING

Appellant Eulalio Huerta was convicted in a jury trial of the offense of recklessly discharging

a firearm inside the corporate limits of a municipality having a population of 100,000 or more. See Tex.

Penal Code Ann. § 42.12 (a) (West Supp. 1998). Appellant's punishment was assessed by the trial court

at confinement in the county jail for 90 days and a fine of $300. The court suspended appellant's sentence

and placed him on community supervision for two years.

In his sole point of error, appellant asserts that the trial court erred in appointing an

interpreter who was biased in favor of the State. We will overrule appellant's point of error and affirm the

trial court's judgment.

When a motion for appointment of an interpreter is filed by any party or on motion

of the court, in any criminal proceeding, it is determined that a person charged or a witness

does not understand and speak the English language, an interpreter must be sworn to

interpret for him. Any person may be subpoenaed, attached or recognized in any criminal

action or proceeding, to appear before the proper judge or court to act as interpreter

therein, under the same rules and penalties as are provided for witnesses. In the event that

the only available interpreter is not considered to possess adequate interpreting skills for

the particular situation or the interpreter is not familiar with use of slang, the person charged

or witness may be permitted by the court to nominate another person to act as

intermediary between himself and the appointed interpreter during the proceeding.

Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.30 (West Supp. 1997). An interpreter was appointed to translate for

appellant, who spoke Spanish but did not speak or understand the English language.

After the parties had announced ready for trial and selected the jury, but before the jury

was sworn, the trial court held a hearing out of the presence of the jury. Appellant's counsel stated that

it had come to his attention that the interpreter, who had been appointed and sworn, was an employee of

the County Attorney's office. The interpreter was employed as a victims-witness coordinator in another

court. Defense counsel asked for a mistrial or that another interpreter be appointed. The motion for

mistrial was denied, but the trial court told defense counsel that the court would consider appointing a

substitute interpreter if the defense would provide an interpreter for consideration before 2:00 p.m. when

the court would reconvene. Counsel objected and rejected the court's suggestion because it would be

burdensome to the defense, onerous, and unfair.

The interpreter testified that because of her employment she favored the State. However,

as an interpreter, she "would be completely unbiased as far as [her] interpretation to the defendant . . . .

She did not know the defendant and [did not] hold anything against him personally." She had served as

an interpreter on previous occasions in another court. The interpreter was questioned by the trial court.

THE COURT: I have one question of you. When [the prosecutor] asked you if you had

any bias or prejudice, you said no personal bias or prejudice. What do you mean by that?

THE WITNESS: I don't hold anything against him personally but, in all fairness, I would

have to say that, you know, I am biased towards the State. I can't explain myself real

well. I would never try to interpret something incorrectly or anything like that, but when

[Defense Counsel] asked me if I was biased, you know, more for the State than for the

defense, then I would have to say that, yes, that is correct.

Defense counsel argued that although he was sure the interpreter's translation would be accurate appellant

was entitled to an unbiased interpreter. Appellant's objection was overruled and the court proceeded with

the trial.

During trial, only once did counsel disagree with the interpreter's translation. Counsel did

not object but corrected the translation.

Q. (By Prosecutor) Who was shooting at the house?

A. Only him.

* * * * *

Q. So Juan was shooting at the house?

A. Yes.

Q. And he wasn't shooting in the air?

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Judge, there's a mistranslation here, "at the house," "in the

house." There's a mistranslation.

THE COURT: That happens in English too. Go ahead.

Q. (By Prosecutor) So Juan was shooting at the house?

A. No, up towards the air.

Q. Did you just say that someone was shooting in the house then?

A. No.

In his brief, appellant discusses several reported cases concluding that the facts in this case

are "distinguishable from the case law." However, we find these cases to be instructive. In Brown

v. Stat e, 59 S.W. 1118 (Tex. Crim. App. 1900), the court noted there was no requirement that an

interpreter should be unbiased as far as the accused is concerned. In Tores v. State , 63 S.W. 880 , 881

(Tex. Crim. App. 1901), the county attorney was appointed to act as interpreter, and the court upheld such

action. And in Sellers v. State , 134 S.W. 348, 349 (Tex. Crim. App. 1911), even the complaining witness

acted as interpreter without there being an abuse of discretion shown. "The appointment of an interpreter

is a matter for the sound discretion of the trial judge and only an abuse of discretion will call for a reversal."

