People v. Ringland

Illinois Official Reports

Appellate Court

People v. Ringland, 2015 IL App (3d) 130523

Appellate Court THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v.

Caption CARA M. RINGLAND, Defendant-Appellee.–THE PEOPLE OF

THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. STEVEN PIRRO,

JAMES SAXEN, STEVEN L. HARRIS and MATTHEW P. FLYNN,

Defendants-Appellees.

District & No. Third District

Docket Nos. 3-13-0523, 3-13-0823, 3-13-0848, 3-13-0926, 3-13-0927

cons.

Filed June 3, 2015

Decision Under Appeal from the Circuit Court of La Salle County, Nos. 12-CF-61,

Review 12-CF-552, 12-CF-584, 12-MR-20, 13-CF-37, 13-CF-144; the Hon.

H. Chris Ryan and the Hon. Daniel J. Bute, Judges, presiding.

Judgment Affirmed.

Counsel on Brian Towne, State’s Attorney, of Ottawa (Judith Z. Kelly (argued), of

Appeal State’s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor’s Office, of counsel), for the

People.

Allan A. Ackerman, of Allan A. Ackerman, P.C., and Stephen M.

Komie (argued), both of Chicago, for appellee Cara M. Ringland.

Louis L. Bertrand, of Bertrand Law Office P.C., of LaSalle, for

appellees Matthew P. Flynn and Steven Pirro.

Dimitri Golfis (argued), of State Appellate Defender’s Office, of

Ottawa, for appellee James Saxen.

Douglas B. Olivero (argued), of Louis E. Olivero & Associates, of

Peru, for appellee Steven L. Harris.

Panel JUSTICE SCHMIDT delivered the judgment of the court, with

opinion.

Justices Lytton and O’Brien concurred in the judgment and opinion.

OPINION

¶1 In these five consolidated cases, People v. Ringland, People v. Pirro, People v. Saxen,

People v. Harris and People v. Flynn, defendants were each charged separately of felony drug

offenses as a result of evidence obtained following traffic stops conducted by the State’s

Attorney’s special investigator Jeff Gaither in La Salle County. Each defendant filed a motion

to quash his or her arrest and suppress evidence.

¶2 The separate hearings on defendants’ motions focused on the traffic stops and Gaither’s

authority as a member of the State’s Attorney’s Felony Enforcement (SAFE) unit to execute

said stops. Each hearing was premised on substantially the same stipulated testimony;

following argument, the trial court granted defendants’ motions. The court found that while the

State’s Attorney had authority to appoint a special investigator pursuant to section 3-9005(b)

of Counties Code (55 ILCS 5/3-9005(b) (West 2012)), the failure to comply with the

fingerprint requirements of the statute meant that Gaither was not authorized to act as a peace

officer on the date of the incidents.

¶3 The State appeals, claiming the trial court erred in finding that special investigator Gaither

was not authorized to act as a peace officer at the time of the traffic stops where the State’s

Attorney substantially complied with the necessary fingerprint requirements of the statute.

¶4 We affirm.

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¶5 BACKGROUND

¶6 At the outset, we note that the cases of People v. Pirro, People v. Saxen, People v. Harris,

and People v. Flynn were all consolidated for appeal on February 7, 2014, under the name of

People v. Pirro, case No. 3-13-0823. This court, sua sponte, consolidated People v. Ringland,

case No. 3-13-0523, with People v. Pirro, as each case is premised on essentially the same set

of facts and our disposition of the issues is identical. The following are the pertinent facts of

each case.

¶7 In case No. 3-13-0523, the State charged defendant, Cara Ringland, via a two-count

indictment with felony drug charges arising out of a traffic stop conducted by special

investigator Jeff Gaither on Interstate 80 in La Salle County on January 31, 2012. Count I

alleged unlawful possession with intent to deliver more than 5,000 grams of cannabis, a Class

X felony in violation of section 5(g) of the Cannabis Control Act (720 ILCS 550/5(g) (West

2010)). Count II alleged unlawful cannabis trafficking for knowingly bringing 2,500 grams or

more of cannabis into the State of Illinois with the intent to deliver in Illinois or any other state,

a Class X felony in violation of section 5.1(a) of the Cannabis Control Act (720 ILCS

550/5.1(a) (West 2010)).

