Opinion

Opinion issued

October 7, 2010

In

The

Court of

Appeals

For

The

First District

of Texas

———————————

NO. 01-10-00593-CV

———————————

Klaus Genssler, U.S. Oil Recovery, L.P., MCC

REcycling, L.L.P., Genssler Environmental Holdings, L.L.C., and U.S. Oil RecoverY,

LLP ,

Appellants

V.

Harris

County and the State of Texas , Appellees

On Appeal from the 125th

District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Case No. 2009-32636

O P

I N I O N

In

this interlocutory appeal, appellants, Klaus Genssler, U.S. Oil Recovery, L.P.,

MCC Recycling, L.L.P., Genssler Environmental Holdings, L.L.C., and U.S. Oil

Recovery, LLP, challenge the trial court’s order appointing a receiver. [1] Harris County and the State, acting through

the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality, brought suit against the

appellants for environmental violations on the real property located at 200 and

400 North Richey, Pasadena, in Harris County.

After evidentiary hearings, the trial court issued a temporary

injunction against appellants requiring appellants to take measures to begin

removing hazardous material and prevent further hazardous materials,

wastewater, or sewage from discharging from the property. Asserting that appellants had failed to take

any remedial measures and that the property posed an immediate risk of harm to

the public, Harris County sought and received the appointment of a receiver who

was charged with remediating the hazardous conditions on the property. The receiver was authorized to seize and sell

assets belonging to the appellants to pay for the cost of remediation and of

the receivership. We affirm in part and

reverse and remand in part.

Background

U.S.

Oil Recovery L.P. (“U.S. Oil”) operates a wastewater facility at 400 North

Richey, in Pasadena, Texas. MCC

Recycling, LLP, operates a wastewater facility at 200 North Richey. Genssler Environmental Holdings,

L.L.C., and U.S. Oil Recovery, LLP are related entities that own the

real and personal property used by the wastewater facilities. We refer to these entities collectively as

“the U.S. Oil Recovery parties.”

Genssler is in charge of some or all of these entities.

Because

facilities of this type can create significant environmental hazards, the

operation of the facilities must be conducted in compliance with state and

federal environmental laws. Harris

County filed this suit alleging that wastewater from the 200 North Richey

facility had been discharged into Vince Bayou in violation of Texas Water Code

section 26.121(a). On June 8, 2009, the

trial court signed a temporary injunction prohibiting unauthorized discharges

from the sites at 200 North Richey and 400 North Richey and requiring the

removal and disposal of hazardous waste from those sites. Because of continuing violations at the

facilities through the course of this suit, Harris County amended its petition

nine times and sought further injunctive relief.

The trial

court conducted a temporary injunction hearing on March 8, 2010. Gary Fogerty

of the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality testified concerning evidence

of releases of wastewater that he had observed at the 200 North Richey location

in May, June, and August 2009, as well as January 2010. He further testified that U.S. Oil Recovery

did not obtain required storm water discharge permits and did not have required

concrete barriers to keep wastewater from running off-site.

Mike Scanlon,

president of Norex Engineering, testified that he was asked to evaluate the

condition of the plant at 200 North Richey and also to look at 400 North Richey. He saw fluid running down the side of some

equipment. The fluid appeared as if it had flowed over the secondary

containment onto the ground at the 400 North Richey facility. Scanlon stated that the facility had leaks

and did not meet the secondary containment requirements imposed by federal

regulations to operate as an oil recycling facility. He further testified that wastewater was

leaking from the facilities and that such facilities are a danger to the health

and safety of Harris County citizens.

Jennifer

Wheeler, the compliance services manager for Harris County Public Health and

Environmental Services, testified that the U.S. Oil Recovery parties had been

cited for approximately sixty violations since the granting of the June 8, 2009

temporary injunction. Thirteen of the

violations were for illegal wastewater discharges. Thirty-four were for hazardous and solid waste

violations, while nine were for nuisances.

She further testified that a half million gallons of wastewater from the

facilities had entered the bayou.

Robert Alan,

manager of the Permits and Technical Services Section of the Environmental

Public Health Division of Harris County Public Health and Environmental

Services, testified that there was no authorization to store hazardous waste at

the 400 North Richey facility. However,

hazardous waste—benzene—was stored in 205 roll-off boxes for longer than 90

days. The estimated cost to remove the

waste in the roll-off boxes was between 1 and 1.6 million dollars.

