Douglas A. Murphy v. American Rice, Inc.

Opinion issued March 9, 2007

Opinion issued March 9, 2007

In The

Court of Appeals

For The

First District of Texas

____________

NO. 01-03-01357-CV

____________

DOUGLAS A. MURPHY, Appellant

V.

AMERICAN RICE, INC., Appellee

On Appeal from the 157th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 99-51044

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant,

Douglas A. Murphy, appeals from a final judgment, rendered upon a jury verdict

and upon trial-court determination, of $4,404,171 in actual damages and $10

million in exemplary damages rendered against him and in favor of appellee,

American Rice, Inc. (“ARI”). 1

We determine (1) whether Murphy has not properly presented certain of

his appellate challenges for having raised them only in his reply brief; (2)

whether ARI had standing to assert all or part of the causes of action for

which it sued Murphy and, if not, whether reversal is required; (3) whether

Murphy preserved his jury-charge-error challenges; (4) whether legally

sufficient evidence supported the jury’s findings on liability and actual

damages against Murphy for conspiracy; and (5) whether the trial court erred in

awarding the exemplary damages that it did.

We affirm.

Background

ARI

was originally an agricultural cooperative formed by rice farmers to market,

and later to process, rice. ARI became a

publicly traded corporation in 1988.

In

1986, ARI formed a joint venture with Comet Rice (“Comet”). 2

At the time, Murphy was the chief executive officer of Comet. The joint venture between Comet and ARI was

called Comet American Marketing (“CAM”). CAM was

formed to market ARI and Comet rice brands.

Murphy was CAM’s president. C. Bronson Schultz was CAM’s

financial officer. Murphy became a board

member of ARI in the late 1980s, and he later became ARI’s president in 1993

and eventually its chief executive officer.

Pursuant to the ARI–Comet joint-venture agreement, CAM obtained ARI’s

and Comet’s rice, which CAM then sold on credit to a distributor, Best

Beverage, for distribution in Haiti. After Best Beverage defaulted in the amount

of about $3,000,000, a company named Rice Corporation of Haiti (“RCH”) was formed to process and to

market CAM’s rice. The ownership of RCH was at the heart of this

lawsuit.

The

parties’ evidence diverged on how and for whom RCH was formed. According to ARI’s evidence, after Best

Beverage had defaulted, Comet decided to run its own Haitian rice

operation. The intention was for Comet

(or CAM: the testimony conflicted on that

point) to own this company, which would be incorporated as RCH. Comet sent employees to find a facility, and

they found a suitable rice mill in Laffiteau,

Haiti. To begin this process of incorporating a

company for Comet to run the Laffiteau facility, Murphy and Robert Papanos, CAM’s

director of Carribean sales, met, on behalf of Comet or CAM (the testimony

conflicted on that point), with lawyers at a Haitian law firm, Cabinette

Lamarre, in the late 1980s. The Haitian

attorneys advised Murphy and Papanos that, under Haitian law, only individuals

could be shareholders. For this reason,

Murphy and Papanos had themselves, another Comet employee (Ray Koza, CAM’s director of domestic sales), and a Haitian attorney

(Louis M. Lamarre), named as founders of RCH, with Murphy’s being named general

director. 3

No share certificates were yet issued.

RCH

officially became a corporation in 1991, when certain information pertaining to

it was published in the Haitian newspaper, Le Moniteur , as required by

Haitian law. Murphy, Papanos, Koza, and

Lamarre were listed in Le Moniteur as RCH’s shareholders and founders

and as having paid part of RCH’s initial capitalization of $20,000. However, ARI’s evidence showed

● that

Papanos never considered himself to be an owner of RCH and instead viewed CAM or Comet as the owner;

● that

Papanos and Koza never actually paid anything for their shares;

● that, at

Murphy’s instruction, Papanos had CAM wire

Cabinette Lamarre $20,000, which the factfinder could reasonably have inferred

was for RCH’s initial capitalization of $20,000;

● that

Koza did not even know until 1998 that he had been named a founder and

shareholder of RCH;

● that ARI

“would not [later] have spent $3 million on something [RCH] that [ARI did not]

own”; 4

● that

Murphy affirmatively represented multiple times—including in filings with the

Securities and Exchange Commission, in merger and debt-offering documents, in

ARI’s annual reports, in letters to shareholders or to others, and in employee

newsletters, all of which he personally signed—that RCH was the wholly owned

subsidiary of Comet or ARI, as Comet’s later successor;

● that

Murphy told ARI’s counsel in 1993 that RCH was “one hundred percent beneficially

owned by Comet and that for purposes of Haitian law nominally 20 percent by a

Haitian citizen” and that Comet had “paid for” RCH; and

● that

Murphy did not begin asserting that he owned RCH personally, as opposed to

nominally for Comet’s (or ARI’s) benefit, until about the time that ARI filed

for bankruptcy in 1998.

In sum, ARI’s evidence showed that

Comet owned RCH from RCH’s inception and that Murphy, Papanos, Koza, and

Lamarre held RCH’s stock only nominally, for the benefit of Comet or CAM.

Murphy’s

evidence differed sharply and can be summarized, in part, as follows: he

personally paid for his shares in cash or services; any written statements that

he made to the effect that RCH was ARI’s wholly owned subsidiary were either

done unknowingly or by misunderstanding (for example, Murphy testified that he

overlooked the statements or did not read some of the documents) or were done

by others; that he had consistently claimed personal ownership of his shares in

RCH; that Koza was aware before 1998 that he was an owner of RCH; that Comet

did not own RCH merely because it had provided RCH’s start-up equipment; that

ARI and RCH treated each other as independent companies; and that ARI obtained

no ownership interest in RCH for the money that it spent on RCH.

As

noted above, on May 23, 1993, ARI acquired all of Comet’s assets in exchange

for ARI stock. Murphy was Comet’s

vice-president and a director at the time.

One of the assets that Comet expressly and repeatedly acknowledged

during the transaction that it was selling to ARI was all of the shares of

capital stock that it owned in RCH, as its wholly owned subsidiary. 5

Murphy, as Comet’s vice-president, personally signed a closing document

containing one of those representations in the asset sale. Given their differing positions on whether

Murphy held his stock in RCH nominally for Comet or personally, the parties

dispute whether the merger and asset acquisition actually transferred any stock

interest in RCH from Comet to ARI.

After

the asset purchase, in the fall of 1993, ARI and RCH entered into an operating

agreement under which ARI shipped rice to RCH for RCH to process and to sell (“the

operating agreement”). Under the

operating agreement, RCH was to receive 10 percent of the sale price of the

rice, a processing fee calculated according to the weight of rice processed,

and an unloading fee (to account for Haitian taxes). The parties appear to have disputed below, at

least to some extent, whether ARI and RCH ever abided by or operated pursuant

to the operating agreement.

In

1994, according to RCH’s board minutes, RCH’s shareholders changed by virtue of

assignment of “ownership right on the shares [sic] certificates that were not

yet printed and issued”: Murphy was described as owning 90 percent of RCH’s

shares; former appellant Lawrence H. Theriot, an ARI employee, 6 was described as owning five percent

of the shares; and another Haitian attorney, Emmanuel Nerette, was described as

owning five percent of the shares.

In

1995, ARI effectuated a debt offering to pay off debt left from the 1993 merger

and asset acquisition of Comet. In the

documents generated to effectuate the debt offering, ARI listed RCH as its

wholly owned subsidiary. RCH was also

listed as the wholly owned subsidiary of ARI in the tax forms that ARI and its

parent corporation, ERLY, filed and on various other of ARI’s documents.

ARI

filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy on August 11, 1998. The principal reasons for the bankruptcy were

(1) a March 1998 judgment against Murphy, his father, ARI, and ERLY for

millions of dollars for fraud that Murphy and his father had committed in a

business deal—the basis for ARI’s involvement being basically that Murphy’s

father had pledged his stock in ERLY in that deal (“the Tenzer judgment”);

(2) a liquidity problem due to high interest rates associated with the 1995

debt offering; and (3) problems in the Saudi Arabian market. In the bankruptcy, ARI submitted a second

amended plan of reorganization (“the bankruptcy plan”), which the bankruptcy

court confirmed in July 1999. The

bankruptcy plan contemplated, among other things, that ARI would incorporate a

successor company—also named ARI, but incorporated in Delaware—into which the Texas-incorporated

ARI would merge after bankruptcy. Pursuant to the confirmed bankruptcy plan,

the Delaware ARI incorporated on September 27, 1999. The newly incorporated ARI board issued a

written consent in lieu of first board meeting on September 28, 1999, in which

the Delaware-incorporated ARI made Murphy its president. The Texas-incorporated ARI then merged with

the Delaware-incorporated ARI on September 29, 1999, with the surviving

corporation being the Delaware-incorporated ARI. 7 ARI came out of bankruptcy on

October 1, 1999.

On

October 4, 1999, ARI’s board unanimously voted to terminate, effective

immediately, Murphy’s employment with ARI and “all its subsidiaries

. . . in which [ARI] has voting control.” 8 The board authorized and directed

Schultz to notify ARI’s subsidiaries that Murphy’s employment had been

terminated and to have Murphy removed as a signatory on “any accounts or

contractual relationships involved with such subsidiaries . . . with

which [ARI] does business, including, without limitation, [RCH].”

Nevertheless,

by October 6, 1999, Murphy had returned to Haiti. Joe Schwartz, ARI’s accounting manager who

had lived in Haiti for two

years in the corporate house that ARI rented, returned to Haiti on

October 6. An armed guard refused him

entrance to the corporate house for which ARI paid rent and advised him that

RCH had terminated the operating agreement with ARI. ARI’s evidence showed that Theriot also

denied Schwartz entrance to the house and to RCH’s plant and sales office. ARI could no longer control its Haitian

assets after October 6, 1999.

ARI

sued Murphy and Theriot on October 8, 1999, based generally on their actions in

Haiti

relating to RCH in October 1999. By the

time of trial, ARI’s “live” petition alleged the following causes of action:

monies had and received; breach of fiduciary duty and “usurpation of corporate

opportunity”; conversion; actual fraud; and constructive fraud. ARI sought actual and exemplary damages,

including those above the exemplary-damages cap because of alleged Penal Code

violations; a declaratory judgment that “ARI owns 100% of the stock of RCH, and

that Murphy and Theriot have no ownership interest in RCH or its assets”;

attorney’s fees; and a permanent injunction “barring Murphy and Theriot from

persisting in their wrongful conduct . . . .” Murphy answered, alleging, among other

things, that ARI had no standing to sue him because ARI “does not own any such

claims.” 9

The

parties submitted ARI’s declaratory-judgment action concerning ownership of RCH

to the court. The trial court found in

favor of ARI on that issue and entered findings of fact and conclusions of law

post-verdict.

