The opinion
UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 15-4157
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
VASCHON ANDREA BROWN,
Defendant – Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. Catherine C. Blake, Chief District
Judge. (1:14-cr-00032-CCB-1)
Submitted: July 2, 2015 Decided: July 30, 2015
Before SHEDD, DUNCAN, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Byron L. Warnken, Matt McKenzie, WARNKEN, LLC, Pikesville,
Maryland, for Appellant. Rod J. Rosenstein, United States
Attorney, Peter J. Martinez, Assistant United States Attorney,
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Baltimore, Maryland, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
In January 2014, a federal grand jury indicted Vaschon
Brown for (1) possession with intent to distribute heroin, in
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1); (2) possession of a firearm
and ammunition as a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(1); and (3) possession of a firearm in furtherance of a
drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).
Brown moved to suppress evidence seized from his person and
vehicle. Following a hearing, the district court denied the
motion. Brown then entered a conditional guilty plea, expressly
reserving his right to appeal the district court’s denial of his
motion to suppress. Brown now appeals that denial. For the
reasons that follow, we affirm.
I.
A.
At approximately 1:10 am on September 16, 2013, Officer
James Morrison of the Howard County Police Department observed
Vaschon Brown driving thirteen miles per hour over the speed
limit, and initiated a routine traffic stop. Morrison entered
Brown’s license plate number into the National Crime Information
Center (“NCIC”) database, which showed an active arrest warrant
for Brown issued by the Maryland Transportation Authority
(“MTA”) for failure to appear in traffic court. Morrison asked
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his dispatcher to contact the MTA to determine whether the
warrant was indeed active, and the MTA confirmed that it was.
Then, Morrison accessed the Maryland Judiciary Case Search
(“MJCS”) website to research Brown’s criminal history and
discovered that Brown had a prior narcotics conviction.
Morrison did not access the portion of the website dealing with
traffic-related cases.
Morrison told Brown there was an active warrant for his
arrest. Brown responded that the warrant had been quashed, and
provided the name of his lawyer. Brown argues he also told
Morrison his new trial date, but Morrison does not remember
Brown providing that information. Morrison nevertheless
executed the arrest warrant and in the subsequent search of
Brown’s person found $1,900 in cash and two cellphones. Brown
was in fact correct that the warrant had been recalled.
Based on the evidence from Morrison’s search and Brown’s
criminal history, Morrison detained Brown’s vehicle until a K-9
unit arrived to scan it. The scan indicated the presence of
narcotics, which led Morrison to search Brown’s vehicle. During
the search, Morrison found a loaded .45 caliber handgun, 38 bags
of heroin, and a duffel bag containing $20,000 in cash.
B.
Brown moved to suppress the evidence seized from his person
and vehicle as a result of Morrison’s searches. He argued, in
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relevant part, that the exclusionary rule applied because (1)
Morrison unreasonably relied on the representation that the
warrant was valid, and therefore his actions constituted police
misconduct to which the good faith exception should not apply;
and (2) Morrison lacked reasonable suspicion to detain the
vehicle for longer than the time reasonably required to issue a
citation.
The district court denied Brown’s motion to suppress,
finding that although Brown’s Fourth Amendment rights had been
violated because the warrant was, in fact, invalid, the good
faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied because
Morrison had reasonably relied on the information from the NCIC
database and the MTA. The court also held that Morrison had
lawfully detained Brown’s vehicle.
II.
“We review factual findings regarding [a] motion to
suppress for clear error and legal conclusions de novo.” United
States v. Williams, 740 F.3d 308, 311 (4th Cir. 2014). We
construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prevailing party in the district court. United States v.
Foster, 634 F.3d. 243, 246 (4th Cir. 2011). Because the
district court denied Brown’s motion, we construe the evidence
in the light most favorable to the government.
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III.
Brown makes two arguments on appeal. First, he argues that
the good faith exception should not be applied to these facts
because to do so would run counter to the exclusionary rule’s
goal of deterring police misconduct. He so contends because
Morrison (1) relied on a systemically incorrect database and (2)
failed to further investigate the warrant’s validity after Brown
informed him the warrant had been quashed. Second, he argues
that the evidence seized from Brown’s vehicle must be excluded
because Morrison lacked reasonable suspicion to detain the
vehicle for an additional 20-30 minutes after the arrest. We
find both arguments to lack merit.
A.
