Opinion

Anna Spainhouer v. Western Electric Company, Inc.

Court
Texas Supreme Court
Filed
Feb 15, 1980
Status
Published
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 35.1%

The opinion

DEC 13 1970

J A HULGAN. mm

B 1 "7 COURT or chL APPEALS

9 A .r 5 NINTH SUPREME JUchlAL 913mm

, BE mom. 15x 3

No. 8372

ANNA SPAINHOUER APPELLANT

V.

WESTERN ELECTRIC COMPANY, INC. APPELLEE

Plaintiff below appeals from an adverse summary judgment

entered in her suit against the defendant—employer for damages

resulting from her alleged wrongful discharge. She sought

damages under the provisions of TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art.

8307c (Supp. 1978-79). Plaintiff was injured in the course

of her employment with defendant and claimed worker's compensa-

tion benefits. She settled her claim with the compensation

insurance carrier but when she failed to report for duty as

instructed by defendant, she was discharged.

Claiming that she was wrongfully discharged by the defendant

she followed the grievance procedures contained in the contract

between her union, Communications Workers of America, and

Western Electric, being assisted by the local Union officials.

The Union diligently pursued her claim through the first

four steps of the grievance procedure and then wrote to the

International representative of the Union recommending that

the grievance be pursued through the fifth step--binding arbitra-

tion--as prescribed in the contract. The International Union

declined to take such step and so advised the local Union

representative. Under the contract, if either party failed to

institute arbitration procedures within sixty days, the right

to arbitrate was deemed to have been conclusively waived.

The local officials of the Union advised plaintiff of the

decision of the International Union not to pursue arbitration

but no further action was taken thereon. Instead, she filed

suit against the Company alleging that she had been discharged

because she had filed a claim for worker's compensation benefits.

Defendant's motion for summary judgment urged the contention

that plaintiff had elected to pursue her claim by way of the

contractual remedy and had failed to exhaust her contractual

remedies. Supporting affidavits were supplied by Union repre—

sentatives. The Union was not made a party to the suit and no

contention is made that the Union or any of its officials

failed to discharge with fidelity and diligence every duty it

owed to plaintiff.

The gravamen of plaintiff's complaint is that she was

wrongfully discharged by the defendant employer. There was a

comprehensive bargaining agreement providing an exclusive

method of settlement of such disputes and plaintiff availed

-2-

l/

herself of such contractual provisions. For reasons which it

did not articulate, the International Union refused to take the

grievance to the fifth step. A similar refusal was not disap-

proved in Vaca v. Sipes, noted earlier. It is sufficient to

state at the moment that no contention is made that the employee-

plaintiff was "prevented from exhausting [her] contractual

remedies by the union's wrongful refusal to process the grievance."

(386 U.S. at 185, emphasis in original) See also, Ostrofsky v.

United Steelworkers of America, 171 F.Supp. 782 (D. Maryland

1959), aff'd per curiam, 273 F.2d 614 (4th Cir.), cert. den'd,

363 U.S. 849 (1960).

The plaintiff chose the Union to process her grievance

through the contractual machinery and is now bound by the acts

of its agent. Harris v. Chemical Leaman Tank Linesz Inc., 437

F.2d 167, 170 (5th Cir. 1971).

Chief Justice Curtiss Brown wrote a scholarly opinion on

the narrow subject now under discussion in the case of Thompson

v. Monsanto Company, 559 S.W.2d 873 (Tex. Civ. App.--Houston

[14th Dist.] 1977, no writ), and held that federal law preempted

the state law. His analysis of the statutes and decisions is

approved and is now followed by this Court.

There is but one factual difference in the two cases. in

Thompson, the parties went to binding arbitration, while here,

plaintiff's Union declined to take the fifth step. But, as

1/ The steps in the grievance procedure in the contract

before us are substantially the same as those set out in

Vaca V. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 175, 87 S.Ct. 903, 17 L.Ed.2d

2, 9, fn. 3 (1967).

-3-

noted above, plaintiff does not contend that the Union wrong-

fully refused to pursue her claim. See Sartwelle, "Workers'

Compensation, Annual Survey of Texas Law”, 33 SW. L.J. 3312

367 (1979), for a discussion of Thompson, supra. See also,

Brown v. Gulf Coast Machine & Supply Co., 551 S.w.2d 397, 400

(Tex. civ. App.--Beaumont l977, writ ref'd n.r.e.), concurring

opinion.

Finally, after considering the very recent opinion in

Carnation Company v. Borner, ___ S.W.2d __p (Tex. Civ. App.--

Houston [14th Dist.], No. B1969, August 1A, 1979, not yet

reported), we are of the opinion that the language used in

Vaca v. Sipes and Monsanto relating to arbitration controls

the disposition of this cause. The local Union in our case

did far more than merely file a grievance. Whatever may have

been the motivating factors compelling the International Union

to forego its demand for arbitration did not confer private

rights upon plaintiff to pursue her tort claim against her

employer.