¶8 On February 1, 2012, the State initiated a forfeiture action against Ringland seeking

forfeiture of $3,300 United States currency seized from the vehicle. The trial court

consolidated the causes on May 13, 2012. Ringland filed a motion to quash her arrest and

suppress evidence on August 2, 2012, alleging, inter alia, that she was placed under arrest by

police officers outside their municipal jurisdiction and that she was stopped and detained

without probable cause.

¶9 In case No. 3-13-0823, the State charged defendant, Steve Pirro, with one count of

unlawful possession with intent to deliver more than 2,000 grams but less than 5,000 grams of

a substance containing cannabis, a Class 1 felony in violation of section 5(f) of the Cannabis

Control Act (720 ILCS 550/5(f) (West 2012)). The charge arose following a traffic stop

conducted by special investigator Gaither on Interstate 80 on January 14, 2013. Defendant

filed a motion to quash his arrest and suppress evidence, alleging, inter alia, that Gaither

lacked the authority to effectuate a traffic stop or arrest.

¶ 10 In case No. 3-13-0848, the State charged defendant, James Saxen, via a two-count

indictment with unlawful possession with intent to deliver 15 grams or more but less than 100

grams of a substance containing methamphetamine, a Class X felony in violation of sections

55(a)(1) and 55(a)(2)(C) of the Methamphetamine Control and Community Protection Act

(720 ILCS 646/55(a)(1), (a)(2)(C) (West 2010)). Count II charged defendant with unlawful

possession with intent to deliver 900 or more grams of a substance containing

methamphetamine, a Class X felony in violation of sections 55(a)(1) and 55(a)(2)(F) of the

Methamphetamine Control and Community Protection Act (720 ILCS 646/55(a)(1), (a)(2)(F)

(West 2010)).

¶ 11 In case No. 3-13-0926, the State charged defendant, Steven Harris, with unlawful

possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver more than 15 grams but less than

100 grams of a substance containing cocaine, a Class X felony in violation of section

401(a)(2)(A) of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act (720 ILCS 570/401(a)(2)(A) (West

2010)).

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¶ 12 Lastly, in case No. 3-13-0927, the State charged defendant, Matthew Flynn, with unlawful

possession with intent to deliver more than 2,000 grams but less than 5,000 grams of a

substance containing cannabis, a Class 1 felony, in violation of section 5(f) of the Cannabis

Control Act (720 ILCS 550/5(f) (West 2010)).

¶ 13 As was the case with defendants Ringland and Pirro, the charges against defendants Saxen,

Harris, and Flynn arose following three separate traffic stops conducted by special investigator

Gaither on Interstate 80 in La Salle County. Gaither initiated the stop against Saxen on

December 12, 2012; against Harris on November 20, 2012; and against Flynn on March 12,

2013.

¶ 14 Like Ringland and Pirro, defendants Saxen, Harris, and Flynn each filed a motion to quash

his arrest and suppress evidence, alleging Gaither lacked the authority to conduct a traffic stop

or arrest.

¶ 15 Each cause proceeded to a separate hearing on the individual defendant’s motion to

suppress. The trial court conducted the hearing on defendant Ringland’s motion to suppress

first. This is significant, insofar as the other four defendants stipulated to the testimony given

by La Salle County State’s Attorney Brian Towne and by special investigator Jeff Gaither at

Ringland’s hearing on February 8, 2013.

¶ 16 At the outset of Ringland’s suppression hearing, the parties tendered certain documents

obtained pursuant to subpoenas. The hearing itself focused on the traffic stop, and the authority

of SAFE investigator Jeff Gaither to execute said stop. The trial judge noted on the record that

based on hearings in other cases, SAFE investigators were not sworn in as deputies by the

sheriff’s department. The parties then stipulated to the transcripts of conversations between

Gaither, Peru police officer Jeremiah Brown, and defendant Ringland.