The

jury found, in pertinent part, as follows:

● ARI paid

the purchase price for RCH and its assets and did not intend to make a gift of

RCH or its assets to Murphy; 10

● Murphy

failed to comply with his fiduciary duties to ARI, and

a. he

realized a “profit” of $4,344,172 from that breach and

b. the

following sums of money would fairly and reasonably compensate ARI for its

damages that were proximately caused by Murphy’s breach:

i. $837,747

in misappropriated funds;

ii. $2,157,347

in misappropriated rice;

iii. $1,409,077

in misappropriated property other than rice or cash; and

iv. $4,404,171

in “ARI’s ownership interest” that was misappropriated. 11

● Murphy

committed fraud, which the jury found by clear and convincing evidence, against

ARI and also constructively defrauded ARI, both of which frauds resulted in the

exact same categories and amounts of damages as those that the jury found for

Murphy’s breach of fiduciary duty. 12

● Murphy

converted property belonging to ARI, and that conversion resulted in the exact

same categories and amounts of damages as those that the jury found for Murphy’s

breach of fiduciary duty; 13

● Murphy

was prohibited from claiming legal title to RCH’s stock; 14

● Murphy

received $837,747 “that, in equity and good conscience, belongs to ARI”; 15

● Murphy

and Theriot were part of a conspiracy that damaged ARI; 16

● The harm

resulting to ARI resulted from Murphy’s malice; 17

● Murphy

and Theriot should each be assessed $20,000,000 in exemplary damages; 18 and

● Murphy

committed three Penal Code offenses, which had the legal effect of removing the

cap on exemplary damages. 19

The

trial court rendered judgment on the jury’s verdict, awarding ARI $4,404,171 in

actual damages against Murphy and Theriot, jointly and severally; reducing the

exemplary-damages award to $10,000,000 against each of Murphy and Theriot;

declaring that the RCH share certificates issued to Murphy (180 of 200 shares)

and Theriot (10 of 200 shares), to the extent valid, were for the benefit of

and owned by ARI; permanently enjoining Murphy and Theriot from asserting

ownership of, rights to, or management and control over RCH or its assets and

from interfering with ARI’s ownership and rights in RCH and its assets;

ordering Murphy and Theriot to transfer and to assign (ostensibly to ARI) any

right, title, and interest that they held in RCH and its assets; and awarding

pre- and post-judgment interest. The

trial court also entered fact findings and legal conclusions concerning the

matters on which it had ruled. Murphy

filed motions for new trial, for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (“JNOV”),

and to disregard certain jury answers, all of which the trial court expressly

overruled.

Unchallenged Matters

On

appeal, Murphy does not challenge the trial court’s legal conclusions, or the

fact findings supporting them, that “ARI’s ownership interest in RCH is

superior to any claim of ownership of . . . Murphy and

. . . Theriot”; that the RCH share certificates in Murphy’s and

Theriot’s names were “for the benefit of ARI”; and that Murphy and Theriot were

estopped “from claiming an ownership interest in RCH or its stock as against

the claims of ownership of ARI.” Neither

does he challenge on appeal the jury’s findings (1) that “ARI paid the purchase

price for RCH and its assets” and (2) that Murphy and Theriot were “prohibited

from claiming legal title to the stock of RCH.”

Murphy has also declined to challenge the final judgment’s provisions

(1) declaring that the RCH share certificates in Murphy’s and Theriot’s names

were, to the extent valid, “for the benefit of ARI”; (2) permanently enjoining

Murphy from “asserting ownership of, rights to, or management and control over

[RCH] and its assets or from interfering with the ownership and management of

and rights to [RCH] and its assets . . .”; and (3) ordering Murphy

and Theriot to “take any and all action necessary to transfer and assign any

and all right, title and interest that they hold in [RCH] and its assets

. . . .” Accordingly, we

must take as true that Comet owned RCH from its inception; that ARI owned—through

its purchase of Comet’s assets in 1993—the stock that Murphy held in RCH; and

that RCH was thus the subsidiary of ARI. 20

Matters Not Properly Raised

For

the first time in his reply brief, Murphy (1) asserts that ARI’s claims are

barred by the statute of limitations; (2) raises various factual-sufficiency

challenges; (3) argues that the trial court erred in entering fact findings and

legal conclusions concerning ownership of RCH that contradicted its other legal

conclusion taking judicial notice of Haitian corporate law; and (4) asserts

that the trial court impermissibly commented on the weight of the evidence by

charging the jury in a way that allegedly assumed the truth of the disputed

fact of ARI’s ownership of RCH and its assets.

However, these issues do not merely “address[] . . . matter[s]

in the appellee’s brief,” as the appellate rules provide for reply briefs, but

are wholly new challenges. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.3. Likewise, Murphy has not moved this Court to

permit amendment of his opening brief’s issues, and he has not explained why

justice requires us to consider issues that he did not timely raise and that,

in fact, he did not assert until after the cause was already set on the

submission calendar. 21

See Tex. R. App. P.

38.7 (“A brief may be amended or supplemented whenever justice requires, on

whatever reasonable terms the court may prescribe.”). Under these circumstances, we do not consider

the new, substantive challenges that Murphy belatedly asserts in his reply

brief. See Yazdchi v. Bank One, Tex.,

N.A. , 177 S.W.3d 399 , 404 n.18 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet. denied)

(declining to consider substantive arguments raised by appellants for first

time in reply brief).

Standing

In

issue one, 22 Murphy argues that ARI did not have

standing to sue “based on conduct that occurred before it came into existence”

because (1) some of the claims that “ARI (Del) asserted in this case arose

before ARI (Del) came into existence through its incorporation on September 27,

1999” and (2) those claims thus “were owned by ARI (Tex), which, through

bankruptcy, assigned them to . . . the Indenture Trustee, in a

Confirmed Plan of Reorganization.” Also

under issue one, Murphy argues that ARI did not have standing to sue for

misappropriation of property other than its rice because that property was

owned by RCH, ARI’s subsidiary corporation, not by ARI, RCH’s principal

shareholder. 23

A. Standard

of Review

Murphy

raised at least some standing arguments akin to these in his motions for JNOV

and for new trial, but even if he had not, standing, as an element of

subject-matter jurisdiction, may be raised for the first time on appeal. See Tex.

Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd. , 852

S.W.2d 440 , 445–46 (Tex.

1993). When standing is raised and considered for the first time on appeal

(and, likewise, when it is raised post-trial, as here), we “must construe the

petition in favor of the [pleading] party, and if necessary, review the entire

record to determine if any evidence supports standing.” Id.

at 446 .

B. The

Law of Standing

A

plaintiff must have standing to bring a lawsuit. Austin Nursing Ctr., Inc. v. Lovato ,

171 S.W.3d 845, 848 (Tex.

2005). “The issue of standing focuses on

whether a party has a sufficient relationship with the lawsuit so as to have a ‘justiciable

interest’ in its outcome . . . .” Id.

(quoting 6A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur

R. Miller, & Mary Kay Kane, Fed. Prac. & Proc.: Civil § 1559, at

441 (2d ed. 1990)). “‘A plaintiff has standing

when it is personally aggrieved, regardless of whether it is acting with

legal authority . . . .’”

Id. (quoting Nootsie, Ltd. v.

Williamson County Appraisal Dist. , 925 S.W.2d 659, 661 (Tex. 1996)) (emphasis in original). “In Texas,

the standing doctrine requires that there be (1) ‘a real controversy between

the parties,’ that (2) ‘will be actually determined by the judicial declaration

sought.’” Id. at 849 (quoting Nootsie ,

925 S.W.2d at 662 ). “Implicit in these

requirements is that litigants are ‘properly situated to be entitled to [a]

judicial determination.’” Id.

(quoting 13 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur

R. Miller, & Edward H.

Cooper, Fed. Prac. & Proc. : Jurisdiction

§ 3531, at 338–39 (2d ed. 1984)).

C. Standing:

“ARI (Tex)” Versus “ARI (Del)”

In

part of issue one, Murphy argues that ARI did not have standing to sue for

unspecified claims that “arose before ARI (Del) came into existence through its

incorporation on September 27, 1999.”

ARI,

as it existed before bankruptcy, was a Texas

corporation. The bankruptcy court

confirmed the bankruptcy plan on July 6, 1999.

As noted above, the confirmed bankruptcy plan required ARI to

incorporate a successor company in Delaware,

into which the Texas-incorporated ARI would merge after bankruptcy. The bankruptcy plan referred to the

Texas-incorporated ARI as “Debtor” and to the Delaware-incorporated ARI as “Reorganized

Debtor.” The bankruptcy plan defined the

Reorganized Debtor as “[t]he Debtor on or after the Effective Date, as a newly

formed Delaware

corporation pursuant to the amended ARI charter.”

The

Delaware ARI incorporated on September 27, 1999, and the Texas-incorporated ARI

merged into the Delaware-incorporated ARI on September 29, 1999. Under the merger agreement, all “assets,

property, rights, privileges, powers, franchises, debts, obligations,

restrictions, disabilities and duties” of the Texas-incorporated ARI vested in

the Delaware-incorporated ARI, “in accordance with and except as provided by”

the bankruptcy plan. Likewise, the July

6, 1999 order approving the bankruptcy plan provided that

except as provided in the Plan, all assets of the

estate (“Assets”), including without limitation, all causes of action, shall

revest in the Reorganized Debtor, as of the Effective Date, free and clear of all

Claims, liens, liabilities, encumbrances, restrictions, or interests whether

contingent or liquidated, except as provided in the Plan.

The

above recitations, both in the order confirming the bankruptcy plan and in the

merger agreement, reflect well-settled Texas

law that the surviving corporation in a merger generally inherits the rights

and liabilities of the merged corporation.

See Tex. Bus. Corp. Act

Ann. art. 5.06 (Vernon 2003); Greene’s Pressure Treating & Rentals,

Inc. v. Fulbright & Jaworski, L.L.P. , 178 S.W.3d 40, 44 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005,

no pet.) (“In a merger, the successor organization stands in the shoes

of prior management and continues the operations of the prior entity. Generally, the rights and liabilities

transfer . . . .”); see also Del Code Ann . tit. 8, § 259 (2007).

By

virtue of the merger, the Delaware-incorporated ARI inherited all of the

Texas-incorporated ARI’s rights and assets, including its causes of action,

that had not otherwise been assigned or disposed of under the bankruptcy plan. 24

We thus reject Murphy’s argument that “ARI (Del) could not have been

injured by pre-September 1999 conduct because it did not exist before that day.” 25

See id.

We

overrule this portion of issue one.

D. Standing:

Assignment of Claims to the Indenture Trustee

The

question remains, however, exactly what rights of the Texas-incorporated ARI

passed to the Delaware-incorporated ARI upon merger.