The factual situation in Borner is inapplicable to our

cause. The trial court properly granted the defendant's motion

for summary Judgment and such judgment is now AFFIRMED.

Quentin Keith

Justice

Opinion delivered

December 13, 1979

IN THE COURT, OF CIVIL APPEALS

FORHTHE

NINTH SUPREME IHDICIAL DISTRICT OF TEXAS

At Beaumont, Texas

STATE OF TEXAS }

COUNTY OF JEFFERSON

I, J. A. Hulgan, Clerk of the Court of Civil Appeals,

for the Ninth Supreme Judicial District of Texas, at Beaumont, Texas,

do hereby certify that the foregoing F3E£___ pages,

is a true and correct copy of Court's Qpinign

in cause No. 8372 _m_uln

Anna Spainhouer

—————-——p—wm—m——a—-—n———————u——i—————

v5, Western Electric ComEanx, Inc. mm

which was filed in said Court of Civil Appeals on the lggh day of

December , A,D. 19 79

Witness my hand and seal of said Court ofCivil Appeals, at

Beaumont, Texas, this 6th day of Februarx A.D. 19 89.

J. A. HULGAN, Clerk

Judgment Rendered _________ ________________________________________ __ 197

__________ -. __

vs. No..-____-_ 7 6

_ ________ __W§__S_t_§_r_n__._Eleg1;_ri§-__§_9mpan _1__-_:_[_IJ_Q-: ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ __

from ______________ "District. ______________________ _.Court of .............. _.Dallas _______________________________________________ __County

Opinion by ..... "Associate ____________________________________________ _.Justice____Quenj;;Ln__.K§3,131.,

This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record, and, the same being inspected, because it is

the opinion of the Court that there was _________________ _.n._9._ __________________________ __error in the judgment; it is therefore

considered, adjudged and ordered that the judgment of the Court below be

in all things affirmed, and that all cost of this appeal be assessed

against the appellant, Anna Spainhouer and the surety on her appeal

bond, Lawyers Surety Corporation. A copy of this judgment, shall

be certified below for observance.

Order, made _.EEEEEILNJL__ 19

overruling motion for a rehearing

Motion No._______-__-; Cause No.-_-____.-__-__________.___.; ____._____-___________________-____

from _________________________________________________________ _.; motion for rehearing; the motion is overruled.

1, JOE A. HULGAN, Clerk of the Court of Civil Appeals, Ninth Supreme Judicial District of

Texas, hereby certify that the foregoing page contains true and correct copies of the judgment of said

Court and its order overruling the motion for a rehearing and the respective dates thereof in the above

numbered and styled cause.

Witness my hand and the seal of said Court, this the ________ _§_Eh__day offlEEQE—EQEX _______ _.A. D 19 ..... .§-Q

JOE A. HULGAN

Clerk

CLERK'S OFFICE-Court of Civil Appeals at Beaumont

Anna Spainhouer BERTlFlED COPY

vs. BILL OF COSTS

No? 8312 in the

Eastern Electric co , Inc COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS, 9th DISTRICT

T

Clerk's Fees, Court of Civrl Appeals (Rule 388—Al $ 2500

Tran-script Fee _- W ‘ 52 L00

Statement of Facts Fee w. _

Total”, 77 00

I. J A. HULGAN. Clerk of the Court of Civil Appeals. Ninth Supreme Judicial District. at Beaumont.

hereby certify that the above copy of Bill of Cost: is true and correct.

GIVEN UNDER MY HAND AND SEAL 0F SAID COURT. at Beaumont. this_£§_}}___ay of

February A. 1).. 19 80

J_ge A. Hulgan ._

Clerk,

\ ‘ Rx

MW “ - Dcpmv

Glnurt nf QIihiI (Appeals

$61111 (Supreme illuhiniul @istrict

33mm, @2319 777111

MARTIN DIES. IR.. CHIEF IUS'I'ICE I. A. HULGAN

QUENTIN KEITH. ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CLERK

HAROLD R. CLAYTON, ASSOCIATE Iusnca February 6 , 1980 (713) Basra-102

Mr. Garson Jackson, Clerk

Supreme Court Building

Austin, Texas 78711

In Re: No. 8372, Anna Spainhouer vs Western Electric Co., Enc.

,1} Transcript

2i Brief of Appellant (3)

,3< Brief of Appellee (3)

4% Motion for Rehearing (3)

5. CC Court's Opinion

6. CC Judgment

7. Appellant's Application for Writ of Error (12)

g. Cost Bill ($10.00 check, Holley & Holley)

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.