¶ 17 Officer Brown testified that on January 31, 2012, he was doing a “ride along” with Gaither

of the SAFE unit. He was not in uniform at the time. They were stationary in the Interstate 80

median when they proceeded to go eastbound on Interstate 80 following a U-Haul vehicle that

contained only a driver. They pulled to the left of the U-Haul, observing that the seatbelt

appeared to be in use and that the driver kept her eyes facing forward. Gaither explained to

Brown that he had a specialty in “truck enforcement” and he would be executing a traffic stop

for inadequate mud flaps. Brown also noticed that the U-Haul’s license plate was partially

obstructed by its frame.

¶ 18 Gaither stopped the U-Haul and approached the passenger-side window while Brown

approached the driver’s window. Less than two minutes later, Gaither signaled Brown to call

the canine unit and had defendant exit her vehicle and sit in his squad car. Brown believed that

the Peru canine unit was required to respond whenever SAFE executed a traffic stop.

¶ 19 Gaither testified that he had been employed by the Illinois State Police from 1987 to 2011,

before retiring in July 2011 as a master sergeant. He then accepted a position as an investigator

with the SAFE team to look for narcotic traffickers traveling along Interstate 80 in La Salle

County. He did not have his fingerprints taken in connection with accepting the position with

SAFE. His fingerprints had been taken prior to his 1987 graduation from the State Police

Academy and maintained by the State Police since that time. However, he had recently been

fingerprinted in connection with a job coaching softball at the high school and those had been

sent to Springfield.

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¶ 20 Gaither took an oath in January 2012 when he joined SAFE. He received his paychecks

from La Salle County. He was provided a Ford Explorer with “police emergency equipment.”

He did not take an oath as a deputy sheriff, but did get sworn in as a Spring Valley police

officer, although that was after he conducted the traffic stop of defendant Ringland on January

31, 2012.

¶ 21 Gaither testified that on January 31, 2012, he was stopped in the Interstate 80 median at the

western county line of La Salle County with Peru police officer Jeremiah Brown present as a

ride along. He observed a U-Haul proceeding eastbound with a female driver and no

passengers. He pulled out to look at the U-Haul, noticing the mud flaps were inadequate and

the license plate was obstructed. He then pulled to the left of the U-Haul; the driver continued

to look straight ahead and was wearing her seatbelt. Gaither executed a traffic stop based on the

mud flap violation. He had Officer Brown call in the traffic stop to the Spring Valley

dispatcher with Brown reading off the license plate number.

¶ 22 Gaither approached the passenger side of the U-Haul and obtained Ringland’s driver’s

license and rental agreement. He took the documents to the squad car and asked Ringland to

accompany him. He informed Ringland his intent was to issue a written warning for the

violation. Gaither stated it generally takes him an estimated 10 minutes to complete a warning

ticket. He engaged the defendant in conversation, eliciting where she was coming from

(Nevada City, California), where she had rented the vehicle three days earlier, where she was

going, and what she was doing. She was not under arrest.

¶ 23 By prearrangement, the canine unit is automatically brought to any traffic stop called in by

a SAFE officer. Here, it arrived before Gaither completed the warning ticket. The dog alerted

to the vehicle.

¶ 24 La Salle County State’s Attorney Brian Towne testified next. Towne testified that he

formed the SAFE unit in late 2011 to have a drug interdiction team operating primarily on

Interstate 80. The unit was comprised of officers with extensive experience with drug

interdiction, along with canine assistance, and additional agencies for follow-up and support.