On March 11,

2010, the trial court granted a second temporary injunction. The court found that Harris County is likely

to prevail at the trial on the merits of its various claims, including its

claim that Genssler is the person in charge of the subject operations and has

caused, suffered, allowed, or permitted violations of the law that have

resulted in the conditions at 200 North Richey and 400 North Richey, Pasadena,

Texas. The court ordered Genssler and

the U.S. Oil Recovery parties to remove and dispose of the hazardous waste

within 60 days of the effective date of the order. Genssler and the U.S. Oil Recovery parties did

not appeal the temporary injunction.

At the

hearing on the application to appoint a receiver in this case the trial court

heard testimony from Norm Williamson, Jr., a fire prevention investigator and

inspector with the Fire Marshall’s Office.

Williamson inspected the 400 North Richey facility on June 8, 2010. He found hazardous material, electrical

hazards, and flammable liquids in the same area as oil waste products. He also found leaking drums. Williamson stated that the facilities

contained fire hazards that are dangerous and in need of immediate attention. Williamson further stated that there is no

containment of chemicals inside the buildings at the facilities and the

chemicals can be washed into the bayou next to the site.

The trial

court had previously heard testimony at the temporary injunction hearing on

March 8, 2010 from Adele Pollard, a former employee of U.S. Oil. Pollard testified that vessels and equipment

were not being maintained at U.S. Oil and MCC Recycling. Pollard said that he saw spillage from the

tanks at the 400 North Richey location.

He stated that hazardous waste was stored in leaking drums at the 400

North Richey location and there was a danger of the equipment failing and

releasing wastewater into the bayou. He

further testified that U.S. Oil emits air contaminants from a slurry dryer and

there were frequent discharges from spills or overflows at the 200 North Richey

location. He said that Genssler could

barely make payroll and he did not believe that Genssler had the funds to fix

the things that needed to be fixed to “get the place in order.” Similarly, Robert Brown, the controller at

U.S. Oil Recovery, said that U.S. Oil had had problems making payroll and had

laid off about 20 employees in the three months prior to the temporary

injunction hearing. He said that he did

not know of any way that U.S. Oil could borrow any of the funds necessary to

get $1.6 million to remove the roll-off boxes.

He further stated that U.S. Oil has no equity in the land or buildings. Brown told the trial court that as of March

11, 2010, U.S. Oil Recovery L.P. was not an adequately capitalized business and

that Genssler controls the activities of all employees of U.S. Oil directly or indirectly.

At the

conclusion of the hearing the trial court granted the application to appoint a

receiver, requiring a $100 bond from Harris County, the applicant, and a $100 bond

from the receiver. The court stated

in the order that it took judicial notice of all testimony and

evidence at the receivership hearing and previous hearings in the case. The order concerning “ Defendants

Klaus Genssler, individually, and d/b/a U.S. Oil Recovery, L.P., MCC Recycling, L.L.P., Genssler Environmental

Holdings, L.L.C., and U.S. Oil Recovery, LLP, a/k/a U.S. Oil Recovery,

L.L.P.,” reads as follows:

1. [They] are violating environmental laws

and putting the health and safety of residents of Harris County at risk by

storing hazardous and flammable waste in conditions that have created an

imminent fire and flood hazard at their facilities at 200 and 400 North Richey

Road in Pasadena, Texas;

2. [They] have violated this Court’s

temporary injunction order signed on March 11, 2010, by failing to remove the

hazardous and flammable waste and all industrial waste and wastewater from

their properties at 200 and 400 North Richey Road;

3. [They] have failed to appear for two

depositions ordered by this Court and have refused to accept service to appear

in court upon court order to show cause in response to plaintiffs Motions for

Contempt;

. . .