We first address Brown’s claim that the good faith
exception to the exclusionary rule does not apply. The purpose
of the exclusionary rule to the Fourth Amendment’s protection
against unlawful searches and seizures is “to deter wrongful
police conduct.” Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 137
(2009). Because excluding evidence exacts a “costly toll upon
truth-seeking and law enforcement objectives,” the exclusionary
rule is not automatically triggered every time the Fourth
Amendment is violated. Id. at 141 (quotation omitted). Rather,
it applies only when the police conduct is “deliberate,
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reckless, or grossly negligent,” or when there is evidence of
“recurring or systemic negligence.” Id. at 144. We apply an
objective standard to that inquiry and ask “whether a reasonably
well trained officer would have known that the search was
‘illegal’ in light of ‘all of the circumstances.’” Id. at 145
(quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922 n.23 (1984)).
If an officer acted with objectively reasonable reliance on
incorrect database information, we conclude that the officer
acted in good faith, and the exclusionary rule does not apply.
See id. at 142. We find that to be the case here, for the
reasons that follow.
Brown contends, in essence, that Morrison’s reliance was
not objectively reasonable. Brown argues that because the NCIC
database is known to be frequently incorrect, Morrison should
not have relied on its information. To the contrary, however,
this court has concluded that the NCIC database generally is
accurate and that widespread use of its reports indicates they
may be trusted. United States v. McDowell, 745 F.3d 115, 121–22
(4th Cir. 2014). Further, Morrison did not rely solely on
NCIC’s information in concluding that Brown’s arrest warrant was
valid. As we have noted, he asked his dispatcher to confirm
with the MTA that the warrant was active. That Morrison took
that additional step places his precautions beyond those of the
officer in Herring, on which both parties rely. In Herring, the
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Supreme Court held that the officer’s execution of an arrest
warrant based only on information from a neighboring county’s
clerk’s office that the warrant was active did not trigger the
exclusionary rule. See Herring, 555 U.S. at 137, 147–48.
In addition to Brown’s challenge to the NCIC database’s
accuracy, Brown argues that Morrison’s failure to check the
traffic portion of the MJCS website or further investigate the
warrant’s validity after Brown informed him the warrant had been
quashed indicates willful blindness. Willful blindness is a
high standard to meet, requiring, as it does, evidence that the
actor “deliberately shield[ed] [himself] from clear evidence of
critical facts that are strongly suggested by the
circumstances.” United States v. Jinwright, 683 F.3d 471, 478
(4th Cir. 2012). We have no difficulty finding that standard
was not met here.
Morrison accessed the MJCS website to investigate Brown’s
criminal history after having confirmed with the MTA Brown’s
warrant was active. Thus, since the authenticity of the warrant
was already confirmed, he was under no obligation to utilize the
MJCS site further. *
* We also reject Brown's argument that Morrison's failure to
infer that the warrant against Brown was inactive from the sole
fact that Brown's driver's license was valid triggered the
exclusionary rule. Although Brown asserts that, in Maryland,
the issuance of an arrest warrant against a person automatically
(Continued)
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Nor does Morrison’s failure to further investigate the
warrant because of Brown’s statements indicate willful
blindness. Brown’s statement that the warrant had been quashed
is not “clear evidence” of that fact, especially when contrasted
with Morrison’s specific information from the NCIC and MTA
regarding its validity. The circumstances thus indicated the
warrant was active; therefore Morrison proceeded reasonably.
B.
We next turn to Brown’s claim that Morrison lacked
reasonable suspicion to prolong the traffic stop. To detain a
driver and vehicle beyond the course of a routine traffic stop,
an officer must have reasonable suspicion of illegal activity.
United States v. Branch, 537 F.3d 328, 336 (4th Cir. 2008)
(citing Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500-01 (1983)).
Reasonable suspicion need not amount to probable cause, but the
officer does need to identify specific facts supporting this
suspicion. Id. An officer’s reasonable suspicion is evaluated
objectively, and we may not engage in “unrealistic second-
guessing” of the officer’s decision. Id. at 337 (citing
triggers suspension of that person's driver's license, Brown
cites no Maryland authority for that assertion, and presents no
evidence that a typical Maryland police officer would rely on
the validity of a driver's license to determine the status of an
arrest warrant.
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Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000); United States v.
Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686–87 (1985)).
Morrison knew that Brown had a prior narcotics conviction,
and discovered two cellphones and $1,900 in cash on Brown’s
person. These specific facts were sufficient to raise a
reasonable suspicion of illegal activity, authorizing Morrison
to order a K-9 scan and detain Brown’s vehicle. Brown has
offered only conclusory statements to argue that those facts do
not amount to reasonable suspicion.
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the
district court. We dispense with oral argument because the
facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before this court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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