1. Murphy’s

Arguments

Under

another portion of issue one, Murphy argues that ARI did not have standing to

sue “based on conduct that occurred before it came into existence” because some

of its claims “were owned by ARI (Tex), which, through bankruptcy, assigned

them to . . . the Indenture Trustee, in a Confirmed Plan of

Reorganization.” Murphy relies on the

following two bankruptcy-plan provisions in support of his position. 26

First, Murphy notes that the bankruptcy plan provided that, upon the “Effective

Date” of the bankruptcy plan, the indenture trustee (U.S. Trust Company of

Texas, N.A.) would receive, among other of ARI’s assets, “all Litigation

(except for Claim Objections) that is not specifically pledged to the Take Out

Lender or otherwise specifically released under this Plan

. . . .” Second, Murphy

notes that the plan defined Litigation as

[a]ny and all claims, demands, rights , defenses, actions, causes of action, suits ,

contracts, agreements, obligations, accounts, defenses, offsets, powers,

privileges, licenses and franchises of any kind or character whatsoever,

known or unknown, suspected or unsuspected, whether arising prior to, on or

after the Petition Date, [ 27 ] in contract or tort, at law or in equity, or under any

theory of law, held by the Debtor or its Estate against any person or entity . . . including but not limited to (i)

rights of setoff, counterclaim, or recoupment, and claims on contracts or

for breaches of duties imposed by law , except to the extent that such

rights would constitute, in whole or in part, the basis for Reorganized Debtor’s

objection to Claim with respect to which Reorganized Debtor has standing to

object, . . . (iv) such claims and defenses as fraud , mistake,

duress and usury . . . .

(Emphasis added.) The bankruptcy plan defined the “Effective

Date” as “the 30th day following the date the Confirmation Order [ 28 ] has become a final order,” which appears to have been

sometime around September 6, 1999. 29

2. ARI’s

Standing to Assert Each Cause of Action

We

consider Murphy’s standing challenge separately for each of ARI’s causes of

action.

a. Conversion

and Monies Had and Received

As

revealed in its petition, ARI’s claims for conversion and monies had and

received were, by and large, based on Murphy’s actions from early October 1999

forward, when he returned to Haiti and (as one of two board members of a

three-member board acting together) refused entry to RCH by ARI’s

employee. The evidence was undisputed

that ARI owned all of the rice held by RCH.

The evidence, viewed in the required light, 30 also showed that the funds in both

ARI’s and RCH’s bank accounts in Haiti came from the sale of, or were for the

purchase of, ARI’s rice and were, therefore, ARI’s funds. 31

However, to the extent that ARI based its claims for monies had and

received and conversion on the taking of its funds from Haitian accounts on

June 23, 1999 ($300,000), July 1, 1999 ($225,208), and July 28, 1999 ($25,000),

that portion of those claims was assigned to the indenture trustee under the

bankruptcy plan because the assignment was effective in early September 1999. 32

Accordingly, only the indenture trustee had standing to assert a

conversion or monies-had-and-received claim based on the three account

withdrawals pre-dating the assignment’s effective date—although ARI had

standing to assert conversion and monies-had-and-received claims based on the

other misappropriations that it alleged.

b. Breach

of Fiduciary Duty

As

alleged in its petition, ARI’s breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim was principally

based on Murphy’s actions from October 1999 forward. However, ARI also alleged that Murphy had

breached his fiduciary duty by “causing stock certificates to be issued in

[his] name[] in 1998 purporting to show [that he] owned stock in RCH

. . . .” Any

breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim based on this one action was assigned to the

indenture trustee because the action predated, and thus the cause of action

arose before, early September 1999.

Likewise, ARI alleged that Murphy’s “insistence that [he is] the owner[]

of RCH” constituted a breach of fiduciary duty.

Because all of ARI’s witnesses who testified on the subject agreed that

Murphy first asserted his alleged ownership interest in RCH before the

effective date of the assignment to the indenture trustee, any

breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim based on his mere assertion of owning RCH (as

opposed to his misappropriating property based on that assertion) was assigned

to the indenture trustee—although ARI had standing to assert a

breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim based on the other actions post-dating the

assignment’s effective date that it alleged constituted such a breach.

c. Actual

and Constructive Fraud

ARI’s

fraud claims are less clear from the petition because the petition did not

specify which acts constituted actual or constructive fraud. However, actual fraud by misrepresentation

(upon which the jury was charged) requires (1) a false, material

representation; (2) the speaker’s knowledge, at the time of the representation’s

making, of the representation’s falsity or the speaker’s reckless making of the

representation without any knowledge of the truth and as a positive assertion;

(3) the speaker’s intent that the other party will act upon the representation;

(4) the listener’s act in reliance on the representation; and (5) resulting

injury to the listener. See In re

FirstMerit Bank, N.A. , 52 S.W.3d 749, 758 (Tex. 2001).

Likewise, actual fraud by non-disclosure (upon which the jury was also

charged) occurs when “(1) a party conceals or fails to disclose a material fact

within their [sic] knowledge, (2) the party knows that the other party is

ignorant of the fact and does not have an equal opportunity to discover the

truth, (3) the party intends to induce the other party to take some action by

concealing or failing to disclose the fact, and (4) the other party suffers

injury as a result of acting without knowledge of the undisclosed fact.” UMLIC VP L.L.C. v. T&M Sales &

Envtl. Sys., Inc. , 176 S.W.3d 595, 604 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2005, pet.

denied).

From

ARI’s evidence and jury arguments, it appears that its theory was that Murphy

committed actual fraud by repeatedly acknowledging that he held RCH’s stock

only nominally (or by failing to reveal that he owned it personally, rather

than nominally) and by accepting ARI’s investments in RCH, when he was actually

waiting to assert that he owned RCH.

Another theory that we can glean from the record was that Murphy’s

altering ARI’s board minutes and back-dating his RCH share certificates to

support his claim to own RCH—both of which acts occurred before September 1999—constituted

actual fraud by misappropriation. Under

either theory, the cause of action for actual fraud necessarily accrued before

September 1999, and the claim was thus assigned to the indenture trustee under

the bankruptcy plan. ARI thus had no

standing to pursue the actual-fraud claim on which it sued.

In

contrast, ARI’s constructive-fraud claim was based on Murphy’s violation of his

fiduciary duties to ARI by misappropriating and continuing to misappropriate

ARI’s property. Under the jury charge

and common law, “constructive fraud is the breach of some legal or equitable

duty which, irrespective of moral guilt, the law declares fraudulent because of

its tendency to deceive others, to violate confidence, or to injure public

interests.” Archer v. Griffith , 390 S.W.2d 735, 740 (Tex. 1964).

Evidence supporting a breach of fiduciary duty may, in appropriate

circumstances, support a constructive-fraud finding. See Flanary v. Mills , 150 S.W.3d 785,

795 (Tex. App.—Austin 2004, pet. denied) (“The evidence that showed the breach

of fiduciary duty supports a finding of constructive fraud.”). In light of ARI’s pleading and the trial

record, ARI’s theory of constructive fraud appears to have been co-extensive

with its claim for breach of fiduciary duty based on Murphy’s actions from

October 1999 forward. Accordingly, this

cause of action was not assigned to the indenture trustee, and ARI had standing

to pursue it.

d. Declaratory

Relief Concerning Ownership of RCH

Finally,

ARI requested declaratory relief in the form of a declaration that it owned “100%

of the stock of RCH, and that Murphy and Theriot have no ownership interest in

RCH or its assets.” Murphy asserts that

the indenture trustee was assigned the right to seek this declaration because

it was undisputed that Murphy had first asserted his alleged ownership interest

in RCH before July 6, 1999—as was also reflected in ARI’s bankruptcy disclosure

statement, which listed as a “business risk” that the ownership of RCH was

disputed. However, ownership is an

element of conversion, which we have already held that ARI has standing to

assert to the extent that the misappropriations occurred after early September

1999. See Green Int’l, Inc. v. Solis ,

951 S.W.2d 384, 391 (Tex.

1997). Accordingly, even if the right to

seek a declaration of ownership in RCH in the abstract was assigned to

the indenture trustee—a matter that we need not decide—ARI would still have had

standing to obtain a declaration of ownership in conjunction with the

conversion and monies-had-and-received claims that it also had standing to

pursue. 33

3. ARI’s

Response to Murphy’s Standing Arguments

In

response to Murphy’s standing arguments, ARI relies on the following, italicized

provision of the bankruptcy plan (“paragraph E(3)”), which ARI claims gives it

standing to pursue all “Litigation,” even those claims assigned to the

indenture trustee:

E. Litigation .

1. The

Indenture Trustee, as assignee of certain of the Debtor’s Litigation Claims

pursuant to the Plan, may commence or advance any Litigation (except Claims

Objections) following the Effective Date . . . .

. . .

3. Unless

Litigation is expressly waived, relinquished, released, compromised or settled

in this Plan or in a Final Order, all rights with respect to such Litigation

are reserved and the Reorganized Debtor or the Indenture Trustee, as assignee

of certain of the Debtor’s Litigation Claims pursuant to the Plan, may pursue

such Litigation .

. . . .

(Emphasis added.) ARI interprets paragraph E(3) to give it “the

right to pursue Litigation if it chooses to do so,” even if that “Litigation”

was assigned to the indenture trustee.

We

disagree. Under the bankruptcy plan, not

all “Litigation” was assigned to the indenture trustee: the plan expressly

excluded from that assignment “Claim Objections” 34 and any “Litigation pledged to the

Take Out Lender or otherwise specifically released under this Plan.” By litigation “pledged to the Take Out

Lender,” the bankruptcy plan appears to have meant litigation on which a “first

priority lien and security interest” in favor of this lender existed as

consideration for its loan to ARI. It is

this category of “Litigation” to which we interpret paragraph E(3) to refer

when it provides that ARI may pursue “such Litigation.” That is, by providing that either ARI or the

indenture trustee may sue, paragraph E(3) does not mean that either entity may

sue for any and all claims, even those owned by the other entity. Rather, consistent with the provision

assigning the indenture trustee certain claims, paragraph E(3) allows the

indenture trustee to sue on the claims assigned to it under the bankruptcy

plan, while allowing ARI to sue on those claims that were not assigned to the

indenture trustee under the bankruptcy plan.

Only this reading renders consistent both the assignment provision and

paragraph E(3). See Frost Nat’l Bank

v. L&F Distrib., Ltd. , 165 S.W.3d 310, 312 (Tex. 2005) (“We

consider the entire writing and attempt to harmonize and give effect to all the

provisions of the contract by analyzing the provisions with reference to the

whole agreement.”). ARI’s reading of

section E(3) would render meaningless the bankruptcy plan’s assignment

provision because it would allow ARI to recover on claims that it had assigned

to another in exchange for the release of claims against ARI in bankruptcy.

4. Conclusion

Concerning Assignment of Claims to the Indenture Trustee

We

hold as follows:

● Concerning

ARI’s claims for conversion and monies had and received: ARI lacked standing to sue Murphy for

conversion or misappropriation of funds that were taken before early September

1999—which funds totaled $550,208.

● Concerning

ARI’s claims for breach of fiduciary duty:

ARI lacked standing to sue Murphy for breaches of fiduciary duty that

occurred before early September 1999, but had standing to sue Murphy for

breaches of fiduciary duty occurring after that date.

● Concerning

ARI’s claim for actual fraud: ARI lacked

standing to sue Murphy on this claim.

● Concerning

ARI’s claim for constructive fraud: ARI

had standing to sue Murphy on this cause of action.

● Concerning

ARI’s request for declaratory relief concerning ownership of RCH and related

matters: ARI had standing to assert this

request for relief.