8. [S]ince the receivership was filed, [they]

have caused or have allowed or permitted others to remove valuable industrial

equipment from their possession from 200 North Richey Road and 400 North Richey

Road in Pasadena, Texas to places unknown;

In its order,

the trial court also makes specific findings concerning Genssler, individually,

as follows:

4. [His] current whereabouts are unknown

and he effectively has abandoned the facilities at 200 and 400 North Richey

Road in Pasadena, Texas;

5. [He] has indicated in his reports to Harris County

and the State of Texas that he and his companies have no money to clean up the

properties pursuant to the terms of the Temporary Injunction, but is not in

bankruptcy;

6. [He] has previously been found to be

causing, suffering, allowing or permitting pollution to take place at 200 and

400 North Richey Road;

7. [He] has taken approximately $10,000,000.00

per year from the defendant businesses for the past 3-4 years, and has not

reinvested this money into these companies. As a result, the physical plants at

defendants’ 200 and 400 North Richey

Road facilities have fallen into disrepair to such a degree that they now pose

a serious threat to the safety of the residents and the environment in Harris

County, Texas;

The trial

court also makes findings concerning the receiver.

9. A receivership is necessary because there

is no other adequate remedy at law as defendants have failed to comply with two

temporary injunctions, and have failed to appear in court when ordered to do

so. In addition, there is an imminent threat to the residents of Harris County

because defendants’ facilities have limited fire protection and are illegally

storing hazardous and other industrial waste, as well as flammable waste, on

property that is partially in the floodplain and floodway;

10. I f

any portion of the Receiver’s compensation under this order exceeds the Defendants’

assets which are under receivership, Harris County agrees to compensate the

Receiver up to ten thousand dollars ($10,000) for these services under this

order. These funds are already authorized by Harris County Commissioners Court.

Any additional amount this Court determines Harris County is to pay the

Receiver is subject to approval by Commissioners Court. The Receiver will be compensated at three

hundred fifty dollars ($350) per hour, subject to approval by Commissioners

Court. Harris County is ordered to place

ten thousand dollars ($10,000) in the Court's registry as a deposit against the

Receiver’s fees.

The

trial court also granted the receiver the following power, among others:

That the Receiver is authorized to use any means allowed

under the statute to bring the defendants’ facilities at 200 North Richey Road

and 400 North Richey Road in Pasadena, Texas permanently into compliance with

environmental laws, [2]

including:

a) seizing all assets in possession or

control of defendants, Klaus Genssler, individually, and d/b/a U.S. Oil

Recovery, LP., MCC Recycling, L.L.P., Genssler Environmental Holdings, L.L.C.,

and U.S. Oil Recovery, LLP a/k/a U.S.

Oil Recovery, L.L.P., including any entities controlled or managed by Klaus

Genssler, or monies received for the benefit of Klaus Genssler; and,

b) using the assets obtained to pay the

Receiver’s fees, and to hire an environmental remediation company to [remediate

the property].

Law of Receivership and

Standard of Review

We should

affirm a trial court’s interlocutory order appointing a receiver unless the

trial court clearly abused its discretion.

Benefield v. State , 266 S.W.3d

25, 31 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, no pet.) (citing Mueller v.

Beamalloy, Inc. , 994 S.W.2d

855, 858 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no pet); Abella v. Knight Oil

Tools , 945 S.W.2d 847, 849

(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, no writ)).

A trial court abuses its discretion when it rules arbitrarily, unreasonably, without regard

to guiding legal principles, or without supporting evidence. See Bocquet v. Herring , 972 S.W.2d 19, 21 (Tex. 1998); Pickens

v. Pickens , 62 S.W.3d 212,

214 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2001, pet. denied).

Under the abuse

of discretion

standard, legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence are not independent grounds for

asserting error, but they are relevant factors in assessing whether the trial

court abused its discretion. Pickens , 62 S.W.3d at 214 . The trial court does not abuse its discretion when its decision is based

on conflicting evidence

and some evidence in

the record reasonably supports the trial court’s decision. Butnaru v. Ford Motor Co. , 84 S.W.3d 198, 211 (Tex. 2002).

“The

appointment of a receiver . . . is a harsh, drastic, and extraordinary remedy,

to be used cautiously.” Benefield , 266 S.W.3d at 31 (citing Hunt

v. Merch. Mart, Inc. , 391

S.W.2d 141, 145 (Tex. Civ. App.­—Dallas 1965, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Balias v.

Balias, Inc. , 748 S.W.2d

253, 257 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, writ denied)). A trial court should not appoint a receiver

if another remedy exists, either legal or equitable. Id.