Towne authorized those officers to operate with police powers pursuant to section 3-9005(b)

(55 ILCS 5/3-9005(b) (West 2010)), the statute governing the duties and powers of the State’s

Attorney. The statute specifically provides that the State’s Attorney may appoint special

investigators. Towne stated he was aware that the statute required that fingerprints of the

appointee special investigator be taken and transmitted to the Illinois State Police to check for

convictions. He was further aware that the section referred to the State’s Attorneys Appellate

Prosecutor’s Act (725 ILCS 210/7.06 (West 2010)), which contained additional requirements

to allow investigators to act as peace officers, and he had taken steps to comply with those

requirements. One of those requirements included completion of basic police training or a

waiver based upon the investigator’s prior law enforcement experience or training.

¶ 25 Towne knew that Gaither had been a decorated member of the Illinois State Police for more

than 20 years prior to his retirement in July 2011. Gaither had been through all the required

Illinois State Police training. Based upon Gaither’s prior law enforcement experience, Towne

applied for a waiver from the Illinois Law Enforcement Training Standards Board’s basic

training course. In March 2012, Towne received from the Law Enforcement Training

Standards Board confirmation that his request regarding Gaither’s waiver had been granted.

¶ 26 Despite his knowledge that section 3-9005(b) required that before a person can be

appointed as a special investigator, fingerprints shall be taken and transmitted to the Illinois

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State Police, Towne failed to do so. He had been informed that the Illinois State Police already

had Gaither’s fingerprints on file. The Illinois State Police did not inform Towne’s office as to

whether Gaither had been convicted of a felony or crime involving moral turpitude, another

requirement per the statute. Towne swore Gaither in as a special investigator with the State’s

Attorney’s office on January 21, 2012.

¶ 27 As previously mentioned, the parties in Pirro, Saxen, Harris, and Flynn stipulated to the

testimony of Towne and Gaither in the hearing on their motions to suppress. However, unlike

Ringland, in each of those four consolidated cases, the parties entered the following additional

stipulations:

“The parties agree and stipulate that if Laura Baker were called to testify, she would

state under oath as follows:

1) Laura Baker would testify that she is employed by the Illinois Law Enforcement

Training and Standards Board. She would testify that one of her responsibilities is to

perform background checks for individuals who have submitted waiver requests.

2) She would testify that on January 19, 2012, a background check was performed

on Jeffery Gaither through the Illinois State Police Criminal History Record Inquiry,

and that there were no felony convictions or crimes of moral turpitude found on the

background check. She would further testify that there was no information gained from

the background check that would have interfered with the issuance of his waiver

request.”

The second stipulation read as follows:

“The parties agree and stipulate that if Lieutenant John Rattigan were called to

testify she [sic] would state under oath as follows:

1) That John Rattigan is employed as a Lieutenant with the Illinois State Police,

specifically the Bureau of Identification.

2) He would testify that the Illinois State Police have fingerprints on file for

Investigator Jeffery Gaither and Investigator Daniel Gillette. He would further testify

that both of their fingerprints have been on file with the Illinois State Police since

before 1990.”

¶ 28 We note that while all defendants questioned Gaither’s authority to make the stops,

defendants Harris and Saxen specifically referred to the State’s Attorney’s failure to comply

with the procedures of section 3-9005(b) in employing Gaither. Saxen also called into question

whether the activities of the SAFE unit exceeded the scope of the statute, where counsel

argued:

“I’m also alleging the fact that I believe even if they had followed the proper procedure

and done everything, that they were actually exceeding the authority given to them

under the statute which, basically, says they’re allowed to help the State investigate

matters and serve subpoenas and things of that nature. I believe that putting them out as

a police unit on a public highway would be a violation of that statute. We go beyond the

powers that are granted to them under that statute.”

¶ 29 Following argument, the respective trial judges in each of the five cases ruled that strict

compliance with the fingerprint requirement of section 3-9005(b) was required prior to

Gaither’s appointment as a special investigator. The trial court noted that the State’s Attorney

had the statutory authority to appoint special investigators to conduct investigations with

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regard to drug trafficking. However, it found that the State’s Attorney had only those powers,

duties, and authority granted under the particular statute and if the statute contained a

restriction therein, it was to be strictly enforced. The statute unequivocally required that the

applicant’s fingerprints be taken and transmitted to the Illinois State Police and the State Police

shall examine its records and submit any conviction information to the State’s Attorney. Such

requirements were not met, thus the court found Gaither lacked the authority to execute each

traffic stop and arrest. The trial court granted the defendants’ motions to suppress.

