in Re King Minors

STATE OF MICHIGAN

COURT OF APPEALS

UNPUBLISHED

In re KING, Minors. July 28, 2015

No. 321921

Wayne Circuit Court

Family Division

LC No. 11-502387-NA

Before: SAWYER, P.J., and DONOFRIO and BORRELLO, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Respondent mother, the mother of the nine minor children at issue in this appeal, appeals

as of right the circuit court’s orders terminating her parental rights to the children pursuant to

MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (c)(ii), (g), and (j). We affirm.

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Respondent mother challenges the sufficiency of the evidence in support of the statutory

grounds for termination and the circuit court’s finding that termination of her parental rights

served the children’s best interests. The petitioner bears the burden of proving a statutory ground

for termination by clear and convincing evidence. MCL 712A.19b(3); In re Trejo, 462 Mich

341, 350; 612 NW2d 407 (2000). Once a statutory ground for termination is established by clear

and convincing evidence, the circuit court must order termination if “termination of parental

rights is in the child’s best interests.” MCL 712A.19b(5). This Court reviews for clear error a

circuit court’s decision to terminate parental rights. MCR 3.977(K). The clear error standard

controls this Court’s review of “both the court’s decision that a ground for termination has been

proven by clear and convincing evidence and, where appropriate, the court’s decision regarding

the child’s best interest.” In re Trejo, 462 Mich at 356-357. A decision qualifies as clearly

erroneous when, “although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire

evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” In re JK,

468 Mich 202, 209-210; 661 NW2d 216 (2003). Clear error signifies a decision that strikes this

Court as more than just maybe or probably wrong. In re Trejo, 462 Mich at 356. This Court

“give[s] deference to the trial court’s special opportunity to judge the credibility of the

witnesses.” In re HRC, 286 Mich App 444, 459; 781 NW2d 105 (2009).

II. MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i)

Respondent mother initially avers that the circuit court erred in terminating her parental

rights to the oldest eight children under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i). Respondent mother asserts that

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she remedied the conditions that led to the children’s adjudication and, with assistance, could

eventually properly care for all of the children, provided that petitioner returned the children

gradually.

In MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), the Legislature authorized the termination of parental rights

as follows:

(c) The parent was a respondent in a proceeding brought under this

chapter, 182 or more days have elapsed since the issuance of an initial

dispositional order, and the court, by clear and convincing evidence, finds either

of the following:

(i) The conditions that led to the adjudication continue to exist and there

is no reasonable likelihood that the conditions will be rectified within a reasonable

time considering the child’s age.

In October 2011, respondent mother admitted several of the allegations in a petition for

temporary custody of seven children: (1) on July 25, 2011, respondent Dean, the boyfriend of

respondent mother and the father of her four youngest children, broke out a window in the front

door to the home she shared with the children; (2) she felt overwhelmed caring for all the

children; (3) on July 28, 2011, she contacted petitioner and expressed her desire to let petitioner

care for her three youngest children because she could not handle them; (4) she failed to pursue

either a January 2011 referral for prevention services or a June 2011 referral for mental health

services; and (5) she and Dean shared a history of verbal abuse. In September 2012, the circuit

court authorized a supplemental petition requesting the termination of respondent mother’s and

Dean’s parental rights. The supplemental petition alleged that in June 2012, Children’s

Protective Services (CPS) received a referral concerning Dean’s sexual abuse of two of

respondent mother’s oldest daughters. A new baby fathered by Dean arrived in the circuit

court’s temporary jurisdiction in March 2013, on the basis of respondent mother’s anticipatory

neglect of the newborn.1 In re Foster, 285 Mich App 630, 631; 776 NW2d 415 (2009).