(citing Rowe v. Rowe ,

887 S.W.2d 191, 200 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1994, writ denied)). Our review focuses on whether the pleadings

and evidence are sufficient to justify a receivership. Id.

(citing Covington Knox, Inc. v. State , 577 S.W.2d 323, 325 (Tex. Civ. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1979,

no pet.)). If the decision to appoint a

receiver was within the trial court’s discretion, we may not reverse simply

because we might have reached a different decision. Id.

(citing Beaumont Bank, N.A. v. Buller , 806 S.W.2d 223, 226 (Tex. 1991)).

Receivership against

Non-Parties

In

his fifth issue, and several times within his other issues, Genssler contends

the trial court erred by appointing a receiver to seize assets of non-party

entities. However, Genssler has provided

no evidence to establish his standing to assert the rights of a non-party. See Birnbaum v. Alliance of American Insurers ,

994 S.W.2d 766, 779 (Tex. App.—Austin, 1999), abrogated on other grounds by In re Bass , 113 S.W.3d 735 (Tex.

2003). We hold that Genssler lacks

standing to appeal an order concerning non-parties. See Goffney v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist. , No. 01-08-00063-CV, 2009 WL

2343250 , *3–4 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] July 30, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op.)

(holding that appellant lacked standing on appeal to challenge alleged

procedural due process violations against third party).

We overrule Genssler’s fifth issue.

Receiver over Genssler’s Personal Estate

In his third

issue, Genssler contends that the trial court erred by appointing a receiver

over his personal assets when there has been no showing that he owns any of the

real or personal property at 200 or 400 North Richey.

In its

petition, the only theory of liability that Harris County alleged against

Genssler, individually, is that the U.S. Oil parties are his “alter ego.” Generally, a business entity exists as a

separate legal entity, insulating the individuals who own ownership interests

from personal liability. Country Village Homes, Inc. v. Patterson ,

236 S.W.3d 413, 428 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, pet. granted, judgm’t

vacated w.r.m.). The alter ego theory

allows the individual to be liable for the business entity when there is such a

unity between the business entity and the individual that the business entity

has ceased to be a separate entity, and allowing the individual to avoid

liability through the use of the business entity would work an injustice. See id. Evidence relevant to prove an alter ego

theory includes: (1) payment of alleged business debts with personal funds or

other commingling of funds, (2) representations that the individual will

financially back the business entity, (3) diversion of profits for the

individual’s personal use, (4) inadequate capitalization, and (5) other

failures to keep business and personal assets separate. Id. A showing that an individual is an officer,

director, or majority owner of the ownership interest is insufficient to

support a finding of alter ego. Id.

Here, the

trial court found that Genssler “has taken” $10,000,000 per year from the U.S.

Oil Recovery parties. The only evidence

that Harris County identifies in support of the alter ego theory is the

testimony of a former employee of U.S. Oil and the testimony of a current

employee. Adele Pollard, the former

employee, testified that Genssler is the president of U.S. Oil, “the man in charge”

of U.S. Oil, and “makes all the decisions” at U.S. Oil. Robert Brown, the Controller for U.S. Oil

testified that Genssler controls U.S. Oil and directly or indirectly controls

the activities of U.S. Oil employees.

Brown further testified that U.S. Oil was not adequately capitalized as of

the March 8, 2010 temporary injunction hearing.

No evidence

shows, however, that the U.S. Oil Recovery parties’ profits were diverted for

Genssler’s individual use or that there was a failure to keep Genssler’s assets

separate from the U.S. Oil Recovery parties assets. No evidence shows that Genssler owns any

interest in any of the U.S. Oil Recovery parties. There is no evidence in the record of Genssler

personally paying debts owed by the U.S. Oil Recovery parties. Furthermore, Genssler’s status as an officer

or director is insufficient, standing alone, to support an alter ego

theory. See id. Because there is no

evidence that Genssler owns an interest in any of the U.S. Oil Recovery parties

or that the U.S. Oil Recovery parties are his alter ego, we hold that the trial

court abused its discretion by appointing a receiver over property owned by

Genssler individually.

We sustain

Genssler’s third issue. Because we

sustain this issue, we need not address Genssler’s other issues.