¶ 30 The State appeals.

¶ 31 ANALYSIS

¶ 32 The State contends that the trial court erred in granting defendants’ motions to suppress

when it found that Gaither did not have the authority to act as a peace officer. Specifically, the

State argues that State’s Attorney Towne strictly complied with the statute or, in the

alternative, substantially complied such that Gaither did have the authority to effectuate the

traffic stops and ensuing arrests as a special investigator.

¶ 33 At the outset, we note that “we review the trial court’s judgment, not its reasoning, and we

may affirm on any grounds in the record, regardless of whether the trial court relied on those

grounds or whether the trial court’s reasoning was correct.” Suchy v. City of Geneva, 2014 IL

App (2d) 130367, ¶ 19 (citing Leonardi v. Loyola University of Chicago, 168 Ill. 2d 83, 97

(1995)). Moreover, we recognize the general rule that “although a defense not raised in the trial

court may not be raised for the first time on appeal by an appellant, ‘the appellee may urge any

point in support of the judgment on appeal, *** so long as the factual basis for such point was

before the trial court.’ ” Travelers Casualty & Surety Co. v. Bowman, 229 Ill. 2d 461, 470-71

(2008) (quoting Shaw v. Lorenz, 42 Ill. 2d 246, 248 (1969)).

¶ 34 On appeal, in addition to his contention that we should affirm the trial court’s suppression

of the evidence because it correctly determined that Gaither did not have authority to conduct

the stop where there was not even substantial compliance with the background verification

procedures of section 3-9005(b), defendant Saxen alternatively contends that Gaither exceeded

the authority that section 3-9005(b) affords special investigators. Leaving aside the issue of

whether the State’s Attorney either strictly or substantially complied with the fingerprint

requirement of the statute, we agree with defendant Saxen that the conduct of both the SAFE

unit and Gaither exceeded the scope of section 3-9005(b), rendering the traffic stops and

arrests unlawful. 55 ILCS 5/3-9005(b) (West 2012). Thus, the trial court correctly granted

defendants’ motions to suppress.

¶ 35 Section 3-9005(b) of the Counties Code provides, in pertinent part:

“(b) The State’s Attorney of each county shall have authority to appoint one or

more special investigators to serve subpoenas, make return of process and conduct

investigations which assist the State’s Attorney in the performance of his duties. A

special investigator shall not carry firearms except with permission of the State’s

Attorney and only while carrying appropriate identification indicating his employment

and in the performance of his assigned duties.

Subject to the qualifications set forth in this subsection, special investigators shall

be peace officers and shall have all the powers possessed by investigators under the

State’s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor’s Act.” 55 ILCS 5/3-9005(b) (West 2012).

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¶ 36 The relevant portion of the State’s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor’s Act provides:

“(a) The Director may contract for such investigators to provide investigative services

in criminal cases and tax objection cases for staff counsel and county state’s attorneys.

Investigators may be authorized by the board to carry tear gas gun projectors or bombs,

pistols, revolvers, stun guns, tasers or other firearms.

Subject to the qualifications set forth below, investigators shall be peace officers

and shall have all the powers possessed by policemen in cities and by sheriffs;

provided, that investigators shall exercise such powers anywhere in the State only after

contact and in cooperation with the appropriate local law enforcement agencies.” 725

ILCS 210/7.06(a) (West 2012).

¶ 37 Risking redundancy, it is important to note that the State’s Attorney has the authority to

appoint special investigators to perform only three specific functions: (1) serving subpoenas;

(2) making return of process; and (3) conducting investigations that “assist the State’s Attorney

in the performance of his duties.” The statute is conspicuously devoid of any other functions a

special investigator may undertake. Thus, the plain language of section 3-9005(b)

demonstrates that the legislature intended the functions of special investigators to be limited to

the three functions listed. See, e.g., People ex rel. Illinois Department of Corrections v.

