American Coal Co. v. Federal Mine Safety & Health Review Commission

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued May 5, 2015 Decided July 31, 2015

No. 14-1206

THE AMERICAN COAL COMPANY,

PETITIONER

v.

FEDERAL MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH REVIEW COMMISSION

AND DEPARTMENT OF LABOR,

RESPONDENTS

On Petition for Review of a Decision of the

Federal Mine Safety & Health Review Commission

Jason W. Hardin argued the cause for petitioner. On the

briefs was Kevin N. Anderson.

Jerald S. Feingold, Attorney, Mine Safety & Health

Administration, argued the cause for respondent. With him on

the brief was W. Christian Schumann, Counsel. John T.

Sullivan, Attorney, entered an appearance.

Before: BROWN, GRIFFITH, and PILLARD, Circuit Judges.

GRIFFITH, Circuit Judge:

The American Coal Company was cited and fined for a

“fire” on one of its coal stockpiles when safety inspectors

2

from the Mine Safety and Health Administration observed

patches of smoldering, smoking coal without visible flames.

The Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977 allows the

issuance of safety orders and the imposition of citations and

fines when a mine operator permits an “accident” to occur in

its facility, including a “mine fire.” American Coal argues that

the citation and fine should be vacated because a “fire,” for

purposes of the Mine Act, exists only when there are visible

flames. The company also contends that even if a fire could

exist without visible flames, there was insufficient proof here

to show a fire of any kind. We disagree on both points and

deny American Coal’s petition for review. The statutory term

“fire” is ambiguous, the Secretary of Labor reasonably

determined that the term does not require the presence of

flames, and substantial evidence supports the conclusion that

the smoldering patches on American Coal’s stockpile satisfied

the Secretary’s interpretation of a “fire.”

I

A

Congress passed the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act

of 1977 (the Mine Act), Pub. L. No. 95-164, 91 Stat. 1290

(1977) (codified as amended at 30 U.S.C. § 801 et seq.), “to

provide more effective means and measures for improving the

working conditions and practices” in American mines “in

order to prevent death and serious physical harm” to miners.

30 U.S.C. § 801(c). The Mine Act assigned enforcement and

other powers to the Secretary of Labor and created within the

Department of Labor a new agency, the Mine Safety and

Health Administration (MSHA), to administer its provisions.

Meredith v. Fed. Mine Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 177

F.3d 1042, 1054 & n.12 (D.C. Cir. 1999).

3

Mine inspectors from MSHA perform frequent,

unannounced inspections to ensure that mine operators

comply with the Mine Act and related safety standards. 30

U.S.C. § 813(a). An inspector who discovers that a mine

operator has violated a provision of the Mine Act or any

related safety standard must issue a citation. Id. § 814(a). The

Secretary is also required to assess civil penalties for each

violation. Id. § 820(a).

In addition to citations, the Mine Act authorizes safety

inspectors to issue “safety orders” to ensure onsite safety “[i]n

the event of any accident occurring in a coal or other mine.”

Section 103(k), 30 U.S.C. § 813(k) (emphasis added). Safety

orders allow inspectors to wield broad authority as they deem

necessary. Under the Mine Act, the term “accident” is defined

to include “a mine explosion, mine ignition, mine fire, or

mine inundation, or injury to, or death of, any person.”

Section 3(k), id. § 802(k) (emphasis added). In other words, a

safety order under section 103(k) can only issue in the face of

an active, ongoing accident, of which a mine fire is but one

example. In this case, the safety inspectors justified the safety

orders based on their conclusion that the smoldering patches

they observed on the coal stockpile were a “fire.”

The Mine Act provides a different type of authority to

inspectors when they discover an “imminent danger.”

“Withdrawal orders” require the mine operator to evacuate the

area in which the imminent danger exists. Section 107(a), 30

U.S.C. § 817(a). The Mine Act defines an “imminent danger”

as “any condition or practice in a coal or other mine which

could reasonably be expected to cause death or serious

physical harm before such condition or practice can be

abated.” Id. § 802(j).

4

A mine operator may contest any citation, order, or

penalty before the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review

Commission (the Commission), a five-member body also

established by the Mine Act. The Commission appoints

administrative law judges (ALJs) to hear and decide the

dispute in the first instance. Either party to a dispute can

appeal any decision of an ALJ to the Commission.