Petitioner arranged for respondent mother to participate in a multitude of services

designed to improve her parenting skills and, between October 2011 and April 2014, respondent

mother participated in and completed many of the services. Although respondent mother

completed multiple parenting classes, including one designed to assist mentally challenged

parents, and received parenting instruction in the course of many supervised parenting times with

different numbers of her children, the circuit court did not clearly err in finding clear and

convincing evidence that in April 2014 respondent mother still lacked the capacity to parent the

children. The testimony of the two primary caseworkers agreed that respondent mother could

not effectively manage at supervised parenting times groups as small as two or three of the

children; that respondent mother usually interacted with the children appropriately at the

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The circuit court terminated Dean’s parental rights to his five children pursuant to MCL

712A.19b(3)(b)(i), (g), and (j), and this Court affirmed that decision. In re King, unpublished

opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued March 18, 2014 (Docket No. 315762).

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beginning and end of the parenting times; that respondent mother often tried some techniques for

redirecting the children’s behavior, but her redirection often did not succeed because the children

usually ignored her; that respondent mother often became frustrated, stopped trying to redirect

the children, sat down on a couch while the children played, and allowed her older children to

parent the younger children; and the children sometimes physically fought or left the supervised

area. The two primary caseworkers, as well as Amethyst Crawford, respondent mother’s parent

partner late in the proceedings, and Latasha Steward, a limited license therapist who also worked

with respondent mother late in the proceedings, agreed that respondent mother often ignored

their suggestions about what consequences she should impose on the children, including

respondent mother’s refusal to redirect a child from physically striking a caseworker, on the

basis of respondent mother’s unfounded belief that the child’s violence was a proper reaction to

advice from the worker intended to divert the children’s attention from respondent mother; and

that respondent mother also sometimes defended her manner of resolving a situation, or denied

the existence of a child’s behavior problem, including respondent mother’s rationalization of a

reason that a child had intentionally defecated in the kitchen sink at her foster home.

Furthermore, after respondent mother assaulted the first primary caseworker in front of

the children during a February 2013 supervised visit, she and the substitute primary caseworker

agreed that respondent mother would choose a dedicated team of people willing to assist her in

parenting all nine children around the clock. Respondent mother chose her mother and two

sisters as her support team, and they all agreed to the terms of the support team concept.

Respondent mother also agreed to avoid Dean, who already had lost his parental rights to his five

children. The substitute caseworker testified that the support team approach had worked briefly

by allowing respondent mother, her mother, and a sister to work on disciplinary techniques

involving smaller groups of children. But respondent mother’s sisters soon stopped coming to

help, respondent mother began making negative comments about her mother, and in August

2013, respondent mother’s mother disclosed that respondent mother’s sisters had stopped

participating because respondent mother lied about and threatened them. Respondent mother’s

mother also expressed her intent not to participate in the support group after respondent mother

made irrelevant and negative comments about her. Although the substitute caseworker arranged

for respondent mother and her mother to participate in family therapy, respondent mother

communicated in January 2014 that she no longer wanted her mother’s help. Furthermore,

respondent mother refused to substantiate any legal income or the status of her housing,

concerning which the substitute caseworker testified that she had become substantially

delinquent in her rent payments.

The record also clearly and convincingly established the unlikelihood that respondent

mother would improve her parenting capacity within a reasonable time in light of the children’s

ages. The record contained abundant examples of respondent mother’s inability to parent even

smaller groups of her children, and the examples remained consistent over the long period that

the oldest children spent in the court’s temporary custody, irrespective that petitioner provided

respondent mother with a reasonable array of services designed to improve her parenting skills.

In re Fried, 266 Mich App 535, 542; 702 NW2d 192 (2005) (observing that the petitioner

generally must “make reasonable efforts to rectify the conditions that caused the child’s removal

by adopting a service plan”).