We

sustain this portion of issue one to the extent that we have held that ARI

lacked standing to assert certain claims for having assigned those claims to

the indenture trustee. We overrule this

portion of issue one in all other respects. 35

E. Alleged

Standing: Ownership of RCH’s Property

For

each cause of action, the jury awarded ARI the same actual damages for the

reasonable cash-market value of each of the following items taken by Murphy or

Theriot: (1) ARI’s funds, i.e. , its monies in bank accounts ($837,747);

(2) its rice ($2,157,347); (3) its “property other than rice and cash”

($1,409,077); and (4) “ARI’s ownership interest” in RCH ($4,404,171). Under issue two, Murphy argues that ARI, as a

mere shareholder and parent corporation of RCH, lacked standing to sue for

misappropriation of items (1) and (3) above—bank-account funds and “property

other than rice and cash”—because this property was owned by RCH, not by ARI. 36

Because item (4) above is merely the sum of items (1), (2), and (3),

Murphy also challenges the jury’s damages award for item (4) to the extent that

that award was based on items (1) and (3) (property allegedly owned by RCH

only). Finally, Murphy challenges the

jury’s damages awarded for monies had and received ($837,747) because that was

the exact amount awarded for item (1) (bank-account funds); those funds

belonged to RCH, not to ARI; and ARI thus lacked standing to recover damages

for the loss of those funds. We construe

this standing challenge of Murphy’s to relate to ARI’s standing to sue (1) for

conversion and (2) for actual damages awarded for all causes of action to the

extent that those damages included monetary awards for RCH’s property.

We

hold that Murphy’s challenges do not go to ARI’s standing. As for the jury’s finding on liability for

conversion and monies had and received, ownership or right to possession of

property are elements of the claims , not matters of standing. Solis , 951 S.W.2d at 391 (“Conversion

is defined as the wrongful exercise of dominion and control over another’s

property in denial of or inconsistent with his rights.”) (emphasis added); Staats

v. Miller , 150 Tex. 581, 584 , 243 S.W.2d 686, 687 (1951) (“‘The question,

in an action for money had and received, is to which party does the money, in

equity, justice, and law, belong. All

plaintiff need show is that defendant holds money which in equity and good

conscience belongs to him .’”) (emphasis added) (quoting 58 C.J.S., Money

Received § 4a, p. 913). That

is, ARI had standing to sue Murphy for conversion and monies had and

received, but then had the burden to prove its ownership or superior

right to possession of all properties that it claimed were wrongfully

taken. This is especially true because

Murphy does not contest on appeal that ARI owned at least the rice at dispute

and, thus, that ARI had standing to sue him for the conversion of its

rice. Moreover, there was disputed

evidence (which, given the jury’s

answers, we infer that the jury believed) that all of the funds in both

ARI’s and RCH’s bank accounts in Haiti came from the sale of ARI’s

rice and were, therefore, ARI’s funds.

The

same logic demonstrates that ARI did not lack standing to assert causes of

action for actual fraud, constructive fraud, and breach of fiduciary duty even

if it did not own some of the property for which it sought compensation. If ARI was damaged at all (because of

ownership of rice and funds) by Murphy’s conduct, then it had standing to sue

him on the claims that it did, and whether it could recover damages for certain

matters went to proof of damages, not to whether ARI had a “‘justiciable

interest’” in the lawsuit’s outcome or was “personally aggrieved” by Murphy’s

actions. Lovato , 171 S.W.3d at

848 (quoting 6A Charles Alan Wright,

Arthur R. Miller, & Mary Kay Kane, Fed. Prac. & Proc.: Civil §

1559, at 441 (2d ed. 1990) and Nootsie, Ltd. , 925 S.W.2d at 661 ); Billy

B., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Galveston Wharves , 717 S.W.2d 156, 158 (Tex.

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, no writ) (“[A] person has standing to sue if:

(1) he has sustained, or is immediately in danger of sustaining, some direct

injury as a result of the wrongful act of which he complains; . . .

(4) the challenged action has caused the plaintiff some injury in fact

. . . .”) (emphasis added); Nauslar v. Coors Brewing Co. ,

170 S.W.3d 242, 249 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, no pet.) (indicating same as Billy

B., Inc. court).

Additionally,

“[w]hether a stockholder may recover damages personally for a wrong done to the

corporation is an argument about capacity—that is, whether the stockholder has

legal authority.” Willis v. Donnelly ,

118 S.W.3d 10, 49 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003) (op. on reh’g) (citing Mackie

v. Guthrie , 78 S.W.3d 462 , 465–66 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2001, pet. denied)), rev’d

on other grounds , 199 S.W.3d 262 (Tex. 2006); see Pledger v. Schoellkopf ,

762 S.W.2d 145 , 145–46 (Tex. 1988) (treating as matter of capacity complaint

that shareholder-plaintiff could not sue individually on causes of action

belonging to corporation). “It is

improper for an appellant to couch such an argument in terms of standing.” Willis , 118 S.W.3d at 49 (citing Mackie ,

78 S.W.3d at 466 ). Accordingly, whether

ARI, as a shareholder of RCH, could sue for damages allegedly suffered by RCH

was not a matter of standing.

We

overrule issue two. 37

We do not reach the question of whether the trial court erred in denying

Murphy’s motions for new trial—in which he argued that the jury should not have

awarded ARI damages for its subsidiary’s property, but did not couch his

challenge in terms of standing to seek such damages—both because, on appeal,

Murphy complains only that ARI lacked standing (not that it lacked capacity)

and because, at trial, Murphy waived this capacity challenge. 38

F. Standing:

Estoppel as Basis to Preclude Standing

Under

an unspecified issue, Murphy argues that ARI “is judicially estopped to assert

that an assignment [from the indenture trustee to it] was not required to

prosecute its claims,” i.e. , ARI is estopped from claiming that it has

standing to sue. Specifically, Murphy

argues that ARI’s having obtained an assignment of claims from the indenture

trustee in a totally separate lawsuit filed in 2000 shows that ARI knew in this

lawsuit that it needed an assignment to have standing to assert these

claims. In that 2000 lawsuit, ARI had

sued its former landlord to recover a security deposit, and the landlord had

defended by asserting, in effect, that ARI lacked standing because the

indenture trustee had allegedly already sued the landlord on the same matter.

Although

Murphy’s argument concerns estoppel to assert standing, it is still an estoppel

argument. Estoppel, unlike standing,

must be alleged, prosecuted, and preserved, or it is waived. See Tex.

R. Civ. P. 94; In re S.A.P. , 156 S.W.3d 574, 577 (Tex. 2005) (“[E]stoppel

was never submitted to the jury. An unpleaded issue may be tried by consent,

but it still must be submitted to the jury. Tex.

R. Civ. P. 279.”). Although

Murphy pleaded judicial estoppel, he raised this estoppel argument only in his

summary-judgment motion, on which the court never expressly ruled, and did not

submit the matter to the jury or again ask the trial court to rule on judicial

estoppel as a matter of law. Even if we

could consider Murphy’s summary-judgment motion as somehow having been

implicitly overruled, 39 a denied summary-judgment motion

does not preserve this type of matter for appeal. See Tex.

R. Civ. P. 279; United Parcel Serv., Inc. v. Tasdemiroglu , 25

S.W.3d 914, 916 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. denied) (holding

that denied summary-judgment motion on issue of preemption, being a

matter-of-law challenge, did not preserve issue for appeal); cf. Ackermann

v. Vordenbaum , 403 S.W.2d 362, 365 (Tex. 1966) (holding that one may not

challenge denial of summary-judgment motion in appeal from judgment rendered

after trial on merits).

We

overrule Murphy’s judicial-estoppel argument.

Jury-Charge Error

In

issue three, Murphy argues that “the jury charge was fatally defective because,

by failing to acknowledge ARI (Del)’s lack of standing and by failing to

distinguish between ARI (Tex) and ARI (Del), it impermissibly allowed the jury

to consider irrelevant evidence that probably resulted in an improper judgment

and prejudiced Murphy’s ability to present his appeal.” Specifically, Murphy argues as follows:

While ARI (Del)

had no standing to sue on the basis of pre-merger conduct or for the

misappropriation of property that it did not own, it arguably did have standing

to sue on the basis of post-merger conduct that affected its property, such as

the alleged misappropriation of its rice.

However, the trial court’s failure, over Murphy’s objection, to

recognize ARI (Del)’s

lack of standing irreparably tainted all of the jury’s liability findings and

resulted in an improper judgment.

Specifically, by refusing to distinguish ARI (Del)

from ARI (Tex), the court allowed the jury to

consider conduct for which ARI (Del) had no

standing to sue in deciding Murphy’s liability for other alleged conduct for

which ARI (Del)

arguably had standing to complain.

To

preserve these jury-charge complaints, Murphy had to raise a “timely and

specific” objection to the submission of the applicable jury questions on the

ground that ARI had no standing to assert those claims. See Crown Life Ins. Co. v. Casteel , 22

S.W.3d 378, 387, 389 (Tex. 2000) (“Crown preserved error by obtaining a ruling

on its timely objection to the question on the ground that Casteel did not have

standing to pursue [specified] claims . . . .”; also requiring

appellant’s objection to have been “timely and specific”).

Murphy’s

only jury-charge objection below even somewhat resembling his appellate

standing arguments occurred during the following colloquy:

My objections will be reflected in the requested

charges submitted to the Court on the matter of the alleged assignment of

causes of action to the indenture trustee . . . . 40

Although the trial court stated that

it was marking that request refused, no proposed jury charge exists in the

record. 41

We thus have only Murphy’s oral statement to consider. That oral statement was not a specific

objection that the trial court not submit specific jury questions because (1)

the Delaware-incorporated ARI had no standing to assert the Texas-incorporated

ARI’s pre-bankruptcy claims, which had allegedly been assigned to the indenture

trustee, or (2) ARI had no “standing” (or capacity) to sue for conversion of

RCH’s property or funds. Murphy’s oral

statements do not reveal, for example, to which jury questions he objected or

to what aspects of each cause of action reflected in those questions he

objected. 42

Neither did his oral statement in any way mention “distinguish[ing] ARI

(Del) from ARI (Tex)” or RCH’s ownership of property.

And

Murphy’s mere reference to the assignment to the indenture trustee did not

render his objection sufficiently specific.

For example, in his earlier oral motion for directed verdict, when

disagreeing with the trial court’s view that ARI’s breach-of-fiduciary-duty

claim was based on pre-bankruptcy actions, Murphy had argued that, if ARI were

indeed making such a claim (which Murphy told the trial court he did not

interpret ARI to be making), then the court would “have to broach the subject

of whether those rights or claims with respect to the breach of fiduciary

duties were assigned to the indenture trustee as part of the reorganization

plan in the bankruptcy.” Murphy added in

passing that ARI’s claim to certain funds that it sought as damages, as well as

ARI’s claim of ownership in RCH, had probably been assigned to the indenture

trustee for their having been made or discovered pre- or mid-bankruptcy. However, Murphy then remarked that, “[i]n any

event,” as he understood the case, ARI’s causes of action concerned Murphy’s post-bankruptcy

actions .