B

American Coal, a subsidiary of Murray Energy, operates a

coal mine complex in Galatia, Illinois, composed of two

underground mines: the New Millennium mine and the New

Future mine. Each mine maintains various surface operations,

including coal stockpiles where raw coal is stacked once it is

extracted from the mines.

On January 19, 2010, two mine inspectors visited the

Galatia complex and found what they determined were signs

of “fire” at the New Future stockpile. As the inspectors later

testified, they observed five spots on the stockpile that emitted

smoke, radiated heat waves, and were covered in whitish ash

produced by heated coal. One inspector also testified that he

smelled an odor like sulfur. Neither inspector, however,

observed any visible flames, glowing coals, or any other kind

of illumination. The American Coal safety officer who

accompanied the inspectors later testified that he did not

believe the spots were smoldering, and characterized what the

inspectors called white ash as nothing more than gray rock

pulled from the mine.

Relying on their observations, the inspectors issued safety

orders under section 103(k) of the Mine Act for the New

Future stockpile, giving them broad authority over the

operation until the “fire . . . presently burning in the coal pile”

5

was brought under control. J.A. 24. The inspectors also issued

a citation to American Coal for failing to report the accident,

and the Secretary of Labor later assessed a civil penalty in

connection with that citation.

American Coal contested the orders, citation, and penalty.

American Coal and the Secretary agreed that the dispute

turned exclusively on the meaning of the word “fire” in the

Mine Act. American Coal argued that the inspectors were not

authorized to issue safety orders under section 103(k) because

mere smoldering combustion is not a “fire.” The ALJ agreed

with American Coal, ruling that the term “fire”

unambiguously required the existence of visible flame.

Because all agreed that there were no visible flames on the

New Future stockpile, the ALJ concluded that the safety

orders were unjustified.

The Secretary appealed his decision to the Commission.

Before the Commission, the Secretary explained that he

interpreted “fire” to include both “events marked by flaming

combustion” and “events marked by smoldering combustion

that reasonably has the potential to burst into flames.” The

Secretary insisted that the spots the inspectors had observed

on the surface of the stockpile satisfied his interpretation of

“fire” because they were instances of smoldering combustion

that could have ignited at any time. Thus the question before

the Commission was whether the term “fire” in the Mine Act

was ambiguous and, if so, whether the Secretary’s

interpretation of it was reasonable.

The Commission resolved that question in the Secretary’s

favor. The Commission pointed out that the term “fire” in the

statute was inextricable from the preceding term “mine,” as

the only fires at issue under the Mine Act were necessarily

those associated with mining. The Commission therefore

6

analyzed the Secretary’s interpretation within the overall

meaning of the statute instead of standing in isolation. The

Commission concluded that the term “fire” was ambiguous

and that the Secretary was free to interpret it to include both

fires involving visible flames and smoldering fires that had

the reasonable possibility of bursting into flames.

One member of the panel dissented. Though he agreed

that the statute did not require the presence of visible flames

to constitute “fire,” he found the Secretary’s definition

impermissibly vague because it did not provide adequate

guidance regarding when a given patch of smoldering

combustion would present a reasonable risk of bursting into

flame. The dissent feared that the term “reasonably” included

in the Secretary’s definition was too “open to subjective

interpretations” and would prove “ultimately useless to

operators.” J.A. 327.

On remand, a new ALJ (the previous ALJ having retired),

applied the Commission’s ruling and upheld the safety order.

The ALJ concluded that the spots the inspectors had observed

met the Secretary’s interpretation. American Coal appealed

this decision, but this time the Commission declined to review

the ALJ’s determination.

American Coal timely petitioned for review, arguing that

the term “fire” is not ambiguous, that the Secretary’s

interpretation of the term is not reasonable, and that there was

not even sufficient evidence to support the Commission’s

conclusion that the Secretary’s interpretation was satisfied

here. We have jurisdiction over a final order of the

Commission under 30 U.S.C. § 816(a)(1). We review the

Commission’s legal conclusions de novo. Sec’y of Labor v.

Twentymile Coal Co., 456 F.3d 151, 156 (D.C. Cir. 2006). We

review the Commission’s findings of fact for substantial

7

evidence, meaning that we “determine whether there is such

relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as

adequate to support the judge’s conclusion.” Jim Walter Res.,

Inc. v. Sec’y of Labor, 103 F.3d 1020, 1023-24 (D.C. Cir.