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The unlikelihood that respondent mother might have the capacity to care for any or all of

her children, most of whom had special needs, also arose from the clear and convincing evidence

of her failure to benefit from the other services designed to prevent or enlighten her regarding

any future involvement with Dean. Respondent mother completed domestic violence education,

which petitioner provided on the basis of respondent mother’s admissions that Dean had behaved

violently toward her and the children. In 2012, supplemental petitions were filed alleging Dean’s

sexual abuse of two of respondent mother’s children, the girls testified to Dean’s acts of sexual

abuse, and the circuit court terminated Dean’s parental rights. Although respondent mother

repeatedly promised to avoid Dean, she conceived another child with him in early 2013. Many

witnesses testified that respondent mother failed to initially disclose her pregnancy and refused

to identify Dean as the father of her ninth child. Many witnesses also agreed that respondent

mother continually suggested that someone planted in her daughters’ heads the idea of sexual

abuse by Dean, and continually made excuses for Dean.

The circuit court did not clearly err in finding that clear and convincing evidence

established that the primary reason for the 2011 placement of the oldest children in the circuit

court’s temporary custody, and the March 2013 arrival of the baby in the circuit court’s

temporary custody, namely, respondent mother’s inability to properly parent or supervise the

children, continued to exist in 2014. In re Foster, 285 Mich App at 635-636. The circuit court

also did not clearly err in finding that clear and convincing evidence established that respondent

mother was not reasonably likely to rectify these conditions within a reasonable time considering

the ages of the eight oldest children, in light of respondent mother’s minimal improvement in her

capacity to parent during the nearly 33-month period that the oldest children spent in the circuit

court’s temporary jurisdiction, respondent mother’s ongoing lack of insight into the potential

harm to her and the children arising from her relationship with Dean, and her failure to

substantiate her possession of stable housing or a legal income. In re LE, 278 Mich App 1, 28;

747 NW2d 883 (2008). We decline to disturb the circuit court’s rejection of Crawford’s and

Steward’s opinions that, with up to 10 hours of daily in-home services, respondent mother could

properly and immediately parent some of the oldest and youngest children, and could parent all

the children with assistance at an unspecified future date. In re HRC, 286 Mich App at 459. The

record supports the circuit court’s criticisms that respondent mother had lied to Crawford and

Steward, they did not know about the entire history of this lengthy proceeding, and any ongoing

in-home services involvement depended on respondent mother’s voluntary participation.

Although the plain language of MCL 712A.19b(3) requires clear and convincing

evidence of only one statutory ground to warrant the termination of parental rights, we briefly

address the additional grounds that respondent mother challenges on appeal.

III. MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(ii)

In MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(ii), the Legislature authorized termination of parental rights as

follows:

(c) The parent was a respondent in a proceeding brought under this

chapter, 182 or more days have elapsed since the issuance of an initial

dispositional order, and the court, by clear and convincing evidence, finds either

of the following:

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***

(ii) Other conditions exist that cause the child to come within the court’s

jurisdiction, the parent has received recommendations to rectify those conditions,

the conditions have not been rectified by the parent after the parent has received

notice and a hearing and . . . a reasonable opportunity to rectify the conditions,

and there is no reasonable likelihood that the conditions will be rectified within a

reasonable time considering the child’s age.

The evidence of Dean’s sexual abuse of two of the children, which petitioner discovered

in 2012, constituted another condition that caused the children “to come within the court’s

jurisdiction.” The record clearly and convincingly reflects that respondent mother repeatedly

received advice concerning the importance of preventing any contact between Dean and

respondent mother or the children, and respondent mother received multiple opportunities to

demonstrate her understanding of the importance of preventing any contact with Dean. Clear

and convincing evidence also proved that instead of avoiding Dean, respondent mother

continued to produce children with him, lied about the existence of a relationship with him, and

blamed others for Dean’s conduct. Furthermore, clear and convincing evidence established the

unlikelihood that respondent mother might recognize and rectify Dean’s danger to the children

within a reasonable time considering the ages of the eight oldest children, in light of respondent

mother’s repeated and ongoing failure to recognize this potential danger after becoming aware of

it in 2012, her failure to improve her parenting skills, and her failure to prove her possession of

stable housing or a legal income. In re LE, 278 Mich App at 28.