Likewise,

although Murphy had earlier moved for summary judgment on the basis that ARI “does

not own the claims asserted in this cause and has no standing to maintain or

prosecute this action against the defendants,” that same motion discussed not

only the assignment to the indenture trustee, but also that the

Texas-incorporated ARI could not prosecute claims because it no longer existed

and the Delaware-incorporated ARI could not prosecute claims because the “claims”

(without further analysis) accrued before that corporation existed. The discussion of the bankruptcy assignment

in the pre-charge conference and the summary-judgment motion demonstrate that

Murphy’s reference to “the alleged assignment of causes of action to the

indenture trustee” could have concerned more than one jury question or

instruction, including damages or liability questions.

Moreover,

we have already held that ARI had standing to assert all or part of all but one

claim that went to the jury; accordingly, Murphy’s charge objection should have

specified separately how the “alleged assignment . . . to the

indenture trustee” affected each liability question. The verbal charge-conference objection was

thus far from “specific” and did not preserve error. See Casteel , 22 S.W.3d at 387,

389 .

We

overrule issue three.

Legal-Sufficiency Challenges

In

issue four, Murphy argues that there is legally insufficient evidence to

support the jury’s liability and actual-damages findings on conversion, breach

of fiduciary duty, monies had and received, actual fraud, and constructive

fraud. He also argues that the evidence

is legally insufficient to show, by clear and convincing evidence, that he

converted ARI’s property with malice—a predicate finding to the assessment of

exemplary damages.

A. Standard

of Review

When

made on an evidentiary basis, rulings on motions for directed verdict and on

motions for JNOV are reviewed under the same legal-sufficiency test as are

appellate no-evidence challenges. See City

of Keller v. Wilson , 168 S.W.3d 802, 823,

827 (Tex.

2005). Accordingly, to determine whether

there is some evidence to support a jury’s finding and, thus, to determine

whether a trial court correctly denied a motion for JNOV or motion for directed

verdict, “we must view the evidence in a light that tends to support the

finding of disputed fact and disregard all evidence and inferences to the

contrary.” Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v.

Miller , 102 S.W.3d 706, 709 (Tex.

2003). However, “‘[t]he final test for

legal sufficiency must always be whether the evidence at trial would enable

reasonable and fair-minded people to reach the verdict under review. . . . [L]egal-sufficiency

review in the proper light must credit favorable evidence if reasonable jurors

could, and disregard contrary evidence unless reasonable jurors could not.’” Chubb Lloyd’s Ins. Co. of Tex. v. H.C.B.

Mech., Inc. , 190 S.W.3d 89, 92 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no pet.) (quoting City

of Keller , 168 S.W.3d at 827 ).

If

more than a scintilla of evidence supports the jury’s finding, “the jury’s

verdict . . . must be upheld.”

Miller , 102 S.W.3d at 709 .

“[M]ore than a scintilla of evidence exists if the evidence ‘rises to a

level that would enable reasonable and fair-minded people to differ in their

conclusions.’” Ford Motor Co. v.

Ridgway , 135 S.W.3d 598, 601 (Tex. 2004)

(quoting Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Havner , 953 S.W.2d 706, 711 (Tex. 1997)). Conversely, evidence that is “‘so weak as to

do no more than create a mere surmise’” is no more than a scintilla and, thus,

no evidence. Id.

(quoting Kindred v. Con/Chem., Inc. , 650 S.W.2d 61, 63 (Tex. 1983)). The jury is the sole judge of witnesses’

credibility, and it may choose to believe one witness over another; a reviewing

court may not impose its own opinion to the contrary. City of Keller , 168 S.W.3d at 819 . Because it is the jury’s province to resolve

conflicting evidence, we must assume that jurors resolved all conflicts in

accordance with their verdict. Id. at 819–20.

In

conducting a legal-sufficiency review of a jury finding made on clear and

convincing evidence (such as malice), we employ an elevated standard of review:

In a legal

sufficiency review, a court should look at all the evidence in the light most

favorable to the finding to determine whether a reasonable trier of fact could

have formed a firm belief or conviction that its finding was true. . . .

If, after conducting its legal sufficiency review of

the record evidence, a court determines that no reasonable factfinder could

form a firm belief or conviction that the matter that must be proven is true,

then that court must conclude that the evidence is legally insufficient.

Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Garza , 164 S.W.3d 607, 627 (Tex. 2004) (quoting In re J.F.C. , 96 S.W.3d 256,

266 (Tex.

2002)) (considering legal-sufficiency review of jury finding—malice—made upon

clear and convincing evidence). We still

“review all the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s finding,

taking into account contrary undisputed facts” in this determination. Qwest Int’l Comms., Inc. v. AT&T Corp. ,

167 S.W.3d 324, 326 (Tex.

2005) (citing Garza , 164 S.W.3d at 619 )).

When

a party in a civil case raises a proper objection to an improper jury charge or

instruction, we measure the sufficiency of the evidence against the jury charge

or instruction that should have been given.

See St. Joseph Hosp. v.

Wolff , 94 S.W.3d 513, 530 (Tex.

2002). However, if no objection is made,

or if an incorrect objection is made, we measure the sufficiency of the

evidence against the jury charge or instruction actually given. See id.

B. Legal-Sufficiency

Challenges to Liability Findings

We

begin with Murphy’s legal-sufficiency challenge to the jury’s finding that he

and Theriot were part of a conspiracy that damaged ARI. In issue six, Murphy argues that the evidence

was legally insufficient to show that he was liable to ARI for having conspired

with Theriot because there is legally insufficient evidence that Murphy

committed any underlying tort on which a conspiracy could have been based.

“Civil

conspiracy, generally defined as a combination of two or more persons to

accomplish an unlawful purpose, or to accomplish a lawful purpose by unlawful

means, might be called a derivative tort” because the “defendant’s liability

for conspiracy depends on participation in some underlying tort for which the

plaintiff seeks to hold at least one of the named defendants liable.” Tilton v. Marshall , 925 S.W.2d 672,

681 (Tex.

1996) (emphasis added). The elements are

“(1) two or more persons; (2) an object to be accomplished; (3) a meeting of

the minds on the object or course of action; (4) one or more unlawful, overt

acts; and (5) damages as a proximate result.”

Tri v. J.T.T. , 162 S.W.3d 552, 556 (Tex. 2005).

“[C]ivil conspiracy ‘came to be used to extend liability in tort . . .

beyond the active wrongdoer to those who have merely planned, assisted, or

encouraged his acts.’” Carroll v.

Timmers Chevrolet , 592 S.W.2d 922 , 925–26 (Tex. 1979) (quoting W. Prosser, Handbook Of The Law Of Torts , § 46, at 293

(1971)). “Once a conspiracy is proven,

each co-conspirator ‘is responsible for all acts done by any of the

conspirators in furtherance of the unlawful combination.’” Id.

at 926 (quoting State v. Standard Oil Co. , 130 Tex. 313, 329 , 107 S.W.2d 550, 559 (1937)).

Along

these lines, jury question 18 provided:

QUESTION 18

Were either of the two persons named below part of a

conspiracy that damaged ARI?

To be part of a conspiracy the defendant and another

person or persons must have had knowledge of, agreed to, and intended a common

objective or course of action that resulted in the damages to ARI. One or more persons involved in the

conspiracy must have performed some act or acts to further the conspiracy.

Answer “yes” or “no” for each of the following:

Murphy yes

Theriot yes

(Emphasis added.) Jury question 18 was predicated on a finding

that either Murphy or Theriot had breached his fiduciary duties

to ARI (jury questions 2 and 5) or had committed fraud, constructive fraud, or

conversion (jury questions 8, 10, and 12).

The

jury found that Theriot committed the predicate torts of breach of fiduciary

duty, fraud, constructive fraud, and conversion. Murphy does not attack these liability

findings against Theriot for purposes of his challenge to the conspiracy

finding against him (or otherwise).

Neither does Murphy challenge on appeal the jury’s conspiracy findings

against Theriot. Because Murphy does not

challenge either the jury’s findings of conspiracy or its predicate tort

liability against Theriot, we must assume that Theriot both committed the

underlying torts and took acts to further the conspiracy to commit them. Thus, the jury had to determine only that

Murphy and Theriot “had knowledge of, agreed to, and intended a common

objective or course of action that resulted in the damages to ARI,” as required

by the charge.

Murphy

does not challenge whether sufficient evidence supported the jury’s implicit

determination that he “had knowledge of, agreed to, and intended a common

objective or course of action that resulted in the damages to ARI”— i.e. ,

that Murphy and Theriot had “an object to be accomplished” and “a meeting of

the minds on the object or course of action” 43 —as required by the charge and the law. 44

Nor does Murphy challenge the jury’s express and implied findings that

Theriot committed the four predicate torts in furtherance of the conspiracy

that it also found. Rather, Murphy’s

legal-sufficiency challenge is premised on the view that, for him to have been

liable under a conspiracy theory under the law and the charge, the jury had to

find that Murphy himself had committed one of the underlying torts of

breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, constructive fraud, or conversion. This is not what the law provides or the

charge instructed. See Carroll ,

592 S.W.2d at 925–26. Under the charge’s

plain language, either Murphy or Theriot could have committed the act or

acts ( i.e. , one of the underlying torts) in furtherance of the

conspiracy. Accordingly, we overrule

this portion of issue four.

Because

Murphy does not challenge on appeal that Theriot committed one of the four

torts that the jury found Theriot to have committed and that could have formed

the predicate for the jury’s conspiracy finding against Murphy, and because we

have overruled Murphy’s sole appellate challenge to the jury’s conspiracy

finding against him, we need not reach Murphy’s legal-sufficiency challenges to

the jury’s liability findings against Murphy for breach of fiduciary duty,

fraud, constructive fraud, and conversion.

That is, even if ARI had presented no evidence to show that Murphy

himself had committed any of these four torts, (1) the jury expressly found

that Theriot had committed all four of them (which express findings Murphy does

not challenge on appeal); (2) the jury expressly found that Murphy had

conspired with Theriot to harm ARI; (3) the jury implicitly found that Theriot

had committed these torts as acts in furtherance of the conspiracy (which

implied finding Murphy does not challenge on appeal); and (4) the jury

implicitly found that Murphy knew of, agreed to, and intended a common object

or course of action that resulted in damage to ARI (which implicit finding

Murphy does not challenge on appeal). We

thus overrule those portions of Murphy’s appellate issues challenging the legal

sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury’s liability findings against

Murphy himself for breach of fiduciary duty (issue five), fraud (issue four),

constructive fraud (issue four), and conversion (issue four).

C. Legal-Sufficiency

Challenges to Actual-Damages Findings

Under

portions of his issues challenging the jury’s liability finding on actual fraud

(issue four) and constructive fraud (issue four), Murphy also asserts that

there was no evidence that ARI suffered any actual damages. 45

In support, he argues only that the evidence showed that “ARI (Tex)’s

investments in RCH yielded millions [of dollars] in returns” and that “ARI

profited from its relationship with RCH and Murphy.” Murphy does not raise this legal-sufficiency

challenge with respect to the actual damages awarded for breach of fiduciary

duty.

With

respect to actual and constructive fraud, the jury found the following damages:

QUESTION 11

What sum of money, if any, if paid now in cash, would

fairly and reasonably compensate ARI for its damages, if any, that resulted

from such fraud?

In answering questions about damages, answer each

question separately.

. . . .

