Opinion

Bill Heard Chevrolet, Ltd v. John Todd and Suzanne Todd

Court
Texas Court of Appeals, 1st District (Houston)
Filed
Nov 30, 2006
Status
Published
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 35.2%

stating that FAA applies when contract relates to interstate commerce

How later courts described this case

  • stating that FAA applies when contract relates to interstate commerce

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

Opinion issued November 30, 2006

In The

Court of Appeals

For The

First District of Texas

NO. 01-06-00183-CV

BILL HEARD CHEVEROLET, LTD. , Appellant

V.

JOHN TODD and SUZANNE TODD, Appellees

On Appeal from the 268th District Court

Fort Bend County, Texas

Trial Court No. 05-CV-144176

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellees, John Todd and Suzanne Todd, sued appellant , Bill Heard Chevrolet,

Ltd., for violations of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices–Consumer Protection Act

(“DTPA”),

fraud, and breach of contract. Appellant filed a motion to compel

arbitration, which the trial court apparently denied, and a motion for reconsideration

of its motion to compel arbitration . The trial court denied appellant’s motion for

reconsideration, and appellant filed an interlocutory appeal,

asking this Court to

order the trial court to withdraw its orders denying the motion to compel arbitration

and the motion for reconsideration of that ruling. We conclude that the Federal

Arbitration Act (“FAA”) applies to this case. See 9 U.S.C.A. §§ 1–16 (West 2000 &

Supp. 2006) . Therefore , we dismiss the interlocutory appeal for want of jurisdiction.

Jurisdiction

Appellees entered into a vehicle-purchase transaction with appellant.

Appellees signed an arbitration agreement that provided,

The Customer acknowledges and agrees that the Vehicle,

which the Customer has purchased or leased or offered to

purchase or lease from [appellant], has traveled in

interstate commerce and that as a result the Vehicle and all

aspects of any offer, sale or lease transaction between

[appellant] and the Customer regarding the Vehicle are

involved in, affect, or have a direct impact upon interstate

commerce.

The Customer and [appellant] therefore agree that all

claims and demands, disputes, or controversies of every

kind or nature that may arise between them concerning any

aspect of any transaction between them, including any offer

to purchase or lease, any purchase or lease, arrangements

for financing or insurance of any kind, any extended

warranty or service contract, the performance, condition or

repair of the Vehicle, any negotiations between the

Customer and [appellant] concerning the Vehicle, and any

other aspect of any transaction between the Customer and

[appellant] concerning the Vehicle shall be settled by

binding arbitration conducted pursuant to the provisions

of 9 U.S.C. 1, et. seq., and according to the Commercial

Rules of the American Arbitration Association.

It is the intention of the Customer and [appellant] to

resolve by binding arbitration any and all disputes

between them concerning the Vehicle and any

transaction relating to the Vehicle.

(Emphasis in original.)

On appeal, neither of the parties disputes applicability of the FAA to the

arbitration agreement. The arbitration agreement provides that arbitration will be

conducted “pursuant to the provisions of 9 [United States Code] 1, et. seq.” See

Allied-Bruce Terminix Co. v. Dobson , 513 U.S. 265 , 277–81 , 115 S. Ct. 834 , 839–41

(1995). Title nine of the United State Code is the FAA. See id. ; see also 9 U.S.C.A.

§§ 1–16. Thus, the parties have agreed to arbitrate under the FAA. See In re Kellogg

Brown & Root , 80 S.W.3d 611, 617 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, orig.

proceeding) (concluding that FAA applied because parties had agreed to arbitrate

under FAA). Additionally, appellant and appellees expressly agreed in the arbitration

agreement that the transaction involved interstate commerce. See Jack B. Anglin Co.,

Inc. v. Tipps , 842 S.W.2d 266 , 269–70, 272 (Tex. 1992) (stating that FAA applies

when contract relates to interstate commerce); see also 9 U.S.C.A. § 2 .

We conclude that the FAA applies to this case. Therefore, the order denying

the motion to compel arbitration must be reviewed by mandamus . See In re Kepka,

178S.W.3d279, 286 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, orig. proceeding). Conclusion We dismiss the interlocutory appeal for want of jurisdiction.

Tim Taft

Justice

Panel consists of Justices Taft, Keyes, and Hanks.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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