1997).

II

A

As a threshold matter, American Coal insists that we

should reverse and remand without considering the merits of

this dispute because the Commission exceeded its authority

under the statute. The Mine Act forbids the Commission from

considering any question that was not first presented to the

ALJ. 30 U.S.C. § 823(d)(2)(A)(iii), (d)(2)(B). In the hearing

before the ALJ, the parties stipulated that their dispute turned

on whether there was a “fire” on the stockpile in the sense

used in section 3(k) of the Mine Act. In its decision, the

Commission focused on the larger statutory term “mine fire,”

concluding that “mine” provided indispensable context for

“fire” and that a “mine fire” could exist even without visible

flames. Because the Commission considered the meaning of

the term “mine fire,” as opposed to the meaning of the term

“fire” standing alone, American Coal believes that the

Commission improperly considered an argument the parties

had not briefed.

We find this argument unpersuasive. “[A] reviewing court

should not confine itself to examining a particular statutory

provision in isolation. The meaning—or ambiguity—of

certain words or phrases may only become evident when

placed in context. It is a ‘fundamental canon of statutory

construction that the words of a statute must be read in their

context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory

8

scheme.’” FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529

U.S. 120, 132-33 (2000) (internal citation omitted) (quoting

Davis v. Michigan Dept. of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 809

(1989)). See also Deal v. United States, 508 U.S. 129, 132

(1993) (observing that it is a “fundamental principle of

statutory construction (and, indeed, of language itself) that the

meaning of a word cannot be determined in isolation, but

must be drawn from the context in which it is used”). In other

words, the Commission did not consider a different question

than the meaning of “fire” in section 3(k). It considered the

question that the parties agreed was at issue and employed

standard interpretive tools to answer it, including looking to

the statutory context of the disputed term. The Commission

was well within its authority to do so.

B

The Secretary’s interpretation of the Mine Act must “‘be

given weight by both the Commission and the courts’” under

the familiar two-step Chevron standard. Sec’y of Labor v.

Excel Mining, LLC, 334 F.3d 1, 5-6 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (quoting

Sec’y of Labor v. Cannelton Indus., Inc., 867 F.2d 1432, 1435

(D.C. Cir. 1989)). Under the first step of Chevron we consider

whether Congress has unambiguously addressed the question.

See Cannelton Indus., 867 F.2d at 1435. If not, we ask

whether the Secretary’s interpretation is reasonable. Id.

Especially in the context of a remedial health-and-safety act

like the Mine Act whose “primary purpose . . . [is] to protect

mining’s most valuable resource—the miner,” Int’l Union,

United Mine Workers v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 823

F.2d 608, 617 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (internal quotation marks

omitted), we must “‘liberally construe[]’” the Act’s terms,

meaning that we are all the more “obliged to defer to the

Secretary’s miner-protective construction of the Mine Act so

9

long as it is reasonable.” Cannelton Indus., 867 F.2d at 1437

(internal quotation marks omitted).

In the statutory scheme of the Mine Act, “the Secretary’s

litigating position before [the Commission] is as much an

exercise of delegated lawmaking powers as is the Secretary’s

promulgation of a . . . health and safety standard,” and so is

also deserving of deference. Excel Mining, 334 F.3d at 6

(alterations in original) (quoting RAG Cumberland Res. LP v.

Fed. Mine Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 272 F.3d 590,

596 n.9 (D.C. Cir. 2001)); cf. Martin v. Occupational Safety

& Health Review Comm’n, 499 U.S. 144, 156-57 (1991)

(explaining that the OSH Act’s analogous allocation of

responsibilities requires according Chevron deference to the

Secretary’s litigating positions).

1

We conclude that “fire” as used in the Mine Act is

ambiguous because there are competing, plausible ways to

read the term.

American Coal insists that there was widespread

agreement at the time the Mine Act was passed in 1977 that a

fire existed only when there were visible flames. To support

this proposition, American Coal cites several general-usage

dictionary definitions and a number of fire insurance cases

ranging from 1905 to 1969, which arguably identify fire

exclusively with the presence of flames. See, e.g., W. Woolen

Mill v. N. Assurance Co. of London, 139 F. 637, 639 (8th Cir.

1905) (“No definition of fire can be found that does not

include the idea of visible heat or light, and this is also the

popular meaning given to the word.”).