Answer separately in dollars and cents, if any, for

each of the following:

1. The

reasonable cash market value of the funds, if any, converted by Defendants;

ANSWER: $837,747.00

2. The

reasonable cash market value of the rice, if any, misappropriated as a result

of the Defendants’ fraud;

ANSWER: $2,157,347.00

3. The

reasonable cash market value of personal property other than rice and cash, if

any, misappropriated as a result of the Defendants’ fraud;

ANSWER: $1,409,077.00

4. The

reasonable cash market value of ARI’s ownership interest, if any,

misappropriated as a result of the Defendants’ fraud;

ANSWER: $4,404,171.00

We

first note that Murphy does not raise this legal-sufficiency challenge to the

jury’s award of actual damages for breach of fiduciary duty. Accordingly, even if the evidence supporting

the actual-damages findings for actual and constructive fraud was legally

insufficient for the reason that Murphy argues, we would still have to uphold

the jury’s verdict because the jury found the same damages for all causes of

action, including for breach of fiduciary duty, and Murphy does not assert this

same legal-sufficiency challenge to the damages finding relating to breach of

fiduciary duty. 46

In

any event, we have reviewed the entire record and conclude that sufficient

evidence, viewed in the required light, 47 supports the jury’s answers to the dollar amounts awarded as

damages for actual and constructive fraud.

Whether and to what extent contradictory evidence also showed that ARI

generally profited from its relationship with RCH does not render the jury’s

damages findings legally insufficient. See

Miller , 102 S.W.3d at 709 (indicating that proper standard of review for

legal-sufficiency challenge requires appellate court to uphold jury’s finding

if more than scintilla of evidence supports finding).

D. Legal-Sufficiency

Challenges to Exemplary-Damages Findings

In

part of issue seven, Murphy argues that the evidence was legally insufficient

to support the jury’s prerequisite findings of fraud and malice underlying its

exemplary-damages award.

Under

the statute applicable to this case, exemplary damages could be awarded only if

the claimant proved by clear and convincing evidence that the harm with respect

to which he sought recovery of exemplary damages resulted from, in addition to

one situation irrelevant here, fraud or malice.

Act of Apr. 11, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 19, 1995 Tex. Gen. Laws 108 ,

110 (amended 2003) (current version at Tex.

Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 41.003(a) (Vernon Supp.

2006)). Under the statute applicable at

the time, malice was defined as

(7) “Malice” means:

(A) a

specific intent by the defendant to cause substantial injury to the claimant;

or

(B) an act or omission:

(i) which

when viewed objectively from the standpoint of the actor at the time of its

occurrence involves an extreme degree of risk, considering the probability and

magnitude of the potential harm to others;

and

(ii) of

which the actor has actual, subjective awareness of the risk involved, but

nevertheless proceeds with conscious indifference to the rights, safety, or

welfare of others.

Act of Apr. 11, 1995, 74th Leg.,

R.S., ch. 19, 1995 Tex. Gen. Laws 108 , 109 (amended 2003) (current version at Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 41.001(7)

(Vernon Supp. 2006)). Under case law, to

establish malice, a plaintiff has to show “more than bad faith and wrongful

conduct; the plaintiff must show that the wrongful act was of a ‘wanton and

malicious nature.’” Solis , 951

S.W.2d at 391 (considering tort of conversion and quoting Ogle v.

Craig , 464 S.W.2d 95, 97 (Tex. 1971)).

“Malice may be actual or implied.”

Morey v. Page , 802 S.W.2d 779, 787 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1990, no

writ) (citing Courtesy Pontiac, Inc. v. Ragsdale , 532 S.W.2d 118, 121

(Tex. Civ. App.—Tyler 1975, writ ref’d n.r.e.)).

Following

the statutory definition of malice, the jury charge (jury question 19)

provided:

QUESTION 19

Do you find by clear and convincing evidence that the

harm to ARI resulted from malice?

“Malice” means:

a. specific

intent by Murphy . . . to cause substantial injury to ARI; or

b. an act

or omission by Murphy . . .

i. which,

when viewed objectively from the standpoint of Murphy . . . at the

time of its occurrence, involved an extreme degree of risk, considering the

probability and magnitude of the potential harm to others; and

ii. of

which Murphy . . . had actual subjective awareness of the risk

involved, but nevertheless proceeded with conscious indifference to the rights

or welfare of others.

“Clear and convincing evidence” means the measure or

degree of proof that produces a firm belief or conviction of the truth of the

allegations sought to be established.

Answer “yes” or “no” for each of the following:

Murphy yes

Theriot no

Question 19 was premised on an

affirmative liability finding on any of the three tort causes of action

committed by either Theriot or Murphy or a finding that Murphy or Theriot

conspired to commit one of those three underlying torts.

Murphy

asserts that there was legally insufficient evidence to show, by a

clear-and-convincing standard, that he committed the fraud necessary to support

a exemplary-damages award or that he acted with the malice that would allow for

a exemplary-damages award for any of the other underlying torts (including the

derivative tort of conspiracy). However,

Murphy’s only argument in support is that “[b]ecause there was no evidence

of [Murphy’s] tort liability, there can be no ‘clear and convincing evidence’

of the fraud or malice required for the recovery of punitive damages.”

(Emphasis in original.)

We

disagree. First, we have already held

that Murphy can be liable for the tortious acts of Theriot , with whom

the jury found that he conspired; thus, whether there is any evidence that Murphy

committed the predicate torts himself is immaterial. Additionally, the jury charge predicated a

finding of malice on an affirmative finding of either the individual’s tort

liability or the individual’s having participated in a conspiracy to commit

an underlying tort. The jury found that

Murphy conspired with Theriot. In any

event, there is sufficient evidence that Murphy acted with malice. For example, the following evidence, viewed

in the required light, 48 supports the jury’s implied finding

that Murphy acted with malice when he eventually converted (or conspired with

Theriot to convert) ARI’s rice and its funds held in ARI’s and RCH’s Haitian

accounts. 49

Upon his return to Haiti, Schwartz was greeted at RCH (of which Murphy

claimed to own the majority of shares) by armed guards, who refused him entry

into his home, the RCH plant, and the RCH sales office—all within two days of

ARI’s having fired Murphy and having voted to remove him from RCH’s board and

accounts, and against the backdrop of Murphy’s having changed his position on

whether he personally owned the RCH stock that had been issued in his

name. The same day that armed guards

forced Schwartz away from RCH, Theriot (with whom the jury found that Murphy conspired

to convert ARI’s property) also advised Schwartz that he would need “to go

tomorrow back to the United States; just go,” at which point Schwartz was “pretty

scared.”

We

hold that a reasonable jury could have formed a firm belief or conviction that

Murphy acted with malice in committing the acts alleged to have been conversion

or conspiracy to commit conversion. We

thus hold that the evidence is legally sufficient to support the jury’s

implicit finding that Murphy acted with malice in converting ARI’s property or

conspiring with Theriot to convert its property. Having determined that legally sufficient

clear-and-convincing evidence supports these implicit jury findings, we need

not determine whether legally sufficient evidence also supports the jury’s

other implicit finding that Murphy acted with malice in breaching (or

conspiring to breach) a fiduciary duty owed to ARI or the jury’s express

finding that ARI’s harm resulted from Murphy’s actual or constructive fraud.

We

overrule this portion of issue seven.

Other Challenges to Exemplary Damages

Under

the remainder of issue seven, Murphy challenges the award of exemplary damages

for the following further reasons: (1) the jury findings on liability for the

underlying torts and for the amount of exemplary damages were not unanimous,

allegedly in contravention of statute; (2) there was legally insufficient

evidence to support liability findings that Murphy committed fraud, breach of

fiduciary duty, and conversion, resulting in the total failure of the jury’s

actual-damages findings relating to those claims, in turn resulting in the

failure of exemplary damages because such damages cannot be awarded absent any

actual damages; (3) ARI lacked standing to sue for any of its claims, resulting

in its lack of standing to pursue exemplary damages on any claim; and (4)

legally insufficient evidence supported the jury’s findings that allowed for

the imposition of exemplary damages over the statutory cap.

As

for Murphy’s argument (1), the exemplary-damages statute that applied to this

case did not require unanimity for such damages to be assessed. See Act of Apr. 11, 1995, 74th Leg.,

R.S., ch. 19, § 1, 1995 Tex. Gen. Laws 108 , 110 (amended 2003) (current

version at Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.

Code Ann. § 41.003(d) (Vernon Supp. 2006)). We thus overrule argument (1) under issue

seven. As for Murphy’s argument (2), we

have already rejected Murphy’s legal-sufficiency challenges to the jury’s

liability findings on the basis of the jury’s conspiracy finding against Murphy

and Theriot and its (unchallenged) findings that Theriot committed all of the

four underlying torts as part of that conspiracy. Because Murphy’s challenge (2) is premised

entirely on the failure, as a matter of law, of any liability findings

applicable to him, we overrule argument (2) under issue seven. As for Murphy’s argument (3), because we have

already held that ARI had standing to assert many of its causes of action and

that one of Murphy’s “standing” challenges was actually a “capacity” challenge,

we overrule argument (3) under issue seven.

Under his argument (4), Murphy actually raises

two challenges. First, he asserts that

the jury’s “verdict on the cap-busting questions [jury questions 20, 21, and

22, i.e. , the findings that he violated three Penal Code provisions that

would allow the statutory exemplary-damages cap to be exceeded 50 ] was insufficient” because the jury’s

verdict was not unanimous and “a defendant can be found guilty of criminal

conduct only upon an unanimous verdict.”

The jury charge did not require the jury to be unanimous on these

findings, and Murphy did not object below to this omission or proffer a

unanimity instruction to the court. Therefore,

to the extent that this challenge under argument (4) can be construed as a

complaint about the jury charge, Murphy waived it. See Tex.

R. Civ. P. 278 (“Failure to submit a definition or instruction shall not

be deemed a ground for reversal of the judgment unless a substantially correct

definition or instruction has been requested in writing and tendered by the

party complaining of the judgment.”). To

the extent that Murphy’s first challenge under argument (4) can be construed as

something else, we also reject it. The

law applicable to the trial of this case did not require unanimity in civil

cases for a verdict. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 292(a), 483–84 S.W.2d

(Tex. Cases) XLVIII (1972, amended 2005) (“[A] verdict may be rendered in any

cause by the concurrence, as to each and all answers made, of the same ten

members of an original jury of twelve . . . .”). That rule made no exception in civil cases to

the jury’s answers concerning Penal Code offenses that would allow the

statutory exemplary-damages cap to be exceeded.

See id. Neither did the

version of Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 41.008 applicable

during the trial of this case require that such “cap busting” findings be

unanimous. See Act of Apr.11,

1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 19, § 1, 1995 Tex. Gen. Laws 108 , 111–12

(amended 2003) (current version at Tex.

Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 41.008 (Vernon Supp. 2006)). Murphy cites no case law requiring that, in a

civil case (as opposed to a criminal case), for purposes of

determining whether the cap on exemplary damages can be exceeded under the law

in effect at the time that this case was tried, a jury’s findings that a

criminal offense was committed must be unanimous. Neither have we found any such

authority. Accordingly, we reject this

first challenge of Murphy’s argument (4) under issue seven.