Bond

In

their first issue, the U.S. Oil Recovery parties assert the trial court erred

by appointing a receiver because the requirements of Texas Rule of Civil

Procedure 695a have not been met.

Specifically, they contend that the trial court’s setting the bond in

the amount of $100 is insufficient to cover their likely damages in the event

they prevail at trial.

Rule

695a provides, in pertinent part,

No receiver shall be appointed with authority to take

charge of property until the party applying therefor has filed with the clerk

of the court a good and sufficient bond, to be approved by such clerk, payable

to the defendant in the amount fixed by the court, conditioned for the payment

of all damages and cost in such suit, in case it should be decided that such

receiver was wrongfully appointed to take charge of such property. The amount of such bond shall be fixed at a

sum sufficient to cover all such probable damages and costs.

Tex. R. Civ. P.

695a. Courts have held that the

applicant’s failure to file a bond in compliance with rule 695a requires

reversal of the order appointing a receiver.

Rubin v. Gilmore , 561 S.W.2d

231, 234 (Tex. Civ. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]

1977, no writ); O’Connor v.

O’Connor , 320 S.W.2d 384, 391 (Tex. Civ. App.—Dallas 1959, writ dism’d). As this Court stated,

The trial court was not, however, authorized to appoint a

receiver in the absence of an applicant’s bond filed in compliance with Rule

695a, Tex. R. Civ. P. Neither the filing

of the receiver’s bond nor the filing of the temporary injunction bond satisfied

this requirement. The requirement of an

applicant’s bond is mandatory, and non-compliance with Rule 695a requires the

reversal of the order appointing the receiver.

Rubin ,

561 S.W.2d at 234 (citations omitted).

Generally,

the amount of a bond rests in the trial court’s discretion. See

Childre v. Great Southwest Life Ins. Co. , 700 S.W.2d 284, 289 (Tex. App.—Dallas

1985, no writ) (bond for receiver); see

also M aples v Muscletech, Inc. , 74 S.W.3d 429, 431 (Tex.

App.—Amarillo 2002, no pet.) (bond for temporary injunction). [3] Here, the U.S. Oil Recovery parties contend

the amount of the bond is insufficient.

They employ the following reasoning.

First, the receiver has been appointed to remediate the property at

issue. The receiver has been empowered

to sell assets of the U.S. Oil Recovery parties to raise funds to pay for

remediation. Harris County “stated in

open court that even $90,000 would not be enough to get started.” The U.S. Oil Recovery parties conclude that

their minimum damages will be $90,000.

Therefore, they contend a bond for $100 is “clearly insufficient” and

the trial court’s order must be reversed.

We

disagree with this reasoning for two reasons.

First, if the receiver sells assets and then applies the proceeds to

remediate the property, the U.S. Oil Recovery parties have not been truly

damaged. Rather, the U.S. Oil Recovery

parties will be in the position they should be now—assets will have been sold

and money spent, but in return the appellants will receive property that complies

with the trial court’s unappelaed injunction order. The U.S. Oil Recovery parties do not explain

how a receiver to bring the property in conformity with the applicable laws and

with the trial court’s unappealed injunction causes them any harm. Second, other

than the statement by Harris County that “$90,000 would not be enough to get

started,” the U.S. Oil Recovery parties identify no evidence showing what their

damages would be in the event the receiver was wrongfully appointed. Without some evidence in the record that

supports a higher bond amount, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused

its discretion. See IAC, Ltd. v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc. , 160 S.W.3d 191, 203

(Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2005, no pet.) (holding trial court did not abuse its

discretion in setting temporary injunction bond at $350,000 when appellant

presented no evidence its damages would exceed that amount); Speedman Oil Co. v. Duval County Ranch Co. ,

504 S.W.2d 923, 931 (Tex. Civ. App.—San Antonio 1973, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (“Defendants’

argument that the amount of the bond is insufficient is not unpersuasive. However, the record furnishes no reliable

information which would guide us in setting the proper amount.”); see also Connell Chevrolet, Inc. v. Carter ,

No. 01-94-00595-CV, 1994 WL 525902 , at *6 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Sept.