10

The Secretary responds principally in two ways. First, he

cites a number of cases of similar vintage that explicitly

distinguish between “smoldering fires” and “flaming fires,” to

show that contemporary usage employed the term “fire” in

different ways. See, e.g., Triple A Machine Shop, Inc. v.

Waterman Steamship Co., 221 F.2d 916, 917 (9th Cir. 1955)

(“[A] fire so started in the [ship’s hold] would smoulder many

hours before it burst into flame.”); Ravenscroft v. United

States, 88 F.2d 418, 419 (2d Cir. 1937) (noting “the danger of

admitting air to a smoldering fire in cotton”); Petition of

United States, 105 F. Supp. 353, 359 (S.D.N.Y. 1952)

(“[Opening the hatch] created a strong circulation of air,

which fanned the smoldering fire into flame.” (internal

quotation marks omitted)). Second, the Secretary points to a

number of technical references focusing on mining and fire

prevention that distinguish smoldering fire from flaming fire.

See, e.g., NATIONAL FIRE PROTECTION ASSOCIATION, FIRE

PROTECTION HANDBOOK 2-18 (Gordon P. McKinnon & Keith

Tower eds., 14th ed. 1976) (“The observer can be sure there is

fire where flame can be seen. Flame is rarely separated from

the burning materials by any appreciable distance. However,

in certain types of smoldering fires without evidence of flame,

heat, smoke, and gas can develop.”); DICTIONARY OF MINING,

MINERAL, AND RELATED TERMS 246, 436 (1st ed. 1968)

(defining “fire” as “[f]uel in a state of combustion” and

defining “combustion” as “[t]he action or operation of

burning” that can be but is not necessarily “accompanied by

the generation of light and heat”).

We agree with the Secretary. The parties have both

presented contemporary readings of the term “fire” that

support their position. For that reason, Chevron step one is

relatively straightforward here. “Confronting diverse readings

of the statutory text, we are obliged to defer to the Secretary’s

miner-protective construction of the Mine Act so long as it is

11

reasonable.” Cannelton Indus., 867 F.2d at 1437. The parties

have both provided competing uses of the term in

contemporary judicial decisions, showing that lawyers and

judges of the time sometimes understood “fire” to require

visible flames and sometimes understood that a “fire” could

exist even when there was only smoldering combustion. And

American Coal cannot successfully distinguish the

contemporary cases cited by the Secretary that clearly

differentiate between smoldering fires and flaming fires. True,

each of those cases involved a smoldering fire that was

succeeded by a flaming fire, and the damage that provoked

the dispute in each circumstance was caused by the later

flaming stage. But that merely underscores that in each case

the court considered the fire to have begun once smoldering

commenced, even though flames had not yet broken out. This

alone is reason enough to conclude that “fire” is ambiguous:

Congress may have meant to include only flaming fires in the

illustrative list of accidents in the Mine Act, but it may also

have intended that list to include smoldering fires as well.

We also note that the term “fire” is identified in the statute

merely as one item in an inclusive list designed to illustrate,

not comprehensively enumerate, the various forms of

“accident” that can justify issuing a safety order under section

103(k). See 30 U.S.C. § 802(k) (stating that an “accident,” for

purposes of the Mine Act, “includes a mine explosion, mine

ignition, mine fire, or mine inundation, or injury to, or death

of, any person” (emphasis added)); see also Burgess v. United

States, 553 U.S. 124, 131 n.3 (2008) (“[T]he word ‘includes’

is usually a term of enlargement, and not of limitation.”

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). In other

words, Congress enacted the Mine Act to create a

comprehensive scheme empowering the Secretary and his

mine inspectors to respond rapidly and flexibly to risks to

miner safety. And as we have already pointed out, the Mine

12

Act is a remedial health-and-safety statute, meaning that its

terms are to be read broadly to offer maximum protection for

miner safety. It would be senseless, in this context, to read a

single term in the statute’s inclusive, illustrative list of

possible accidents in the narrowest possible way, based on a

cherry-picked selection of contemporary decisional law, so as

to preclude the Secretary from adopting a reasonable

construction that increased the safety of miners. On this basis,

we are satisfied that there are competing, plausible

interpretations of the term “fire,” and so find it ambiguous.

See Cannelton Indus., 867 F.2d at 1437.