In

his second challenge under his issue (4), Murphy attacks the sufficiency of the

evidence relating to the jury findings on questions 20 to 22 because “no

probative evidence” supports the findings.

However, Murphy’s argument concerns only questions 20 and 22, 51 and he fails entirely to discuss how

the evidence is legally insufficient to support the jury’s answer to question

21: that Murphy committed theft of property valued at $20,000 or greater. Accordingly, any error in the jury’s answers

to questions 20 and 22 for lack of evidentiary support was rendered moot by

Murphy’s failure to challenge on appeal the jury’s answer to question 21. We thus overrule the remainder of argument

(4) under issue seven.

Conclusion

The

only appellate challenge of Murphy’s that we have sustained is his argument,

under a portion of issue one, that ARI lacked standing to sue Murphy for

certain causes of action that it had assigned to the indenture trustee during

bankruptcy. Murphy argues that this

error was harmful because “it renders this Court unable to review the

sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury’s liability findings” and “prevents Murphy from properly presenting his case to

this Court.” In support, Murphy cites to

the Texas Supreme Court’s opinions in Crown Life Insurance Co. v. Casteel , 52 Romero v. KPH Consolidation, Inc. , 53 and Harris County v. Smith . 54

This

authority does not apply here. In Casteel ,

for example, the court held that “[w]hen a single broad-form liability

question erroneously commingles valid and invalid liability theories and the

appellant’s objection [to the charge error] is timely and specific ,

the error is harmful when it cannot be determined whether the improperly

submitted theories formed the sole basis for the jury’s finding,” and the

judgment must be reversed and a new trial ordered. Casteel , 22 S.W.3d at 389 (emphasis added) (considering

broad-form liability question that commingled valid liability theories with one

that was invalid because plaintiff lacked standing); accord Romero , 166

S.W.3d at 227–28 (applying Casteel to broad-form

apportionment-of-responsibility question that allowed jury to consider

liability theory that was unsupported by any evidence); Smith , 96 S.W.3d

at 234 (applying Casteel to broad-form question that commingled damage

elements, when some of those elements were not supported by legally sufficient

evidence). We have already held that

Murphy did not properly preserve his appellate challenge that the trial court

erred in submitting jury questions on claims that only the indenture trustee

had standing to pursue in whole or in part.

Casteel and its progeny do not apply to charge-error complaints

that have been waived.

Additionally,

the liability and actual-damages issues here were submitted separately, not in

broad form—with separate liability questions for each cause of action and for

conspiracy and with line-item damage questions for each cause of action

(although the court gave a single line-item damage question for both actual and

constructive fraud). Casteel and

its progeny apply when proper and improper liability or damages theories are

submitted in a single broad-form question, i.e. , when they are submitted

in such a way that one cannot determine whether the improperly submitted

theories formed the sole basis for the jury’s finding.

Finally,

we have already overruled Murphy’s challenges to the legal sufficiency of the

evidence supporting the jury’s separate liability findings because (1) Murphy

did not challenge on appeal the liability findings against Theriot, (2) Murphy

was found liable as a conspirator for Theriot’s commission of the underlying three

torts that ARI had standing to pursue in whole or in part, and (3) Murphy’s

only challenge to the jury’s conspiracy finding lacked merit. Accordingly, any error that the trial court

committed in charging the jury on some claims that only the indenture trustee

could pursue did not prevent our considering the only legal-sufficiency

challenges that Murphy raised.

Because

Casteel and its progeny do not apply for the reasons stated above, we

apply the usual harmless-error standard under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure

44.1(a)(1). See Tex. R. App. P. 44.1(a)(1) (providing, “No

judgment may be reversed on appeal on the ground that the trial court made an

error of law unless the court of appeals concludes that the error complained

of: . . . probably caused the rendition of an improper judgment

. . . .”); cf. Bed Bath & Beyond, Inc. v. Urista ,

2006 WL 3825300, at *3 (Tex. Dec. 29, 2006) (reviewing preserved jury-charge

error to which Casteel did not apply for whether error probably caused

rendition of improper judgment).

Under

this standard, ARI’s lack of standing to pursue its monies-had-and-received and

conversion claims for $550,208 in funds, to pursue its actual fraud claim at

all, and to pursue its breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim to the extent that that

claim was based on pre-September 1999 actions does not require reversal of the

judgment. We explain our conclusion

below.

We

have held that ARI had standing to pursue its constructive-fraud claim, its

request for declaratory relief, and its breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim to the

extent that that claim was based on post-September 1999 actions, and its

conversion and monies-had-and-received claims for property taken after September

1999. The jury found the same line-item

damages for all liability findings against Murphy except monies had and

received, including its liability findings that Murphy had committed actual

fraud, constructive fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, and conversion. The jury also found the same damages for each

of conversion, breach of fiduciary duty, and actual or constructive fraud. 55

The line-item damages awarded for each cause of action included (1) the

value of funds that Murphy took, 56 (2) the value of ARI’s rice that Murphy took, (3) the value

of “personal property other than rice and cash” that Murphy took, and (4) the “reasonable

cash market value of ARI’s ownership interest” in RCH that Murphy took (the

last item being merely the sum of the first three items), for a grand total of

$4,404,171 in actual damages assessed for each cause of action except monies

had and received. The judgment awarded

ARI $4,404,171 in actual damages, without specifying for which liability

finding that sum was awarded.

The

jury found the same damages for constructive fraud, which ARI had standing to

pursue fully, as it did for the one claim that ARI had no standing to pursue

(actual fraud) and for two of the claims that it had standing to pursue only in

part (breach of fiduciary duty and conversion).

Because the jury’s liability and actual-damages findings on constructive

fraud, which ARI had standing to pursue, independently support the judgment, it

is immaterial that ARI could not recover $550,208 for some of its conversion

and monies-had-and-received claims that only the indenture trustee could have

pursued. 57

For the same reasons, we need not determine the effect, if any, of ARI’s

lack of standing to pursue pre-September-1999 instances of breach of fiduciary

duty.

Accordingly,

we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Tim

Taft

Justice

Panel consists of Justices

Taft, Alcala, and Higley.

1 The

actual-damages portion of the judgment was rendered jointly and severally

against Murphy and another defendant below, Lawrence H. Theriot, and $10

million was assessed as exemplary damages separately against Theriot. On December 5, 2005, however, this Court

granted Theriot’s motion to dismiss his appeal.

Therefore, Theriot is no longer a party to this appeal.

2 Comet

or its parent corporation, ERLY, owned 48% of ARI.

3 Haitian

law, of which the trial court took judicial notice and concerning which it

entered fact findings and legal conclusions, required that a corporation formed and operating in Haiti have at least

one shareholder who was a Haitian citizen.

It was for this reason that Lamarre was made a founder and shareholder.

4 As is

discussed below, ARI purchased Comet’s assets in 1993 and subsequently invested

millions of dollars in RCH.

5 At

this point, RCH still had not issued any stock certificates. Comet thus represented in the 1993 asset

purchase that “[s]hare certificates have not been issued. Comet has paid for and will be assigned one

hundred percent of the stock.”

6 The

jury found that Theriot was an ARI employee.

Murphy does not contest that finding on appeal.

7 Murphy

refers to the pre-bankruptcy ARI as “ARI (Tex)” and to the post-bankruptcy ARI

as “ARI (Del).”

8 The

parties dispute whether ARI’s board had the authority to terminate Murphy’s

employment with RCH.

9 Murphy

also counterclaimed, seeking damages for tortious interference with RCH’s

business relations and defamation.

However, he never submitted jury questions on these issues, and he

non-suited his counterclaims after trial.

Likewise, RCH intervened in the lawsuit, asserting ARI’s tortious

interference with its business relations, but it non-suited its claims over two

years before trial.

10 Jury

question 1.

11 Jury

questions 2, 6, and 7.

12 Jury

questions 8, 9, 10, and 11.

13 Jury

questions 12 and 13.

14 Jury

question 14.

15 Jury

question 17. This is the exact amount

that the jury also found to be the damages that ARI suffered from Murphy’s

misappropriating ARI’s funds through fraud, constructive fraud, conversion, and

breach of fiduciary duty.

16 Jury

question 18. Jury question 18 was

predicated on a finding that either Murphy or Theriot had breached his

fiduciary duties to ARI (questions 2 and 5) or had committed fraud, constructive

fraud, or conversion (questions 8, 10, and 12).

We note in passing that the jury found that Theriot had breached his

fiduciary duties to ARI and had committed fraud, constructive fraud, and

conversion.

17 Jury

question 19. Jury question 19 was

predicated on a finding that either Murphy or Theriot had breached his

fiduciary duties to ARI (questions 2 and 5); had committed fraud, constructive

fraud, or conversion (questions 8, 10, and 12); or had conspired to do any of

those things (question 18). The jury

found malice by clear and convincing evidence.

We note that the jury found that Theriot’s malice had not harmed ARI.

18 Jury

question 23. Jury question 23 was

predicated on a finding, made by clear and convincing evidence, that the

specified individual had either committed fraud (question 9) or had harmed ARI

as a result of his malice (question 19).

19 Jury

questions 20, 21, and 22. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §

41.008(b), (c) (Vernon Supp. 2006); see also Tex. Pen. Code Ann. §§ 31.03(a), (e)(5) (Vernon Supp. 2006)

(theft), 32.45(b), (c)(4) (Vernon Supp. 2006) (misapplication of fiduciary

property or property of financial institution), 32.46(a), (b)(3) (Vernon Supp.

2006) (securing execution of document by deception). Because the applicable provisions of section

41.008 that applied at the time of this suit were not substantively changed by

later amendments, we refer in the opinion to current section 41.008. The jury found that Theriot committed two of

the alleged Penal Code offenses, whereas it found that Murphy had committed all

three offenses.

20 Murphy

did challenge some of the matters discussed in this section for the first time

in his reply brief, but did not do so in his opening brief. We discuss immediately below the effect of

his belatedly having asserted these and other challenges.

21 ARI’s

appellee’s brief was filed on November 28, 2005. Murphy’s reply brief was filed on February

28, 2005, two weeks after the parties were notified that the cause would be set

for submission on April 18, 2006.

22 Certain

of Murphy’s appellate issues were inadvertently misnumbered. We employ the issue numbers used in his

brief, without correction.

23 As

discussed further below, we conclude that this particular challenge is not

truly one of standing, although we list it here because Murphy does.

24 We

discuss in the next section the significance of the assignment of ARI’s “Litigation”

to the indenture trustee during bankruptcy.

25

We distinguish the authority on which Murphy relies

because none of it involved a corporate merger.

See McAllen Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Cortez , 66 S.W.3d 227 , 235–36

(Tex. 2001); Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue , 34 S.W.3d 547, 558 (Tex.

2000); Payne v. Edmonson , No. 01-96-00792-CV, 1999 WL 350928 , at *6–7

(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] June 3, 1999, pet. denied) (not designated for

publication); Reyna v. Flashtax, Inc. , 162 F.R.D. 530, 534 (S.D. Tex.

1995).