Bustillos v. State , 464 S.W.2d 118, 126 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971). In this case, although the interpreter

testified that she favored the State, she also stated that she would faithfully perform her sworn duty as an

interpreter. There is nothing in the record to show the interpreter did not accurately perform her duties in

an unbiased manner.

Appellant argues, for the first time on appeal, that the "biased interpreter" interfered with

appellant's constitutional right to counsel and with appellant's attorney-client privilege. There is nothing in

the record to show that the interpreter translated conversations between appellant and his counsel. The

record does not specifically show that defense counsel spoke and understood Spanish, but that may be

inferred; in the one instance already noted counsel during trial corrected the interpreter's translation of a

witness who was testifying in Spanish.

In considering the record presented, we conclude and hold the trial court did not abuse its

discretion in appointing an interpreter who was an employee of the county attorney's office. There is no

showing that appellant's defense was prejudiced by the interpreter. Appellant's point of error is overruled.

The judgment is affirmed.

Carl E. F. Dally, Justice

Before Justices Powers, Jones and Dally *

Affirmed

Filed: December 18, 1997

Do Not Publish

* Before Carl E. F. Dally, Judge (retired), Court of Criminal Appeals, sitting by assignment. See Tex.

Gov't Code Ann. § 74.003 (b) (West 1988).

l, only once did counsel disagree with the interpreter's translation. Counsel did

not object but corrected the translation.

Q. (By Prosecutor) Who was shooting at the house?

A. Only him.

* * * * *

Q. So Juan was shooting at the house?

A. Yes.

Q. And he wasn't shooting in the air?

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Judge, there's a mistranslation here, "at the house," "in the

house." There's a mistranslation.

THE COURT: That happens in English too. Go ahead.

Q. (By Prosecutor) So Juan was shooting at the house?

A. No, up towards the air.

Q. Did you just say that someone was shooting in the house then?

A. No.

In his brief, appellant discusses several reported cases concluding that the facts in this case

are "distinguishable from the case law." However, we find these cases to be instructive. In Brown

v. Stat e, 59 S.W. 1118 (Tex. Crim. App. 1900), the court noted there was no requirement that an

interpreter should be unbiased as far as the accused is concerned. In Tores v. State , 63 S.W. 880 , 881

(Tex. Crim. App. 1901), the county attorney was appointed to act as interpreter, and the court upheld such

action. And in Sellers v. State , 134 S.W. 348, 349 (Tex. Crim. App. 1911), even the complaining witness

acted as interpreter without there being an abuse of discretion shown. "The appointment of an interpreter

is a matter for the sound discretion of the trial judge and only an abuse of discretion will call for a reversal."

Bustillos v. State , 464 S.W.2d 118, 126 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971). In this case, although the interpreter

testified that she favored the State, she also stated that she would faithfully perform her sworn duty as an

interpreter. There is nothing in the record to show the interpreter did not accurately perform her duties in

an unbiased manner.

Appellant argues, for the first time on appeal, that the "biased interpreter" interfered with

appellant's constitutional right to counsel and with appellant's attorney-client privilege. There is nothing in

the record to show that the interpreter translated conversations between appellant and his counsel. The

record does not specifically show that defense counsel spoke and understood Spanish, but that may be

inferred; in the one instance already noted counsel during trial corrected the interpreter's translation of a

witness who was testifying in Spanish.

In considering the record presented, we conclude and hold the trial court did not abuse its

discretion in appointing an interpreter who was an employee of the county attorney's office. There is no

showing that appellant's defense was prejudic

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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