It is true, as American Coal points out, that the general-

usage dictionaries from the period when Congress passed the

Mine Act, define fire only as flaming combustion. But these

general-usage dictionaries do not change our view that the

term “fire” is ambiguous in the Act. General-usage

dictionaries cannot invariably control our consideration of

statutory language, especially when the “dictionary definition

of . . . isolated words[] does not account for the governing

statutory context.” Bloate v. United States, 559 U.S. 196, 205

n.9 (2010). After all, “‘[t]he plainness or ambiguity of

statutory language is determined [not only] by reference to the

language itself, [but as well by] the specific context in which

that language is used, and the broader context of the statute as

a whole.’” Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074, 1081-82

(2015) (plurality opinion) (quoting Robinson v. Shell Oil Co.,

519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997) (alterations in Yates)); see also id.

at 1092 (“[W]e interpret particular words in their context and

with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme. And

sometimes that means . . . that the dictionary definition of a

disputed term cannot control.” (Kagan, J., dissenting)

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Though our

assessment of the ambiguity of statutory text sometimes

begins and ends with the definitions provided in

13

contemporary general-usage dictionaries, on other occasions

it is useful and important to consult more technical sources

where, as here, the statute focuses on a specific technical

context. The Mine Act is designed to secure and enhance the

safety of miners in and around mines. The characteristics of

fire that matter for the purposes of this statute are those

relevant in the context of mining and industrial safety. And

the general-usage dictionaries American Coal cites cannot and

do not account for these particular characteristics. The

Secretary, on the other hand, has provided technical

resources, also from the period when Congress passed the

Act, that define fire in the specific context of mining and

industrial safety. For example, the Fire Protection Handbook

that the Secretary has produced unmistakably supports the

Secretary’s position by identifying the distinct risks

associated with “smoldering fires.” NATIONAL FIRE

PROTECTION ASSOCIATION, FIRE PROTECTION HANDBOOK 4-

34 (George H. Tryon & Gordon P. McKinnon eds., 13th ed.

1969); see also NATIONAL FIRE PROTECTION ASSOCIATION,

FIRE PROTECTION HANDBOOK 2-18 (Gordon P. McKinnon &

Keith Tower eds., 14th ed. 1976) (same). And the Dictionary

of Mining, Mineral, and Related Terms identifies “the

generation of light and heat” merely as an “example” of the

attributes of fire, not as a necessary precondition for fire to

exist. DICTIONARY OF MINING, MINERAL, AND RELATED

TERMS 246, 436 (1st ed. 1968); see also DICTIONARY OF

MINING, MINERAL, AND RELATED TERMS 114 (2d ed. 1997)

(same). In other words, paying attention to the context of the

Mine Act, the exchange of contrasting definitions from

various dictionary sources provides further basis to conclude

that the term “fire” is ambiguous.

American Coal argues that the structure of the Act as a

whole unambiguously requires that the term “fire” cover only

combustion that displays visible flames. Specifically,

14

American Coal claims that the Secretary’s interpretation is

clearly foreclosed by the interaction between the two types of

orders inspectors can issue to deal with mine accidents: safety

orders under section 103(k) and withdrawal orders under

section 107(a). American Coal argues that withdrawal orders

under section 107(a) are designed to deal with conditions that

pose a future risk of danger, while safety orders under section

103(k) are designed to deal only with ongoing or completed

accidents, not their prevention. In American Coal’s view, a

smoldering fire is a pre-accident condition, dangerous only

because it poses the risk that it will ignite and become a

flaming fire. Thus, American Coal insists that section 103(k)

should not permit inspectors to issue safety orders to control

smoldering fires because 103(k) orders are authorized only to

confront actively occurring accidents, not to prevent future

accidents. Instead, inspectors should be authorized to deal

with smoldering fires only by issuing withdrawal orders under

section 107(a) because that section offers appropriate

authority for prophylactic measures.

We disagree with American Coal’s view of the statute.

For one thing, we cannot agree that smoldering combustion is

nothing more than a pre-fire state, important only because it

might burst into flames in the future. Just the opposite. As the

Secretary has explained, the self-heating properties of coal

mean that coal stockpiles can begin smoldering and reach

high temperature points without igniting, generating

substantial heat and smoke that can imperil miners in the

vicinity even without bursting into flames. Worse, smoldering

combustion consumes coal just as surely as does flaming

combustion. Patches of smoldering combustion can thus eat

away at the stockpile from within, creating a hidden cavity

that can destabilize the stockpile as a whole or into which a

miner can fall. A smoldering fire poses active risks and can

15

constitute an “accident occurring” on a coal stockpile in its

own right. 30 U.S.C. § 813(k).

