Opinion

Del Valle Independent School District v. Enrique G. Lopez, Jr.

Court
Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin)
Filed
Sep 28, 1994
Status
Published
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 35.7%

The opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT OF TEXAS,

AT AUSTIN

ON REMAND

NO. 3-92-078-CV

DEL VALLE INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, ET AL.,

APPELLANTS

vs.

ENRIQUE G. LOPEZ, JR., ET AL.,

APPELLEES

FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY, 261ST JUDICIAL DISTRICT

NO. 475,874-A, HONORABLE JOE B. DIBRELL, JR., JUDGE PRESIDING

Appellants Del Valle Independent School District; John Ojeda, Danny Zieger,

Eugene Johnson, Lee Machan, Kay DeVilbiss, Gary Viktorin, Chuck Greenwood, its Trustees;

and Edward A. Neal, its Superintendent, ("the District") bring this interlocutory appeal from a

temporary injunction.

Through a class action filed in December 1989, Enrique Lopez, Felix Rosales, and

Maurice Walker ("Plaintiffs") sought a declaration that the at-large system of electing board

members to the Del Valle Independent School District Board of Trustees violated the Texas

Constitution by diluting minority voting strength. See Tex. Const. art. I, §§ 3, 3a, 19. Plaintiffs

also requested injunctive relief enjoining the District from holding elections under the at-large

system.

Before the trial on the merits, the District offered to settle the suit by voluntarily

adopting a plan creating five single-member districts and two at-large positions (the "5-2 plan").

However, because the District would not admit that the at-large system was unconstitutional,

Plaintiffs rejected the settlement offer, and then amended their petition, contending the 5-2 plan

was also unconstitutional and seeking to enjoin the use of it in elections. The district court

severed the claims relating to the 5-2 plan from those relating to the at-large system.

In this severed cause, the district court issued an order that adopted a plan for six

single-member districts and one at-large position (the "6-1 plan"). The court ordered further that

the District was to conduct an election under this plan on May 2, 1992. (1) All parties objected to

this order and the District appealed.

On appeal to this Court, we concluded that the order was not a temporary

injunction and was therefore not an appealable order. Del Valle Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Lopez , 845

S.W.2d 916, 917 (Tex. App.--Austin 1992). Following our dismissal, the Texas Supreme Court

granted writ of error, reversed our judgment, and remanded the case to us concluding that our

dismissal was erroneous. Del Valle Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Lopez , 845 S.W.2d 808 (Tex. 1992).

We are thus confronted with whether the trial court properly granted the temporary injunction in

question.

DISCUSSION

In an appeal from an order granting a request for a temporary injunction, appellate

review is confined to the validity of the order granting the injunctive relief. The merits of the

lawsuit are not presented for review. Davis v. Huey , 571 S.W.2d 859, 861-62 (Tex. 1978).

Indeed, appellate consideration of the merits of the underlying lawsuit is error. Id . at 862; Hertz

Corp. v. State Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp. , 728 S.W.2d 917, 919 (Tex. App.--Austin 1987,

no writ). This Court may reverse the trial-court order only on a showing of a clear abuse of

discretion. Transport Co. of Tex. v. Robertson Transp. , 261 S.W.2d 549, 552 (Tex. 1953).

To be entitled to a temporary injunction, Plaintiffs had the burden to demonstrate

both a probable right to recover and a probable irreparable injury that would occur if the trial

court did not grant the injunction. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 65.011 (West 1986 &

Supp. 1994); Robertson Transp. , 261 S.W.2d at 552 ; Rutherford Oil Corp. v. General Land

Office , 776 S.W.2d 232, 234 (Tex. App.--Austin 1989, no writ). In its points of error, the District

contends that the trial court abused its discretion in enjoining the continuation of the at-large

method of electing the school board and, among other things, contends that the Texas Constitution

does not empower a state district court to provide remedies in a cause involving a voting-rights

challenge. We disagree.

As we held in a severed part of this cause:

We hold that a party may bring a voting-rights challenge under either the Texas

Constitution's equal protection clause, Tex. Const. art. I, § 3, or the equal rights

amendment, Tex. Const. art. I, § 3a. Terrazas , 829 S.W.2d at 717. Accordingly,

we conclude that Appellees clearly stated a cause of action against Del Valle under

article I, sections 3 and 3a of the Texas Constitution.

Del Valle Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Lopez , 863 S.W.2d 507 , 515 (Tex. App.--Austin 1993, writ

denied).

CONCLUSION

Since we conclude that Plaintiffs demonstrated both a probable right to recover and

a probable injury which would have resulted, we overrule the District's point of error and affirm

the temporary injunction order rendered by the district court.

Mack Kidd, Justice

Before Chief Justice Carroll, Justices Jones and Kidd

Affirmed on Remand

Filed: September 28, 1994

Do Not Publish

1. Apparently, the May 2, 1992, election was held using the 6-1 plan.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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