29, 1994, no writ) (not designated for publication) (holding trial court did

not abuse its discretion in setting temporary injunction bond at $1000 when

appellant asserted amount was “patently an abuse of discretion” but failed to

introduce any evidence to show possible damages from injunction); Taylor v. Parker , No. 01-87-00393, 1988

WL 10770 , at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Feb. 11, 1988, no writ) (not

designated for publication) (stating, in appeal from interlocutory order

appointing receiver, “appellant bore the burden of showing that the

circumstances dictated a more substantial bond”).

We overrule the U.S. Oil Recovery parties’ first issue.

Mueller Case

The

U.S. Oil Recovery parties contend that the trial court’s order is an

impermissible order granting a “liquidating receivership,” citing this Court’s

opinion in Mueller v. Beamalloy, Inc. ,

994 S.W.2d 855 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no pet.).

In Mueller , this Court held that section

64.001(a)(6) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code does not authorize

the appointment of a liquidating receiver over a corporation . In Mueller , this Court addressed the authority of the trial court’s

appointing a receiver authorized to carry out “the liquidation of the assets

and business of the corporation.” Id. at 859 (quoting former Tex. Bus. Corp. Act. Ann. art. 7.06A); compare Tex. Bus. Orgs. Code § 11.405 (Vernon 2010) (current

version of statute, stating court may appoint a receiver charged with

“liquidation of the property and business of the domestic entity”). Here, the

receiver has not been charged with liquidation of the property and business of

the U.S. Oil Recovery parties. Rather,

the receiver is charged with remediating the property and has been authorized

to sell assets as necessary to fund the remediation efforts. This is not a “liquidating receiver” as

discussed in Mueller . We hold that Mueller does not apply to this case.

We overrule the U.S. Oil Recovery parties’ second issue.

Conclusion

We

affirm that portion of the trial court’s order appointing a receiver over U. S.

Oil Recovery, L.P., MCC Recycling, L.L.P., Genssler Environmental Holdings,

L.L.C., and U.S. Oil Recovery, LLP for the purposes of remediating the

properties at 200 and 400 North Richey in Pasadena. We reverse that portion of the

trial court’s order appointing a receiver over the assets and estate of Klaus

Genssler, individually, and remand this cause for the trial court to modify the

order appointing a receiver by removing references to Klaus Genssler,

individually, in accordance with this opinion.

Elsa

Alcala

Justice

Panel consists of Chief

Justice Radack and Justices Jennings and Alcala.

[1] See

Tex.

Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann.

§ 51.014(a)(1) (Vernon 2008) (authorizing appeal of interlocutory order

appointing receiver).

[2] At oral argument, the panel discussed

the phrase “permanent compliance” contained in the order appointing a receiver

with the parties. Harris County

explained that, as used in the order, the phrase means “complete compliance.” The U.S. Oil Recovery parties have not challenged

the use of that phrase on appeal; we, therefore, do not address it.

[3] As

the Dallas court of appeals noted in a case dealing with the sufficiency of a

temporary injunction bond, “Surprisingly, there is little authority to guide us

. . . .” Currie v.

Int’l Telecharge, Inc. , 722 S.W.2d 471, 475 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1986, no

writ). The cases cited by the U.S. Oil

Recovery parties all concern the absence of an applicant’s bond, not the

insufficiency of the amount of the bond.

See, e.g. , Rubin

v. Gilmore , 561 S.W.2d 231,

234 (Tex. Civ. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]

1977, no writ). We, therefore,

look to cases involving bonds for a temporary injunction or for a receiver

because the bonds in each of those circumstances serve a similar purpose to the

bond required of an applicant for a receivership. Compare

Tex. R. Civ. P. 695a (applicant’s bond must be conditioned on payment of “all damages and

cost in such suit, in case it should be decided that such receiver was

wrongfully appointed to take charge of such property” with Tex. R.

Civ. P. 684 (injunction bond must be conditioned on

payment of “ all sums of money and costs that may be

adjudged against him if the restraining order or temporary injunction shall be

dissolved in whole or in part”); see also

Fite v. Emtel, Inc. , No. 01-07-00273-CV, 2008 WL 4427676 , at *9 (Tex.

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Oct 2, 2008, pet denied) (stating purpose of

applicant’s and receiver’s bonds “is to ensure that the defendant can be

reimbursed for any damages caused by the appointment of the receiver in the event that the receiver was

wrongfully appointed”).