Nor do we think American Coal’s account of the structure

of the Mine Act is correct. Section 103(k) orders are broad,

flexible tools, authorizing inspectors to confront many

different circumstances that present immediate risks. For

example, once safety orders are issued under section 103(k),

inspectors often modify them to change the requirements

imposed on mine operators as the accident evolves. See

Performance Coal Co. v. Fed. Mine Safety & Health Review

Comm’n, 642 F.3d 234, 237 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (“It is

undisputed that [section] 103(k) orders undergo frequent

modifications.”). Inspectors sometimes issue section 103(k)

safety orders first, while trying to deal with an accident, and

only thereafter issue section 107(a) withdrawal orders to shut

the mine down completely. See, e.g., Clinchfield Coal Co. v.

Fed. Mine Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 895 F.2d 773,

774 (D.C. Cir. 1990). Most obviously, section 103(k) safety

orders allow inspectors to impose whatever restrictions or

requirements they judge appropriate to deal with the accident

in question, while section 107(a) withdrawal orders simply

close the mine. In short, section 107(a) is an emergency

blunderbuss, unsubtle and extreme, for circumstances in

which getting miners out and away is the only appropriate

response. Section 103(k), which the inspectors used here, is a

subtler instrument that can be tailored to any situation.

There is no risk that finding the term “fire” ambiguous

will destabilize the statute. To the contrary, allowing the

Secretary to wield section 103(k) orders in a broader range of

circumstances accords with the statute’s structure by making a

flexible, nuanced tool available to handle accidents while they

happen but before they become critical.

16

To sum up, the contemporary body of decisional law

shows competing definitions of the term “fire” in a variety of

contexts. General-usage and technical dictionary definitions

from the period when Congress passed the Mine Act offer

support for both sides of the debate. And finding ambiguity in

this statutory term does not pose a risk to the structure of the

statute but rather will conform to that structure by enabling

the Secretary to use the flexible tool of section 103(k) safety

orders in an appropriate range of circumstances. Because the

parties to this dispute have shown that the term “fire” is

susceptible to multiple plausible interpretations, we find it

ambiguous and move on to consider whether the Secretary’s

interpretation warrants deference.

2

Under Chevron step two, we defer to the Secretary’s

interpretation of an ambiguous term unless it is unreasonable

or inconsistent with the statute. The Secretary’s interpretation

contains two elements. To qualify as “fire,” non-flaming

combustion must qualify as “smoldering” combustion, and it

must also present a reasonable chance of bursting into flame.

We find both elements of this interpretation perfectly

reasonable.

First, nothing in the statute expressly prohibits the

Secretary from reading “fire” to cover smoldering

combustion. And as we explained in our analysis under

Chevron step one above, there is substantial authority in

judicial decisions and relevant technical references to support

the conclusion that smoldering combustion qualifies as a type

of “fire” whether it displays visible flames or not. It comports

with the goal of protecting miner safety not to ignore an entire

category of fire simply because it does not show flames.

17

We also conclude that the Secretary was entitled to limit

his interpretation of “fire” to include only smoldering fires

that reasonably could ignite at any time. The Secretary has

explained that the risks posed by a smoldering fire cross a

critical line that warrants regulation when it reaches the point

at which it might burst into flame. At that point, the Secretary

has concluded, a smoldering fire’s danger to miners is

significant enough to require regulation. That conclusion is

reasonable. By limiting the scope of his authority to

smoldering fires that reasonably could burst into flame at any

time, as opposed to all smoldering combustion, the Secretary

allows “operators and inspectors [to] focus their attention

where it will do the most good” and avoids “unduly or

unnecessarily burden[ing] operators or keep[ing] inspectors

from attending to other important matters.” Resp. Br. 43. This

explanation adequately justifies the Secretary’s decision to

limit the scope of his oversight.

American Coal raises three challenges to the

reasonableness of the Secretary’s interpretation. None

succeed. First, American Coal argues that the interpretation is

unconstitutionally vague, leaving mine operators unable to

comply and vulnerable to arbitrary and capricious

enforcement, which, it submits, is a very ineffective way to

promote miner safety. The Secretary rejoins that the

interpretation is adequately specific because it limits its scope

to smoldering combustion that “reasonably” might ignite. The

Secretary is confident that “reasonable” mine operators,

experienced in the industry and well-schooled in the

characteristics of coal and its propensity to self-heat and

ignite, will be able to comply.

