Wilbert Lillie v. State

Opinion issued October 13, 2005

In The

Court of Appeals

For The

First District of Texas

NO. 01-04-00237-CR

WILBERT LILLIE, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 230th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 962490

MEMORANDUM OPINION

A jury convicted appellant, Wilbert Lillie, of aggravated robbery and assessed

punishment at 50 years in prison. See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 29.03 (Vernon 2004).

We determine whether the trial court erred by failing to grant appellant’s motion for

mistrial after appellant assaulted the prosecutor in front of the jury and whether

appellant was denied due process by the trial court’s decision to allow testimony from

a deputy who had previously served as a bailiff in the trial proceedings. We affirm. Facts

On September 22, 2003, Houston Police Department Narcotics Officer Dirk

Bogaard was working undercover in connection with an operation initiated to curtail

narcotics distribution in a particular area of town. Upon observing suspicious activity

on the part of appellant, Officer Bogaard approached appellant and said that he

wanted to buy some crack cocaine. Appellant agreed to sell Officer Bogaard the

crack cocaine on the condition that they go elsewhere to complete the deal. Appellant

got into Officer Bogaard’s car and began directing him to a location where they could

proceed with the transaction. At some point during the commute, appellant directed

Officer Bogaard to stop the car. Appellant then pointed a gun to Officer Bogaard’s

head and demanded money. Officer Bogaard surrendered $40 in cash and suggested

that appellant take the car. Appellant exited the passenger’s side of the car and began

to approach the driver’s side. At this point Officer Bogaard drew his gun and shot

appellant three times. Appellant was subsequently arrested, indicted, and found

guilty of aggravated robbery by the jury .

During the punishment-phase cross-examination of appellant’s brother, John

Lillie, prosecutor Marc Brown suggested that appellant’s mother was once afraid

when appellant chased her around the house and threatened her with a pair of

scissors. At this point, appellant got up from his chair and attacked Prosecutor

Brown, striking him repeatedly about the face before being restrained. The following

day, defense counsel presented the court with a motion for mistrial because of the

attack, which motion the court denied.

The punishment proceedings continued two days after the attack. Before the

punishment proceedings began, the trial court held a hearing outside the presence of

the jury. The prosecution made known to the court its intention of calling Deputy

Nunez to the stand to testify . Deputy Nunez had been in the courtroom at the time of

the attack and was one of the men who had helped restrain appellant. Defense

counsel objected to Deputy Nunez’s being allowed to testify because the deputy had

been present during the trial, acting as a bailiff since March 2, when he had relieved

Deputy Cepiel.

Deputy Nunez stated that his direct contact with the jury had been

limited to letting the jury in and out of the courtroom on one occasion. The court

found that Deputy Nunez’s contact with the jury had been minimal and allowed him

to testify. Motion for Mistrial

In his first point of error, appellant contends that the trial court abused its

discretion in denying his motion for mistrial. Specifically, he alleges that a fair and

impartial trial was not possible once the jury had witnessed appellant’s violent attack

upon Prosecutor Brown.

We review a trial court’s denial of a motion for a mistrial under an abuse-of-discretion standard, recognizing that the court has broad powers to deal with

unexpected situations occurring at trial. See Ladd v. State , 3 S.W.3d 547, 567 (Tex.

Crim. App. 1999); Sapata v. State , 574 S.W.2d 770, 771 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978). We

must uphold the trial court’s ruling if it is within the zone of reasonable disagreement.

Wead v. State 129 S.W.3d 126, 129 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004).

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees an accused

the right to trial by an impartial jury. Franklin v. State 138 S.W.3d 351, 356 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2004); see U.S. Const. amend. VI. A verdict rendered by a jury

influenced by prejudice or bias violates that right. See id . However, Texas has long

refused to permit an accused to profit in the form of receiving a mistrial ruling due

to his own misconduct. Chamberlain v. State , 453 S.W.2d 490, 493 (Tex. Crim. App.

1970) (refusing to find error in court’s overruling motion for mistrial after defendant

had gotten into scuffle with deputies in presence of jury).

In Smith v. State , this Court was presented with facts similar to those presently

before it. 638 S.W.2d 200, 201 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1982, pet. ref’d).

In Smith , the appellant argued that a fair trial was not possible after he had attacked

the complaining witness in the jury’s presence. Id. at 202 . In that case, this Court

considered the accused’s constitutional right to a trial by an impartial jury in the

context in which the accused stood to benefit from his own misconduct and found no

error in the trial court’s refusal to grant a mistrial. Id. at 201-02 . We find Smith

controlling.

Appellant contends that his constitutional right to trial by an impartial jury was

denied by the trial court’s allowing the same jury that had witnessed his attack on the

prosecutor to decide the terms of his punishment. Appellant overlooks the fact that

it was he who created any partiality by intentionally assaulting the prosecutor in front

of the jury. See Smith , 638 S.W.2d at 201-02 .

We overrule point of error one.

Testimony of Bailiff

In his second point of error, appellant contends that he was denied due process

when the court allowed Deputy Nunez to testify because the deputy’s prior contact

with the jury had been more than minimal.

The Texas Code of Criminal Procedure provides that if a person is to be called

as a witness in a case, that person may not serve as bailiff. See Tex. Code Crim.

Proc. Ann. art. 36.24 (Vernon 1981). However, reversal is not automatically

mandated when the bailiff does in fact testify; instead, we must determine whether

there has been a showing of harm or prejudice as a result of the bailiff’s dual role.

S ee Criado v. State , 438 S.W.2d 557, 560 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968); Reed v. State , 974

S.W.2d 838, 840 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1998, pet. ref’d). In making this

determination, we examine the facts of each case to determine what, if any, impact

the bailiff’s testimony had on the jury. Criado , 438 S.W.2d at 559 . Important factors

that we must assess in making this determination are (1) the extent of the bailiff’s

association with the jury and (2) the importance of the bailiff’s testimony. See Reed ,

974 S.W.2d at 840 ; Onofre v. State , 836 S.W.2d 807, 811 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st

Dist.] 1992, pet. ref’d).

Here, Deputy Nunez’s prior contact with the jury is analogous to that of the

bailiff in Reed , in which a key State’s witness had acted in a limited capacity as

bailiff. Reed , 974 S.W.2d at 840 . In Reed , the court found no harm in allowing the

testimony of the bailiff because there was no evidence that he had had any personal

contact with any juror or even that he had exerted control over the jury (his contact

with the jury had been limited to his having escorted witnesses to the stand, having

adjusted the microphone and curtains, and having sat in a chair next to the jury box).

Id. The relevant facts in this case are like those in Reed . Likewise, the importance

of Deputy Nunez’s testimony can be compared with that of the testimony presented

by the bailiff in Onofre , 836 S.W.2d at 811 . In Onofre , this Court found no harm

when the bailiff’s testimony was limited to an uncontroverted fact that had been

obvious to the jury before the bailiff testified. Id.

Deputy Nunez’s contact with the jury amounted to letting the jury out and back

into the courtroom on one occasion and was thus minimal. Furthermore, the scope

of his testimony was limited to describing appellant’s attack upon the prosecutor,

which had occurred in the presence of the jury. Accordingly, we hold that there was

no harm in the trial court’s decision to hear testimony from Deputy Nunez and,

therefore, that appellant’s due process rights were not violated.

We overrule point of error two.

Conclusion

We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Tim Taft

Justice

Panel consists of Justices Taft, Keyes, and Hanks.

Do not publish. Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b) .