Hawkins, 2011 IL 110792, ¶ 23 (“The most reliable indication of the legislature’s intent is the

plain language of the statute.” (citing MidAmerica Bank, FSB v. Charter One Bank, FSB, 232

Ill. 2d 560, 565 (2009))).

¶ 38 It is the third function that causes divergence among the parties here. Defendant Saxen

urges this court to find that the investigations the special investigator may conduct under the

statute are limited to those crimes that have already come to the attention of the State’s

Attorney. Such a reading would place Gaither’s traffic stops squarely outside the scope of

section 3-9005(b).

¶ 39 In response, the State first argues that the record on appeal is insufficient to support or to

allow this court to resolve defendant’s contention in this regard. The State claims that

defendant has not pointed to any further evidence, arguments, or discussion regarding this

issue below. As noted earlier, the appellee can urge any point in support of the judgment on

appeal, so long as the factual basis for such a point was before the trial court. Travelers

Casualty & Surety Co., 229 Ill. 2d at 470-71.

¶ 40 Here, it is clear from the record that aside from compliance with the fingerprint

requirement, the trial court did, in fact, consider the issue of whether the statute even permitted

Gaither’s law enforcement activities in the first place. This is evidenced by counsel’s argument

on Saxen’s amended motion to suppress, wherein he alleged that even if the State’s Attorney

had followed the proper procedure and complied with the fingerprint requirements, the State’s

Attorney was actually exceeding the authority granted under the statute. It is further evidenced

by the trial court’s order when it noted in granting defendants’ motions to suppress that it

believed the State’s Attorney did have the statutory authority to appoint special investigators to

conduct investigations with regard to drug trafficking. We simply cannot imagine what

additional evidence or argument defendant would need to present in order for us to consider

this alternative contention. This is particularly true in light of the fact that this issue is one of

statutory interpretation and we have before us testimony about the formation of the SAFE unit

generally and Gaither’s testimony as to his conduct as a special investigator in these specific

cases. Thus, the record is adequate to support our consideration of this issue.

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¶ 41 Substantively, the State argues that the statute does not contain such a limitation, and this

court should not add exceptions, limitations, or conditions that the legislature did not express.

See Board of Education of Gardner-South Wilmington High School District 73 v. Village of

Gardner, 2014 IL App (3d) 130364, ¶ 16. The phrase to “conduct investigations which assist

the State’s Attorney in the performance of his duties” is broad, encompassing all manner of

investigatory activity. The State argues that such a reading is supported by section 3-9005(b)’s

reference to section 7.06 of the State’s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor’s Act, which

necessarily provides investigators with all the powers possessed by policemen in cities and by

sheriffs, including carrying firearms and conducting traffic stops. 725 ILCS 210/7.06(a) (West

2012).

¶ 42 The State’s argument in this regard is similarly unpersuasive. If we were to accept that

tortured construction, investigators would, in fact, be police officers, and the three enunciated

duties of the appointed State’s Attorney special investigators would be rendered superfluous.

We cannot fathom how patrolling Interstate 80, issuing warning tickets, and confiscating

contraband can be realistically viewed as “conducting investigations that assist the State’s

Attorney with his duties.” The prosecution of drug dealers and traffickers is indisputably a duty

of the State’s Attorney; outfitting his own drug interdiction unit is not. Such a statutory

construction would effectively give the State’s Attorney the power to create and maintain the

equivalent of his own police force. Taken to its furthest logical conclusion, the SAFE unit

would be no different than the county sheriff’s police. The legislature could not have intended

and did not intend such a consequence. In our view, the legislature clearly intended that special

investigators appointed by the State’s Attorney have police powers to the extent necessary to

assist the State’s Attorney in cases brought before him and originated by traditional police

agencies, or in cases where the police were unable or unwilling to investigate.