We agree. There is no doubt that the Secretary has

provided limited direction. But an interpretation need not be

prolix to avoid impermissible vagueness. It must merely

18

provide sufficient guidance so that reasonable regulated

parties, aware of the goal the regulation seeks to accomplish,

have “fair warning” of what the regulation requires. Freeman

United Coal Mining Co. v. Fed. Mine Safety & Health Review

Comm’n, 108 F.3d 358, 362 (D.C. Cir. 1997). This

interpretation passes that bar. After all, the opinions that will

matter in enforcing this standard are those of mine safety

inspectors and mine operators who see smoldering patches on

coal stockpiles with great regularity and have extensive

experience in recognizing those patches of smoldering

combustion that might soon ignite. We are confident that

reasonable mine operators and reasonable safety inspectors

will prove able to implement the Secretary’s standard in

practice.

Second, American Coal argues that the Secretary failed to

provide a reasonable explanation for his decision to limit his

interpretation of “fire” to cover only smoldering combustion

that reasonably has the potential to burst into flames. We

disagree. Based on his experience, the Secretary concluded

that once smoldering fires have reached the point at which

ignition is imminent, they pose risks to the miner significant

enough to constitute an active accident. As we have already

explained above, this conclusion was reasonable. American

Coal seems to suggest that the Secretary could only

reasonably define “fire” to include all smoldering combustion

as well as all flaming combustion. But there is no basis for

that position. After all, an agency need not target every danger

in order to target any danger. See, e.g., Pers. Watercraft

Indus. Ass’n v. Dep’t of Commerce, 48 F.3d 540, 544 (D.C.

Cir. 1995) (“An agency does not have to make progress on

every front before it can make progress on any front.”

(internal quotation marks omitted)). And agencies may

marshal their limited resources by pursuing their goals “as

priorities demand.” Nat’l Cong. of Hispanic Am. Citizens (El

19

Congreso) v. Marshall, 626 F.2d 882, 888 (D.C. Cir. 1979).

In light of these principles, the Secretary has provided a

reasonable explanation for the scope of his interpretation of

“fire.”

We acknowledge, as American Coal points out, that none

of the technical treatises the Secretary has cited define fire by

pointing to the reasonable possibility of ignition. But the

Secretary has adequately explained his reasoning in limiting

the scope of “fire” under the statute to cover only smoldering

combustion that reaches the point at which ignition is an

immediate risk. The fact that a dictionary or manual does not

make that distinction in no way invalidates the Secretary’s

otherwise reasonable explanation for adopting it.

Finally, American Coal argues again that the Secretary’s

interpretation of the statute is foreclosed by the interaction

between section 103(k) and section 107(a) of the Mine Act.

We reject this argument for the reasons we have already

stated.

The Secretary’s interpretation of “fire” is reasonable. It

furthers the statute’s purpose, provides adequate guidance for

its implementation, and conforms harmoniously to the

statute’s text and structure. We defer to the Secretary.

C

Separately, American Coal argues that, even if the

Secretary’s interpretation of the term “fire” is reasonable, the

Commission erred in finding that interpretation satisfied here

because there was insufficient evidence either that the patches

on the stockpile were instances of smoldering combustion or

that those patches could reasonably burst into flame at any

time. Under the deferential standard of review we use to

20

evaluate the Commission’s factual determinations, we reject

both arguments. See Jim Walter Res., Inc., 103 F.3d at 1023-

24.

1

Substantial evidence supported the Commission’s

determination that the safety inspectors observed patches of

smoldering combustion. One mine safety inspector, Wendell

Crick, testified that he observed smoking or smoldering areas

and whitish ash, smelled a sulfur-like odor, and observed heat

waves rising from the smoldering areas. The other inspector

also testified that he saw smoldering patches. American Coal

sought to counter this evidence with the competing testimony

of its supervisor, who claimed that what Crick saw was

nothing more than gray rock. We conclude that the

Commission was justified to rely on the testimony of the mine

safety inspectors over that of American Coal’s witness.