IV. MCL 712A.19b(3)(g)

Respondent mother next challenges the circuit court’s invocation of MCL

712A.19b(3)(g) as a basis for terminating her parental rights to the children. Pursuant to MCL

712A.19b(3)(g), a circuit court can terminate a respondent’s parental rights “if the court finds, by

clear and convincing evidence,” “[t]he parent, without regard to intent, fails to provide proper

care or custody for the child and there is no reasonable expectation that the parent will be able to

provide proper care and custody within a reasonable time considering the child’s age.” The

evidence that clearly and convincingly established the propriety of terminating respondent

mother’s parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) and (c)(ii) likewise clearly and

convincingly established respondent mother’s failure to properly care for, protect, or supervise

the children and her current inability to parent, protect, or supervise them. In re JK, 468 Mich at

213-214. As summarized above, respondent mother failed to properly care for the children when

she sought parenting assistance from petitioner because she could not handle her youngest

children, left some of the children unsupervised and unfed, and associated with Dean, who

became violent in the children’s presence and sexually abused respondent mother’s two oldest

children. Overwhelming evidence established the unlikelihood that respondent mother might

meaningfully improve her parenting skills within a reasonable time given the children’s ages,

including the wealth of evidence concerning respondent mother’s failure to improve her

parenting skills even after participating in many specialized services, respondent mother’s

violation of her repeated promise to avoid Dean, including her conception of another child with

him in early 2013, respondent mother’s failure to initially disclose her pregnancy with another of

Dean’s children, respondent mother’s refusal to identify Dean as the father of her ninth child,

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respondent mother’s continual suggestions that someone had planted in her daughters’ heads the

idea of sexual abuse by Dean, respondent mother’s repeated making of excuses for Dean, the

special needs of most of respondent mother’s children, and the long period of time the seven

oldest children languished in foster care. In re LE, 278 Mich App at 28.

V. MCL 712A.19b(3)(j)

With respect to the circuit court’s reliance on MCL 712A.19b(3)(j), respondent mother

insists that no evidence reasonably suggested that any of the children faced a risk of harm in her

custody. A circuit court can terminate parental rights if the record clearly and convincingly

establishes that “[t]here is a reasonable likelihood, based on the conduct or capacity of the child’s

parent, that the child will be harmed if he or she is returned to the home of the parent.” MCL

712A.19b(3)(j). Although petitioner included subsection 19b(3)(j) as a ground for termination

only in the petition regarding the youngest child, the record equally established, clearly and

convincingly, its applicability to all nine children. The previously summarized evidence clearly

and convincingly established that, given respondent mother’s capacity and conduct, including

her continued association with Dean, the children faced substantial risks of both emotional and

physical harm in her custody.

VI. BEST INTERESTS

Respondent mother lastly argues that the circuit court erred in finding that termination of

her parental rights served the children’s best interests. “Even if the trial court finds that the

[petitioner] has established a ground for termination by clear and convincing evidence, it cannot

terminate the parent’s parental rights unless it also finds by a preponderance of the evidence that

termination is in the best interests of the children. MCL 712A.19b(5).” In re

Gonzales/Martinez, ___ Mich App ___; ___ NW2d ___ (Docket No. 324168, issued May 5,

2015), slip op at 4. “The children’s bond to the parent, the parent’s parenting ability, and the

children’s need for permanency, stability, and finality are all factors for the court to consider in

deciding whether termination is in the best interests of the children.” Id. Although respondent

mother and the children shared a bond, respondent mother made no improvement in her

parenting ability or insight regarding her relationship with Dean, the older children spent

approximately 33 months in foster care, the two younger children spent their entire lives in foster

care, and most of the children had special needs. The circuit court did not clearly err in finding

that termination of respondent mother’s parental rights served the children’s strong needs for

permanency.

Affirmed.

/s/ David H. Sawyer

/s/ Pat M. Donofrio

/s/ Stephen L. Borrello

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