26 In his reply brief, Murphy for the first time relies

on a third provision of the bankruptcy plan in support of his position:

(b) Upon

confirmation of the Plan, any and all claims, causes of action or rights held

by Holders of Unsecured Claims against Debtor’s directors, officers or other

agents . . . shall be deemed assigned to Debtor’s estate and

transferred to the Indenture Trustee for the benefit of the Bondholders.

We decline

to consider this argument because it was not timely raised. See Yazdchi v. Bank One, Tex., N.A. ,

177 S.W.3d 399 , 404 n.18 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet. denied).

27 The

Petition Date was defined as the date of the bankruptcy proceedings’

commencement: August 11, 1998.

28 Under

the bankruptcy plan, the defined term “Confirmation Order” was the July 6, 1999

order confirming the plan.

29 Murphy

focuses on September 29, 1999—the date of the Texas-incorporated ARI’s merger

into the Delaware-incorporated ARI—as the date through which any claims were

assigned to the indenture trustee.

However, through use of the term “Effective Date” in the assignment

provision, the bankruptcy plan made the date of assignment approximately early

September 1999.

30

See City of Keller v. Wilson , 168 S.W.3d 802, 827 (Tex. 2005).

31 For

example, there was evidence that the source of the funds in both RCH’s and ARI’s

Haitian bank accounts was purchase monies from ARI’s rice customers, that is,

that the funds in those accounts were customers’ cash advanced to purchase ARI’s

rice.

32 ARI’s

own witness (Schultz) acknowledged as much when he testified that “[t]here is

at least a legal argument that maybe a half a million dollars of that 700

[thousand dollars that ARI was claiming as damages], occurred before the

bankruptcy—before we emerged during bankruptcy.

And the argument could be made that we did assign that claim to the

indenture trustee.”

33 See

Green Int’l, Inc. v. Solis , 951

S.W.2d 384, 391 (Tex. 1997) (“Conversion is defined as the wrongful exercise of

dominion and control over another’s property in denial of or

inconsistent with his rights.”) (emphasis added); Staats v. Miller , 150

Tex. 581, 584 , 243 S.W.2d 686, 687 (1951) (“‘The question, in an action for

money had and received, is to which party does the money, in equity, justice,

and law, belong. All plaintiff need show

is that defendant holds money which in equity and good conscience belongs to

him .’”) (emphasis added) (quoting 58 C.J.S., Money Received § 4a,

p. 913).

34 The

bankruptcy plan defined “Claim Objections” as “the exclusive right of the

Reorganized Debtor to object to Claims.”

35 We

discuss at the end of this opinion whether ARI’s lack of standing to pursue

some of the claims that went to the jury requires reversal.

36 In

support, Murphy relies on the undisputed fact that RCH was ARI’s subsidiary

corporation and on authority holding that “parent and subsidiary corporations,

absent exceptional circumstances and when it is in the interest of equity to do

so, are not held accountable for the acts of the other; this is a primary

motivation for incorporation.” Sims

v. W. Waste Indus. , 918 S.W.2d 682, 686 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 1996, writ

denied). From that premise flows the

corollary that, generally speaking, a parent corporation’s merely owning stock

in its subsidiary does not make the parent the owner of the subsidiary’s

assets. See Drilltec Techs., Inc. v.

Remp , 64 S.W.3d 212, 217 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, no pet.) (stating

that parent corporation of wholly owned subsidiary does not have property

interest in subsidiary’s assets). The

right to sue for the subsidiary’s wrongful deprivation of its property

generally belongs to the subsidiary, not to its parent corporation. See Wingate v. Hajdik , 795 S.W.2d 717,

719 (Tex. 1990) (“A corporate stockholder cannot recover damages personally for

a wrong done solely to the corporation, even though he may be injured by that

wrong.”). Of course, even under this

line of authority, “a stockholder [may recover] damages for wrongs done to him

individually ‘where the wrongdoer violates a duty arising from contract or

otherwise, and owing directly by him to the stockholder.’” Id. (quoting Mass. v. Davis ,

140 Tex. 398, 408 , 168 S.W.2d 216, 222 (1942)).

37 In

issue three, Murphy challenges the court’s charge, which he complains “impermissibly

allowed the jury to consider irrelevant evidence that probably resulted in an

improper judgment” because the jury charge did not distinguish between the pre-

and post-bankruptcy ARI or recognize ARI’s lack of standing to assert some

claims. Because this issue is phrased in

terms of a jury-charge challenge, albeit based on Murphy’s concept of standing,

we consider issue three separately.

38 The

Texas Rules of Civil Procedure require that a defendant challenging a plaintiff’s

capacity to sue raise the matter by verified pleading if lack of capacity is

not evident from the petition. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 93(1), (2); Coastal

Liquids Transp., L.P. v. Harris County Appraisal Dist. , 46 S.W.3d 880, 885

(Tex. 2001); Nootsie, Ltd. v. Williamson County Appraisal Dist. , 925

S.W.2d 659, 662 (Tex. 1996). Lack of the

plaintiff’s capacity to sue can be waived if not timely raised. See Coastal Liquids Transp., L.P. , 46

S.W.3d at 884 . Although Murphy raised in

motions for new trial the question of whether ARI, as parent corporation and

shareholder, had the capacity to recover damages for loss of RCH’s assets, he

did not do so by verified denial, and he thus waived the challenge. See Tex.

R. Civ. P. 93(1), (2); Pledger v. Schoellkopf , 762 S.W.2d 145 ,

145–46 (Tex. 1988) (holding that appellants’ complaint that shareholder-plaintiff

lacked capacity to sue individually on causes of action belonging to

corporation was waived for failure to raise issue by verified denial, as

required by rule 93(2)); Willis v. Donnelly , 118 S.W.3d 10, 49 (Tex.

App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003) (op. on reh’g) , rev’d on other grounds ,

199 S.W.3d 262 (Tex. 2006); Mackie v. Guthrie , 78 S.W.3d 462, 466 (Tex.

App.—Tyler 2001, pet. denied).

39 But

see Williams v. Vought , 68 S.W.3d

102, 115 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2001, no pet.) (“The record in this case does not

reflect that the trial court denied, or even considered, [the appellant’s]

motion for partial summary judgment. As

a result, [the appellant] has not preserved this complaint for our review.”).

40 One

of Murphy’s motions for new trial raised an objection to the trial court’s failure

to distinguish the two ARI corporate entities within the jury charge, but that

objection was not timely and did not preserve his charge challenge. See Tex.

R. Civ. P. 274 (“Any complaint as to a question, definition, or

instruction, on account of any defect, omission, or fault in pleading, is

waived unless specifically included in the [jury-charge] objections.”); see

also Crown Life Ins. Co. v. Casteel , 22 S.W.3d 378, 387, 389 (Tex. 2000)

(requiring that jury charge objection be timely).

41 It

is unclear from the record whether the jury questions that Murphy submitted

have been lost or were simply omitted from the clerk’s record. At one point during the charge conference,

the trial court mentioned that it would “staple [the submitted question]

together and . . . I’ll mark each one refused.” Shortly thereafter,

the court mentioned that “I had previously marked the Defendants’ objections

refused and I will locate them.” In any

event, the objections or proposed issues do not appear in our record. ARI noted this omission in its appellee’s

brief, but Murphy did not thereafter move to supplement the record or indicate

where the document existed in the record.

It is our burden to ensure that all items to be included by

default in the clerk’s record and that are designated by the parties for the

clerk’s record actually become part of the clerk’s record on appeal. See Tex.

R. App. P. 35.3(a), 34.5.

However, Murphy did not designate his refused, proposed jury charge for

inclusion in the clerk’s record, and the rules do not otherwise require that

rejected, proposed jury issues be made part of the clerk’s record. See id.

42 For

example, on appeal, Murphy concedes that ARI “arguably did have standing to sue

on the basis of post-merger conduct that affected its property, such as the

alleged misappropriation of its rice.”

Likewise, we cannot know from his oral statement whether Murphy’s

written submission was an instruction concerning this assignment or was,

instead, one or more alternative liability or damages questions that somehow

recognized the assignment or its effect.

43 Tri

v. J.T.T. , 162 S.W.3d 552, 556 (Tex.

2005).

44 In

the statement of his issues at the start of his brief, Murphy recites that no

evidence supports the jury’s implicit determination that he agreed to a course

of action or intended to act towards an object that would injure ARI. However, nowhere in Murphy’s actual argument

does he address, brief, or discuss that specific challenge. Accordingly, that challenge is not before

us. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(h) (“The brief must contain a clear and

concise argument for the contentions made, with appropriate citations to authorities

and to the record.”); Miller v. State & County Mut. Fire Ins. Co. , 1

S.W.3d 709, 712 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1999, pet. denied) (in considering brief

that identified four issues presented, but that briefed only two of those

issues, declining to address two issues that were not discussed in brief’s

argument section).

45 Murphy

does not expressly raise a legal-sufficiency challenge to the jury’s

actual-damages determination (jury question 11) to the extent that that

determination was predicated on the jury’s finding of Murphy’s liability for

constructive fraud (jury question 10).

However, jury question 11 asked the jury to find damages for actual or

constructive fraud, without distinguishing between the two, and Murphy has

challenged the legal-sufficiency of the evidence supporting question 11. We must construe Murphy’s brief

liberally. S ee Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(e), 38.9; Sterner

v. Marathon Oil Co. , 767 S.W.2d 686, 690 (Tex. 1989)). Accordingly, we deem him to have raised an

appellate challenge to the legal-sufficiency of the evidence supporting the

jury’s actual-damages determination relating to constructive fraud.

46 We

note that we have already concluded that ARI, as opposed to the indenture

trustee, had standing to assert a breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim against Murphy

for his actions after early September 1999.

47 See

City of Keller , 168 S.W.3d at 827 .

48 See

City of Keller , 168 S.W.3d at 827 .

49 We

note that we have already concluded that ARI, as opposed to the indenture

trustee, had standing to sue for conversion of its rice and of those funds that

were converted after early September 1999.

50 See Tex. Civ.

Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 41.008(c)(10), (11), (13) (Vernon

Supp. 2006).

51 Murphy

also argues—again, with respect only to questions 20 and 22, which concerned

the securing execution of a document (stock certificate) by deception and the

intentional misapplication of stock—that ARI had no standing to sue for any

matters relating to RCH’s stock because any wrongdoing concerning stock was

assigned to the indenture trustee.

Again, this argument concerned only jury questions 20 and 22 and not

question 21, which did not necessarily relate only to stock.

52 See 22 S.W.3d 378 (Tex. 2000).

53 See

166 S.W.3d 212 (Tex. 2005).

54 See 96 S.W.3d 230 (Tex. 2002).

55 The

trial court submitted a single damages question for actual and constructive

fraud.

56 The

jury’s actual-damages finding on ARI’s monies-had-and-received claim was the

same amount that the jury found for this line-item damage element under the

other four causes of action.

57 The

jury found line-item damages for conversion, and the standing challenge that we

have sustained affects only one item of those damages. Accordingly, if we had to reverse for this

error relating to conversion, we could simply modify the judgment to remove

$550,208 from the damages line item for “funds” and affirm the judgment as so

modified. The same is true for monies

had and received. But we need not

reverse for the reasons stated above.