¶ 43 Even the name of the unit, the State’s Attorney’s Felony Enforcement unit, militates

against a finding that the special investigators were merely assisting the State’s Attorney in

conducting investigations. Gaither actively sought out criminal activity and, as the name

suggests, enforced the law. This is bolstered by Towne’s testimony that he authorized Gaither

to “go out and enforce the law.” Gaither stated he was hired to look for narcotics traffickers

that travel up and down the interstates and highways in La Salle County. Gaither’s job

description was to “arrest people who were smuggling narcotics or proceeds from narcotics up

and down the interstates in Illinois in La Salle County.” The General Assembly did not

envision these investigators making traffic stops and writing traffic tickets or warnings.

¶ 44 We acknowledge that a State’s Attorney is “vested with wide discretion in enforcing

criminal laws” (People v. Williams, 147 Ill. 2d 173, 256 (1991) (citing Marcisz v. Marcisz, 65

Ill. 2d 206, 210 (1976))), and that in some circumstances a State’s Attorney may investigate

criminal activity. The State cites to People v. Nohren, 283 Ill. App. 3d 753, 758 (1996), where

the court, quoting the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice noted that “ ‘[a] prosecutor

ordinarily relies on police and other investigative agencies for investigation of alleged criminal

acts, but the prosecutor has an affirmative responsibility to investigate suspected illegal

activity when it is not adequately dealt with by other agencies.’ ” (Emphasis in original.)

Nohren, 283 Ill. App. 3d at 758 (quoting ABA Standards for Criminal Justice § 3-3.1(a), at 47

(3d ed. 1993)). However, Nohren ultimately held that that a State’s Attorney could use a

subpoena duces tecum to obtain the blood-alcohol test results of a defendant who had yet to be

charged. Nohren, 283 Ill. App. 3d at 758-59.

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¶ 45 That is a fundamentally different situation than what is occurring in La Salle County. The

State’s Attorney provided his SAFE unit officers with Ford Explorers replete with emergency

police equipment to conduct traffic stops, as well as books to write traffic warnings and

citations. Any vehicles seized by the SAFE team are taken to the Spring Valley police

department, which receives 12.5% of money and property that is seized and forfeited.

¶ 46 Our supreme court has consistently recognized that a State’s Attorney’s investigative role

is limited to the investigation of facts of an alleged criminal act when the police are in need of

investigative assistance or when the investigation of alleged criminal activity is not adequately

dealt with by the police. See, e.g., People v. Williams, 147 Ill. 2d at 256; see also People v.

Wilson, 254 Ill. App. 3d 1020, 1039 (1993) (stating that it is the general practice of a State’s

Attorney to stand ready and provide investigative assistance to the police). Seeking out

criminal activity by virtue of patrolling the highway is a far cry from “standing ready” to assist

police. The State presented no evidence that either the Illinois State Police, or the local police

or sheriff’s departments, needed assistance with drug interdiction. Nor was there any

allegation that these other law enforcement agencies were not adequately addressing drug

trafficking within the county. With the SAFE unit, the State’s Attorney created yet another

branch of law enforcement, the conduct of which falls well outside the duties contemplated by

section 3-9005(b) for special investigators.

¶ 47 To be clear, our holding is not intended to limit the power of the State’s Attorney except to

the extent that we hold that he does not have the authority to equip his investigators with squad

cars and ticket books for the purpose of patrolling the highways. In light of our resolution on

this issue, we find it unnecessary to address the remaining issues raised by the parties, both in

opposition to and in support of the trial court’s rulings.

¶ 48 We accordingly find that the trial court did not err in granting defendants’ motions to

suppress where the actions of the State’s Attorney’s SAFE unit and special investigator

Gaither exceeded the scope of section 3-9005(b).

¶ 49 CONCLUSION

¶ 50 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of La Salle County is affirmed

in each of the consolidated cases.

¶ 51 Affirmed.

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