American Coal attacks Crick’s testimony by insisting that,

when he discussed visible heat waves rising from the patches

on the coal stockpile, he was merely speaking generically

about the phenomena generally associated with smoldering

coal, not any observations he actually made at the time. But

when pressed about what he saw rising from the stockpile,

Crick responded, “You can see the heat waves and . . . a

whitish coat of ash around the areas that smoke was rising

from.” J.A. 103. The Commission was entitled to determine

from this testimony, especially Crick’s reference to “the areas

that smoke was rising from,” that Crick was in fact reporting

his observations, not speaking in the abstract. Id. After all,

when reviewing an agency determination for substantial

evidence the question is not whether the challenger’s

construction is plausible but whether the record can support

the agency’s conclusion. See Fla. Gas Transmission Co. v.

21

FERC, 604 F.3d 636, 645 (D.C. Cir. 2010). The

Commission’s determination satisfies that standard.

American Coal also argues that the inspectors’ testimony

was not reliable because the Secretary did not show that either

held advanced academic degrees or had completed scientific

studies relevant to the self-heating properties of coal. There is

no basis for this challenge. Crick had extensive experience in

coal mining as a foreman, safety analyst, and surface

operation instructor. He had been a mine safety inspector for

three years, and he had extensive volunteer firefighter training

and experience. We need not determine the minimum

credentials a mine inspector must have for his judgments to

provide evidence on which an ALJ can permissibly rely.

Crick’s credentials are adequate to justify the Commission’s

reliance on his observations.

2

We also find that substantial evidence supports the

Commission’s determination that the smoldering patches

reasonably had the potential to burst into flame.

In the original hearing, Crick testified that in his judgment

“if the oxygen or the wind blows or . . . an amount of air hit[]”

the smoldering patches “just right,” they could “burst into

flame spontaneously at any time.” J.A. 107-08. American

Coal presented no evidence controverting Crick’s assessment.

The Commission was entitled to credit Crick’s testimony and

rely on it to conclude that the smoldering patches satisfied the

Secretary’s interpretation.

American Coal argues that Crick’s testimony contradicts

itself. Crick testified that the wind was blowing while he was

inspecting the New Future stockpile, yet the smoldering

22

patches had not ignited. Thus his claims about the ignitibility

of the smoldering patches must be false. But Crick did not say

that the smoldering patches he observed would necessarily

ignite whenever the wind blew. The fact that there was wind

does not mean that the patches were exposed to a sudden

increase in oxygen level sufficient to trigger their ignition.

American Coal also argues that Crick’s testimony should

not have been credited because the first ALJ rejected his

testimony after seeing him testify in person, while the second

ALJ reversed and credited his testimony on remand based

only on the transcript of the hearing. Not so. The first ALJ

concluded only that Crick’s testimony did not warrant “great

weight,” not that it was incredible. And that determination

was a natural one given that he had already rejected the

Secretary’s interpretation of the term “fire.” Crick’s testimony

regarding the smoldering combustion he observed only makes

a difference if smoldering combustion can qualify as a “fire.”

Because the ALJ had rejected that construction, it made little

difference that Crick had testified that “a fire could start up at

any time.” After the Commission held that the ALJ was

wrong to reject the Secretary’s interpretation, Crick’s

testimony was of course far more valuable. Thus on remand

the second ALJ had a blank slate to evaluate the credibility of

Crick’s testimony. And an ALJ’s credibility determination is

“entitled to great deference.” Sec’y of Labor v. Keystone Coal

Mining Corp., 151 F.3d 1096, 1107 (D.C. Cir. 1998). We

cannot say that the second ALJ erred in any way when she

relied on Crick’s uncontradicted testimony, backed up by

Crick’s experience, that the patches on the stockpile that day

posed the risk of bursting into flame.

We acknowledge that there was little evidence presented

on whether the smoldering piles might soon burst into flames.

But “[t]he substantial evidence inquiry turns not on how many

23

discrete pieces of evidence the Commission relies on, but on

whether that evidence adequately supports its ultimate

decision.” Fla. Gas Transmission, 604 F.3d at 645. Crick’s

testimony was enough to show that the Secretary’s

interpretation was satisfied. As we have already noted, the

question we ask when evaluating agency action under the

substantial evidence standard is not whether the petitioner can

reasonably read the evidence another way but only whether

the agency was reasonable to read the evidence the way it did.

Id. The Commission’s determination on this score satisfies

that standard.

III

For the foregoing reasons, we deny the petition for

review.